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aABSTRACT
As the title of the thesis suggests, we have attempted 
to study the process of amendment of the Constitution of 
India in its various aspects*.
To start with, in the First Chapter, the importance 
of the topic has been brought out. The Second Chapter 
traces the history of the amending procedure as provided 
in the Imperial Acts relating to the governance of India 
from 1600 to 1950. In the succeeding three Chapters ( Chap­
ters III, IV, and V ), the amending procedure provided in the 
present Constitution has been explained and critically 
examined. The Sixth Chapter has been devoted to discuss 
the power-procedure controversy: whether Article 368 ( the 
amending provision in the Constitution ) contains only 
"procedure" or "procedure" as well as "power" to amend the 
Constitution. Besides this, the alleged express or 
implied limitations to the power of amendment have also been 
considered therein. Then the highly intricate issue, namely, 
whether Part III of the Constitution containing the Funda­
mental Rights is amendable by Parliament so as to take away 
or abridge the rights, has been tackled in Chapter VII.
Along with this Mr. Nath Pai*s Bill pending in the Lok Sabha
3( Bill NO. 10-B of 1967 ) has been discussed. In Chapter 
VIII, all the amendments made to the Constitution of India 
have been reviewed with a special emphasis on the procedure 
adopted in enacting them. The propriety or otherwise 
of these amendments has been also discussed. The main 
conclusions reached in our study have been expressed in 
the last Chapter.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
n Nature is changeable, that is, it is every 
moment changing in its entirety- On account 
of the changeability of nature, all its animate 
and inanimate kingdoms and all living and non­
living, big and small units of these kingdoms,
1
are always undergoing change."
In studies on Constitutional law, if anything is cons­
picuous, it is the fact that the process of amendment of the 
constitution has always received inadequate attention, as 
if it were an insignificant issue whereas in reality it is 
one of the most important aspects of a constitution. While 
commenting on a constitution most authors discuss in detail 
the provisions relating to the structure of government, the 
Bill of Rights ( Fundamental Rights ), judicial review, the 
separation of powers and the taxation and commerce clauses.
The provisions relating to the amendment of the constitution 
hardly receive the treatment they deserve. It is rarely reali­
zed that the existing provisions of a constitution can be 
completely changed by exercising the power of amendment. 
Logically, if a power is capable of altering all other powers 
provided for in the constitution, that power turns out to be
1. Bhagwan Dev Atma, The Dev Shastra Part I, 1940, p 57.
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superior to them all. In fact, the power of amendment by
its very nature is a " power of a higher grade and of more
potential importance than any other power provided for in
2
the constitution," so much so that the very life of a cons­
titution depends upon its amending provision . One writer 
has observed about the power of amendment as follows:
"Upon its existence and truthfulness i.e., its
correspondence with real and natural conditions, depends 
the question as to whether the state shall develop with 
peaceful continuity or shall suffer alterations of stag­
nation, retrogression and revolution. A constitution which 
may be imperfect and erroneous in its other parts, can be 
easily supplemented and corrected, if only the state be 
truthfully organized in the constitution; but if this be 
not accomplished, error will accumulate until nothing
5
short of revolution can save the life of a state."
Not only can an imperfect constitution be improved by 
amending it but it can also be enabled to withstand unfor- 
seen stresses and strains put on it by the onward march 
of time. Therefore, it is obvious that the process of amend­
ment is of paramount importance in the life of a constitu­
tion; it may revivify and rejuvenate it from time to time.
2. Orfield, The Amending of the Federal Constitution XIII,': 
1942.. " ============--
3. Burgress, J.W., PoL*Scuvpomparative Constitutional Law,
P 157, 1891.  ---- — -----------------------------
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If the people outgrow their constitution^ either it must be 
amended formally or informally or the day will not be far 
off when the constitution falls into disuse. How true Mr. 
Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India was when he said t
" A constitution which is unchanging and static, it
does not matter how good it is, how perfect it is, is a cons- 
that
titution/is past its use. It is in its old age already and
gradually approaching its death. A constitution to be living
be
must be growing; must be adaptable, must/flexible, must be 
changeable. And if there is one thing which the history of 
political developments has pointed out, I say with great force, 
it is this that the greatest strength of the British Nation 
and the British People has laid in their flexible constitu­
tion. They have known how to adapt themselves to changes, 
to the biggest changes constitutionally. Sometimes they 
went through the process of fire and revolution. Even so, 
they tried to adapt their constitution and went on with it.
It is needless to stress that the study of a constitution 
remains incomplete unless the formal process of amendment by 
which it can be amended is fully studied.
In the Constitution of India, the formal process of amend­
ment assumed unparallelled importance the day the Supreme
4. Pari. Debates ( of India ), 1951, Vol XII, Col 9625-26
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5 6:-
Court exploded a "veritable bombshell" in the Golak Nath case." 
This case can be characterised as unique in the history of 
Judicial review in India if not in the world. The uniqueness 
of the decision lies in the fact that it cannot be circum­
vented by Parliament even by exercising the power of amend­
ment, notwithstanding the fact that the procedure prescribed 
for amendment has no express limitations as to the substance 
of amendment. Generally, when the power of amendment is 
provided in plenitude, there should be no obstacle which 
cannot be overcome by effecting an amendment to the consti­
tution. But the Golak Nath decision has been derived by 
employing a process of reasoning which not only denies to 
Parliament the power of amendment in regard to Pundamental 
Rights in case these are taken away or abridged, but also 
disables Parliament from amending the Constitution to get 
round the Golak Nath decision. In this respect, it is an 
invincible interpretation of the Constitution.
Since 27th Feb, 1967- the date on which Golak Nath case
was decided- a few articles have appeared in periodicals.^
The members of Parliament have been making strenuous efforts
8
to restore to parliament the power of amendment. Thus while
5- Subharao, G.C.V., Fundamental Rights in India versus
power to amend the constitution., 4 Taxas, Int Law Forum,
291-339, 1968.
6. I.C* Golak Nath and others V State of Punjpb, A.I.R. 1967-
S.C., 1643.
7.= These are referred to hereinbelow at appropriate places.
8.. A Bill ( Bill No 10-B of 1967 ) is still pending in the 
Lok Sabha.
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this work was in progress the elite in India were seriously 
debating in Parliament as well as in the press, the issues 
raised by the Golak Nath decision.
Because the Golak Nath decision cried for a full under­
standing of the amending procedure provided in the Constitu­
tion, it was but unavoidable to study it in its various 
aspects. Only after a complete and crystal-clear understan­
ding of the amending process was it possible to comment 
upon the decision authentically and to offer general sugges­
tions for the future. As regards the nature of the study 
of the power of amendment, it can be aptly said that it is 
a meeting point of Political Science, Jurisprudence and
9
Constitutional Law and therefore, one has, of necessity, to 
intrude into other fields of knowledge than one's own. In 
our case, it became all the. .more necessary to see our way 
through the field of Jurisprudence because in the Golak Nath 
case the concepts of "power", "procedure", "constituent”law" 
and "ordinary law" could be discussed only with the help of 
jurisprudential authorities. To cap this, it was also 
necessary to have studied the process of amendment provided 
in the main written constitutions of the world so that we 
might gain the maximum benefit by the experience of these
9. Orfield, op. cit., supra, p xiv
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countries and steer clear of all the unnecessary obstacles 
in our way. Moreover, there being a dearth of material 
on the topic, it was essential to evolve our ideas on a 
comparative basis while attatching special regard to the 
conditions existing in India. In this way we have tried to 
shed light on the subject from every possible quarter known 
to us and appreciated what appeared to be good and warned 
against what seemed to be deterimental to our country in 
so far as the amendment of the Constitution iscconcerned.
CHAPTER II
History Of The Amending Process in India
The purpose of this chapter is to look at the history 
of the amending process in India and the manner in which the 
constitution of India came to be amended from time to time.
The word Constitution1 is employed in this chapter inra Vide, 
sense as referring to the various organic Acts by which 
British India was governed. Our study is concerned only 
with British India and not with 1 Indian India1 that is the 
Indian States.
The period spanned by this chapter extends over three 
centuries. It is convenient to study this history in four 
periods, following the pattern of constitutional historians.
The first period extends from 1600, the year which saw 
the birth of the English East India Company, to 1765* Strictly 
speaking, this period is not very significant for our purpose 
because during this- period, according to Sir Courtenary Ilbert,
ir
* the East India Company are primarily traders.1 The Company 
got its charter on December 51?1600, from Queen Elizabeth I.
The charter was given for 15 years and could be ended by 
giving notice of two years. In 1609, James I renewed the 
Company* s Charter 1 for ever " with a condition that it might
1h. Ilbert, C., The Government Of India, p 1 ,1915-
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be revoked by giving notice of three years in case the monoply 
given to the Company was proved injurious to the interest 
of the realm. The privileges and powers of the Company 
were extended from time to time. It is remarkable that no 
power was reserved to the Crown to alter any provision of 
the Charter; of course, the whole Charter could be revoked 
in cases of extraordinary emergency or delinquency.
The second period extends from 1765 to 1853. In this
period the East India Company acquired the attributes of
a territorial sovereign, which were taken over by the Crown
in 1858. In 1773 > Parliament passed the Regulating Act for
the purpose of removing the evils resulting from the working
of dyarchy in Bengal. It was the first Act passed by
Parliament to regulate the government in India. It is said
that the system of a written Constitution for British India
started with this Act. It brought drastic changes in the
set-up of the Company and its internal matters. Since the
government had not reserved any power to interfere in the
affairs of the Company, it was fiercely opposed and attacked
as infringing upon the Charter rights. Burke described the
Act as " an infringment of national right, national faith,
and national justice.” The city of London also petitioned
against it as it was a n direct and dangerous attack on the
2
liberties of the people,"because, it alleged, the privileges
2. Hansard, Parliamentary History 1771 to 1774-, Vol XVI, 
p 889.
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which the city of London enjoyed stood on the same security 
as those of the East India Company. In reality, what Parlia­
ment gained was the assumption of power of amending the Char­
ter without revoking it. Among other things, the effect of 
this legislative measure was the recognition of the right of 
Parliament to interfere in the affairs of the Company. In 
a way, it transferred power from the Company to Parliament 
and established the fact that ultimately it was Parliament 
who could do or undo the law including the constitutional 
law governing the Company and British India. The events 
following it prove this beyong any shadow of doubt. When 
put into practice, the Regulating Act 1773? turned out to 
be defective, because it suffered from vagueness and lack 
of clearly defined powers. The Judicature Act 1781 was 
passed to remove those defects by defining the powers of 
authority as clearly as possible. Since 1781 the British 
Parliament had been passing one Act or the other to remedy 
the defects revealed by the working of the Government. The 
Pitt India Act 1784 established a system of dual control 
which reduced the court of Directors of the Company to no 
more than the Mayor and Alderman of any corporation.. The 
Act of 1786, the Declatory Act of 1788, the Charter Act 1793? 
the Act of 1807 and the Charter Act 1813 passed h;y^ ;pa’r liaise nt 
established unmistakably, among other things, the fact that 
the power to alter, amend or repeal the Charter lay in Parlia­
ment and not in the Court of Directors or the Board of Control
23
which was at the helm of the Government in India. The 
Charter Act of 1833 also brought many fundamental changes 
in the administrative system of the country. The Charter Act 
of 1853? the Government of India Act 1854 and previous 
statutes suffered from one main defect and that was that 
Indians were not associated with the Legislative Council.
The mutiny of 1857 necessitated the enactment of the Govern­
ment of India Act 1858 by which the political power was 
transferred from the Company to the Crown.. The assumption 
of the Government of India by Queen Victoria1s declaration 
is justly called the Magna Carta of India. With this, we 
pass into the third period.
The third period extends from 1858 to 1934. In this 
period the British Parliament zealously guarded its right 
to amend the Constitution of India. Sec 52 of the Indian 
Councils Act, 1861 is a clear pointer to this fact. All- 
embracing power to amend all Acts was expressly reserved in 
this section. Though this Act was amended in 1892 and 1909? 
the amending power was not parted with. However, no suit 
could lie against the East India Company for acts done by 
it as a sovereign power in India. It was not until 1915 that 
Parliament felt the necessity of delegating to the Governor- 
General the power to amend certain provisions of the Govern­
ment of India Act 1915- The said act empowered the Governor-
3• The Secretary of State in Council of India V Kamachee 
Boye Sahaba. Moore I. A. C 1857-60) Vol 7V p 476.
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General in Council to repeal or alter certain provisions of
the Act,as for instance Sections 62, 106, 108r(l), 109, 110,
111, 112, 114(2), 124(1), 124(4), 124(5), 125, 126, 128, and 
4
129- The reason given for this delegation was that it was 
to save the power of the Governor General in Council to deal 
with certain provisions contained in the Acts of Parliament
5
prior to 1861. Except in respect of the provisions listed
above, the Government of India Act 1915 was not amendable
by the Governor General. The British Parliament alone
6
could amend it. Sec 44(1) of the 1919 Act ( 9 & 10 Geo 5 Ch 
101 ) empowered the Governor General to make rules under the 
Act on certain prescribed matter , but this power was res­
tricted and controlled by the Secretary of State and Parlia-
7
ment. Thus by exercising his rule-making power, the Governor 
General could not amend the Act.
Now we enter into the fourth period beginning v/ith the 
enactment of the Government of India Act, 1955 and ending 
in 1950 with the coming into force of the Constitution of 
India. This period is remarkably different from the period 
1858 to 1935 in that the amending power came to be shared 
and also reduced in a sense. From the point of view of
4. Government of India Act, 1915, See 131(3) & fifth Schedule.
5. Notes on the Govt, of India Act 1915-19^6 ( 5 & 6 Geo 5,
C 37, P. H I  )
6. Sec 31 of Govt of India Act 1915* C 61, 6 & 7.
7. Sec 44(3) of Govt of India Act 1919, 9 & 10 Geo 5 Ch, p 101
studying the amending power, the Government Of India Act 
1935 exhibits its own singularity and that is why it has 
been thought proper to deal with it separately.
Sec 308 of the Government of Act 1935 provides the 
procedure for amdnding certain provisions mentioned in Sec 
308(2) or an Order in Council made under the Act. It provides 
that the Federal Legislature or Provincial Legislature must 
pass resolution on montions proposed in each Chamber of the 
Legislature by a minister on behalf of the council of minister 
recommending an; amendment of the Act or an Order in Council 
made there under. The resolution was required to be presen­
ted to the Governor General in the case of the Federal Legis­
lature , and to the Governor in the case of a Provincial 
Legislature by an address proposed and passed in the same 
manner as the resolution could be communicated to the British 
Parliament. The Governor General or the Governor, had to 
present the resolution to the Secretary of State for India 
along with his own opinion regarding the proposed amendment 
and its effect on the interests of any minority, praying 
that His Magesty might be pleased to communicate the resolu­
tion to Parliament. The Secretary of State had to cause it to 
be laid before both Houses of Parliament within six months 
after the resolution was communicated to him. It is to be
noted that the resolution required a bare majority of votes
8
of the members of the legislature present and voting. In the
8. Section 23 of the GoYt of India Act, 1935
26
House of Commons the provision of a bare majority remained 
a matter of considerable debate and many members moved an 
amendment to the clause to the effect that there should be 
a two-thirds majority for such a suggestion. Though it was 
made clear that the handscfcthelmperial Parliament were not 
tied, the members argued that a resolution ought not to be 
regarded as expressing Indian opinion uhless there was an 
overwhelming majority in its favour. Viscount Walmer said,
" Remember what the situation is in the provinces.
In five provinces there is a perpetual Hindu majo­
rity under this communal law. It is, I grant, a 
bare majority, nothing like a two-thirds majority, 
but it is perpetual. Is it right to say that the 
perpetual Hindu majority in those provinces or a 
perpetual Mohammedan majority in other provinces, 
is to have authority to demand, in the name of the 
whole province, an alteration of the constitution
9
which may benefit its own party or denomination ?tt
He was in favour of a two-thirds majority so that in nearly 
every province there would have to be agreement between Mos­
lems and Hindus on the proposed amendment. But Davieg felt 
that a provision for a two-thirds majority would 1 stultify 
the Chambers in India from passing any resolution at all1
9. Offcial Reports, House of Commons, 1955*. V 500,{Col 1104
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and ultimately a bare majority was thought proper.
Sec 308 empowered the Indian Legislatures to express 
to His Majesty*s Government their intention of a Constitu­
tional change in respect of the matters specified therein.
The actual power of amendment was placed in the hands of
His Majesty's Government by Order in Council laid in draft
10
form before both Houses as provided in Sec 309* A.B. Keith 
comments on this section in these words:
“As was inevitable in the circumstances, the Act 
confers7 on the federation no general constituent 
power, nor does it give authority to the provinces, 
such as is enjoyed by the provinces of Canada and the 
States of the Commonwealth, to mould their own cons­
titutions in detail, within the federal frame work.
The only power of change is vested in the Imperial 
Parliament with the exception that in a number of
minor points, change by the crown in Council is 
11
permitted."
given
The fact that the Indian Legislatures had not been/any 
constituent power, did not go unnoticed, rather it was lamen­
ted. Dr. Ambedkar opined: " There is no reason why constitu­
ent power should not have been given within certain defined 
limits to the Legislatures in India when they were
10. Mahajan, V.D., Constitutional History of India, sixth Ed,
p 136, 1964. And Bose, S.M., The Working Constitution of 
India, pp 493-94. 1939*
11. Keith, A.B., A Constitutional History of India,1600-1933» 
1936, p 438.
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12fully representative of all sections and of all interests.”
There is no doubt that the amending power in the Act was 
virtually vested in Parliament but once the requisite number 
of Indian States had decided to join the federation, the 
amending power of Parliament would have been limited and 
restricted to a considerable extent. This follows from Sec 
308(4) (ii) read with Schedule II. Sec 308(4) (ii) provided 
that the provisions of part • II of the Pirst Schedule to 
the Act could not be amended without the consent of the 
Ruler of any state which would be affected by the amendment.
It is necessary to mention here that the 1935 Act sought 
to create a federation of provinces and states upon certain 
conditions being fulfilled. In brief, if the Rulers of 
States representing not less than half the aggregate popu­
lation of the Indian States and entitled to not less than 
half the seats allotted to the Council of States ( Pederal 
Upper Chamber ) acceded to the Pederation in accordance with 
Sec 6, the Federation was to come into being. This event 
never came to pass. Sec 6 elaborates the conditions of the 
execution of an Instrument of Accession by a Ruler. Part II 
of the Pirst Schedule provided the allocation of seats to 
the Indian States in the Pederal Legislature. Therefore, 
according to Sec 308 (4) (ii) , the allocation of seats to 
the Indian States could not be interferred with by Parliament., 
unless the Ruler of any state , who would be affected by the
12. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: Pederation Vs Freedom p 115> 1935*
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change consented to it.. The net result was that the power 
of Parliament to amend Part II of the First Schedule was 
reduced in this regard.
The Second Schedule specified the provisions of the
Act which might be amended without affecting the accession
of a State. If the Imperial Parliament wanted to amend the
sections of the Act not falling within the pale of the
Second Schedule, the amendment would remain inoperative in
an Indian State unless its Ruler accepted the amendment by
13
executing a supplementary Instrument of Accesion. This
is a result which the Imperial Parliament itself might not
have visualized. After the establishment of the Federation,
become
the Federal Constitution would have/very rigid. Dr.. Ambedkar
has observed on this aspect of the Act :
" The only authority which can change the constitution
is of course the British Parliamament. But very few
seem to be aware of the fact that even Parliament
14
has no power to alter the Federal Constitution."
After this survey of the history of the amending pro­
cess in action, it is not out of place to see the views of 
Indian thinkers on the amending procedure they would like 
in a Constitution framed by themselves.
Before 1928, there was no occasion for Indian constitu-
13. Section 6 Cl. 5.
14. Dr Ambedkar, op. cit., supra, pp 115-16.
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tional lawyers to consider this particular subject. In
that year, the Nehru Report was prepared to meet the cha­
llenge thrown by Lord Birkenhead to Indiansto produce an 
agreed Constitution. The All Parties Conference, 1928, had 
appointed a Committee for framing the Constitution of India. 
The Committee made an admirable effort to frame a Constitu­
tion of India for the first time. This report goes by the 
name 1 the Nehru Report1, after its Chairman Mr. Moti Lai 
Nehru. Clause 87 of the Report laid down the procedure 
for amending the Constitution. It empowered Parliament to 
repeal or alter any of the provisions of the Constitution, 
with a proviso that the Bill embodying such repeal or alter­
ation could be passed by both Houses of Parliament sitting 
together and at the third reading agreed to, by not less
than two thirds of the total number of the members of 
15
both Houses.
As is obvious, the States were not given any right to 
share in the amending process at any stage. Compared with 
the procedure provided in the Constitution of India, 1950, 
the Nehru Report prescribed a rigid procedure in so far as 
the special majority required is concerned. It is difficult 
to say whether the provision of both Houses sitting together, 
as opposed to sitting separately, would have made for flexi-
15* Nehru Report, Clause 87, p 123, 1928
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bility or rigidity.
The Nehru Report was submitted to the All Parties 
Conference which met at Calcutta on 22nd Dec. 1928. Mr.
Jinnah moved many amendments to the Report and one of them 
was that no amendment of the Constitution would come into 
force unless it was first passed by both Houses of Parlia­
ment separately by a majority of four-fifths and was appro­
ved by a similar majority of both the Houses in a joint 
16
session. This amendment was accepted unanimously.
Mr Jinnah*s amendment aimed at securing a right of 
veto for the minorities in regard to amending the Constitu­
tion. Muslims were a minority and his sole purpose was
a
to save Muslims from/steam-roller majority of the Hindus 
in the Central Legislature. Needless to say if this provision 
had been embodied in the Constitution of I950,rigidity of 
a high order would have been introduced.
Next in chronological order is the Sapru Report. In 
1944, the breakdown of the Gandhi-Jinnah talks on the 
communal issue, necessitated the calling of a Non-Party Con­
ference. The Non-Party Conference appointed a Committee 
to examine the whole communal and minorities question from 
a Constitutional and Political point of view. The Sapru 
Report is the result of the labours of this Committee.
The Report recommended th& framing of a new Constitution
16. All Parties Conference. Supplementary Report of the 
.Committee. 1928, p 50~
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of India by Indians. The amendment of such a constitution 
was to be effected by the procedure laid down in clause 20. 
This clause provided that the intention to; move a motion 
in the Union Legislature for an amendment of the constitution 
should be notified to the public and such motion should not 
be taken for consideration by the legislature until the 
expiry of at least six-jrtfn-thh from the date of such noti- 
fication. The approval of such a motion required, at least 
a two-thirds majority of the sanctioned strength in each 
House of the Union Legislature. In addition to this, the 
motion had to be approved by the Legislatures of not less 
than two-thirds of the Units., Vital provisions of the 
constitution were required to be listed in a schedule to 
the Constitution Act, and not to be amended for a period 
of five years from the coming into force of the new 
Constitution. It is significant to note that the clause 
also provided that amendments of a purely formal character 
could be done through the ordinary legislative process of 
the Union Legislature. In pursuit of communal harmony, 
the Sapru Committee sought to put the centre at par with 
the units as far as the amendment of the Constitution was 
concerned.
The Hindu, Mahasabha released a draft constitution 
called * The Constitution of the Hindustan Free State Act,
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-1944. The procedure to amend the constitution was given 
in Sec 58* It fully realised the necessity of amending 
the constitution frequently for some time ( the number of 
years was to be specified ), after the constitution came 
into force and so, provided for amendment by way of ordi­
nary legislation. After the specified period had elapsed, 
the amending procedure was sought to be made very rigid.
The amending bill passed by the two Chambers of the Pederal 
Legislature was to be submitted to a Referendum of the 
people. A majority of the voters: on the register had to 
record their votes on the register. The amending bill 
would be deemed to have been approved by the people in 
case either the votes of a majoi'ity of the voters on the 
register, or two-thirds of the votes recorded, had been
17
cast in favour of such amendment.
On behalf of the Radical Democratic Party, Mr. M.N.
Roy published a draft called 1 Constitution of Free India1, 
on December 20, 19^. In the introductory part, he sub­
mitted that the procedure for the revision or amendment 
of the constitution had not been prescribed because it 
was implied in the draft. However, he hoped to add a 
chapter on the subject to the final draft. Art I (b) in 
the Pirst Chapter read : ’ The people have the inalienable
17* Sec 58 of the Draft Constitution : The Constitution 
of the Hindustan Free State Act, 194> 1944*
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right to alter and modify the political organisation of 
18
society.1
As a matter of fact, most of the constitutional lawyers 
and statesmen started serious thinking regarding the type 
of constitution and its mode of amendment only when the 
task of constitution-making fell to be considered by 
Indians. Individuals and political parties produced 
their draftssof the Constitution so that their ideas might 
find a place in the future Constitution of India, which 
was being hammered out by the Constituent Assembly of 
India.
Constituent Assembly: The Constituent Assembly was
elected according to the Cripps offer of 19^ -2, reaffirmed 
in the paper issued on May 16th, 1946, by the Mission of 
the British Cabinet. Since the election of the Constituent 
Assembly on universal adult franchise would have caused 
undue delay, the elected Provincial Legislative Assemblies 
were utilized as the electing bodies. Each ^ Province was 
allotted a number of seats proportional to its population, 
approximately in the ratio of one to a million. As the 
members of the Provincial Assemblies had been elected by the 
main communities separately, these communities came to be
18. Roy, M.N., Constitution of Free India; A Draft 194-5* 
Art. 1 (b).
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represented in the Constituent Assembly. For this purpose, 
three communities were recognised, namely, Muslims, Sikhs 
and General, the last including all those who were not 
Muslims or Sikhs. The Indian States were allotted a maximum 
of 93 seats, the method of election being left to be decided 
by consultation. At the preliminary stage, the States were 
represented in the Constituent Assembly by a negotiating 
committee.
The elections to the Assembly were held in July, 19^6.
Out of 212 general places, Congress filled 203* In addition,
the Congress Party elected four Muslims and one Sikh in
the Provincial Legislature. Therefore, the Congress got
208 seats of the total of 296 allotted to the Provinces,
making up a majority of 69$ in the Assembly. The remaining
sixteen seats were filled by five small groups. After
partition, the number of Muslim League representatives fell
to 28, shooting up the Congress majority to 82$ in the 
19
assembly.
The.Indian Constituent Assembly, like the Australian 
conventions but unlike the American, Canadian and South 
African Conventions, adopted a policy of publicity as 
opposed to that of secrecy. As a matter of fact, in a 
country where delicate controversial matters had to be 
settled and embodied in the constitution, the policy of
19* Austin, G., The Indian Constitution : Corner Stone of 
Nation, 1966, p 10.
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secrecy would perhaps have been better* The Indian Consti­
tuent Assembly had no less complicated and complex matters 
to settle than any other Constituent Assembly in the world.
It goes to its credit that it preferred the democratic 
tradition of publicity and held its sessions in the open 
and the " publication of its high level debates had no
doubt a thrilling, educative and ennobling effect upon the 
20
country." Since decision-making in the Assembly was
democratic, the constitution M expresses the will of the
21
many rather than the needs of the few."
The Constituent Assembly was the master of its proce­
dure and its powers were not limited or fettered by any 
other authority - indeed it was a self-directing and self- 
governing body. The editor of the Eastern Economist called 
it ' the second Assembly of its kind in Asia1 the first 
being the Chinese National Assembly, conceived by Dr. Sun 
Yat Sen, and convened by his successor Marshall Chiang Kai 
Shek which was 1 turbulently1 in session at that time.
There was a doubtpprevailing in the minds of some
persons regarding the status of the Constituent Assembly and "the
22
character of the constitution it was called upon to frame.
The Assembly was not the result of a revolution as the cons-
20. Venkataraman, T.ff.., History of Constituent Assemblies of 
the world, 194-7* X E J lj.J. p 111
21. Austin, G., op. cit., supra, p 9.
22. Roy, M.N.-, The Constituent Assembly, 194-7 I.LJR* V. I p 7‘
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titutional convention of the United States and hence some
people had doubts regarding its sovereignty and the fate of
the constitution it was going to frame. On the other hand,
other people felt that n the British Government lost its
23
status as the sovereign power" on the day the Constituent 
Assembly met.. The Constituent Assembly was not sovereign 
in that the British Parliament did not transfer its sovereignty 
over India to it. The Imperial Parliament was still the 
repository of sovereignty. No Act of transfer of power was 
passed before its creation. It was later on, when the 
Independence Act of 194-7 was passed,that sovereignty was 
bestowed on the Constituent Assembly. The Independence Act 
194-7 removed, for ever, all doubts regarding the status of 
the Constituent Assembly and the people, by whole-hearted 
acceptenceobftthe constitution framed by the Constituent 
Assembly, have put a stamp of sovereignty on it';..
It is not out of place here to state, in brief, how the 
amending provision in the Constitution of India, 1950 came 
to be shaped and formed in the Constituent Assembly. This 
will help us in understanding and analysing the amending 
process in the Constitution.
The drafting of the amending provision started in June
23. Eastern Economist V. 7 No 24, 194-6, p 951
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194-7 when the Union Constitution Committee began its meetings. 
Prom the documents before the Union Constitution Committee, 
it seemed that the amending process was on the way to rigid­
ity.. The Draft Constitution of K.T^ Shah provided that 
amendments should first be passed by a two-thirds majority 
in each House of Parliament and then be ratified by a similar
majority of Provincial Legislatures and approved by a majority
24
of the population in a referendum. K.M. Munshi's Draft 
Constitution required a two-thirds majority in each House of 
Parliament and ratification by one half of the Provinces. ^ 
Pannikar's and S.P. Mukerjee(s replies to B.N. R a u fs ques­
tionnaire favoured a two-third majority in each House of 
Parliament and ratification by the same majority of the 
Provinces. Ayyarfs and Ayyangarfs memoranda also supported 
the view held by Pannikar and Mukerjee.
B.N. Rau, the Constitutional Adviser to the Government
o
of India played hisrunique role in regard to the amending 
provision. His view was that an amending bill should be 
passed by a two-thirds majority in Parliament and ratified 
by a like majority of Provincial Legislatures. But he wanted 
to insert a 1 removal-of-difficulties clause in the consti­
tution so that Parliament might make 1 adaptations and modi­
fications * in the constitution by amending it through an
24. Shah, Draft Constitution, I H A - cited by Austin, G., 
op., cit. p 257.
25. Munshi, Draft Constitution Art. L. Munshi Papers.
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ordinary act of legislation. This removal-of-difficulties
clause was to remain in force for three years from the
26
commencement of the Constitution. In his memorandum of 
Transitional Provisions he strongly argued for such a provi­
sion in the constitution. He explained that :J: such a clause 
was quite usual and that it was like Sec 310 of the Govern­
ment of India Act 1935* In his Draft constitution, of
September 194-7 , he further explained in a note that the clause
27
was derived from Art. 51 of the Irish Constitution. K.M.
Munshi also supported Eau on this point and he justified it
on the ground that : TIIn framing a constitution as we are
doing under great pressure, there are likely to be left
several defects; and it is not necessary that we should have
a very elaborate and rigid scheme for amending these provi-
28
sions in the first three years.” Moreover, many members
had apprehensions that the Constitution might turn out to
was
be bad when put into practice because this /the first attempt
to frame & constitution and they lacked experience of
29
constitution-making.
In October, 194-7 Rau went to Europe to consult various
justices and statesmen of the U.S.A, Canada, and Ireland.
Most of them supported him on a provision for easy amendment
30
of the constitutionin the first three rather than five years
26. Eau, B.K., India's Constitution in the Making; 1960, p 96.
27« Eau, Draft Constitution, cl 238.
28. CAD IV, I, p 54-6*,
29. C.A.D. IX, 37, 1644-5
JO. Eau: op. cit. Supra, p 311.
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of the constitution, Rau wrote a letter to Dr Prasad, the 
President of the Assembly who passed the information to the 
Drafting Committee and to the Assembly. But the Drafting 
Committee rejected the proposal of inserting a clause for 
easy amendment of the constitution in the Transitional 
Provisions. Though the provision was rejected, yet the 
principle of easy amendment was adopted in that in various 
articles it has been provided that certain matters can be 
amended by a simple majority in Parliament. According to 
G r a n v i l l e A u s t i n ' s  speculation " it appears that Rau 
was stretching the customary meaning of a removal-of-diffi­
culties clause into a device for the easy amendment of the
31
constitution-- the need for which he strongly believed."
Regarding the history of the main amending provision 
which ultimately was numbered as Art. 568 of the Constitu­
tion, the Union Constitution Committee first recommended that 
the amending Bill should be passed by a two-thirds majority 
in Parliament and ratified by a like majority of provincial 
Legislatures. After a few daysi* the Committee decided that 
there need only be one-half majority of the Provinces and 
not a two-thirds majority. Thereafter, the Committee 
appointed a sub-committee to consider the matter once again. 
The sub-committee met on 11th and 12th July 1947* The 
sub-committee, at the first meeting, recommended that the 
ratification should be by legislatures representing one-half
51. Austin, G. , op. cit. Supra, p 258
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the total population of the Units, including one third of the
32
population of the Princely States.
On 12th July, major changes were wrought by the sub­
committee. It decided that amendments regarding the Union 
Legislative List, Representation of the Units in Parliament 
and powers of the Supreme Court required to be ratified 
by Provincial Legislatures; other provisions were to be 
amendable simply by a two-thirds majority in Parliament.
This decision was incorporated in a supplementary report
33
drafted on 13th July. This overnight drastic change was 
explained as probably due to Nehru*s presence in the second
meeting, he being in favour of amendment by Parliament alone
34
by a simple majority.
These provisions as drafted by the Committee were 
never debated by the Assembly. Actually, when they came 
up for debate, N.G* Ayyangar pleaded that there be no debate 
on the clauses because it was being separately considered 
whether;? the Provincial Legislatures should be given cons­
tituent power and consquently the debate on the matter was 
deferred.
The Drafting Committee introduced significant changes
in the amending provision. Pirst, in regard to ratification,
the Drafting Committee provided that along with one-half
32.Minutes of the Meeting, 11 July, 1947; INA. cited in Austii 
op. cit. Supra, p 259•
33-Austin, G . , op, cit. p 259*
34. Supplementary Report of the Union Constitution Committee
pp 68-69.
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of the Provinces, one third of the former princely states
35
should be necessary* The Constitution Committee*s reco-
the
mmendation regarding/support of Legislatures representing a 
majority of the population was dropped. The Drafting Commi­
ttee expanded the pale of the entrenched clauses; instead 
of only the Union list, it preferred to have all the 
Legislative lists* In addition to these, the Drafting 
Committee sought tocgivepProvineial Legislative Assemblies 
the power to initiate an amending bill in the Assembly, 
relating to the method of choosing a Governor or relating to 
the number of the Houses of the Legislature in any state. 
This provision was removed from this article and embodied 
in Art. 169 of the Constitution.
The Drafting Committee also retained the provision
prohibiting amendment of the articles reserving seats in
the Legislatures for minorities for ten years from the
commencement of the constitution. On the expiration of
ten years, the provision would cease to have effect unless
36
continued in operation by an amendment of the constitution.
It is a strange irony that when draft Art?: 304- which 
became Art. 368 ) came up for debate in the Constituent 
Assembly on 17th September 194-9? Dr.. B.R.* Ambedkar, the
35* Art. 304- of the Draft Constitution of India 194-8 
prepared by the Drafting Committee.
36. Art 305 of the Draft Constitution of India 194-8 prepared 
by the Drafting Committee.
Chairman of the Drafting Committee himself moved two amend- 
37
ments to it which resulted in an increase in the entrenched 
articles. Dr Ambedkar's two amendments were ultimately ado­
pted almost verbatim in Art.368 of the Constitution of India.
The whole debate in theConstituent Assembly took place 
on the two amendments of Dr. Ambedkar. Since the debate was 
held at the fag end of the session, only a few members 
showed interest in it. Contrary to Dr. Ambedkar's antici­
pation that there would be 'considerable debate* on the 
article, only eight speakers participated, besides Dr.. 
Ambedkar himself.
Six of the speakers criticized the article on the 
ground that it was very rigid. They argued in favour of 
flexibility in the consititution. Dr. P.S. Deshmukh pleaded 
for a bare majority of the total membership of each House. 
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad also supported him on this point.
Shri Mahavir Tyagi and H.V. Kamath also spoke for flexibility 
Even the fact that the Constituent Assembly had superior 
status to a future Parliament was sought to be refuted on 
the ground that the members of the Constituent Assembly 
were never elected by the people directly.
There was a considerable debate for a clause for easy 
amendment of the constitution for at least a period ranging
37. Amendment No. 18, No 207
44
from 3 to 5 years. There was an amendment in the name of
Pandit Nehru, ( amendment number 326? ) to the effect that
the Parliament be enabled to amend the constitution in the
beginning for a period of five years. Pt. Nehru did not
move it and many speakers lamented the fact of its not
being moved. Nehru's silence remained unexplained and Austin
speculates that probably ' he had changed his mind and come
was
to believe that the amending process/sufficiently easy
regarding provisions relating to language and creation of
new states and other stringent mechanisms were necessary 1
to inspire confidence in the permanence of the federal 
38
structure.
Only one speaker ( Dr. P.S* Deshmukh ) moved an amend­
ment to make fundamental rights unamendable. Pive amend­
ments were sent to make the fundamental rights unamendable 
but except one speaker, others did not defend their motions 
on the floor of the Assembly.
Mr. Brajeshwar Prasad argued for introducing referendum 
on the model of the Australian Constitution^ Babu Ramnaryan
39
Singh supported him in this.
Shri H.V., Kamath wanted the article, first of all, to 
define what an amendment is. He suggested the insertion of
38. Austin, Op. cit. Supra, p 264.
39. C.A.D. IX p 1658.
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the words 1 by way of variation, addition or repeal1 along
4-0
with 1 to amend*. He also preferred, * A proposal for an
amendment* to be substituted in place of * An amendment**
Shri H.V. Kamath also moved an amendment to the effect that
the Presidential assent to an amending Bill should be menda-
41
tory and not discretionary*
He further suggested that a period of six months must 
elapse between the initiation of the Bill and its final 
passage in Parliament.
One of the novel and unusual suggestions made in the 
Assembly was that of Dr. P.S. Deshmukh. In his amendment 
no 210 he suggested that, for a period of three years from 
the commencement of the constitution, the Parliament be 
empowered to amend the constitution by a simple majority 
in respect of the matters to be certified by the President 
as not being of substance. He meant only formal amendments 
but wanted to include in them * any formal amendment reco­
mmended by a majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court 
on the ground of removing difficulties in the administration 
of the constitution or for the purpose of carrying out the
constitution in the public interest and certified by the
42
President to be necessary and desirable.* Mr.» Naziruddin
40. Amendment No. 3246 C.A.D. IX p 1649
41. ibid, p 1649.
42. Dr. Deshmukh, P.S. , C.A.H. IX , p 1644.
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Ahmed fully sympathj^ized with hr. Deshmukh on the point 
and believed that many difficulties might arise in the 
near future. ^
Shri R.K. Sidhwa supported Dr. Ambedkar*s two amendments. 
Acharya Jugal Kishore accepted Dr. Ambedkar*s amendments but 
suggested that the constitution should be kept easier to 
amend for five years and afterwards be made amendable in the 
way suggested by Dr. Ambedkar.
In the end Dr. Ambedkar replied to the speakers. He 
repudiated the charge of the Constituent Assembly being 
unrepresentative of the people. It was he who disclosed 
the third mode of amending the constitution by a simple 
majority in respect of a large number of articles. He 
explained that this fact had not been noticed by the members 
because there was no mention of it in Art. 304. Various 
articles which begin with the words ’until Parliament other­
wise provides* were the articles amendable by a simple 
majority in Parliament- Ultimately the Assembly passed 
the two amendments of Dr. Ambedkar and rejected each and 
every amendment to his amendments.. Dr. Ambedkar*s two 
amendments were embodied in a new article numbered as 368 in 
the Constitution of India.
After reaching the end this long journey, one realises
43. C.A.D. IX, p 1654
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that the final form and shape which Art. 368 attained, 
emerged out of a hard battle of ideas favouring rigidity 
on the one hand, and flexibility on the other, sometimes 
rigidity having the upper hand and sometimes flexibility 
gaining ground. In this struggle taking place mostly in 
the committees supporters of rigidity persisted strongly 
and were not prepared to give in. On the whole, flexibility 
seems to have suffered considerably, though it entered 
by the back door. This will be made clear in the following 
chapters in which Art. 368 itself will be subjected to 
minute scrutiny and thorough analysis-
CHAPTER III 
The Analysis Of The Amending Precess 
The moment the constitution of a state is reduced to 
writing, its amending provision assumes great importance 
because the very object of writing a constitution depends 
upon it. In fact, the essence of a written constitution 
lies in its mode of amendment. According to John Burgess, 
the amending process envisaged in a constitution is the 
first of the three fundamental parts of a constitution; the 
second and the third being the constitution of liberty and 
the constitution of Government.
" A Complete constitution may be said to consist 
of three fundamental parts. The first is the orga­
nisation of the state for the accomplishment of 
future changes in the constitution. This is 
usually called the amending clause and the power which 
iir 4 describes and regulates is called the amending
power.- This is the most important part of a
1
constitution."
In this chapter, an attempt is made to analyse the 
process by which Constitution of India can be amended. The 
analysis of Art 368 suggests, as we will show hereafter, 
that it is better to describe the subject-matter of Art 368 
as the "process of amendment" rather than:rthe "procedure 
for amendment". Though the words "process" and "procedure"
are interchangeably used in law, there is a slight difference.
1. Burgess, J., op. cit., supra, p 137»
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Generally, ‘process1' denotes fa continuous or regular,
of
action, or succession/actions, taking place or carried
2
on in a definite mannter,1 whereas, ’‘procedure’1 denotes the
3
mode of action. Therefore, 'process' is a sufficiently 
comprehensive word for denoting an action being done in a 
definite manner. In our analysis of Art 368, the compre­
hensiveness of the word 'process' is limited in respect of
4
the formal provisions of the constitution.
The amending process in the constitution is contained in 
Art 368 which has the marginal note 'procedure for amendment 
of the Constitution* and reads as follows:-
be
" An amendment of this Constitution may/initiated 
only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose 
in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill 
is passed in each House by a.majority^of not less 
than two-thirds of the members of that House present 
and voting, it shall be presented to the President 
for his assent and upon such assent being given to 
the Bill, the Constitution shall stand amended in 
accordance with the terms of the Bills.
2. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary Third B&n, p 1590.
3. ibid, p 1589.
4. Livingston (W.SO thinks that the amending process inclu­
des a “complex of psychological and sociological habits 
and that makes men act they do.”
Federalism And Constitutional Change, 1958, p 303.
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provided that if such amendment seeks to make any 
change in
(a) article 54-* article 55* article 75* article 162 or 
article 241, or
(b) Chapter IV of part V, chapter V of part VI, or chapter I 
of part XI, or
(c) any of the lists in the Seventh Schedule, or
(d) the representation of states in parliament, or
(e) the provisions of this article,
the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the 
Legislatures of not less than one-half of the states by 
resolutions to that effect passed by those legislatures 
before the Bill making provision for such amendment is 
presented to the President for assent.ri
Ihe scheme of this article was explained by the Chairman
5
of the Drafting Committee, Dr. Ambedkar. Prima facie,
this article places all the articles of the Constitution
in two categories for the purpose of amendment.- In the
first category are the articles which are amendable under
the substantive part of Art 568, that is to say, when a
Bill is introduced in either House of Parliament and passed
in each House by a majority of the total membership and by
a majority ofiot less than two-thirds of the members present
and voting and also assented to by the President, the provi-
shall
sions sought to be amended/stand amended. In the second 
category
5. C.A.D. Vol IX, pp 1660-1661
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6
are the articles specifically mentioned in the proviso 
to article 568 under items (a) to (e). These articles 
require, not only a special majority in Parliament i.e. a 
majority of the *total membership1 and majority of not 
less than two-thirds of the members bfrthat House present 
and voting but also ratification by at least half the state 
legislatures.
But this is not the whole story. There is still 
another category of articles and schedules which, for the 
purposes of their own amendment, fall under either of the 
two categories mentioned above but also allow their content 
to be amended by a bare majority in Parliament by ordinary 
legislation. In fact, the provisions under this category 
can further be classified i n t o ' two types : (a) those 
under which formal amendments can be effected to the 
Constitution and (b) those under which formal amendments are 
not effected to the constitution but otherwise serve the
7
purposes of amendment.
Meaning of 11 an Amendment” ; In common parlance,’'amend­
ment" might convey the sense of "improvement” or a slight 
change in the main instrument but the word " amendment", 
when used in relation to a constitution, carries all shades 
of meaning such as alteration, revision, repeal, addition, 
variation or deletion of any provision of the constitution.
6. These articles and schedules will be dealt with in chapb 
er IV.
7» S&?lfn^B8lS?fSes are ^ scusse(  ^ detail in Chapter V
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By usage, it has come to mean every kind of change brought
about by the process of amendment in the constitution; it
is used in the widest possible sense• Herman Finer goes
to the extent of saying that " to amend is to deconstitute
8
and reconstitute.”
Some of the early written constitutions contained no
9
provision for their alteration.. With the passage of time, 
it was felt that constitutional amendment was necessary 
in order to adapt the constitution to changed conditions.
The amending provision is all the more necessary in modern 
constitutions because the world in which we are living is 
growing constantly more crowded and complex and there is 
constant pressure on constitutions for amendment* or 
abandonment. Therefore, it is appropriate and indispensable 
that the word "amendment" be understood as including all 
kinds of change.,
In Art 368, the expression "amendment" has been used 
in a very wide sense. When this article was discussed in
10
the Constituent Assembly, Mr. H.VY Kamath moved an amentment 
to add to Art. 368 that any provision of the constitution 
might be amended by way of variation, addition or repeal 
in the manner provided in the article. But this amendment
■■— ■ ■ ■ ■    - ■ ■ ■ - ■■■■■■' - • — — - —  ’ O f
8. Herman Finer: The Theory and Practice /Modern Government
Vol I, 1952, p 193.
9. For example, the constitution of States in the United 
States. Dodd(W.Fj) . The Revision and amendment of 
State Constitutions. 1910, p 118.
10. C.A.D. Vol IX, p 1649.
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11
was negatived- Probably the reason for not adding the 
explanatory words "by way of variation, addition or repeal" 
to the article was that by then the word "amendment11 itself 
as used in respect of the constitution had come to attain 
an all-comprehensive sense of change and, therefore, there 
was no need of having any explanatory words. The fact that 
the constitution framers did use these explanatory words 
in certain places does not prove that they intended to 
give narrow meaning to "amendment" in article 368. For 
instance, in schedule 5 * para 7 and in schedule 6 para 21 
the word "amendment" is followed by the words "addition,^, 
variation or repeal". But in article 368, such words were 
deliberately avoiddd. It appears that since the Founding 
Fathers knew well the meaning of "amendment" as used in 
regard to a constitution, they considered it unnecessary 
and superfluous to insert the words " addition, variation 
or repeal" in Art 368. But in regard to the amendment of 
the schedules they might be rightly apprehensive of the 
possibility of the word " am^ nd" being interpreted narrowly.
For instance, under the Civil procedure Code of India the 
amendment of a plaint is understood to incorporate only
12
minor changes; it does not mean to change the plaint totally.
11. C.A.D. Vol IX, p 1663.
12. Ma Shawe Mye V Maung Mo Houng ( 1921) 48.1.A 214
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Thus, it seems that the drafters thought it better to make 
their intention clear by employing additional words like 
"addition, variation or repeal" in respect of the Schedules*
Meaning of "this Constitution":: The word " Constitution"
has been defined by various authors# Most writers regard
the document in which the rules governing the composition,
powers and methods of operation of the main institutions are
set out as the constitution. But the modern trend of inser-
14
ting as many matters in the constitution as possible indi­
cates that it is no use defining the word "constitution" 
merely in terms of the rules regarding the institutions 
under it, because the definition holds good only in respect 
of some of the matters enumerated in the document called 
"constitution". In regard to a written constitution, the 
word "constitution" is taken in the documentary sense; it 
means the document itself irrespective of the type of rules 
it contains. Undoubtedly in the Constitution of India 
"this constitution" conveys the sense of *document* and 
particularly so in regard to its amendment. The phrase 
"this constitution" includes all the provisions which have 
been written in the instrument called the Constitution of 
India. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court has
13. Friedrich, C.J. Constitutional Government ^Democracy, 
1941, p 119.
14. Karl Loewenstein : Reflections on the value of Constitu­
tions in Zurcher. A. constitutions and constitutional 
trends since World War II, p 197.
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15
interpreted the phrase "this constitution" as meaning all
the provisions of the constitution except Part III. As a
reaction to this decision, a Bill is pending at the moment 
16
in Parliament by which "any provision of " is sought to
be inserted before the words "this constitution" so that the
first line of the article would read : " An amendment of 
any provision of this constitution."
Initiation of the Process of Amendment : The right
to initiate the process of amendment has been given only
to the House of the People ( Lok Sabha ) or Council of States
( Kajya Sabha ) and not to the people as in the Constitution
of Switzerland or to Congress and the States as in the
constitution of the United States of America or to the
head of state as in the constitution of the Pifth Prench
17
Republic, 1958* Indirectly, of course, the states in India 
can initiate the process of amendment through their repre­
sentatives in the Council of States.
Since the initiation of the process of amendment is to
be done by introducing a Bill to that effect in either 
House of Parliament, the rules regarding the introduction, 
consideration and passing of bills are applicable to the
15. Golak Nath Vs State of Punjab AIR 1967 S.C. 1643.
16. Bill No 10-B of 1967, introduced by Nr Nath Pai.
17. Art. 89.
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amending bills also. The Lok Sabha has framed its Rules 
of Procedure and conduct of Business of the House under 
Art 118 of the Constitution. Rules 155 to 159 of the 
R.P.C.B, -1957? relate to a bill seeking to amend the Cons­
titution. It has been provided therein that the rules of
procedure applicable to ordinary bills will also apply to
18
the constitutional amendment bills. This means that Art 
568 is not a complete code in respect of the procedure 
provided by it. The procedure prescribed in Art 568 is to 
be supplemented by the rules made by each House for regula­
ting its procedure and the conduct of its business. In
19
Sankari Prasad Vs Union of India it was contended that the 
legislative procedure prescribed in Art 107? which specifi­
cally provides for a bill being passed with amendments, was 
not applicable to a bill for amending the Constitution 
under Art 568. The argument was further supported by point­
ing out that Art 108 which provides for a joint sitting 
of both Houses, was inapplicable to a Bill under Art 568., 
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the argument and held 
that, ’’having provided for the constitution of a parliament 
and prescribed a certain procedure for the conduct of its
18. Rule No. 159*
19. AIR 1951 S.C. 458.
57
ordinary legislative business to be supplemented by rules 
made by each House ( Art 118 ), the makers of the Constitu­
tion must be taken to have intended to fbllow that procedure,
so far as it may be applicable, consistently with the
20
express provisions of Art. 368u
Introduction of the Bill: The procedure as to how and
after what notice a bill is to be introduced has been laid 
down in the Rules and Procedure for the conduct of business 
in the Lok Sabha, 1957* A private member*s bill has to 
undergo a special procedure, Rule 294(1) of the R.P.C.B. 
provides that the committee on private member*s bills shall 
examine every bill seeking to amend the Constitution notice 
of which has been given to a private member, before a 
motion for leave to introduce the Bill is included in the 
list of business.
There is a convention in both the Houses of Parliament,
that a bill is not to be opposed at the introduction stage^
But sometimes this convention is not observed. Many a bill
seeking to amend the Constitution has been opposed at the
21
time of introduction.
It is to be noted that Art. 117 forbids the introduction 
of money bills unless they have received presidential reco­
mmendation prior to their introduction. Art 117( 3) is still
20. AIR 1951 SC at 462.
21. The Constitution Ninth, Seventeenth. Eighteenth (which 
was ultimately withdrawn ) and Twentieth Amendments ACUS.
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wider. It reads as follows
11 A Bill which, if enacted and brought into opera­
tion, would involve expenditure from the Consoli­
dated Fund of India shall not be passed by either 
House of Parliament unless the President has 
recommended to that House the consideration of 
the Bill.11
This article has been made applicable to Bills seeking
to amend the Constitution. On 26th May, 1987 Mr. Madhu
22
Limaye introduced a Bill in the House of the People ( Lok
Sabha ). His Bill purported to amend Art. 37, 4-5* 4-7 so as
to make the provisions of Art. 4-5 and 47 obligatory on the
state. In short, he intended to make Art 45 and 47 enforce- 
23
able against the state just like the Part III rights. The 
nature of the Bill was certainly such as to involve expendi­
ture from the Consolidated Fund of India, if it had been 
passed. When the Bill was to be taken into consideration, 
a member pointed out that the Bill could not be proceeded 
with because it required the recommendation of the President. 
There were two opinions regarding the interpretation of Art 
117(3)• The proponents of the Bill argued that Art 117(3) 
does not say that a Bill cannot be considered; it only 
says that it cannot be * passed. *
22. Bill No 45 of 1966. Govt of India Gazette Extra-ordinary 
Part 2 Section 2, July, 29, 1966.
23• Art 45 related to free and compulsory education for chil­
dren and Art 47 directs the state to raise the level of 
nutrition and the standard of living and to improve 
public health. But these articles are unenforceable.
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The whole point was whether Consideration1, ‘discussion1,
24
and ‘passing * are one transaction or different transactions* 
If these stages of the Bill are regarded as different then 
a Bill requiring prior recommendation of the President under 
117(3)* can be introduced and considered but not passed* 
Ultimately the Speaker followed a previous ruling theft " 
there is no goodri embarking upon an enterprise which will 
end m  nothing. Therefore, the Bill was not taken up for 
discussion.
It is submitted that the ruling obliterates the 
distinction between Art 117 (1) and 117(3) as regards the 
introduction of the Bill. Art 117(1) applies to a Money 
Bill as defined in Art 110 whereas Art 117(3) is in respect 
of a financial Bill other than a Money Bill and,therefore, 
a Bill under the former can be introduced only in the 
House of the People ( Lok Sabha ) but a Bill under the 
latter can be introduced in either House of Parliament. 
Secondly, a Bill under Art 117(1) requires the recommendation 
of the President even for its introduction. But Art 117(3) 
does not forbid expressly the introduction of a Bill v/hich 
has not received a prior recommendation of the President; 
what it forbids is the "passing" of it.. V.N. Shukla 
comments on the Bills under Art 117(3) as follows:
24. L.S.D. 4th series Vol III col 1259
25. ibid, col 1265.
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11 They are different from Bills given in Article
117(1) in as much as such Bills can be introduced
in the ‘Council of States and need the recommendation
of the President not at the time of introduction
but only at the time of the passing of the Bill**—
technically speaking, before the motion for
26
passing is made."
It isobvious that the ruling on Art. 117(3) deprives 
private members of their right of introducing a constitu­
tional amendment, which is likely to be caught by miscief 
of Art. 117(3)? because they are not in a position to 
secure the presidential recommendation unless the Council 
Of Ministers patronises the Bill. In other words, amendments 
to the Constitution involving expenditure from the Consoli­
dated Pund Of India cannot be moved by private members of 
the House without governmental support. It is noteworthy 
that a member intended to get Art 117(3) and 207(3) amended 
in order to do away with the requirement of a prior reco­
mmendation of the President for a motion for circulation of 
a Bill for the purpose of eliciting public opinion, because 
such a motion does not bind the Legislature one way or
27
the other.
It is submitted that irregularity in the procedure
26. Dr. Shukla, V.N., The Constitution of India, 4th Edn, 
1964, p 221.
27. Bill No. 52 of 1965? The Gazette of India Extra-ordinary 
Part II Section 2, August 19? 1965*
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prescribed in Art. 117(1) or Art 117(3) is not fatal to 
the validity of legislation because Art 255 cures the want 
of previous recommendation provided the Bill in question 
receives the assent of the President afterwards. Therefore, 
it seems that a Bill lacking a prior recommendation of the 
President under Art 117(3) is permissible for introduction 
and consideration but not for the final stage of ‘passing 1 
it.
n For the Purpose0: As a matter of fact, these words
in Art 368 are of great significance and embody an essential
principle of constitutional amendment. These words are
designed to emphasise the serious and important character
of an alteration of the constitution. A Bill which seeks
to amend the constitution is required to disclose its
purpose clearly and specifically. In some constitutions, it
is expressly provided that a Bill amending the constitution
28
shall be expressed as a Bill to amend the constitution and 
shall contain no other provisions. n This is to protect
29
members of Parliament from being caught unwares.11 The 
Constitution Amendment Bill should not spring a surprise on 
the members, Moreover-" the members must apply their minds 
to the amendment sought and its effect on the Constitution 
as a whole. Therefore, it is necessary that the purpose of
28. For instance Sec 210 of the Constitution of Burma 1961;
and Art 20(2) of the Republic of Ghana, 1960.
29* Fiaung Maung : Burmafs Constitution, 1961, p 193*
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the Bill seeking to amend the constitution should be made 
as clear as possible.
nIn either House of Parliament11 t It is needless to 
say that the Bill can be introduced in either of the two 
Houses of Parliament. In enacting twenty one amendments 
to the Constitution to date, the first twenty amendments 
were introduced in the Lok Sabha ( House of the People ) 
first but the twenty-first amendment was introduced in the 
Rajya Sabha. However, private members have been introducing 
constitutional amending bills in the Rajya Sabha from time 
to time. When one House has passed a Bill, it is sent to 
the other House. It was contended in the Sankari Prasad 
case that a constitution amendment bill under Art 368 
requires to be passed in each House in the form it is intro­
duced, that is, it cannot be amended during passage. But 
this contention was refuted. It was held that each House 
can pass such a Bill with or without amendments to it during
its passage. Uptil now, the House which has been in the
of
last possession/"such a bill has passed it in the form passed 
by the other House. In other words, no bill has been 
amended by the House which considered it after the other 
House had passed it..
It is to be noted that the Constitution ( First Amendment] 
Act, 195*1 was passed by the Provisional Parliament which
63
consisted of only one House. It was contended in the
30
Sankari Prasad case that Art, 368 postulates the existence 
of two Houses of Parliaments The contention was repelled 
by pointing out that the defect was removed by the Presiden­
tial order under Art 392 of the Constitution. The two 
Houses of Parliament are to be taken as these are constitu-
31
ted under Chapter II of part V of the Constitution..
Meaning of fthe Bill is passed1 :: In the whole Art 368
the word "passed" has posed as formidable difficulties as 
the word "majority". Though this word seems to be very 
simple, when the Pirst Constitution Amendment Bill was being 
discussed the question arose  ^ What is the meaning of 
1 passed 1 in Art 368 Z Should it mean'the last stage of 
the Bill i.e, the third reading or each stage of the Bill, 
that is, the first reading, the consideration stage and the 
third reading ? If it meant only the last stage of the 
Bill, the special majority required by Art 368 would have 
been necessary only at that stage. That means, the first and
30. op. cit. Supra.
31. D.V. Cowen opines that in the Constitution of South 
Africa, the word 1 Parliament* constains two concepts, 
namely, a static concept that has reference to its 
structure as provided for in Sec 19 of the Constitution; 
secondly, it has a dynamic concept that, the elements
of Parliament functioning as a law making* body, in some 
cases bncamerally as in Sec 23* and sometimes acting
unicamerally as in Sec. 35* 137 and 152 of th&
Constitution:- Cowen, D.V., Parliamentary Sovereignty 
And the Entrenched Sections of the South Africa Act,
32- Psll’. debates ( of India ), 1951, Vol XII, Col 9748.
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the second stages would have required only a bare majority 
to pass the Bill. The Speaker consulted the Attorney-General 
of India, who gave his opinion as follows
" The expression 1 when the Bill is passed in each 
House ' has reference to the passing of the Bill at 
the final stage. The majority insisted upon by 
Art 368 is, therefore, applicable only to the voting 
at the final stage. It is, however, better to err 
on the safer side and take a stricter view insisting 
on the requisite majority at all stages of the 
passage of the Bill.11
This advice was strictly followed and since then a
practice has been established to observe the special majority 
by
requirecy Art y 368 at all the effective stages of the Bill 
i.e. the motion that the Bill be taken into consideration, 
the motion that the Bill as reported by the Select Committee 
of the House or the Joint Committee of the Houses, as the 
case may be, be taken into consideration, the motion for 
passing of clauses and schedules to the Bill and the motion 
that the Bill with or without amendments be passed. Other 
motions such as that the Bill be circulated for the purpose 
of eliciting public opinion or that the Bill be referred to
33• Quoted by M.N. Kaul in Practice and Procedure of Parlia- 
ment, 1968, p 477.
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a select or joint committee are passed by a simple majority
only. The practice has hardened into rules and the Rules
34
of the House specifically provide for this procedure.
The practice of having a special majority at every
effective stage of the Bill was introduced by way of caution
and cannot be characterised as a constitutional requirement.
This has made the amdnding process more rigid than what
the framers contemplated. Of course, it has a bright side
also. Members have to be careful in keeping themselves
present in the House when a Bill seeking to amend the
constitution is taken up by the House. It is noteworthy
that in some constitutions it is specifically provided in
the amending clause that the Bill must be passed by a
35
special majority on the second and third readings. In
some countries a special majority is required only at the
36 37
second reading or only at the third reading.
The voting is by division whenever a motion has to be
34.* Rule 157* R.P.C.B. of Lok Sabha, 1957*
35* Art 159* Constitution of Malaysia 1964;
Sec 46 the Constitution of Malawi, 1964.
36. Art 138 Constitution of Italian Republic 1947.
37* Sec 118(1) Constitution of South Africa, 1961.
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carried by a special majority under Art. 368.. The result
is declared by the Speaker or the Chairman and, in case
the motion is carried, he announces also that the motion
is carried by a majority of the total membership of the
House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the
58
members present and voting. The names of the members who 
vote for fAyes * or 'noes1 are published in the Lok Sabha 
Debates and the Rajya Sabha Debates.
Voting Clause-by-Clause; Each clause or schedule in 
the Bill is put to the vote of the House and if passed by
59
a special majority is deemed to be passed- However,
the Speakeriin the Lok Sabha and the Chairman in the Rajya
Sabha may, with the concurrence of the House, put any group
40
of clauses or schedules together to the vote of the House *
In case any member requests that any clause or schedule be
put separately,the Speaker Shall put that clause or schedule,
or clause or schedule as amended as the case may b e , separa- 
41JL
tely- But the short Title, the Enacting Formula and the 
Long Title may be adopted by simple majority. The provision 
that the Speaker shall put clauses or schedules separately 
when reqested so by a member gives a significant right to a
38. Rule 158, of R.P.C.B.., 1957.
39* Rule 155* R.P.C,B. Lok Sabha. 1957* There is a convention 
in the Rajya Sabha to the same effect.
40. Proviso to Rule 155»
41 A>. ibid-
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member.. In the absence of it, a member who wants to vote 
differently on the clauses sought to be put together would 
be deprived of his right to apportion his votes according 
to his choice. For instance, if three clauses are put to 
vote together and a particular member intends to vote ^ye* 
for one of them and 'no* for the other two, he would not be
able to do so because he can only vote either 'aye* or 1 N o 1
for all of them.
Amendments to Clausesr The matter was settled after
some controversy that proposed amendments to the clauses of
41
the Bill should be decided by a bare majority. While
enacting the First Amendment Bill, the Speaker was of the
view that even proposed amendments to the clauses of the Bill
would have to be passed by a special majority. He informed
the House that he did not want to run the risk of getting
the whole legislation challenged in the courts and as a
matter of greater caution he preferred to err on the safer
side in having the division and voting record on each
42
amendment. But afterwards he changed his mind and he ruled 
that proposed amendments to the clauses of the Bill would 
be decided by a bare majority. Since thei} amendments to
41. Pari. Debates, Parliament of India, 1951 Vol XII, 
Col 9794.
42. Pari. Debates(of India), 1951, Vol XII, 9748.
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clauses of the Bill have been decided by a bare majority.
( i.e. by the voice-vote)• Members, while voting by voice
over proposed amendments to the clauses of a Bill n§ed not
rise in their seats to mark their division numbers. If 
one
some/chooses to challenge the decision of the Chair on any 
amendment, then it is in the discretion of the Speaker 
whether he grants a division. In the case of the Constitu­
tion Fourteenth Amendment Bill, the opposition members 
challenged the decisions of the Chair in respect of two 
proposed amendments to the clauses of the Bill and the 
Speaker allowed a division on each of them; the results of 
the divisions confirmed the decisions of the Speaker. ^
"In Each House;" The Bill is required to be passed in 
each House of Parliament. Supposing, the two Houses 
disagree on a particular amendment, can a joint sitting of 
both the Houses be held under Art 108 ? There can be two 
views on the question. First that a joint sitting has 
been impliedly ruled out by requiring that the Bill be passed 
in each House of Parliament. Therefore if the two Houses 
disagree on a Bill seeking to amend the Constitution, the 
Bill cannot be passed in a joint sitting and consequently 
such a Bill would elapse*. This view can be further supported 
by the argument that the number of the members of the House 
of the People(Lok Sabha) being more than double the members
43. L.S.D., 3rd series Vol VIII col 5971.
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of the Council of States( Rajya Sabha ), it is likely
that in a joint sitting the Lok Sabha would override the
Rajya Sabha. Thus, the interests of the Rajya Sabha can
only be safeguarded by providing no facility for a joint 
sitting. It can be said/ in addition that the consititution 
framers have been guided by practical convenience in having 
separate sittings which are conducive to good discussion 
and serious thinking on constitutional amendments*
The second view is that there is no reason why a dead­
lock between the two Houses cannot be removed by the 
President summoning a joint sitting under Art 108. It can 
be argued that Art. 368 merely emphasises the requirement 
of a special majority and is not complete code in the matter 
of procedure. Parliament is competent to adopt its own 
rules of procedure as long as these rules are consistent
with the requirements of Art 368. This view is fully
44
supported by the Sankari Prasad decision in which the 
Supreme Court repelled the argument that "legislative pro­
cedure" was not applicable to a Bill under Art. 368 and 
observed as follows:
11 Assuming that amendment of the consititution is
not legislation even where it is carried out by
the ordinary legislature by passing a bill intro­
duced for the purpose and that Arts 107 to 111,
44. A I R  1951 S C 458 =s 1952 SCR 89
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cannot in terms apply when parliament is dealing with a 
bill under Art. 368, there is no obvious reason wh y 
Parliament should not adopt, on such occasions, its own 
normal procedure so far as that procedure can be
45
fallowed consistently with statutory requirements.”
The argument that interests of the Upper House are 
jeopardised in a joint sitting, can be repelled by pointing 
out that the Lok Sabha represents the will of the people and 
the will of the people must prevail. The Upper House should 
not become an obstacle in its way. Moreover, in case the 
amendment relates to any of the entrenched provisions, the 
interests of the States are not in danger because the 
amendment would require ratification by at least half the 
State Legislatures and the States can take care of their 
interests better than the Upper House.
The second view seems to be more logical than the first 
view which makes the Constitution unnecessarily rigid.
Meaning of "Majority" in the expression 1 by a majority
of the total membership of that House1.
The words "majorityi! of the total membership" were 
regarded as having a double import. One view was that 
"majority" here should be construed as of the total number of 
the members that should exist at a particular time irrespec­
tive of the fact whether they in fact do exist or not. The
45. AIR 1951 SC 458 (462)
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second, view was that the total membership means the total 
number of members as they actually exist at a time. These 
two views give different results. For example, supposing 
at a particular time total membership is 500. Supposing 
further that 10 seats are vacant. According to the first 
view, the "majority" is 251 but according to the second 
view it is 246. The total number as it should be and the 
actual number of members are not necessarily one and the 
same, and the difference, therefore, has some significance.
The first Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Mr. Mavlankar, requested 
the advice of the Attorney-General who expressed the following 
opinion on this question.
" The expression *by a majority of the total member­
ship of that House* means that it is not the actual 
number of members existing at a given point of time 
which has to. be cosidered but fthe membership* meaning 
the totality of the members that should exist whether 
they in fact do exist or not. This aspect is em­
phasized by the use of the words *the total* and also
by the omission of the qualifying words 1 present and 
46
voting."
In passing the twenty-one constitution Amendment Acts, 
the totality of the membership has been taken into account
i
in calculating the majority' hat doubt has been cast on the
46. Kaul, M.N.., op. cit. Supra, p 477-78
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meaning of ‘majority* at times. When the Constitution 
Fifth Amendment Bill ( under the heading Seventh Amendment 
Bill) was voted at the consideration stage, it happened 
that 246 members voted for 'ayes' and 2 members voted for 
* noes*. At that time the total number of members of the 
Lok Sabha was 499. The Speaker declared the result of the 
voting but wanted to reserve his opinion as to what was to 
be declared in regard to the Bill; he was not sure whether 
the total of the actual number as it exists should be taken 
or the total number of members as it ought to b e , should
47
be counted. If the total number of members as they should 
exist is taken in the above case, the Bill is not carried 
because in that case the‘majority• required comes to 250. 
But if the actual number of members be taken and if 8 or 
more seats in the House are vacant, the Bill is carried. 
There was much argument that the total membership should 
be interpreted as the strength of the House for the time 
being, that is, the total strength of the House minus the 
vacant seats. When a member pointed out that Rule 169 of 
the then Rules of the House required total membership, the 
Speaker announced that the motion was not carried in 
accordance with Rule 169. The fact that he did not announce 
that the motion was not carried in accordance with Art 568 
shows that he was not convinced that 'majority should be
47. L.S. Deb. 1955, Vol IX col 887
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calculated as of the total membership
In our opinion, Art 568 requires the majority of the 
total membership of the House as it should b e , and the 
interpretation of the Attorney-General is correct. Rule 
159 of the R.P.C.B. of the Lok Sabha makes the point clear 
beyond any shadow of doubt by providing an explanation to 
the effect that "total membership" means the total number 
of members comprising the House irrespective of the fact
48
whether there are vacancies or absentees on any account.
A Majority Of Not Less Than Two-thirds Of The Members 
Of That House Present And Voting ::
The majority of two-thirds of the members present and 
voting is to be calculated by taking into account the number 
of members who are actually present at the time of voting. 
The Lok Sabha observes a convention of ringing the division 
bells for two minutes so that those members who happen to 
be outside the House at the time of voting may present 
themselves in th& House and participate in the voting.
After the bells have rung for two minutes, the doors of the 
House are closed. At the time the Constitution Fifth Amend­
ment Bill was put to vote, the division bells were rung as 
usual, the doors were closed. Unfortunately the motion was
48. Rule 159 R.P.C.B. Lok Sabha, 1957
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not carried. An objection was raised that the doors of the 
House should not be closed; otherwise, the meaning of 
'present1 in Art 368 fails to take into account those mem­
bers who/just at the doors when these are closed. The 
Speaker ruled that it would be difficult to keep the doors 
open and "present" means those who are present in the House 
when the doors are closed after ringing the bells for
two minutes."
The words "present and voting" seem to have been 
inserted on the basis of the Americal experience in this 
connection. Art V of the Constitution of the United States 
provides for a majority of two-thirds of both Houses of 
the Congress, for a proposal by the Congress to amend the 
constitution. The question arose in the National Prohi-
bihion Cases as to whether "two-thirds" means two-thirds 
of the total number of members or two-thirds of the members 
present and voting. The Supreme Court held that "two-thirds" 
means 2/3 of the members present, assuming the presence of 
of quorum. Since Art. 368 requires an absolute majority 
along with a two-thirds majority of the members present and 
voting and the quorum of each House is 1/10 of the total
are
49
50
strength of that mention the
49* L.S.D. 1955 Vol IX col 886-87
50. 1920, 253 U.S- 350.
51- Art 100(3)
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presence of quorem in Art. 368.
The use of the words "not less than" before two-thirds 
shows that the number of members may be exactly 2/3 of the 
members present and voting i.e. it is not necessary that 
their number should exceed the remaining 1/3. Supposing, 
the present and voting members are 450 and 300 are in favour 
of the Bill, 300 being exactly 2/3 of 450 and it also makes 
an absolute majority, ( taking the total membership as 500 ), 
therefore, the Bill would be carried. The words "not less 
than” signify that the majority required may be exactly 2/3 
or more than that, but not less than, the number of the 
members present and voting*
It is( observable that the words *present* and ‘voting* 
have been joined with the conjunction *and*, indicating that 
only those members are to be counted for the purpose of 2/3rd 
majority who are both present and also are actually voting.
In other words, those members who are present but do not 
vote in fact either way are not to be taken into account 
while counting the number of those who are present and also 
vote. By way of illustration, supposing at the time of 
voting on a Bill under Art 368 the total number of members 
present in the House is 450. Supposing of these 450 members, 
50 members do not exercise their vote at all, 260 vote for 
*ayes* and 140 for 'noes1. In this case, the 50 members who 
are present but who do not vote at all are not to be counted
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for finding the total number of those who are 1 present 
and voting*. Thus, the total number of those who are 
•present and voting* would be 450-50 = 400 and the requisite 
two-thirds majority would be 2/3 rd of 400 i.e. at least 
267. Therefore the Bill will not be carried, it falling 
short of 7 votes.
The word "present" makes it clear that physical presence 
of the members is necessary; they cannot exercise their 
votes by other means.
Presentation of the Bill to the President: When a Bill
has gone through the procedure prescribed in Art 368 in
both the Houses, and, if the Bill relates to any of the
provisions entrenched under Art 368, it has also been ratified
by at least half the state legislatures, it is mandatory that
it be presented to the President for Lhis assent. The words
used being "shall be presented", their unmistakeable import
is that it is not directory but mandatory that the Bill
be presented to the President. In the Constituent Assembly
a member moved an amendment to Art 368 which, if it had
been accepted, would have made the assent of the President 
52
mandatory • /
As to who shall present the Bill to the President for
52. C.A.D. Vol. 12 , p 1649
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his assent, we have to refer to the Rules of the Houses 
which provide that after a Bill is passed by the House the 
Presiding Officer of the House who is in possession of the
53
Bill will authenticate the Bill by his signature and then 
present it to the President. In case of absence of the 
presiding officers, the Secretary ofnegchoHhuseais^aTlithcjiJ- 
feed to authenticate the Bill. So the President can give 
his assent only to a Bill which has been so authenticated 
and presented..
Hole Of The President In TheAmending Process
What, after all, is the role of the Indian President 
in amending the Constitution ? According to Art 368, the 
presentation of a Bill, after it has been passed by both 
Houses of Parliament in accordance with the requirements of 
Art 368 - to the President is imperative but it is not made 
mandatory that he must give his assent to the Bill. If the 
President gives his assent, the Bill amends the Constitution 
immediately. Since it is not provided that the President 
must give his assent, it falls to be considered whether he 
can withhold his assent or send the Bill for reconsideration 
or whether he can cause delay in the matter. It is also
54
necessary to consider whether he can act under Art 143 in 
regard to such a Bill so that he may secure the opinion of
53« Rule 128 of the Rules of House, 1957*
54. Art 143 provides that the President can seek the advisory 
opinion of the Supreme Court.
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the Supreme Court.
Before we start considering these possibilities, it is 
relevant to note in contrast, that the amending process in 
the Constitution of the United States does not mention the 
President at all and the question arose whether a proposal 
of amendment of the constitution under Art V required the 
assent of the President or not. The Supreme Court held that 
an amendment of the federal constitution, being not a
55
legislative act, does not require the assent of the President.
Justice Chase, as he then was, observed : "The negative of
the President applied only to the ordinary cases of legis-
the
lation; he has nothing to do with/proposition or adoption
of amendments to the Constitution." Therefore, amendment
of the Constitution is outside the scope of the Presidential
veto power. It is to be noted that in some of the recently-
adopted constitutions.-it has been provided that the amendment
of the constitution is subject to the exclusive approval
56
of the head of the State, or it is mandatory for the head 
of state to give his assent or such assent has been done
55. Hollingsworth V Virginia, ( 1798 ) 3 Pall 378.
56. Sec 126(1) of Constitution of Jordan, 1951.
57* Sec 210 of the Constitution of Burma, 1948, Art 96 of
the Constitution ofJapan 1946.. Art 12(2) of the Consti­
tution of Republic of Korea, 1946, and Art 74 of the 
Constitution of Algeria, 1963*
58
away with.
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Can The President Withhold His Assent ?
The answer to the above question depends upon the posi­
tion and power of the President as provided in the Consti­
tution* There are three views about the position which 
the President occupies under the Indian Constitution. First, 
that his position corresponds to that of the Sovereign in 
England and, therefore, he is a mere nominal Head of State.
In fact, this view is entirely based upon the parliamentary 
system envisaged in the Constitution. Since in the Parliamen­
tary type of government the executive is responsible to, 
and removable by the legislature, therefore, the Head of 
State is only symbolical and represents the unity of the 
country and the real power lies in the Council of Ministers
59
headed by the Prime Minister1.
The second view is that the President is not a mere 
figurehead but his position is one of great authority and
58. Art 89 of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, 
1958. It is to be noted that the initiative for amending 
the constitution belongs to the President.
59. Rau, B*2i. , Indian Constitution in the making, 1980, 
pp 202-215.
Setalvad, M.C., The Indian Constitution 1950-65* 1967* 
pp 23-25.
60 80 
dignity. This view is based upon the provisions of the
Constitution. As a matter of fact, the Constitution provides
no where that the President is bound by the advice of his
61
Council of Ministers. So far as the letter of the Constitu­
tion is concerned, the President is not under any legal obli­
gation to act on the advice of his Council of Ministers and he 
may not only disregard the advice given by the Ministers but 
may act even contrary to it.
When the position of the President was discussed in the 
Constituent Assembly, it was pointed out by many members that 
it should be , made clear that the President shall be bound 
by the advice of the Council of Ministers. Even Dr. Rajendra 
Prasad, President of the Constituent Assembly, expressed the
view that " Art. 74(1) does not say that the President shall
62
be bound to accept that advice.” He suggested that some 
provision should be put in the Constitution to make the Presi­
dent bound by such advice. Dr. Ambedkar felt that the expre­
ssion ” aid and advice11 would serve the same purpose as it 
serves in section 11 of the B.N.A. Act, 18g7? from where it 
was borrowed and embodied in Sec 9 and Sec 50 of the Govt of
India Act, 1935? and transposed from there into the present
63
Constitution of India. Similarly, Alladi Krishnaswami, a
60. Munshi, KJ1., The President Under the Indian Constitution,
1963. Prof Gledhill, A., The Republic of India, 1964,
p 121. Mishra, R.N., The President of the Indian Republic
1964, pp 182-193.
Kapur, R.P., Revolution or Dictatorship, 1967-* P 267*
61. Art 74, 75? 78.
62. C.A.D.. Vol VIII, p 216.
63. C.A.D., Vol VIII, pp 215-16.
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great jurist and member of the Drafting Committee held the 
opinion that the expression 11 aid and advice” used Art 74- 
was an euphemism for act on the advice of his ministers and 
that in all circumstances the President would be bound by the 
advice of his ministers. In the beginning, the constitution 
framers had in mind to express the binding nature of the 
ministerial advice to the President, in the form of an Ins- 
truement of Instructions but ultimately the idea was dropped*
It is true that the members of the Constituent Assembly, 
referred to the position of the President as equivalent to 
that of the British Nonarch, but the written words of the 
Constitution, as interpreted by accepted cannons of inter­
pretation, do not say so. In fact, the position of the 
President as it exists at present, was expressed quite 
fairly by the President of the Constituent Assembly himself 
as follows:
“ Although there are no specific provisions, so far 
as I know, in the constitution itself making it binding 
on the President to accept the advice of his ministers, 
it is hoped that the convention under which in England 
the King acts always on the advice of his ministers 
will be established in this country also and, the Pre­
sident, not so much on account of the written word in
the Constitution, but as the result of this very health;
convention, will beeom&-ai-Constitutional President
64
in all matters.0
64. C.A.D. Vol XI p 988
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It seems that the Founding Fathers in their wisdom 
leftnthe matter to be resolved by conventions.
The Supreme Court favoured the first view given above 
and expressed it in these words:
"In India, as in England, the Executive has to act 
subject to the control of the legislature; but in 
what way is this control exercised by the Legislatu­
re? Under Art 53(1) of our Constitution, the 
executive power of the Union is vested in the 
President but under Art 75 there is to be a Council 
of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head 
to aid and advise the President in the exercise 
of his functions. The President hastthus been 
made a formal or constitutional head of the execu­
tive and the real executive powers are vested in
65
the Ministers or the Cabinet•”
The third view is that the constitution framers undoub­
tedly preferred the first view but intended that the second 
view should prevail in case the circumstances and conditions 
in the country frustrated the working of the parliamentary 
system. Therefore, the actual position and powers of the 
President depend more on the conditions prevailing in the 
country rather than the cold letter of the Constitution.
65. Ram Jawaya V State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 54-9(556)*
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As long as the parliamentary system works satisfactorily 
on the whole, the President remains a figurehead* The 
moment this system fails, the President becomes competent 
to assume the maximum powers provided to him but he is 
expected to restore the parliamentary system as soon as he 
can in the circumstances. Prof Gledhill, discerns this 
scheme underlying the provisions relating to the relation­
ship of the President and his Qouncil of Ministers and 
observes as follows:
" What the constitution contemplates is that norma­
lly the government shall be carried on by a Committee 
of Ministers selected from the elected representa­
tives of the people but it recognises that circums­
tances may arise in which that system may breakdown, 
so it is desirable that there should be.some autho­
rity empowered to continue the Government and set 
about restoring parliamentary government as soon as
possible. It is for this reason that the constitution
66
legally vests the executive power in the President.”
Thus, the constitution framers have shown their depth 
of wisdom, remarkable vision and farsightedness in providing 
the position and powers of the President in such a flexible
66. Gledhill, A., The Republic of India, 1964,
The Development its Laws and Constitution, 
P 115.
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and elastic language as to meet adverse circumstances without 
having to amend the Constitution or violate its provisions. 
Indeed, this device has achieved an appreciable amount of 
inherent flexibility and inbuilt viability for the Constitu­
tion. Had the Constitution provided expressly that the 
President is a nominal head and that all the executive power 
lies in the Council of Ministers, there might perhaps have 
been created a power-vacuum and situations arising out of 
the failure of cabinet government would have been unprovided 
for- By clothing the President with legal powers, political 
power ( de facto power ) has been saved from degeneration 
and disintegration because, in that eventuality, it passes 
on to the President who has been sufficiently informed 
and instructed as to what to do with it and in what manner 
and how to return it to those to whom it belongs. It is 
to be noted that, though the constitutional provisions seem 
to make the President an autocract, in fact his powers would 
remain unused unless the political conditions warrant him 
to make any use of them. If the President fails to sense 
the political conditions correctly and acts indiscreetly 
in regard to his powers, he would meet utter failure. Perhaps, 
the position of the President can be described accurately 
in these words:-
no
11 The President has practically/power when there is 
a stable majority in the Lok Sabha to support the 
Council of Ministers headed by a Prime Minister
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who rules the Country; but these powers increase 
in proportion to the instability and weakness of 
the Council* They will reach a maximum when there 
is no party in a majority in the Lok Sabha and the 
Union Government has to be carried on with shifting
67
coalition minorities.!t
It follows from the position and powers of the President
that though there is nothing in the Constitution which
prevents him from withholding his assent to an amendment of
he
the constitution, it is rarely that/Would do so. This is 
so because an amendment of the constitution, if it has 
gone through the procedure laid down in Art 568, testifies 
that at least an absolute majority of each House of Parlia­
ment has supported the Bill and in case he withholds his 
assent, the same absolute majority would take his decision 
with resentment. In other words, he would be inviting a 
direct conflict with Parliament, which no wise President 
would like to do. The President, however, would be entitled 
to refuse assent if he feels that the procedure laid down 
in Art 568 has not been followed or that at least half 
the state legislatures have not ratified the Bill. In such 
circumstances the amendment can be declared unconstitutional 
by the Supreme Court as well.
67. Srivastava, V.N., The Indian President. The Journal of 
Parliamentary Information, 1967* Vol XII, p 22 (27)
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There might be circumstances in which the Council
of Ministers may advice the President to withhold his assent,
as for instance if the Bill happens to be amended in the
Rajya Sabha in such a form that the Council thinks it. * proper
not to amend the Constitution.. Such a situation is possible
because it is not provided in the Constitution that the
be
amending Bill should/passed in identical terms i.e. the
Rajya Sabha is entitled to pass it with amendments. The
Council of Ministers might also advise the President to
exercise his veto power if such circumstances have taken
place since the bill was passed as to render the amendment
unnecessary. If the President declares that he withholds
68
his assent from a Bill, there is an end to it.
Can The President Use His Suspensive Veto ?
Art 111 provides that the President may return the Bill
if it is not Money Bill to the Houses for reconsideration
in part or as aiwhole, with or without his own suggestions.
Therefore, except Money Bills all other Bills can be sent 
by him for reconsideration. If a bill introduced under Aj?t 
368 is sent for reconsideration and is again passed with 
or without amendment by each House by an absolute majority 
of the House and also by a two-thirds majority of the
68. Basu,D.D. , Commentary on the Constitution of India. 1965
5th Edn, Vol 2, p 686.
87
members present and voting and then presented to the 
President for his assent, the President is bound to give
69
his assent. He cannot withhold his assent this time,
otherwise he might be impeached for violation of the 
70
Constitution.
It is of interest to note that the President’s veto 
power in regard to a Bill under Art. 368 is more in accord 
with the qualified veto of the American President in that 
an extraordinary majority is required in both the cases 
but in respect of all other Bills remitted for reconsideration 
only a bare majority is required to repass the Bill.
It is to be noted that no time limit is prescribed
in which the President must assent or refuse to assent or
return the Bill for reconsideration. In this regard the
only requirement is that if the President wants to return
the Bill he shall do it "as soon as possible" after the Bill
71
is presented to him. Though the words "as soon as possible" 
are indefinite and vague, they emphasise that there should 
be no unreasonable delay. Therefore, if the President wants 
to cause delay by keeping the Bill on his desk for an unduly 
long time, he might find it difficult to justify his act in
69. Art 111
70. Art 61
71. Art 111
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case he is impeached under Art 61•
Who Shall Present the Bill After Reconsideration ? t
The Constitution is silent on the point as to who is 
responsible for representing the Bill to the President. Both 
the Houses have framed their Rules. R. 154- of the Rules of 
the House and R. 135 of the Rules of the Council provide 
that after a Bill has been passed again by the Houses, the 
Presiding Officer of the House, which is in possession of 
the Bill will authenticate the Bill by his signature and then 
present it to the president for his assent. In case of 
absence of the presiding officer, the secretary of each 
House is authorised to authenticate the Bill on their behalf. 
In no amendments to the Constitution enacted so far has the 
president withheld his assent or returned the Bill for 
reconsideration or kept it on his desk for a long time.
Can The President Consult The Supreme Court Before Giving
Assent ?
The President is entitled to seek the advisory opinion
{--
of the Supreme Court under Art 14-3C1) Sf it appears to him 
that a question of law or fact has arisen or is likely to 
arise, which is of such a nature and of such public importance 
that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme
39
Court upon it. The Supreme Court is not hound to give an 
72
opinion.. The scope of Art. 143 is very wide. Amendment 
of the Constitution, by its nature, is a matter of public 
importance. Moreover it is not necessary that the question 
of law or fact to be referred must arise in fact. Even 
if it is likely to arise, it can be referred. So, the 
President may refer to the Supreme Court any question of 
law or fact in regard to a Bill which seeks to. amend the 
Constitution. Whether he would do so on the advice of his 
Council of Ministers or act suo moto is beside the point.
The President may be having doubt as to whether the amend­
ment Bill requires ratification of at least half the state 
legislatures or not. In the present state of the case law
75
on the point, it is not difficult to conceive that such a 
doubt can arise in regard to a number of Articles. The
74
Supreme Court would apply the doctrine of pith and substance 
or see whether the amendment of unentrenched Articles has
75"direct11 effect on the entrenched Articles or not.. If it 
has "direct" effect "it Would require ratification under Art 
368, otherwise not. It is only the Supreme Court who can
72. Re, Kerala Education Bill AIR 1958 SC. 956
75. Sajjan Singh V State of Rajasthan AIR 1965 SC 845 and
Golak Nath V State of Punjab A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643.
74. Per Gajendragadkar in Sajjan Singh Case AIR 1965 SC 
845 (852).
75. Per Wanchoo J in Golak Nath case. AIR 1967 SC 1643(1687)
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decide finally the question of “direct” effect. Therefore, 
the President may proceed under Art 14-3(4) to have the
opinion of the Supreme Court in the matter so that the
76
Government may act accordingly. Sometimes a doubt might 
arise whether a constitutional amendmentiis.,necessary in 
order to enable an action to be taken. Thus the President 
referred three questions to the Supreme Court in regard to 
the implementation of the agreement relating to the Barubari
77
Union. After the Supreme Court had expressed its opinion,
78
the Constitution was amended under Art 368.
Availability of the Power of amendment to the President.
Art 368 gives the power of amendment to the three
components of Parliament, namely, the House of the People
( Lok Sabha ), the Council of States ( Rajya Sabha ) and the
President. But in view of the fact that the Supr&me Court 
79
has held that Art 368 does not contain the power of amendment 
but only lays down a procedure of amendment and that such 
power lies in Art 248 read with List I* item 97 in the Seventh 
Schedule , the power of amendment becomes available to the
76. The advisory opinion under Art 143 is not binding upon the 
referring authority.
77. In Re Berubari i960 3 SCR 250 = 1960 AIR S.C. 845.
78. The Constitution ( Ninth ) Amendment Act, 1960.
This amendment has been discussed in detail in Chapter
VIII hereinbelow.
79. Golak Nath V State of Punjab 1967 AIR S.C. 1643.
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President exclusively in addition to his sharing it with 
both the Houses of Parliament. As the power of amendment 
of the Constitution has been regarded as “legislative11 as 
opposed to "constitutent” and, therefore, was placed among 
the legislative powers of Parliament ( List I ), it can be 
also used by the President under Art 123. Art 123 empowers 
the President to promulgate such ordinaces as the circums­
tances appear to him to require at any time except when 
both Houses of Parliament are in session. Such ordinances 
have the same force and effect as Acts of Parliament. The 
duration of an ordinance depends upon the re-assembly, of 
Parliament. If on reassembly. Parliament disapproves of the 
ordinance it ceases to have effect immediately; otherwise 
it continues for another six weeks from the date of re­
assembly of Parliament. As long as the Golak Nath decision 
holds the ground, the President can amend any provision 
except Part III ( in caBe of abridgment or taking away the 
rights) of the Constitution under Art 123 because his 
legislative power is co-extensive with the power of Parlia­
ment. Of course, the duration of his ordinace is supposed 
to be temporary but it is not difficult to visualize a 
Union Government which intends to amend any of the entrenched 
provisions of the Constitution under Art 368, when lacking 
the support of half the State Legislatures being tempted
92
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to amend Art 123 so as to remove the restrictions regarding 
the duration of an ordinance and then advising the President 
to amend the entrenched provision in question by an ordinance 
during recess of Parliament. In this way, the Golak Nath 
decision, by tracing the power of amendment in the legis­
lative powers of Parliament goes a long way in making that 
power available exclusively also to the President. Perhaps, 
it would be no exaggeration to say that in this way the whole 
amending machinery set up in Art 368 can be rendered useless* 
The President, thus, becomes the greatest and the easiest 
amending agency.
Significance of the expression; 11 this constitution shall 
stand amended.”
Apart from the fact that the expression “this constitu­
tion shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of
81
the Bill“ , contains power to amend, it has also dispensed 
with a large number of formalities usually observed in in­
corporating the amendment in the constitution after it has 
been passed by the House and assented to by the head of
the state viz, the requirement of its publication in the
official gazette or Register or the requirement of some
80. Art 123 being not entrenched, it can be amended by a
majority of the total membership of each House and by a
majority of two-thirds of the members present and voting 
in each House of Parliament; it does not require rati­
fication under Art 368.
81. This is discussed in Chapter VI hereinbelow.
82
internal between the passage and its entry into the Register. 
Such formalities may give rise to a lot of litigation. For 
instance, in the case of Collier V Pierson, 24 Ala 100, the 
legislature had proposed eight different amendments to the 
state constitution, which were approved by the people and 
had gone through all the requisite proceedings except that 
one of them was omitted by mistake in the ultimate resolution 
of ratification.
It was a fact that the legislature ratifying the 
resolution, ratified the amendment under the impression that 
eighth was also included in them. The dispute was whether 
the amendment left out was adopted or not. The court held 
that all the formalities must be gone through and the 
omission was fatal. Since the eighth amendment could not be 
said to have gone through the whole procedure, it was not 
adopted.
82. Sec 210 Burma's constitution requires that an amending 
Bill after going through the prescribed procedure shall 
be signed by the President and then promulagated forth­
with.
Sec 90(1) of Singapore's constitution, 1963 provides 
that an amending Bill, having been passed in the manner 
laid therein and assented to by the President, shall 
come into operation on the date of its publication in 
the Gazette or on sometther date mentioned either in the 
Bill or any other law.
Similarly, an amending Bill in the Constitution of 
Algeria, 1963 requires promulgation under Art 74 by the 
President within eighth day following the date of 
referendum.
( Constitutions of Nations by Peasle ).
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So far, the main limb of Article 368 has been dealt 
with and the entrenched articles will be discussed in 
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV 
Amendment Of The Federal Clauses
After explaining the process of amendment provided in 
Art 368, it is proposed in this chapter to study the so- 
called entrenched provisions in the proviso to Art 365.
There are two reasons for considering amendment of the 
federal clauses in a separate chapter.* First, these clauses 
bear a special significance in the whole scheme of the 
Constitution and that is why they have been entrenched for 
the purpose of amendment- Secondly, the substantive part 
of Art 368 and its proviso have presented difficulties in 
interpreting the whole Article and, according to the present 
case law, the scope of the substantive part may affect the 
scope of the proviso directly or indirectly. That being 
so, it is necessary to deal with the proviso separately.
The Reason For Entrenchment: The reason why certain
articles of the Constitution dealing with federal relations 
were entrenched was given by Dr. Ambedkar as followst
” If Members of the House who are interested in this
matter are to examine the articles that have been 
the will
put under/proviso, they/find that they refer not
merely to the centre but to the relations between the
centre and the Provinces. We cannot forget the fact
that while we have in a large number of cases invaded
provincial autonomy, we still intend and have as
a matter of fact seen to it that the federal structure
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1
of the constitution remains fundamentally unaltered,11
The entrenched articles are not the only articles which 
determine the relationship of the centre and the states 
hut these are thei.most important ones. In fact the federal 
structure of the constitution rests upon them.
The entrenched articles in the proviso to Art, 368 
are amenable to amendment only when a Bill passed to that 
effect in each House of Parliament by a majority of the
tot4?al membership of the House and also by a majority of
not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting 
and is thereafter ratified by at least half the state 
legislatures and then assented to by the President.
The entrenched provisions are as follows
(a) article 54* article 55* article 75* article 162, or 
article 241;
(b) Chapter IV of part V, Chapter V of part VI, or 
Chapter I of part XI;
(c) the lists in the Seventh Schedule;
(d) the representation of States in Parliament; and
(e) the provisions of Art 368.
Since the principle underlying the entrenchment is to
1* C.A.D. Vol IX, p 1661
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safeguard and preserve the Centre-state relations in the 
constitution it is convenient to feirady the entrenched pro­
visions according to their subject matter. Therefore, we 
propose to rearrange them in this way:-
(A) The manner of election of the President ( Art 54- 
and Art 55 )
(B) Distribution of legislative powers between the 
Union and the States ( Ch. I of part XI; Seventh 
Schedule )
(C) Extent of the executive power of the Union and 
the States. ( Art 73 and 162 )
(D) Representation of States in Parliament
(E) The Supreme Court and the High Courts ( Ch. IV of 
part V,)Ch. V of part VI and Art 24-1 )
(P) Amendment of the Constitution ( Art 368 )
To bring out their significance in regard to the centre- 
state relations it is necessary to briefly explain each of 
the above categories. Having done this, we may enquire into 
the question whether the federal principle has been suffi­
ciently observed in so far as the amendment of the consti­
tution is concerned.
(A) The Manner Of Election Of The President
Art 54- and 55 deal with the mode of electing the Preside­
nt. The President is not elected directly by the people but
\
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indirectly by an electoral college consisting of the elected
members of both Houses of Parliament and the elected members
2
of the legislative assemblies of all the states. The
election aims at a double parity viz first among the states
inter se and secondly between the states as a whole and
the Union. The first parity is achieved by adjusting the
weight behind each member of a legislative assembly in
proportion to the number of people he represents in the
state legislature. For this purpose, every elected member
of the legislative assembly of a state has been given as
many votes for the election of the President as there are
thousands in the quotient obtained by dividing the population
of the state by the total number of the elected members of 
3
the Assembly. The second parity ( between the union and the 
been
states ) has/secured by providing that the number of votes
a member of Parliament will have is to be arrived at by
dividing the total votes of all the Assemblies by the number
4
of the elected members of Parliament.
2. Art. 54-.
5. Art. 55 (2) (a) 
4.. Art- 55 (2) (c)
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Moreover, the system of proportional representation 
by means of the single transferable vote has been adopted
5
in the election and the voting is by secret ballot..
Significance of including Members of State Assemblies 
in Electoral College:
In the Constituent Assembly, the idea of having a
direct election of the President was rejected for various
reasons such as the large size of the electorate, the great
strain on the administrative machinery, and the figurehead
6
function of the President. The alternative was to have 
. . /byindirect election/an electoral college consisting of all
the elected members ofl'Parliament. But this would have
reduced the election to a party affair because the President
would have been elected only when supported by the majority
party in Parliament. A "middle course" was adopted lest
the President might represent the same group or party as
7
at the centre. It is submitted that the expansion of the 
electoral college to include members of the Legislative 
Assemblies goes to prove that the President is not necessarily
5. Art 55 (3)
6. C.A.D. Vol VII pp g£:o: 987-999•
7. C.AID. Vol IV, pp 734-35•
bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers in all 
matters, otherwise an electoral college consisting of only 
the members of Parliament would have been enough.
By including the elected members of the Legislative
Assemblies in the electoral college, the states came to
have a substantial right in the election of the President.
Besides this, the system of proportional representation allows
the minorities, according to Dr. Ambedkar, to have "some
8
hand and some say" in the election. Thus the way in which 
the President is ejected makes him representative of the 
whole nation and he can claim moral independence and autho­
rity which would have not been possible, had he been an 
individual elected only by the majority in Parliament.
Viewed from the constitutional provisions, the position 
and powers of the President are such that it all depends 
upon him whether the Constitution should work federally or
9
unitarily at a particular time. Therefore, from the point
of view of the federal principle, it is necessary that the
states should have an equal share with the Union in electing
of
the President. No doubt, the Upper House/Parliament ( Rajya 
Sabha ) has representatives of the states but this would 
have been ineffective in representing the states in the
8. C.A.D. Vol VII p 1017.
9. For instance the emergency powers ( Art 352-360 ); appoin­
tment and dismissal of Governor ( Art 155 > 156(1} ); and
powers of giving directions to state governments in matter 
enumerated under Art 275(2)(3)> 339(2), 355(a) and 360(3)*
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election of the President, because the membership of the 
House of the People ( Lok Sabha ) is at least double that 
of the Rajya Sabha. But the question to be asked is whether 
this principle was adequately entrenched*.
Loop-Holes in entrenchment: Art 54- creates an electoral
— a ^  - , •> * '
college comprising all the/electecfc members of Parliament
and the Legislative Assemblies. But the crucial question is
whether the election can take place when one or more
legislative Assemblies stand dissolved. Supposing an
emergency under Art. 356 is declared in a State and the
Legislature is not functioning, can the Presidential election
be held at that time? It seems that it can be held. In
10
N.B. Khare V Election Commissioner of India. a point was 
made by the petitioner that for a valid election of the 
President, all elections to the two Houses of Parliament 
should be completed before the election of the President is 
held; otherwise some members are denied the right to take 
part in the election. The Supreme Court expressed no opinion 
on the point- This point made the Government aware of the 
possibility of some one challenging the election of the 
President on the ground that some members of the electoral 
college were not returned at the time of the election of the 
President. Therefore, the Govt, amended Art 71 by inserting
10. 1957 S.C.R. 1081.
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a new clause which reads as follows:
” The election of a person as President or Vice-Presi' 
dent shall not be called in question on the ground 
of the existence of any vacancy for whatever reason 
among the members of the electoral college electing 
him •11
11
Though Basu holds the view that the wordnvacancyn
involves the idea of quitting and it is, therefore, doubtful
whether it covers the case of the two Houses not being
fully constituted by reason of the generaL election being
not held for certain seats at all. It seems that clause
4 of Art 71 is so widely worded that it would be difficult
to assert that such a case is not covered by it. The
question has not yet been answered by the Supreme Court. If
it ever arises, the Supreme Court might find it difficult
to resolve the apparent conflict between Art. 54- aud 71(4).
If it is held that no election can take place when any
legislature is not functioning, then an out-going President
12
acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers, might be 
tempted to dissove one or two legislatures by declaring an 
emergency and thus perpetuate himself.. On the other hand,
11. Basu, Commentary, Vol II, p 398.
12. It is more likely that a majority party in the centre,
being doubtful of further support from the states for
its candidate for Presidentship, would tender such
advice to the President in office..
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if itiis held that an election can take place even when 
any legislature is not functioning, an ambitious President 
would be tempted to dissolve hostile legislatures and 
contest for reelection. In any event, the purpose of Art 
54- and 55 seems to have been defeated by Art 71(4) and 
with it the federal principle too. It appears that it did 
not occur to the Constitution framers to entrench Art 71 
along with Art 54 and 55 and thereby the entrenchment itself 
is rendered ineffective if Art 71 ( which is not entrenched ) 
can undercut them.
(B) Distrubution of Legislative Powers Between the Union
And States.
In a federal polity, it is essential to allocate legis­
lative powers between the centre and the state (units) as 
clearly as possible. In the Constitution of India, Art 245 
shows the extent of Union and State legislative power. The 
Union Parliament is competent to make laws for the whole or 
any part of the territory of India whereas a state legisla­
ture can make laws for the whole or any part of the terri­
tory of that state.
Subjects of legislation have been enumer&ted in the 
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and have been classified 
into three lists, namely, the Union List ( List I ) the 
State List ( List II ) and the Concurrent List ( List III ). 
The Union Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with 
respect to matters included in the Union List and the matters
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included in the State List are within the exclusive legisla­
tive competence of the States. As regards the Concurrent 
List, both the Union and the States have competence to make 
laws but, in case of inconsistency, the Union law prevails
over the State law unless the State law has been reserved for
15
the assent of the President and has received his assent. It
is to be noted that Art 246 secures the supremacy of the
Union legislature in case of overlapping as between the
14
various Lists. The exclusive legislative powers of the State
Legislatures is made subject to the powers of Parliament in
List I and III, whereas the powers under List I are not
subject to those under any other List. Residuary powers
15
have been vested in the Uhion.
The scheme of distributing the legislative powers 
between the centre and the states is not watertight but 
allows Union intervention even in the exclusive field of 
legislation of the States.
Under Art .200.' the Governor of a State may reserve 
a bill passed by the state legislature, for the consideration 
of the President. This:.:reservation is compulsory if the law
13. Art. 254.
14. Art. 246(3)
15* Seventh Schedule, List I, item 97*
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in question would so derogate from the powers of the High
16
Court as to endanger its position under the Constitution.
The President may give his assent to the bill so reserved 
or withhold his assent therefrom., The matter of propriety 
or otherwise of assent or refusal to a State bill by the
17
President cannot be questioned in any court. Therefore, 
even within the exclusive field of legislation of the States 
there is scope for Union intervention-
Art. 24-9 provides that if the Council of State &as 
declared by resolution supported by not less than two-thirds 
of the members present and voting that it is necessary 
or expedient in the national interest that Parliament 
should make laws with respect to any matters enumerated in 
the State List specified in the resolution it shall be law­
ful for Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part 
of the territory of India with respect to that matter while 
the resolution remains in force.: The maximum life of such
a resolution is one year but it can be kept alive for as
many years as required by passing a resolution in the same
18
manner as provided above every year. This provision intro­
duces for the first time a useful innovation designed to
19
secure greater flexibility in working the federation. In
16. Proviso to Art 200
17. Art 201
18. Art 24-9(2)
19. Seervai, H.M., Constitutional Law of India, 1962, 78 
L.Q»R. at 4-00
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reality it constitutes a temporary amendment of the State 
List, without undergoing the process of amendment under 
Art. 368.
During a Proclamation of Emergency under Art. 356(1),
the legislative power of Parliament extends to any of the
20
matters enumerated in the State List. In reality, the 
federal character of the constitution ceases to exist during 
a Proclamation of Emergency.
The exclusiveness of the State List is further qualified
by the provision which empowers Parliament to legislate for
two or more States by consent and for other States by adop-
21
tion of such legislation , even though the subject matter 
of legislation falls exclusively in the State List. By way of 
comparison, we may refer to the proposed Fulton-Favreau 
formula in Canada which seeks to achieve flexibility in the 
amending process by adopting the delegation of powers of 
legislation. Section 9 of the Fultion Bill and Section 13 
of the Favreau Bill provide that, under specified conditions 
the provinces can delegate to Parliament the authority to 
enact a particular law in respect of a subject coming within 
the major categories of provincial matters that would other­
wise be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces 
to enact and that Parliament can similarly delegate to the 
provincial legislature authority to enact a particular law
20. Art 250
21. Art 252
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would
thay otherwise be within theexclusive jurisdiction of
Parliament to enact. Such delegation would specifically
require, in each case, an Act and consent of both Parliament
22
and at least four provincial legislatures. It is to be
e.
noted that m  this way jurisdiction is not delegated but
only the enactment of a particular law. The delegating
authority may subsequently revoke the consent. If it does,
the specific statute ceases to have effect. Indeed,11 it is
a practical means of adapting the exercise of legislative
authority to changing conditions while maintaining ultimate
23
control where the constitution has placed it.”
The power of the Indian Parliament in regard to trea­
ties is also an important modification of the distribution 
of powers as between the Union and the States. According 
to Art 253? Parliament has the power to make any law for 
implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with foreign
countries or any decision made at any international con-
24-
ference, association or other body. According to Ivor 
Jennings, ” on its face it ( this provision ) would seem
25
to apply to any international organisation....”
22. Guy, Favreau, The Amendment of the Constitution of Canada 
Ministry of Justice, Feb, 1968, p 28.
23* Guy Favreau, op. cit. p 4-1 
24-. Art 253.
25. Jennings, Ivor^ Some Characteristics of the Indian 
Constitution, pp 65-66.
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It may be pointed out that the scheme of distribution
of the legislative powers is applicable to the Union and
the States but not in regard to the Union territories in
respect of which the legislative power in its entirety is
26
vested in Parliament.
The distribution of legislative powers between the Union 
and the States is so designed that the need for any cons­
titutional amendment in this matter has been reduced to the 
minimum. As we have seen above the State List is not exclu­
sive in the real sense of the word.- It can be interfered with 
by the Union in various ways. As compared with the distri­
bution of legislative powers in the constitutions of Canada 
or Australia, the Indian Constitution follows the principle 
of flexibility to the maximum possible extent and yet carves 
out a legislative field for the States. In fact, the scheme 
adopted, though centre-biased, completely does away with the 
difficulties arising out of a divided jurisdiction. The 
founding fathers were fully aware that a federal constitution 
generally suffers from two defects, namely, rigidity and 
legalism and they adopted every possible technique to do
27
away with them. No doubt, the distribution of the legisla­
tive power is elastic but the federal principle requires 
that it should not be disturbed without the consent of the
26. Art 246(4)
27. Dr. Ambedkar C.A.D. Vol VII pp 35-36
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States and entrenchment achieves this end only to a limited 
extent.
(C) Extent Of the Executive Power Of the Union and the 
States ( Art 73 and 162 )
Articles 73 and 162 read together determine the extent
of the executive power of the Union and the States. Neither
Article 162 nor 73 contains any definition as to what the
executive function is. Generally, executive powei1 has been
taken to be the residue left after the legislative and the
28
judicial powers have been taken into account.
In respect of three specified matters, executive power is 
expressly conferred upon the Union and the State Governments. 
These are as followsi
1. Carrying of any trade or business ( Art 298 )
2. Acquisition, holding and disposal of property
( Art 298 ); and
3. making of contracts for any purpose ( Art 299 )
It is to be noted that it is not necessary that there 
should be legislation to authorise the executive power to 
be used- Both Art 73 and 162 use the words " has power to
make law u which indicate clearly that the legislative
competence is enough to determine the validity of the execu-
29
tive act.
28. Ram Jawaya V State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1955 SC 554**
29.
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In distributing the executive power between the Union 
and the States, the scheme of the distribution of the legis­
lative power has been followed with a few exceptions. The 
Union has exclusive executive power over the matters with
respect to which Parliament has exclusive power to make 
30
laws. The executive power of a State extends only to its
own territories and with respect only to those subjects over
31
which it has legislative competence. The exceptions to this 
general scheme are in the following cases:
(a) So far as the Concurrent List ( List III ) is 
concerned, though both the Union and the States have legis­
lative power but the executive power is vested in the States, 
except in two cases:
(1) Where Parliament vests some executive power speci-
32
fically by law in the Union.
(2) Where the provisions of the Constitution itself
33
vest some executive functions upon the Union.
(b) There are provisions enabling the Union executive 
power to encroach on the state executive power. The Union 
can give directions to the State Governments as regards the
30. Art. 73(1) (2)
31. Art. 162.
32. Proviso to Art 73(1)(a) read with Art 162.
33. Art 73(1)
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34
exerfcise of their executive power in certain mattersw in 
normal times. Further, during a Proclamation of national 
emergency, the Union can give a direction to any state as 
to the manner in which the executive power thereof is to
35
be exercised. Under Art 356(1), when constitutional machi­
nery in a state has broken down, the President is entitled 
to assume>to himself all or any of the executive powers of 
the State. Similarly during Proclamation of financial
emergency alsoif vast executive powers to give directions to
36
the states become available to the Union*
(c) With the consent of the Union, a State Government 
is competent to entrust any of its executive functions to
37
the Union. Conversely, with the consent of a State Govern­
ment, the Union may entrust its own executive functions
38
relating to any matter to the State.
34. For instance ensuring due complinace with union laws and 
existing laws which apply in the stqte ( Art 256 ); 
ensuring that the exercise of the executive power of the 
state does not interfere with that of the union (57(1); 
to secure the construction and maintenance of the means 
of communication of national or military importance
by the State 275(2); to ensure protection of railways 
within the state Art 275(3); in regard to the drawing 
and execution of schemes for the welfare of the scheduled 
Tribes in the state (Art 339(2); to secure the provision 
of adequate facilities for instruction in the mother 
tongue at the primary stage of education to children 
belonging to linguistic minority groups ( Art 350A) 
and to ensure the development of Hindi ( Art 351)
35. Art. 353(a)
36. Art 360(3); 360(4)(b) and 360(4)
37. Ait 258 A
38. Art 258(1)
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(d) Under Art 258(2), a law made by Parliament relating 
to a union subject may authorise the Central Government to 
delegate its functions or duties to a State Government or 
its officers, irrespective of the consent of such Government.
(e) Certain pre-constitution Central Acts which entrust 
specific functions to the State Governments are to remain 
valid until Parliament provides otherwise, though the exe­
cutive power relating to these subjects, lies with the
39
Union.-
It follows from what we have noted above that the dema­
rcation line between executive power of the Union and that 
of the States is not fixed or rigid but very flexible. In 
some cases, the executive power of the Union extends to the 
whole range of the legislative power of the State Governments 
e.g. in the matter of implementing a treaty. In this 
connection it is note-worthy that Art.73 and 162 both begin 
with the words " subject to the provisions of this consti­
tution. 11 That means that whatever scheme of demarcating the 
executive power has been followed in Art 73 and 162, it is 
overriden by the provisions of the Constitution.
It seems that the constitution framers have exhausted
39. Art. 73(2)
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all the possible ways of making the executive power of the 
Union and the State Governments as flexible and elastic as 
possible- For inscance, the general principle adopted in 
distributing the executive power on the basis of the legis­
lative power itself yields a remarkable flexibility because
undernArt 249 any of the legislative heads in List II ( State 
List ) can be shifted to the Union List, though for a tem-
40
porary period ( not exceeding one year for each resolution ).
When the legislative power belonging to the States is
transfared to the U&ion under Art 249, the executive power
41
is also transferred . It is to be noted that the Council 
of States consists of representatives of the States and, 
therefore, the consent of the States can be said to have 
been indirectly given for such transfer. But it is to be 
observed that the special majority required is not two-thirds 
of the total membership of the House but only two-thirds
of the members present and voting.
The constitution framers have introduced the method
of delegating the executive power with the consent of the
42
Union and of the States. The centre can delegate its exe-
43
cutive power to any State eyen without consent. These
40. See supra, p 105.
41. The executive function of the Union being co-ext^nsive 
with its legislative functions ( Art 73(1)(a).
42. Art 258A, 258(1).
43. Art 258(2)
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provisions have provided for any unseen contingency which 
might happen.
Besides, the power of giving directions is an effective 
weapon of control of the Union over the States because a 
direct sanction has been attached for non-compliance with 
directions issued by the centre. In case of failure to give 
effect to such directions, the President is competent to 
hold that a situation has arisen in which the government of 
the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the pro­
visions of the Constitution and he can then exercise his
44
powers under Art 356.
As we have seen, during the Proclamation of Emergency, 
the union executive power can expand to cover the whole 
executive field of the State concerned.
The distribution of the executive power being what it is, 
the question arises whether there is any advantage in 
entrenching Art 73 and 162. It is submitted that, though 
the executive power has been distributed in a very flexible 
way and is therefore capable of meeting any conceivable 
contingency, the entrenchment has some significance. The 
States can remain content that, in normal times, there will 
not be any change in broad scheme of distribution of the 
executive power except with the consent of at least half the 
States. There might be slight modification in some matters,
44. Art. 365
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sometimes with consent and sometimes even without consent, 
but the major scheme stands preserved and safeguarded-
(D) The Representation Of States in Parliament.
The States can be said to be represented in Parliament
in the Council of States because mostly its members are
elected by the elected members' of the Legislative Assemblies
of the States. The maximum number of the members of the
Council of States has been prescribed as 250 of whom twelve
46
members are to be nominated by the President. The system 
of proportional representation by means of the single 
transferable vote has been adopted in the election of the
47
Council of States, except in regard to the representatives
of the Union Territories who are to be chosen in such manner
48
as Parliament by law provides. The States representation 
in the Council is not based on equality but on a fixed
49
allocation of seats. The allocation varies from 34 ( Uttar 
Pradesh ) to 1 ( State of Nagaland ).
It follows from the manner of the election of the Council 
of States that it is difficult to assume that its members
45.* Art. 80(4)
46- Art. 80(b) and ( 80(a)
47. Art. 80(4)
48. Art 80(5), part IVA in the Representation of the People 
Act ( LXXII of 1950 ).
49. This allocation is given in the Fourth Schedule to the 
Constitution.
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represent ;the States as units- The Council of States is not
50
subject to dissolution but one-third of its members retire 
every two years. Thus the members of the Council hold their 
seat for six years. Normally, legislative Assemblies are
51
elected after five yearsr and this period may or may not 
coincide with the period during which the representatives of 
the States in the Council of States hold their seats. There­
fore, the members of the Council of States cannot be regar­
ded as truly representing the State Legislatures or State 
governments. Nor can they be considered as representatives 
of the people of their States because they have not been 
electedbj3yuthe people directly. Do they represent the 
interests of their States? Judged by their voting behaviour,
they follow the party alignment rather than the interests
52
of their States and so it is difficult to assume that the 
members of the Council of States represent the States qua 
States any more than the members of the House of the People.
Be that as it may, a significant doubt remains as to 
the meaning of the expression : "the representation of States 
in Parliament" in the Proviso to Art. 368. Does it mean 
the number of the members elected by each state legislature,
50. Art. 83
51. Art. 172
52. Rao, K-V., Parliamentary Government in India, 1965, p 135
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keeping the total constant or does it include a variation 
in the total number of members of the Council of States or 
a complete removal of representation for an individual 
state? Does it include the manner of election of the Council 
of States because even the mode of election might affect 
the representation of the States? Alternatively, does it 
simply mean that the States must be represented in the 
Council of States and the manner of election and the number 
of the members elected by them are immaterial?
It is submitted that the phrase " the representation of 
States in Parliament" is very vague. In the Constituent 
Assembly, the entrenched articles were not discussed in 
detail and, therefore, it is not clear as to what the cons­
titution framers really meant by the above phrase. Apart 
from the general purpose of the entrenchment and the fact 
that the entrenched articles are those significant provisions 
which establish the relation between the centre and the 
states, nothing can be learnt in this regard from the 
Constituent Assembly Debates.
In view of the vagueness of the phrase " representation 
of States in Parliament", it is difficult to say what sort 
of amendment of the Constitution can be characterised as 
requiring ratification under it by half the state legisla­
tures. This uncertainity iss aggravated by the fact that no
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specific articles or provisions have been mentioned as
falling under this category and some provisions of the
Constitution go to negate the entrenchment. For instance,
Art 2 provides for admission or establishment of new States
and Art 3 provides for formation of new States and alteration
of areas, boundaries or names of existing States. Parliament
is competent to act under these articles by an ordinary law.
A law under Art, 2 or 3 would naturally affect the First and
the Fourth Schedules. Art 4(1) expressly provides that a
law relatable to Art 2 or 3 may contain such provisions for
the amendment of the First and the Fourth Schedules as may
be necessary- Art 4(2) expressly provides that such law
shall not be deemed to be a Constitutional amendment for
the purposes of Art 368. In other words, acting under Art. 2
or Art 3 Parliament is competent to affect the representation
of States in Parliament but such a law is outside the purview
of Art 368. It is of interest to note that Parliament has.
53
amended the Fourth Schedule by ordinary laws many times e.g. 
by enacting the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, the Andhra 
Pradesh and Madras ( Alteration of Boundaries ) Act, 1959, 
and the State of Nagaland Act, 1962. Therefore, the number of 
members of the Council of States allocated to the States can
53• Fourth Schedule contains the allocation of seats in the 
Council of States.
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be altered by Parliament pursuant to Apt 2 or Art 3 and 
this kind of alteration does not bring in the operation of 
Art 368 and, therefore,avoids ratification by the States. 
Moreover, if "the representation of States in Parliament” 
was intended to mean the number of members elected by each 
State to the Council, was it not necessary to entrench the 
Fourth Schedule also?
The use of the word'States' in the plural does not 
make it clear whether the representation of a single State 
is intended to be covered by the phrase or not. In any 
event the whole phrase is not free from ambiguity and the 
Supreme Court might be called upon to interpret this provi­
sion and determine what "the representation of states in 
Parliament” means and which Articles of the Constitution fall 
under its ambit. It seems that, except for the abolition 
of the Council of States, no amendment of the Constitution 
on this subject can be said to be caught by the phrase.
In view of the existing provisions of the Constitution, 
probably amendment of the Fourth Schedule for purposes other 
than those specifically mentioned in Art 2, 3 or 4 would 
be regarded as a constitutional amendment and would therefore, 
require ratification by at least half the state legislatures 
along with the special majority of Parliament required by 
Art 368. Again amendment seeking to abolish the Council of 
States seems to be one falling clearly under this category.
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(E) The Supreme Court And The High Courts
( Chapter IV part V, Chapter V of Part VI and Art 
241 )
Chapter IV of Part V deals with the Union Judiciary i.e. 
the Supreme Court; Chapter V of part VI deals with the High 
Courts in the States and Art 241 deals with the High Courts 
in the Union Territories. We propose to deal with them 
separately.
The Supreme Court: The Supreme Court is at the apex
of the Indian Judiciary and the law declared by it is binding
54
on all courts in the land. The Supreme Court interprets not
only the Constitution but also the general law of the land.
In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it may pass any decree
or make any order to do complete justice in any cause or
matter pending before it, which is enforceable throughout
the territory of India in the manner laid down by law by
Parliament. If there is no such law made by Parliament, the
President may prescribe by order the manner in which the
55
orders of the Supreme Court are to be enforced. The Supreme
Court is also a court of record with power to punish for
56
contempt of itself.
54. Art 141; the expression "declared" was interpreted as 
being wider than the words "found or made". To declare 
is to announce an opinion. The latter involves a process 
while the former expresses a result. Golak Nath V State 
of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643 (1669)
55* Art 142.
56. Art 129*
121
The judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the
President after consultation with such judges of the Supreme
he
Court and of the High Court in the States as/thinks necessary• 
In the case of a judge other than the Chief Justice, the
57
Chief Justice of India must be consulted.* Normally a ^g 
judge holds office until he attains the age of sixty-five
59
but a retired judge may be reappointed.. A judge of the
Supreme Court cannot be removed except on the grounds of
misbehaviour or incapacity and in accordance with the
60
procedure prescribed in the Constitution. No person who
has held office as judge of the Supreme Court can plead or
act in any court or before any authority within the territory
of India. The judges of the Supreme Court are paid a speci- 
61
fied salary and their privileges or allowances cannot be
62
varied to their disadvantage after appointment. The conduct
of the judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts cannot
be discussed in Parliament with respect to their official
conduct except upon a motion for their removal under Art.
63
124(4) • Thus the Constitution establishes an independent 
Supreme Court.
57. Art 124
58. Art 124(2)
59. Art 128
60. Art 124(4)
61. Art 125? Schedule II.
62. Art 125.
63. Art 121
64
Besides its appellate jurisdiction in certain cases, 
the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in any dispute 
between the Government of India and one or more States or
65
between two or ,imore; .States inter se. The jurisdiction 
o .intends to any question (whether of law or fact ) on which
65
the existence or extent of a legal right d e p e n d s A  few
matters have been exempted from the original jurisdiction of
66
the Supreme Court.
In a federal State, along with & written constitution
having distribution of powers between the centre and the units
it is also necessary that there should be an impartial body,
67
usually the judiciary to interpret the constitution. In
the Constitution of India, not only a body (Supreme Court)
it
has been created but the provisions creating/have been 
entrenched under Art. 368.
64. Art 132 to 136.
65« Art 131*
66. Proviso to Art 131? Art 262, Art 257(4)? Art 258, Art 290
67. Some theorists argue that it is not derogatory to the
federal principle, that the functions of interpreting 
the constitution and the settlement of disputes between 
the centre and the units are vested in a body other than
the judiciary, as in the Constitution of Switzerland
and of the U.S.S.JR. All thgt is necessary is that there 
must be some impartial body. The arguments for and 
against Judicial review have been ably presented by 
Cowen, D.V., The Poundations of Freedom with special 
reference to Southern Africa* Chapter 7. 1961.
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The entrenchment of the whole chapter IV of part V 
gives the impression that rigidity has been cast on a large
68
chunk of what is generally regulated by ordinary legislation. 
But, in fact, this statement is partially true because some 
of these entrenched provisions empower Parliament to make
69
ordinary law in regard to them. For instance, the number
of the Supreme Court Judges can be increased by Parliament
70
by ordinary law. The privileges and allowances and the 
rights in respect of leave of absence and pension of the 
judges can also be varied by ordinary law but not to their
71
disadvantage after their appointment.
Parliament may by ordinary law provide that an appeal
shall lie to the Supreme Court from the judgment, decree or
72
final order of one judge of a High Court. In regard to
certain matters, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can
be withdrawn without having to go through the process of
75
amendment of the Constitution. The power of the Supreme 
Court to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it
68. Jennings, Ivor. op. cit, supra, p 16.
69. We propose to deal with these provisions in details in 
the subsequent chapter.
70. Art 124(1)
71. Art 125(2)
72. Art 135(3)
73- Art 135
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is subject to ordinary legislation by Parliament or rules
made under Art 145 by the Supreme Court with the approval
74
of the President. Similarly supplemental or ancillary
75
powers may be conferred on the Supreme Court. The manner
in which the decrees of the Supreme Court should be enforced
76
can be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament.
The conditions of service of officers of the Supreme Court 
are liable to be modified by Parliament by ordinary legis-
77
lation.
It istto be noticed that if Parliament ever wants to 
change the salaries of the Supreme Court judges, it needs 
only to amend the Second Schedule for which ratification 
by the State legislatures is not required. Not only that, 
flexibility has been achieved by means other than ordinary 
legislation.. For instance, the Supreme Court has been 
empowered to make rules in regard to the practice and pro­
cedure of the Court. But this power is subject to law made
by Parliament and the rules so made must be approved by the 
78
President. Appointments of officers and servants of the 
Supreme Court inay beenegulated by the President to a certain
79
extent. The seat of the Supreme Court can be changed from
74.Art 137
75.Art 140
76.Art 142(1)
77.^rt 146(2)
78.Art 145
79.Art 146(1)
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Delhi to some other place by the Chief Justice of India
80
with the approval of the President,
It is to be observed that the entrenchment of Chapter 
IV of part V is the most significant one because without 
entrenching the provisions regarding the Supreme Court, 
the entrenchment of all other provisions would have been in­
effective. Ihe Supreme Court is the only body to decide 
whether the Union Government or the State Governments or 
other functionaries in the Union have transgressed on one 
another*s powers and whether in effecting a measure the 
constitutional requirements have been complied with or not. 
It is the Supreme Court alone which can pronounce finally 
whether the procedure laid in Art 368 has been observed in 
enacting an amendment. If the Supreme Court itself is left 
unentrenched, the very purpose of entrenchment could be 
defeated by amending the provisions regarding the jurisdic­
tion of the Supreme Court.
80. Art 130
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High Courts in States: A High Court is the highest
court in a State. Every High Court is a court of record,
81
having the power to punish for contempt of itself. The
independence of the High Court has been established almost
82
in the same manner as in regard to the Supreme Court. The 
High Courts have been vested with vast jurisdictions and 
powers to issue writs not only, like the Supreme Court, to
83
protect a Fundamental Right, but also for any other purpose.
There are changes that can be effected in Chapter V of
of Part VI without going through the process of amendment
been
under Art 388. Many matters have/left to the legislature
84
to be changed, if so desired, by ordinary legislation. Some
85 86
changes can be effected by the President or the Governor . 
Thus, a measure of flexibility has been introduced in the 
provisions.
High Courts in Union Territories: Afticle 241(1)
provides that Parliament may by law constitute a High Court 
for a Union territory or declare any court in a union
81. Art 215
82. Articles, 121, 217, 218, 221, 224.
83. Art 226
84. See Articles 221(2), 222(2), 225, 229, 230, 231(1)
85. Art 216, 224, 222
86. Art 229.
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territory to be a High Court for all or any of the purposes 
of this Constitution. Clause(2) of Article 24-1 applies 
the provisions of chapter V of part VI to the High Courts in 
the Union territories, subject to such modifications or 
exceptions as Parliament may by law provide. Further, clause 
3 continues the extra-state jurisdiction of some of the 
High Courts over union Territories until Parliament by law 
excludes such jurisdiction. Parliament is competent to 
extend or exclude the jurisdiction of a State High Court to 
or from any union territory or part thereof.
Prom the above provisions it is obvious that Parliament 
has plenary powers in regard to High Courts in the union 
territories. In fact, Art 24-1 empowers Parliament to create 
the judiciary in a union territory on the model of a High 
Court in a State•
In view of the fact that Art 24-1 has been couched in
a wide language, it is difficult to see how its entrenchment
under Art 368 serves any purpose. It is to be noticed that
a High Court for a Union territory is to be constituted or
declared by an ordinary law and it is not necessary that
all the; provisions of chapter V of part VI should apply to
such a High Court. On the other hand, these provisions can
be modified or exceptions to them can be specifically
provided. Therefore, the High Court in a Union territory
a
can be made different and distinct from one in/ptate.. ;'h:
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If the whole structure of a High Court in a union territory 
is amenable to amendment by ordinary law, what object is 
being sought by entrenching Art 241 in Art 368 ? The 
Judicial Commissioner's courts ( Declaration as High Courts ) 
Act (XV) 1950, provides that the provisions of Articles 216, 
217, 218, 220, 222, 223, 224,230, 231 , and 232 shall not 
apply to the High Courts declared under Art 241. Since the 
law under Article 241 is an ordinary law, it can be repealed 
by an Act of Parliament or amended from to time. Then what 
purpose does the entrenchment achieve ? It seems that Art 
241 is the most flexible article among the entrenched ones 
and its entrenchment is superficial. It is to be noted 
that if Art 241 is ever intended to be amended, the amending 
Bill must be ratified by at least half the state legislatures. 
It is anomalous that the union territories do not participate 
in the process of amendment* Prom the democratic point 
of view the union territories and not the state legislatures 
should be consulted in regard to the amendment of Art 241.
(F) The Provisions of Art 368
The last of the entrenched articles is Art 368 itself. 
Without entrenching this Article, it could be logically 
argued that all the provisions of the Constitution could be 
amended by Parliament alone by removing the requirement of 
ratification for the entrenched articles. Moreover, the
requirement regarding the special majority in each House of
Parliament could also be amended by Parliament alone. Thus, 
if Art. 368 had not been entrenched, the purpose of entrench­
ment could have been easily defeated. By entrenching Art. 368 
entrenchment has been fully secured and adequately safegua­
rded..
Probably, the idea of including Art. 368 also in the 
entrenched provisions was evolved from the difficulties 
caused by the amending process in the Constitutions of the 
United States and of Australia. In the U.S. Constitution,
Art V is not mentioned in the express limitations provided 
in the Article itself. One of the express limitations to 
the process of amendment is that no State, without its 
consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the 
Senate. In other words, amendments affecting the equal 
representation of States in the Senate require unamity among 
the States. On the other hand, the process of amendment 
in Art V requires a three-fourths majority of the States 
for ratifying an amendment. It is argued against the require­
ment of unanimity, that the provisions of Art V should first 
be amended so as to do away with the requirement of unanimity. 
This being done, an amendment affecting the equal representa­
tion of States in the Senate could be passed by the special
87
majorities laid down in Art V.
Similarly in the Constitution of Australia, it is a
the
87. Dumbauld, E., The Constitution of/United States. 1964. 
p 436.
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matter of controversy as to whether the last paragraph of 
Sec 128 can he amended by the special majorities required by
88
Sec 128 or whether all the States must agree to its amendment•
In the Constitution of India, the constitution framers 
have avoided this sort of uncertainty by including the pro­
visions of Art. 368 in the entrenched provisions.
We have studied in brief the entrenched Articles. Now 
we will consider a few points in the process of ratification.
Ratification
An amendment of any of the entrenched provisions requires
ratification by the legislatures of not less than one-half
of the States. The words ,f not less than one-half of the
Statesu are significant because it is not a majority of the
States that is needed. Even if the number of the ratifying
State legislatures is just half of the total number, the
89
amendment is carried. If a requirement of a majority of 
the state legislatures was intended, the relevant words ought 
to have been^ore than one-half of the States.'
88. Dr. Wynes: Executive, Legislative and Judicial powers
in Australia , 1962, p 695.
Eor further discussion see Express Limitation in Chapter
VI hereinbelow.
89. It is submitted that Basu is not right in saying that 
more than half the state legislatures are required to 
ratify the amendment.
See, Commentary, Vol V, 4th Edn, p 239.
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Resolutions:- The ratification is to be made by passing
resolutions. It is not clear as how a resolution is to be
passed for the purpose of Art, 368, that is to say, whether
the Governor is required to give his assent to such a
resolution. In Jatin Chakravarty V Mr, Justice Himansa Kumar 
90
Bose, the Constitution Fifteenth Amendment Act was challen­
ged on the ground that it was not validly ratified. There 
were 14 States at that time. Seven States ( Madras, Punjab, 
Orissa, Gujarat, Mysore, Bihar and Jammu and Kashmir ) 
passed resolutions ratifying the amendment. No such reso­
lution was passed by three states ( U.P, Maharashtra and M.P. 
No assent of the Governor was given in 11 states. It was 
argued by the petitioner that the Governor is a part of the 
legislature and since his assent was not given, the ratifi­
cation was not valid. The Court held that there was no 
definition of "legislature” in Art 366 which is the defini­
tion section. The General Clauses Act also contains no 
definition of "legislature”. Following the Supreme Courtfs
91
observation in State of Bihar V Kameshwar Singh, however, 
the Court held that a resolution under Art 368 does not 
require the assent of the Governor. While it expressly 
provides for the assent of th@ President, it does not provide
90. A.I.R.. 1964 Cal. 500.
91. A.I.E. 1952 S.C. 252.
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for the assent of the Governor.
Moreover, it is also not clear whether the resolution
is t^ o he passed by a special majority of the legislature
or by an ordinary one• Some writers take the view that
ratification in each legislature ggain requires a two-thirds
majority of the members present and voting and also a
92
majority of the total membership of the House. However, 
in the absence of any express provision in this regard, it 
is submitted that a bare majority is enough to pass the 
resolution. It is not required that an amendment should be 
placed before or considered by all the State legislatures* 
u All that is necessary under Art 368 is that an amendment 
should be ratified by the legislatures of not less than one- 
half of the States. As long as the necessary number of State 
legislatures have ratified the amendment, the Parliament 
is empowered to present the amendment to the President for
93
assent."
It may be noticed that, though the requirement of Art 
368 is fulfilled when half the State legislatures have 
ratified an amendment, it appears undesirable that some of
92* e.g. Sharma, Ham : Some Aspects of the Indian Consti
tution, 1949, Modern Review p 115 117*
Diwan Chaman Lai: 1954 R.S. Deb. Vol VII Col 3624.
93. A*I*R* 1964 Cal. 500(503).
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the States either are not asked to pass a resolution or, 
if asked, are not given sufficient time to pass the required 
resolution. In the case of the Constitution ( Third Amend­
ment ) Act, the Constitution was amended even before some 
of the States could consider the provision on the ground
that half the States had already approved it. The Legislative
94
Assembly of Mysore took strong objection to this procedure. 
Similarly in respect of the Constitution(Fifteenth Amendment 
Act ), no resolution was passed by three States ( U.P, 
Maharashtra and M.P.).
Time limit for Ratification: There is no time limit
prescribed within which the state legislatures must pass the 
resolutions. The question might arise in India as it arose 
in the United States, for what period should an amendment 
awaiting ratification be considered as alive? While submi­
tting the Eighteenth Amendment to the States, the U.S.
Congress stipulated that it should be inoperative unless 
ratified within seven years. The Supreme Court held the 
limit to be valid and observed:-
M As ratification is but the expression of the 
approbation of the people and is to be effective 
when had in three-fourth of the states, there is 
a fair implication that it must be sufficiently
94. Rao, K.V., Parliamentary Democracy in India, 1965 > P 3^ -2
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the States eotjer are mpt asled tp -s ss a resp;i
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contemporaneous in that number of states to refle­
ct the will of the people in all sections at rela­
tively the same period'1,, which, of course, rati­
fication scattered through a long series of years
95
would not do."
Since the proposal and ratification were not treated 
as unrelated acts but as succeeding steps in a single 
endeavour, it can be inferred that they should not be 
widely separated in time. In other words, the ratification 
must be within some reasonable time after the proposal.
The HJS.. Supreme Court refrained from determining the
reasonable time in such a case but it left the matter to
96
the final discretion of the Congress. It rested content 
by pointing out that a large number of variant, social, 
political and economic factors would have to be taken into
97
account in the determination of "reasonable 'time" • The 
Congress had proposed an amendment in 1924 to limit, regulate 
and prohibit the labour of persons. After having been 
duly passed by Congress, the amendment was submitted to the 
State legislatures for ratification but the matter was
95. Dillon V Gloss 256 U.S.. 368(1921) 
96.. Coleman V Hiller, 307 U.S.. 433
97. ibid.
conts
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iporaneous in that number of states to reflect
135
delayed because the requisite number of States could not 
ratify it. In 1939* the Supreme Court was asked to decide 
whether the amendment was still alive. The Court held that 
sinae no time-limit had been prescribed for ratification and 
the Congress had declared the proposal of amendment to be 
valid, it was perfectly valid. It was solely for the Congress 
and not, for the Supreme Court to declare the amendment 
as valid or otherwise.
In case such a problem arises in India, probably the 
Indian Supreme Court will follow the American precedents 
in the matter..
Can the Union Government Withdraw An Amendment Awaiting
Ratification ?
This question might create difficulties in the future. 
Supposing Parliament submits an amendment to the States for 
ratification and before half the state legislatures ratify 
it, elections to Parliament are held. An opposition party 
is returned to power in Parliament and the new Parliament 
wants to withdraw the amendment:. Can it do so ? The Cons­
titution is silent on this point and , therefore, no
definite answer can be given. In case the requisite number 
of the States have ratified the amendment, it is unclear 
whether Parliament can kill the amendment by not presenting 
it to the President for his assent. Most probably, it can.
In case the amendment is awaiting Presidential assent at the
time the new Ministry is formed, the only alternative left
136
to it is to advise the President not to give his assent.
If the President follows the advice, the amendment will
not come into existence at all. Assuming that he can refuse
98
to follow such advice, there is nothing in the Constitution 
to avoid the amendment.
Can A State Rescind Its Ratification ?
The answer to this question is also equally uncertain. 
In the United States, the position is that a State cannot 
rescind its ratification if it has once agreed to the amend-
99
ment and communicated the fact to the Secretary of State.
The reason for this view is that Art V creates a power of
ratification and not of "rejection". Applying this very
100
reason, it was held in Chandler V Wise that a State can 
ratify an amendment even if it has rejected it previously.
It is argued that ratification should not be more final 
than rejection and that it is more democratic to allow the 
reversal of a prior affirmative action because a truer pic­
ture of public opinion at the final date of ratification is 
obtained. It is said that if reversal of an acceptance is
98. The position of the President has been discussed in 
the preceding Chapter, op. cit. Supra, pp 77-85.
99. Coleman V Miller (1939) 307 U.S. 433.
100. (1939) 307 U.S. 474.
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not allowed, a cautious legislature might not act at all.
It is logically consistent that both acceptance and rejection 
should be treated as either conclusive or not conclusive 
but it should not be ignored that allowing the reversal of 
an acceptance not only creates confusion but also makes 
the amending process more rigid. Therefore, the view that 
rejection can be reversed but acceptance cannot be seems 
to be appropriate and can be safely imported into the 
amending process under Art 368, if a situation calling for 
it ever arises in India.
Date Of Enforcement Of An Amendment
/
Does an amendment come into force on the date c J the
President gives his assent or on some earlier or later date ?
Art 368 specifically provides that when the Presidential 
assent is given to the Bill, tT the Constitution shall stand 
amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill." This 
provision provides a key to the problem of ascertaining the 
date of enforcement of an amendment. If the terms of an 
amending Bill do not express any particular date on which the 
amendment is to come into force, the date on which the
President gives his assent to the Bill is the date of
enforcement. In case Parliament wants to enforce an amendment
101. Orfield. op. cit. , Supra, p 70
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on a particular date  whether retrospective or prospective—
it should provide so in the terms of the Bill. In that 
case, the amendment would be enforced not on the date the 
Presidential assent is given but on the date mentioned in the 
Bill* For instance, ihothe Constitution ( First Amendment ) 
Act, 1951? changes in regard $0 Art 19 were intended to be 
enforced retrospectively and, therefore, in Sec 3 of the 
Amending Bill it was expressly provided that the clause " sha­
ll be deemed always to have been enacted" in the form 
provided. Similarly, in the case of the Constitution ( Ninth 
Amendment ) Act, 1960, Parliament was not sure of the date 
on which the transfer of the territories would take place. 
Therefore, it was expressly provided in the Bill that the 
First Schedule to the Constitution would be amended on the 
"appointed day" which was defined in the Bill as " such 
date as the Central Government may, by notification in the 
Official Gazette, appoint as the date for the transfer of 
territories to Pakistan in pursuance of the Indo-Pakistan 
agreements." As a result of this provision, the amendment 
came into force on the "appointed day" i.e. 17th January 
1961, though the President had given his assent on 28th 
December 1960. On the other hand, the Constitution ( Twelfth 
Amendment ) Bill was assented to by the President on 27th 
March 1962 but it was enforced retrospectively. This was 
achieved by providing in Sec 2 of the Bill that the Act
139
"shall be deemed to have come into force on 20th day of 
December 1961."
By way of comparison, it may be noticed that the Supreme
Court of the United States has ruled that the controlling
date of ratification is the date on which the State completing
the three-fourths number of the States ratifies the proposed
amendment and not the date on which the proclamation of
102
ratification is made by the Secretary of State.
Procedure For Communication:- The communication of an
amending Bill to the States for ratification has been through
the Union Ministry of Law. When the Bill is passed by both
the Houses of Parliament, the House which happens to be
in last possession of the Bill sends it to the Ministry of
Law for taking necessary steps to get it ratified by the
State Legislatures as required by Art 368. The Ministry
of Law informs the Rajya Sabha Secretariat when the required
number of State legislatures has ratified the Bill, enclosing
copies of the letters received from the Governments of these
States indicating the necessary resolutions have been passed
by the respective legislatures. The Bill is duly endorsed
by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha and sent to the President
103
for his assent through the Secretary of the Ministry of Law.
102. Widenmann V Colby% 265 Fed. 998.
103. See M.N. Kaul., op. cit., Supra, 1968, p 480
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which
The Rules^ Committee of the House/examined this method 
and expressed its opinion in favour of a procedure of sending 
direct communications from the secretariat to the secreta­
riats of the legislatures of the States in preference to the 
procedure of getting the amendments ratified through the 
Ministry of Law. The Committee pointed out that there might 
be contingencies in which the procedure suggested would 
prove more beneficial. For instance, it would be more 
useful,
"in a contingency where there was difference of 
opinion with the states in the ratification of amend­
ments and where, as a result of resolutions rece­
ived from the states, they had to be reconsidered 
by parliament and an agreement reached through 
messages between parliament and the states legis­
latures. It would also be a more suitable proce­
dure in the case of a Bill introduced by a private 
Member and passed by both the lj-ouses inspite of the 
opposition by the government and where Government
104
might not be interested in pushing the Bill through"
It is submitted that the suggestion given by the Rules 
Committee is very significant and ought to be adopted.
104. Quoted by M.N. Kaul., op. cit., Supra., 1968, p 480
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Twenty one amendments have been made to the Constitution 
of India by 10th April 1967 and of these, the third, sixth, 
seventh, fifteenth and twentieth amendments were duly rati­
fied. It is significant to note that when ratified amend­
ments are assented to by the President, these are published 
in the Gazette of India but the naines of the ratifying states 
are not so published. It would be better if the States 
who ratify an amendment are also mentioned along with the 
fact that the President has given his assent to it. This 
would not only inform the public of its State's attitude 
towards the amendment but also help to ascertain whether 
the amendment was ratified by just half the number of States 
or by more than half. In the absence of such information, 
it remains obscure whether an amendment was ratified by an 
overwhelming majority of the States or whether it was 
opposed by any State. Since the party in power at the 
Centre might be dixferent from those in the States, the 
information regarding the ratifying States would reflect 
their political stand on the issues involved in the amend­
ment. In case a State legislature refuses to ratify 
amendment when the bulk of its population might favour it , 
the people of the State must know about it so that they 
may think twice before returning the party again in the 
next election.
14-2
Federalism And Constitutional Amendment
Many writers on federalism have agreed that one of its
defining characteristics is the existence of an amending
procedure in which the units (states ) as separate entities.?
105
must participate. This characteristic is derived by defining
federalism as " a tendency to substitute co-ordinating for
106
subordinating relationship” which necessarily involves
" a division of authority between the national government
107
and the separate states." But this very definition of
108 109
federation is criticized as "legalistic" and "traditional".
On the contrary, it is asserted that the essential nature of
federalism lies in the economic, social, political and
cultural forces and not in " the shading of legal and cons-
110
titutional terminology." In fact, federalism is a concept
111
the definition of which has been changing from time to time.
105. Wheare, K.C., Modern Constitution 1960, pp 121-122 
Bryce Studies in Higtoy and Jurisprudence, 1901, p 173. 
Finer, The Theory and Practice of Modern Government,
Vol 1 p. 204.
Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, 
Boston, p 209.
Moore, W.H., The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1902, p 516.
Gerin-Lajj oie Paul., Constitutional Amendment in Canada,
p 262.
106. Boehm. H . , Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences Vol VI,
~ ^ U T . ----------------- --------------------------
107* Dicey, A.V., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution ( 9th Edn ; p 151.
108. Livingston, W.S., op. cit., Supra,1956, p1.
109. Ray,A., The Inter-Governmental Relations in India, 1966,
110. Livingston, W.S., op. cit., p 1.
111. C.A.D. Vol XI pp 950, 953.
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Since there are various definitions of federalism, it is not
necessary to provide an amending procedure in which the
states are consulted. The constitutions of New Zealand,
Soviet Russia, Austria, Germany under Weimar and Bonn, have
of
been described as "federal", though none/these contains
any provision for consulting the component units in the
112
process of amending the Constitution.- Although it is not
absolutely necessary to provide for state participation
in the amending process sruch participation is desirable
because all.-other federal characteristics can be varied by
exercising the power of amendment, and thus the federal
113
balance can be affected.
Generally , the state participation is provided in the 
following forms:-
(I) Requirement of ratification:- It is provided 
that a certain number of component units must consent to 
the adoption of the amendment before it can become a part 
of the constitution. It is to be noted that it is not the 
unanimous concurrence of the states that is required; the 
number required might be half or a majority or two thirds 
or three-fourths or any other fraction of the total number of
112. Livingston: op., cit. p 301; Bowie R.R. Studies in 
Federalism, 1954, p 791.
113. Alexandrowicz, C.H., Constitutional Development in India
1957, P 167.
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the units. Judged from this criterion, the Constitution 
of India provides a federal amending process. In regard to 
the entrenched provisions which can be regarded as very 
significant in the centre-state relationship, ratification 
by at least half the state legislatures is required.
(2) Right to Initiate: If it is provided that the
states may initiate amendments to the Constitution, it is 
regarded as observance of the federal principle. In the 
U.S.A. Constitution, two-thirds of the States may petition 
the Congress to call a constitutional convention for sub­
mitting amendments for ratification. This form haa not been
adopted in the amending process ih India. The Supreme Court
114
held in State of West Bengal V Union of India that the
Constitution is liable to be altered by the Union Parliament
no
alone and that the units have/power to alter it and, there­
fore, it is not federal. It may be pointed out that it is 
not necessary that the units must have power to amend the 
Constitution; what is necessary is that these must be 
consulted in the matter. No doubt the States in India have 
no initiatory right in regard to amendments but they a right
to ratify an amendment relating to the entrenched provisions
115
and that is enough to characterise the process as federal.
114. (1963) A.I.R. S.C. 1241
115. Pillai, K.M.., Reflection on the federal Structure of the 
Indian constitution (1964) K.L.T.(Journal) p 37.
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In passing, it may be submitted that it was for practical 
reasons that the power of amendment has been Q.oijferred ^ ft; 
Parliament alone.
"Political and parochial stresses and strains in
the States might otherwise influence amendments
in the states section of the constitution which
would run counter to the concept of national unity,
which is sought to be preserved and .festered in many
of the constitutional provisions. It would be
unfortunate also if the uniformity introduced
were to be destroyed by any of the states acting
116
unilaterally.”
(3) Limiting The Power Of Amendment: In some consti­
tutions it is specifically provided that certain provisions 
-of the constitution are unamendable or can be amended only 
with the consent of the state concerned e.g. the provision
I
regarding the States equality of representation in the U.S*
Senate cannot be amended without the state's consent. Though
this device is not necessarily federal, it can be adopted 
117
as such. There is no such provision in the Constitution 
of India.
116. Ashok Chand: Federalism in India., 1965> PP 56-57* 
117* Livingston W.S., op. cit., Supra, p 507*
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(4) Fourthly, the representation of the states in the 
second chamber in the cehtre is also regarded as safe­
guarding the federal structure of the Constitution, Consi­
dered from this point of view, the representation of States 
in Parliament has not only been provided in the constitution 
but also has been entrenched in Art 368. Therefore, the
i
federal principle has been fully observed in the amending 
process.
"The Principles of parliamentary government and federal­
ism which run ttough the constitution are all recognised
118
in the formal amending process.n
Though the federal principle has been followed in the 
formal amending procedure, £here is a lot of truth in the 
statement that the federal character of the Constitution 
stands disregarded and is ineffective when the techniques 
and devices employed to gain flexibility are used. The 
Central Government can change, by ordinary majority, the 
boundaries of the States without their consent. Thus, the
119
very existence and integrity of the States can be threatened- 
Originally, Art 3 provided that the President must ascertain 
the views of the State whose boundaries are sought to be 
changed before the bill for that purpose is introduced in
118. Joshi,G.N., Aspects of Indian Constitutional Law, 1964,
P 33.
119* Watts,R.L., New Federations, 1966, p 307*
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either House of Parliament- But the Constitution ( Fifth 
Amendment) Act, 1955 modified this condition. At present, 
such a Bill can he introduced only on the recommendation of 
the President and after the time prescribed by him for the 
State legislature for expressing its views on it has expired. 
"If the territorial integrity of a State can be destroyed 
by a simple majority in Parliament, it is no wonder that a 
theme of subordination of the states to the national govern­
ment runs right through the fabric of the Indian Constitu- 
120
tion." The distribution of powers can be affected under 
Art 249 without undergoing the process of amendment- Again, 
the emergency power vested in the President, obviates the 
necessity of amending the constitution in regard to its 
federal structure. By the Third Amendment Act, 1954 the 
concurrent List has been amplified resulting in the increased 
powers of the Union, at the expense of the states.
In addition to it, some of the entrenched provisions, 
as we have already shown, can be affected otherwise also 
than by acting under Article 368. In the result, although 
the amending process ostensibly embodies the federal princi­
ple 5in view of the fact that certain provisions striking 
at the root of the principle are outside the ambit of 
Art 368 and that the various devices and technique adopted
120. Chanda, Ashok., Federalism in India, 1965> p 41.
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to allow changes to be made without activising the amending 
process, it can be said that the federal principle has been 
recognized to a limited extent only.
Conflict between the Substantive Part of Art. 568 and 
the Proviso to it;.
Before we clo,se this Chapter, it is relevant to consi­
der how a conflict can arise between the main part of Art. 
368 and the entrenched provisions listed in the proviso to 
it. It is possible that a provision of the Constitution, 
when amended, may affect a provision entrenched in Art 368. 
Can a question be raised that if the amendment of the 
unentrenched provision affects any of the entrenched provi­
sions, the amendment should be ratified by the requisite 
number of the State Legislatures?
This question was raised for the first time in Sankari 
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Prasad case, in which the Constitution ( First Amendment ) 
Act, 1951 was challenged. It was argued that the newly 
inserted Art 31-A and 31-B in the Constitution deprived 
the High Courts and the Supreme Court of their powers to 
issue appropriate writs under Art, 226 and Art 132 and 136 
respectively. Since these provisions are entrenched in
121. 1952 S.C.R. 89; A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 458
14-9
Art 368, the amendment in question required ratification 
by the requisite number of the State legislatures and, not 
having been so ratified, the amendment was unconstitutional 
and void. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and 
held that :
11 It is not correct to say that the powers of the 
High Courts under Art 226 to issue writs ,f for 
the enforcement of any of the rights conferred 
by Part IIIfor of this Court under Arts. 132 and 
136 to entertain appeals from orders issuing or 
refusing such writs are in any way affected. They 
remain just the same as they were before: only 
a certain class of cases has been excluded from 
the purview of Part III and the courts could 
no longer interfere, not because their powers 
were curtailed in any manner or to any extent, 
but because there could be no occasion hereafter 
for the exercise of their powers in such cases.”
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Such a question was again raised in the Sajjan case on 
the ground that the Constitution ( ;1.7.th Amendment ) Act,
1964- affected the powers of the High Courts under Art 226 and, 
therefore, there was a necessity for ratification. Though
122. 1965 IJ3.C.R. 993
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the Supreme Court held unanimously that the amendment did 
not require ratification and that it was valid, it admitted 
the possibility of there being a conflict between the two 
parts of Art. 368 Viz: the substantive part and the proviso 
to it. The Court sought to resolve such a conflict byf
putting a harmonious construction on the two parts and cons­
equently propbunde$* the following test:.-
”If the effect of the amendment made in the fundamen­
tal rights on the powers of the High Courts prescribed 
by Art 226, is indirect, incidental, or is otherwise 
of an insignificant order, it may be that the proviso 
will not apply.. The proviso would apply where the 
amendment in question seeks to make any change, inter- 
alia, in Art 226, and the question in such a case 
would be :: does the amendment seek to make a change 
in the provisions of Article 226? The answer to this 
question would depend upon the effect of the amendment 
made in the fundamental rights.”
Justice Mudholkar differed on the test as propounded by 
the majority. He would emphasise the substantial rather than 
the direct qualities of the test. He observed as follows:
”To this I would like to add that if the effect of an 
amendment is to curtail substantially, though indirect­
ly, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Art. 226 
or of this Court under Art 136 and recourse has not
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been had to the Proviso to Art 368, the question 
whether the amendment was a colourable exercise of 
power by Parliament will be relevant for consideration”
123
In Golak Nath V State of Punjab, the judges who consi­
dered whether the Constitution(Seventeenth Amendment) Act,
1964 affected Art 226, observed that it is only a ’’direct”
change in Article 226 which would require the procedure as to 
124
ratification.
So far the conflict between the two parts of Art 368 has 
been considered in regard to Part III of the Constitution only 
but it can be presumed that the test of ’direct effect1 would 
be applied in respect of other provisions of the Constitution. 
Since it is not clear as, to which particular provisions are
f
purported to be covered under the ’’the representation of 
states in Parliament” ( item (d) among the entrenched provi­
sions ), probably the above test will be useful in a case 
where an amendment of the unentrenched provisions has the 
effect of amending ” the representation of states in Parlia­
ment” to all intents and purposes.
123. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643.
124. Per Wanchoo J, Bhargava and Mitter JJ, ibid, p 1674. 
Per Bachawat, J, ibid, p 1727.
Eer R a m a s w a m i ,  J, i b i d ,  p 1739*
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CHAPTER Y 
Provisions Which Allow Easy Changes
As stated in the second Chapter, there are provisions 
in the Constitution of India which permit easy changes to 
he made with or without a constitutional amendment. Gener­
ally, such provisions have been characterised as alterable
1
by a simple majority in Parliament. But this statement is 
not strictly correct because an alteration in any of these 
provisions falls under Art 368. It is true, however, that 
Parliament can render such provision inoperative by enacting 
legislation in which case the provision is not altered but 
merely ceases to operate. Provisions of this type can be 
divided into two categoriest (A) those provisions which 
necessarily entail an amendment of the Constitution and (B) 
those provisions under which no formal amendment need be 
affected to the Constitution but which nevertheless have 
the effect of making a change in the law.
The provisions under (A) are as follows:-
Art 4 read with Art 2 and 3* Art 169, Schedule 5, para 7 
and Schedule 6 para 21.
Under Art 2, Parliament is competent to enact a law by
1» See Dr. Ambedkar. C.A.D. IX pp 1660-61;
Joshi, G.N., op. cit., Supra p 36.
153
ordinary majority and admit into the Union or establish new 
states on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit*. Art 3 
empowers the Parliament to form a new state, to increase or
diminish its area or to alter the boundaries or the name of
any state. A Bill for this purpose can be introduced in 
either House of Parliament only on the recommendation of the 
President. In case the Bill affects the area, boundaries or 
name of any of the States, it must be referred by the Presi­
dent to the legislature of that State for expressing its 
views on it within such period as may be specified in the 
reference or within such further period as the President 
may allow and the period so specified or allowed must expire 
before the Bill is introduced. Any law relatable to Art 2 
or Art 3 shall contain such provisions for the amendment of 
the Pirst and Pourth Schedules as may be necessary to give 
effect to the provisions of the law. Article 4(2) speci­
fically provides that such a law as aforesaid in Art 2 , 3  
and 4(1) shall not be an amendment of this Constitution for 
the purposes of Art 368.
Art 169(1) provides that Parliament may by law abolish
the legislative Council of a State or create one in a State
having no such Council, if the legislative Assembly of the 
State passes a resolution to that effect by a majority of 
not less than two-thirds of the members of the Assembly 
present and voting.
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Similarly para 7 of schedule 5 and para 21 of schedule 
6 confer power on Parliament to amend schedule 5 and schedule 
6 respectively by an ordinary law.
amendment of
The above provisions confer the power of/certain other 
provisions on Parliament, to be exercised by an ordinary 
majority but only in regard to the specified matters. In 
other words, it is not a general power. In case Parliament 
wants to amend any of the above provisions it is required 
to act under Art 568 and undergo the procedure laid down 
therein.
Art,4(2) provides that Parliament is competent to
redraw the internal frontiers of India to increase or
diminish the area of any state or to alter the name of any
state, by passing a law by a simple majority after observing
the conditions laid down in Art 3* Such a law is not an
amendment of the Constitution for the purposes of Art 368.
But if Art 3 or, for that matter, Art 4 itself is sought
to be amended in any respect, Parliament is required to
proceed under Art 368. Parliament amended Art 3 by the
Constitution Fifth and Eighteenth Amendment Acts by observing
the procedure prescribed in Art 368 i.e. the requirement
of a special majority was fulfilled. Similarly, Parliament
2
may by ordinary law provide for the abolition of the 
legislative Council of a state, or the creation of such a
2. Art 169 (5)
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council, provided the legislative Assembly of the state 
passes a resolution to the effect, in accordance with the 
terms of Art 169- It is of interest to note that the opera­
tion of Art 368 has been specifically made inapplicable in 
regard to the amendment of the subject matter of the above 
articles by providing that such laws shall not be deemed to
be amendment of this Constitution for the purposes of Art 
3
368. The word "deemed11 does not mean that the Constitution 
has been amended in fact but not to be considered as amended 
in theory; it only means that the special machinery provided 
for the amendment of the Constitution in Art 368 is not to be 
used in regard to these articles. It is indeed, a remarkable 
mechanism designed to achieve flexibility in these provisions 
of the Constitution. The founding fathers visualized that 
there would be frequent changes in regard to these provisions 
of the Constitution and, therefore, they thought it fit to 
provide a fairly flexible way of effecting these changes 
without having resort to the amending process provided in 
Art 368. It seems that the whole mechanism is based upon 
a distinction between power to make a law and the content 
of a l&w. The power of Parliament to make constituent law 
under the provisions of this category is alterable only 
under Art 368 but the content of law i.e. the subject-matter
3. Art 4(2), Art 169(3)» Sch 5 para 7* Schedule 6, para 21
4. Seervai. op cit., Supra, p 1092.
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of these provisions is alterable byl^ simple majority in 
Parliament. Though the law is passed by an ordinary majority
in fact and form it is a constituent law because it brings
5
about a formal change in the body of the Constitution.
The following provisions can be put under category B t- 
Articles 11, 59(3), 65(3), 73(2), 75(6), 97, 98(2),
98(5), 100(3), 105(3), 106, 118(2), 120(2), 124(1), 125(2),
133(3), 135, 137, 142(1), 146(2), 148(5), 149, 158(3), 164(5), 
171(2), 186, 187(2), 187(3), 189(3), 194(3), 195, 208(a), 
208(2), 210(2), 221(2), 222(2), 225, 229(2), 250(1), 251(1), 
259(1), 259A, 241(1), 241(2), 241(5), 241(4), 275(2), 285(1), 
285(2), 285(1), 287, 289(2), 500(1), 509, 313, 343(3), 345, 
548(1), and 573-
We propose to rearrange these articles according to 
their subject-matter and explain briefly how changes can 
be brought under them, though the text of the Constitution 
is not changed thereby.
(1) Right of Citizenship (Art. 11 ) : The constitution^]
provisions relating to citizenship are found in Art 5 to 10 
but a comprehensive law relating to citizenship has not been
5. We have shown in Chapter VII that the sole criterion to- 
distinguish between an ordinary law and a constituent 
law is not the manner in which it is enacted but the 
nature of i t , which depends on the criterion whether or 
not it brings a formal change in the letter of the Cons­
titution. If it brings a formal change, it is a cons­
tituent law otherwise not.
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laid down therein.j Art 11 gives power to Parliament to enact
such law. It has been held by the Supreme Court that the
power under Article 11 is not fettered by Arts 5 to 10 and
it is competent for Parliament, in exercise of this power,
to take away or affect citizenship already acquired under 
6
Arts 5 to 10. By exercising this power, Parliament has passed 
the Citizenship Act, 1955- In reality, Art 11 enables 
Parliament to regulate the right of citizenship by ordinary 
legislation, obviating the necessity of amending the Cons­
titution in this regard under Art 368.
(2) 'Continuance of Executive Power of the State 
Art 75(2) .
Under the Govt of India Act, 1935? certain legislative
powers belonged to the provinces, which have been transfared
by the Constitution to the Union. For instance, item 9 of
List II of the Act of 1935 gave the Provincial Legislature
exclusive power with respect to ‘Compulsory acquision of 
the
land1 but/Constitution has placed the legislative power as to 
*acquisition or requisition of property for the purposes of 
the Union1 in Entry 33 of List I. In the Constitution, these 
legislative powers have been transferred to the Union but the
6. Izhar Ahmed V Union of India, A.J.R. 1962 S.C. 1052.
7. Entry 33 of List I has been omitted and Entry 42 of the 
Concurrent List has been substituted by the words: 11 Ac 
quisition and requisitioning of property.” by Sec 26 of 
the Constitution ( Seventh Amendment ) Act, 1956.
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executive powers in respect thereof were intended to be 
exercised by the States. Therefore, Art 73(2) provides that 
a State and any officer or authority of a State may continue 
to exercise the executive power which it could exercise 
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, 
until otherwise provided by Parliament. In other words, 
Parliament may divest the states of the executive power 
saved by Art 73(3) by enacting an ordinary law; it need not 
amend Art 73(2) under Art 568 for this purpose.-
(3) Provisions permitting changes in the Second 
Schedule r
Arts 59(3), 65(3), 75(6), 97, 125(2), 148(3), 158(3), 
164(5), 186, and 221(2).
The Second Schedule to the Constitution provides for 
the privileges to be enjoyed by and the emoluments, allow­
ances and salaries to be paid tothe President, the Governors 
of the States, the Speakers and the Deputy Speakers of the 
Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assemblies, the Chairman and 
the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha and the legislative 
Councils of States, Judges of the Supreme Court and of the 
High Courts, and the Comptroller and Auditor-General of 
India. These provisions apply until parliament determines
by law the privileges, emolument®, salaries and allowances 
attachable to the above offices. Therefore, if Parliament 
ever wants to amend the Second Schedule in regard to these
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matters it needs only to enact an ordinary law and there is
no need to amend the Second Schedule.
It is to be noted in- this Connection that the salaries
of all the officers mentioned above except the judges of the
Supreme Court and df the High Courts can be varied in this
way. It seems anomalous that the salary of the Head of State
can be varied by an ordinary law enacted by Parliament but
the salaries of the Supreme Court and High Court judges
8
cannot be varied by an ordinary law, the matter reqiiring 
amendment of the Second Schedule under Art 568. The reason 
is not far to seek; it is for establishing an independent 
judiciary in India.
It is to be further observed that if the Second Schedule 
is intended to be amended, Parliament is required to act 
under Art 568 and to observe the procedure laid down therein. 
Part B of the Second Schedule providing for the salaries and 
allowances of the Prime Minister and the Ministers at the 
Centre as well as in the States was omitted by the Cons­
titution ( Seventh Amendment ) Act, 1956.
(4) Salaries and Allowances of the Members of Parliament 
and of the State Legislature ( Art 106 and Art 195 )
The salaries and allowances of the members of either
8. Arts 125(1) and 221(1)
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House of Parliament or of either House of a State Legislature
9
can be determined by law by Parliament, and the State 
legislature respectively and, until such laws are passed, the 
members of Parliament continue to receive such salaries and 
allowances as were paid to the members of the Constituent 
Assembly and the members of a State legislature as were 
paid to the members of the Legislative Assembly of province, 
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution.
(5) Quorum for either House of Parliament or of a State 
Legislature ( Art 100(3) and 189(3) )•
Art 100(3) provides that the quorum to constitute a 
meeting of either House of Parliament shall be one-tenth of 
the total number of members of the House until parliament 
by law otherwise provides. Similarly Art 189(3) prescribes 
the quorum for either House of the State legislature as 
ten members or one-tenth of the total number of the House, 
whichever is greater, but the state legislature is competent 
to provide otherwise by enacting a law to that effect. In 
case Parliament or a State legislature passes a law providing 
a quorum different from that prescribed in Art 100(3) or 
189(3) the constitutional provisions relating to the quorum 
would cease to be operative*. It is significant to note that
Parliament has passed the Salaries and Allowances of 
Members of Parliament Act, 1954- to provide for the 
salaries and allowances of Members of Parliament.
Act 30 of 1954-.
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changes in the quorum may make the legislative process 
difficult or easy.* Supposing the quorum for either House of 
Parliament is prescribed as one-fifteenth, obviously fewer 
members would be required to enact a valid law^
(6). Privileges of Parliament and the State legislatures 
( Art 105(3) and 194(3) ):•
The powers, privileges and immunities of each House of 
Parliament and of the legislature of a State have been left
by
to be defined by them respectively/law and, until so defined, 
are such as were enjoyed by the House of Commons of the 
Parliament of the- United Kingdom on 26th January, 1950. 
Therefore, it is by ordinary law that the powers, privileges 
and immunities of the legislature can be varied from time 
to time.
(7) Rules of Procedure;: ( Arts 118(2), 208(1), 208(2) )
Each House of Parliament and of a State legislature is 
competent to make the rules of procedure for itself, subject 
to the provisions of the Constitution* Until such rules are 
made, each House has to observe the rules of procedure 
applicable to it immediately before the commencement. of 
the Constitution.
(8) Language in Parliament and in a State Legislature:
( Art 120(2) and 210(2) )
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Hindi and English are the two recognized languages
to be used in Parliament for the first fifteen years from
10
the commencement of the Constitution, However, the Presiding
Officer in each House is authorised to permit any member
who cannot adequately express himself in Hindi or in English
11
to address the House in his mother tongue. After the
expiration of the period of fifteen years, English is to
cease to be a parliamentary language, unless Parliament by
law provides otherwise. In a State legislature, the official
language or languages of the State or Hindi or English can 
1?
be used and the presiding officer in each House of the State 
legislature is authorised to permit any member who cannot 
adequately express himself in any of these languages to
13
address the House in his mother-tongue. Unless the legis­
lature of the State by law otherwise provides, after the
expriation of a period of fifteen years English ceases to
14
be a language to be used in the state legislature.
10. Art 120(1)
11. Proviso to Art 120 
12* Art 210(1).
13« Proviso to Art 210.
14. Art 210(2).
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(9) Language to be used in the Supreme Court and the 
High Courts:
Until Parliament by law provides otherwise, all procee­
dings in the Supreme Court and the High Courts and the 
authoritative texts of Union and State laws shall be in
15
English, With the previous consent of the President, the
Governor is competent to authorise the use of Hindi or any
other language used for any official purpose of the State,
in proceedings in the High Court having its principal seat 
16
in the State. But the order made by the Governor under
Art 54*8(2) is not applicable to any judgment, decree or
17
order passed or made by the High Court of the State•
(10) Official Language: (Art 54-5(5) and 54-5 )*
Art 54-5(1) declares that the official language of the
Union shall be Hindi in the Devanagari script but English
shall continue to be used for all the official purposes of
the Union upto 1965* However, the President is empowered
to authorise the use of Hindi in addition to English during 
18
this period. Therefore, English ceases to be an official
15. Art 34-801)
16. Art 34-8(2)
17« Proviso to Art 34-8(2)
18. Art 34-3 ( Proviso )
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language after 1965. If however, parliament wants to keep 
English for any purpose even after the prescribed period,
19
it is required to pass a law to that effects Such a law 
has already been passed by enacting the official Language 
Act, 1963. It provides for the continued use of English 
for the official purposes of the Union indefinitely " Not­
withstanding the expiration of the period prescribed in 
Art 345(2)."
In the States, English is to continue to be used for
the purposes it was being used immediately before the
commencement of the Constitution until the legislature of
the State adopts any one or more of the languages in use in
the State or Hindi for all or any of the official purposes 
20
of the State^
(11) Number of Supreme Court Judges ( Art 124(1) ):
The number of the judges of the Supreme Court is another
matter which can be determined by Parliament by an ordinary 
21
law.: The Constitution provided a Chief Justice and not more
19- Art 343(3)
20. Art 345.
21. Art 124(1).
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than seven other judges but this number has been increased 
22
to 15 by now. It is to be noted that if Art 124(1) is 
itself sought to be amended, Parliament is required to observe 
the procedure laid down in Art 368 and the amending Bill 
requires to be ratified by atleast half the State legisla­
tures, A5?t 124 being in Chapter IV of part V- of the Cons­
titution which is entrenched in Art 368.
(12) Jurisdiction and Powers of the Supreme Court in 
Certain matters:: ( Art 133(3)? 135? 137? 142(1) )
Art 133(3) provides that, unless Parliament by law 
provides, no appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from the 
judgment, decree or final order of one judge of a High Court. 
Article 135 vests in the Supreme Court the jurisdiction and 
powers of the Federal Court with respect to any matter not 
covered by Art 133 and 134, until Parliament by law 
otherwise provides. The Supreme Court has been given the 
power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by
23
it but this power is subject to any law made by Parliament 
or any rules made by the Court under Art. 145. It is for 
Parliament to provide in an ordinary law the manner in which 
the decrees or orders of the Supreme Court should be enforce­
able throughout the territory of India. Until Parliament
22. Vide Act 17 of 1960
23. Art 137.
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enacts a law in this respect, the President may by order
24
prescribe the required manner.
(13) Judicial System and Administration of Union 
Territories:
( Arts : 239(1), 239A, 241(1), 241(2), 241(4), 
230(1), 231(1) )
25
The Administration of Union territories lies in the hands
of the President but Parliament is empowered to make a law
in this regard and then the powers of the President become
26
exercisable subject to the law. Art 239A provides that
Parliament may by law create local legislatures of any type
for certain Union territories. Sub-clause 2 of Art 239A
lays down that no such law shall be deemed to be an amendment
of this Constitution for the purposes of Art 368 even if it
contains any provision which amends or has the effect of
amending this Constitution. Under Art 241, Parliament is
competent to constitute a High Court for a Union territory
or declare any court in any territory to be a High Court by
27
enacting ordinary legislation. It is not necessary that a
24. Art 142(1).
25. Art 366(30) defines a Union territory as "any Union terri­
tory specified in the First Schedule and includes any
other territory comprised within the territory of India 
but not specified in that Schedule."
26. Art 239.
27. Art 241(1)
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High Cburt in a Union territory must be having all the powers
28
that a High Court in a state has. Even a state High Court 
might be empowered to exercise jurisdiction in regard to a
29
union territory. Parliament may by law establish a common
High Court for two or more States or for two or more States
30
and a Union territory.
(14) Jurisdiction of Existing High Courts. ( Art 225 ):
Art 225 seeks to preserve all the powers possessed by the 
High Courts at the date of commencement of the Constitution
31
until affected by any law passed by a competent legislature.
Cl5) Compensatory allowances to High Court judges.
( Art 222(2))r
In case a judge is transferred from one High Court to 
another he is entitled to receive a compensatory allowance in 
addition to his salary, which is to be determined by Parlia­
ment by law.* Until Parliament makes such a law the compen-
32
satory allowance is to be fixed by the President.
28. Art 241(2)
29. 241(4), 230(1), entry 79 of List I.
30. Art 231(1)
31. Entries 79* 95 of List l*r Entries 3 and 65 of List II 
and Entry 46 of List III.
32. Art 222(2)
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(.16) Composition of the Legislative Councils. 
( Art 171(2) );
The composition of the Legislative Council of a State
has been laid down in Art 171(3) but it can be varied or
33
affected by law made by Parliament.
(17) Duties and powers of the Comptroller & Auditor- 
General ( Art 149 ):
The duties and powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-
General of India shall be such as may be prescribed by or
behalf
under any law made by Parliament. Until provision in this/
is made, his duties and powers in relation to the accounts
of the Union and the States are such as were exercisable
by the Auditor-General of India immediately before the
34
commencement of the Constitution.
(18) Custody of C.F.I. and C.F.S. ( Art 283(1), 283(2) :
The custody of the Consolidated Fund of India and the 
Contingency Fund of India is to be regulated by law made by 
Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, it
35
is to be regulated by rules made by the President. The custody 
of the Consolidated Fund of a State and the Contingency Fund 
of a State is to be regulated by law made by the State
33. Art 171(2)
34. Art 149.
35. Art 283(1)
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legislature. Until the state legislature makes such a law,
36
it shall be regulated by rules made by the Governor.
(19) Recruitment and conditions of service of Civil 
Servants:
It is by ordinary legislation that the recruitment and 
conditions of service of officers and servants of the Supreme 
Court and of persons serving the Union or in the secretariat
37
of Parliament,are to be regulated. Similarly in a State, 
the recruitment and conditions of service of officers and
38 39
servants of a High Court and of persons serving the State
40
or in the secretariat of the State legislature are to be 
regulated by an ordinary law passed by the State legislature 
concerned.
(20) Exemption of Union property from State taxation
and State property from Union taxation: ( Art 285(1 
289(2), 287 )
The property of the Union has been exempted from State 
taxation except in so far as Parliament by law otherwise 
provides or in case it is specifically excepted under Art
36. Art 283(2)
37. Art 146(2), 98(2), 98(3), Art 229(2).
38. Art ;229(2)
39. Art 1509.1 i' S \
40* Art .187(2)
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285(2). Similarly, the property and income of a State is
41
exempt from Union taxation. But the Union can levy tax
in respect of a trade or business carried on by or on behalf
42
of the Government of a State. The Union has also been 
exempted, save in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise 
provide, from a State tax on the consumption or sale of 
electricity as specified under Art 287*
(21) Suits and Proceedings; r ( Art 300(1) )
Art 300(l) provides that the Union of India and'hthe 
Governments of States shall be juristic personalities for 
purposes of suits or proceedings but the Constitution itself 
does not lay down the circumstances in which such actions 
lie.. Therefore, the power to sue or'bb;. sued is left to the 
legislatures of the Union and the respective States and , 
subject to such legislation, the existing law relating to 
this matter is to be operative.,
(22) Power of President to make certain orders 
(. Art 275(2) And Art 373 )
Art 275(2) provides that powers conferred on Parliament 
under Art. 275(1) in respect of grants from the Union to
41. Art 289.
42. Art 289(2)
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certain States shall be exercisable by the President by 
order, until provision is made by Parliament under Art 2 7 5 0 )  * 
Under Art 375> the President was given power to make orders 
in respect of persons under preventive detention in certain 
cases until the expiration of one year from the commencement 
of this Constitution or until provision was made by Parlia­
ment in this behalf,.whichever was earlier.
(23) Transitional provisions relating to the Public 
Services: ( Art 515 )
Art 315 validates all the laws in force immediately 
before the commencement of the Constitution applicable to 
any public service, so far as consistent with the provisions 
of the Constitution, until other provision is made in this 
behalf under the Constitution.
From the study of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear 
that there is a large number of articles which empower 
Parliament or the State legislatures to make laws by 
ordinary majority so as to effect practical changes in these 
provisions. But it is to be noted that changes effected 
in this way"* though they may be significant and far-reaching, 
cannot be said to be amendments of the Constitution because 
these changes do not alter the provisions of the Constitution. 
In other words, the letter of the Constitution remains un­
touched and the changes are embodied in ordinary laws. The
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only effect of laws is to substitute the provisions of the 
Constitution by different provisions.
Taking a typical example, Art 105 (3) provides that 
the powers privileges and immunities of each House of Parlia­
ment shall be such as may from time to time be defined by 
Parliament by law, and until so defined, shall be those of 
the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
and of its members and committees at the commencement of this 
Constitution. The members of Parliament in India gpe entitled 
to the powers, privileges and immunities as were available 
to the members of the House of Commons in the United Kingdom 
on 26th January, 1950. Of course, it is not easy to ascer­
tain' what these were at that particular point of time. But 
we are not concerned with that question here. Our point is th­
at if the, Indian Parliament intends to codify the powers, 
privileges, and immunities of its members, it will have to 
pass a law and when this law comes into operation, the 
members of Parliament will have the powers, privileges and 
immunities as provided under the law and not those enjoyed 
by the members of the House of Commons in the United Kingdom
43
on 26th January, 1950. In other words, the law passed by 
Parliament will have the effect of ceasing the operation 
of Art. 105(3)• Por practical purposes, it would be an
43. Since it was held in Re Under Art 145 of the Constitutiont 
that a law providing for the powers, privileges and 
immunities of each House of Parliament is liable to be
£ § ? P f n t 2 ! ? d 0I u ! £ r ! d f t § . the P a r t  111
See. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 745 (769')
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amendment of Art. 105(3) but nevertheless it cannot be said 
to be an amendment of the Constitution because the law makes 
no change in Art 105(3)* Such a process can at the most be 
characterised as an informal amendment of the type brought 
about by usage, conventions and judicial interpretations.
If Parliament ever wants to amend Art 105(3) it will have to 
act under Art 368.
All the; articles discussed above are transitory in 
nature and cease to operate when a law is made on the subject. 
None 'of them can be regarded as conferring the power of 
amendment of the Constitution. They can be compared to the 
legislative entries provided in the Lists in the Seventh 
Schedule. Just as a law made by Parliament or by a State 
legislature under a legislative entry cannot be termed as 
an amendment of the Constitution, a law made in pursuance of 
one of the aforesaid provisions cannot be charaterized as an 
amendment of the Constitution. Similarly, just an ordinary 
law has to compdy with the provisions of the Constitution, the 
validity of the laws so made is open to challenge in a court 
of law on the ground of constitutionality.
The constitution framers discovered a unique process 
of amendment which treats different provisions of the Cons­
titution differently for the purpose of amemdment * There
174-
are entrenched provisions dealing with the relationship 
of the Centre and the States which require not only a special 
majority in Parliament but also ratification by at least 
half the State Legislatures. Many provisions require only 
a special majority in Parliament while a few require only a 
simple majority. Pinally there is a large number of articles 
which are not amendable by a bare majority but, at the same 
time, can be bent to serve the purpose of amendment by only 
a simple majority in Parliament or a State legislature. This: 
kind of gradation of different provisions of the Constitution 
according to their significance and then their subjection to 
various modes of alteration was not found in any of the 
written constitutions of the world at the time the Indian 
Constitution was framed. No wonder it evoked this apprecia­
tive comment from no less an authority than Prof. K.C. Wheare
" This variety in the amending process is wise but it is
44
rarely found.11 It seems that, by discovering new modes of 
amendment which were not hitherto known to constitutional 
draftsmen, the Indian constitution framers have made an 
important contribution to the theory and practice of constitu­
tional law. It is interesting to note examples of similar 
techniques of prescribing different modes of amendment.
D. Pulton has
44. Wheare, K.C., op. cit., Supra, p 143
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evolved an amending formula for Canada in which the provisions 
of the British North America Act have been divided into 
five categories, each being assigned a different procedure 
for amendment, thus attaching different degrees of rigidity
4-5
to different provisions of the constitution* The same
technique has been employed in the Draft Treaty (1954) of
46
the European Community. Similarly, in the Constitution of
Malaysia of 1964, the provisions have been placed in different
categories for the purpose of amendment. Some provisions are
amendable by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the
47
total number of members in each Setose of Parliament, some
to  ^ 48
can be amended only if consented/by the Conference of Rulers ,
49
soi&e are amendable by a bare majority in Parliament and there
are others in which the concurrence of the Governors is nece- 
50
ssary. This kind of device has enabled the draftsmen to 
draw the boundary line between flexibility and rigidity with 
more precision and exactness* In the absence of such a device
45. Laskin, B . , Amendment of the- Constitution 15 U.T.L.J. 
1964, p 191.
46. The text of the Draft Treaty embodying the statue of the 
European Community has been given in Studies in Federal­
ism by R.R. Bowie ( Appendix II ).
47. Art 159«
48. Art 159(5)
49. Art 159(4)
50. Art. 161 E(2), 161E(4), and 161H (1).
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it is not only difficult but impossible to apportion the 
desired amount of flexibility or rigidity to the various 
parts of a constitution. The lengthy Constitution of India 
would have been either too rigid or too flexible but for the 
novel device adopted for its amendment.
Rigidity and Flexibility :
Constitutions have been classified as "rigid” or "flexi-
51
ble" or "controlled" or "uncontrolled". A constitution 
which may be modified or repealed in the same way as an 
ordinary piece of legislation is described as "flexible" or 
"uncontrolled" and a constitution which can only be altered 
with some special formality is characterised as "rigid" or 
"controlled". Though rigidity and flexibility are relative 
terms, neither is free from defects. If the constitution 
is very flexible, it may become a plaything in the hands 
of transient majorities and, therefore, may not last long.
The great danger inherent in an easy amending process was 
exemplified by the Constitution of the Weimar Republic. In 
1933 * a bare majority of Nationalists and National Socialists 
deputies abused its legislative to bar part of the opposition 
( the Communists ) and then amended the amending provision, 
giving absolute power to the Government to amend the
51* McCawley V The King 1920 A.C. 691 at 704, Per Lord 
Birkenhead.
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52
Constitution. Moreover, Bryce holds the view that flexible 
constitutions tend towards an aristocratic structure of 
government because "it needs a good deal of knowledge, skill
and experience to work a flexible constitution safely, and it
' *> . 
ig only m  the educated classes that these qualities can
55
be looked for." It is 'also thought that the satisfactory 
functioning of a flexible constitution presupposes the 
existence of deep-rooted traditions as well as a profoundly
54-
conservative spirit, as in the United Kingdom.
On the other hand, rigidity is also regarded as danger­
ous if it stands in the way of the natural development of a 
55
country. Finer says "Too difficult an amending procedure
necessarity requires, if not killing of the body^ then the
56
killing of the mind. Rigidity in the amending process is 
also regarded as a cause of revolution. Bryce holds the 
view that '
" when a party grows up clamouring for some reforms
52. Friedrick C.J., Constitutional Government, 194-1, p 139.
53* Bryce, James, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Vol I
P 179.
54-. Sen, D.K.S., A Comparative Study of the Indian Constitu­
tion , 1966, p 502.
55. Bryce, op. cit., p 223.
Burgess, J.W., op. cit. p 151.
56. Finer, op. cit., Supra, p 193.
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y
which can be effected only by changing the constitution, 
or when a question arises for dealing with which the 
constitution provides no means, then, if the consti­
tution cannot be amemded in the legal way, because 
the legally prescribed majority cannot be ~bbtained, 
the discontent that was debarred from any legs;!
outlet may find vent in a revolution or a civil 
57
war."
Mukharji observes as: n A constitution which
cannot be constitutionally amended is an invitation
58
to revolution.M
But others take the view that even the most
\
flexible amending process cannot guarantee the constitution
59
against revolution. 11 For revolutions may be made by others
60
than those who would constitute a constituent group.1
Rigidity is supposed to achieve stability and flexibility 
makes room for growth or development. Since both are equally
57« Bryce, J . , op. cit., Supra , Vol I , pp 223-224.
58. Mukharji, P.B., The Critical Problems of the Indian
Constitution, 1968, p 191.
59. Hidayatullah J., Golak Nath V State of Punjab, A.I.E.
1967, S . C . / a ^ 6 9 7 .
60. Friedrich C.J., Constitutional Government and Democracy.
p 14-2.
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desired, it becomes important to strike a happy balance
61
between the two.
"One of the main problems to which the framers of a
c;-us l£0nstitution must address themselves / is how to recon­
cile the idea of a stable juridical order, affording no
scope for sudden or hasty changes with the idea of
growth and development. It is, therefore, a mistake.
to overemphasise either flexibility or rigidity.What
62
is necessary is the judicious blending of the two*”
Is the Indian Constitution Rigid or Flexible?
There are two schools of thought on this question. One
63
view is that the Constitution is rigid and the other and
is
more predominant view/that the t C o n s t i t u t i o n  is fairly 
64
flexible. The explanation for this difference of opinion 
seems to be that those who support the flexible view compared
61. Jameson, J . , A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions,
1887, p 82.
Joshi, G.N., op. cit, Shpra p 41.
62. Sen , S.D.K., op. cit., Supra, p 302*
63* Jennings, 1*7. , Op.cit. Supra , pp 59-60.
Gledhhill, A., op. cit. Supra, p 74*
64. Joshi, G.N. op. cit p 41.,
Alexandrowicz, op cit. Supra, p 231*
N.V*. Gadgil, C.A.D., Vol XI, p 658-659*
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the amending procedure with the amending procedures provided
in the constitutions of the United States, Canada and
Australia. For instance, Dr. Ambedkar referred to the
aforesaid constitutions while passing judgment on the
amending procedure. Similarly, others also seem to have
these very constitutions in mind . On the other hand,
those who described the Constitution as rigid did so on the
consideration of the practical difficulties involved in
65
securing an amendment.
It is submitted that a comparative study of the various
amending processes provided in other constitutions is no
sure guide to the rigidity or flexibility of a constitution.
Much depends upon the cultural background of the people.
of
For instance, the constitution/Switzerland and that of 
Australia have almost similar amending processes but there 
have been far more amendments in Switzerland than in 
Australia. The reason for this lies more in the cultural
66
background of the people than in the constitutional provisions,
w Flexibility is not a function of the amending proce-
a
dure so much as it is/function of the willingness of the
people to countenance changes in the basic structure of
67
their institutions.”
65* Jennings, I.V., op. cit. pp 59-60.
66. Livingston, W.S.,.op. cit., Supra p-■. 198.
r
67. ibid,, p. 147.
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Besides the formal amending procedure, custom, usage
68
and conventions may lend flexibility to a constitution. 
Judicial interpretation is another factor in making a 
constitution flexible or rigid. It has been said that more 
changes have been brought about in the U.S. Constitution by
69
the Supreme Court than through the amending process.
Many authors take the view that if a constitution is
70
filled with details, it will require frequent alteration. 
Thus, Jennings took the elaborate character of the Indian 
Constitution into consideration when he observed:-
“What makes the Indian constitution so rigid is that, 
in addition to a somewhat complicated process of 
amendment, it is so detailed and covers so vast 
a field of law that the problem of constitutional
71
validity must often arise.”
Though it can be argued that in a detailed constitution
68. Austin, G., op. cit., Supra, p 255.
69. Orfield:. op. cit., Supra, p 120.
70. Ames. H.V. i/& Annual Report of the American Historical
Association for 1896, p 302.
Dodd, W.F. v The Revision and Amendment of State Consti­
tutions. 1910, p 129.
Finer, H. t op. cit., p 240.
Jennings, I.V., op. cit., p 9.
71. Jennings, op. cit., pp 9-10.
much is already provided, and, therefore, there would be 
lesser need for amendment, in view of the facts that human 
language is anything but unequivocal, the working out of 
human relationships is difficult to forecast and the actual 
conditions of human society change, there is no escape from 
the conclusion that a constitution must require alteration 
and a detailed constitution needs all the more alteration.
Besides the length of a constitution, the language
used also gives flexibility or rigidity to it. If the
constitution is couched in elastic words* or nthin languageM
72
it would require less need of amendment*
As regards the amending process provided in the Indian 
Constitution, it is certainly more flexible when compared 
with those of the constitutions of the United States, Australi 
or Canada but it is rigid when considered in the Indian 
context. It is to be noticed that the flexibility or rigidity 
of the process would depend, inter alia, on the complex of 
political parties at the Centre as Well as in the States •
If the present domination of one party were to cease, as it 
is already beginning to do, and a multiplicity of parties was 
to appear in the country, the absolute majority and the two- 
thirds majority required under Art. 368 would be almost
72. I." Markandan; K.C., : Directive Principles in the Indian
Constitutions, 1965, p 149»
Dawson, Flacgregor t Ihe Constitution of Canada, p 137*
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impossible to obtain. In case different parties were to be 
in control at the Centre and in the States, the amending
process in regard to the entrenched provisions can hardly
be made use of.
73
On the basis of the Fourth General Elections and the
present political conditions in the country, there is a strong
trend for the emergence of a larger number of political 
parties and the days of one party domination in India seem 
numbered.
The fact that twenty one amendments were effected to the 
Constitution in the first seventeen years led many to think 
that the amending process is fairly flexible. It is submitted 
^however, that this fact was due to one party domination at 
the Centre as well as in the States and cannot be cited as 
proof of the flexibility of the amending process.
Fr equent amendments; It is argued that frequent amend­
ments make the people lose reverence or regard for the cons-
is
titution. It is submitted that it/not frequent amendments
73. The Indian National Congress secured only 284- seats in
the Lok Sabha out of 520 whereas it had 361 seats in the 
third general elections. The Swantantra Party, The Bhar- 
tiya Jansang and D.M.K. increased their strength consider­
ably. Similarly, in the state legislatures also the 
strength of the Congress is much reduced and other parties
gained at its expense. ( The Fourth General Elections---
a statistical Indian National~CTongres^-Publication— ~  
1967; Report on the Fourth General Elections in India 1967
by Election Commission of India.)
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but amendments for selfish or partisan purposes that lead to 
disrespect for the constitution. If there is a genuine nece­
ssity for amendment the constitution must be amended and it 
should not matter that it has been already amended many times. 
After all the constitution is meant for the nation and not the 
nation for the constitution. The Swiss change their consti­
tution when they need to but it does not mean that the consti­
tution loses any respect in their eyes. Livingston 
remarks:
” It does not imply a lesser respect for law 
and order or even for the constitutional document 
itself; it merely means that the constitution 
and the law are called upon to respond to the 
purposes for the people they are designed to
serve and that this response must be immediate
and direct. The constitution becomes a tool
to be used as needed rather than idol to be
74
worshipped from afar.”
It is proposed to analyae in a later chapter the circums 
tances in which the various amendments to the Indian Cons­
titution were made and to examine whether there was any need 
for them.
74. Livingston : op. cit., p 195
CHAPTER. VI
Power of Amendment and Alleged Express or Implied limita­
tions to it::
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Golak Nath V
1 ----------
State of Punjab has raised the controversy whether the power
of amendment of the Constitution lies in Art. 368 or somewhere
else.. In this chapter, we propose to consider the question in
detail and also to examine whether or not there are any express
or implied limitations to the amending power.
It was said in the Golak Nath case that Art. 368 merely
provides the procedure to pass an amending Bill and does not
grant power to amend the Constitution. This question had not
2
been raised in the Sankari Prasad case and until the Golak 
Nath decision it had been assumed that Art 368 contains both 
the power and procedure for amendment. In a startling pronounce 
ment, however, the Supreme Court held in Golak Nath that 
Parliaments power to amend the Constitution is., derived from
3 •:
its residuary power of legislation.
It is true that the marginal note to Art 368 reads 1 pro­
cedure for amendment of the Constitution'1 but M a marginal note 
cannot control the meaning of the body of the section if the
1. A . I J U  1967 S.C. 1643.
2. Sankari Prasad V Union of India A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 458 
3* Golak Nath V State of Punjab ' A.I.P. 1967 S.C. 1643*
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4
language employed therein is clear and unambiguous" • The 
heading of Part XX of the Constitution which contains only 
Art 368 is "Amendment of the Constitution." It is an accepted 
fact that a heading is regarded as giving the key to the 
interpretation of the clauses ranged under it. Therefore, 
it is not correct to characterise Art. 368 as a mere procedure 
al provision only on the basis of its marginal note. Then, 
is there anything else in the Article which shows that it 
merely lays down the procedure for amendment?
Distinction Between "Power" and "Procedure"
What is the test to determine whether Art. 368 is merely 
procedural or procedural as well as substantative? This 
necessarily leads to the distinction between ’procedure1 and 
'power1 or substantive right. The main majority in the 
Golak Nath case expressed the view that Art. 368 is merely 
procedural because the power to amend has not been expressly 
conferred and need not be implied as the power lies else­
where in the Constitution. The Court did not, however, dis­
cuss the distinction between "power" and "procedure".
4. Nalinakhya Bysack V Shyam Sunder Haider and others 
A.I^R* 1953 S.C. 148(150).
This case was relied on by the Supreme Court in W.I. Thea- 
tres v Municipal Corporation Poona. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 566.
18 7
Power has been defined as " ability conferred upon a 
person by the law to alter, by his own will directed to that 
end, the rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations,
5
either of himself or of other persons." Thefore, power is
the ability created by law to alter legal relations; its
6
correlative is liability. The law which creates such power
7
is classified as "substantive law". However, regarding the 
distinction between "substantive” law and "procedural law", 
there exists no accurate criterion. Salmond observes " it 
is not an easy task to state with precision the exact nature
of the distinction between substantive law and the law of
8
procedure." In a similar view Paton states " one of the 
orthodox classifications is that which distinguishes between 
substantive and procedural law, but it is difficult to
9
draw a clear line between them."
Julius Stone also feels the same difficulty. He observes:
“The categories of "substan£e";,and “procedure"
5. Salmond : Jurisprudence, Twelfth Edn, 1966, pp 229-30
6. Ibid, p 230.
7. Paton, A Text Book of Jurisprudence, 1964, p 535*
8. Salmond, op. cit, Supra, p 461.
9. Paton, G.Vf., op. cit, Supra, 1964, p 535*
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compete to control a vast variety of matters, pro­
ducing a confusion in at least one field which 
led the Law Revision Committee to refrain sine die
from proposing reforms on the singular ground that
10
it is a problem of considerable difficulty.1’
A distinction is attempted on the basis of 'substantive 
law' being an end and ” procedural law ” a means to that 
end. ” Substantive law is concerned with ends which the 
administration of justice seeks; procedural law deals with 
the means and instruments by which those ends are attained.”
Another jurist draws a distinction in these words
’’That part of the law which creates or defines rights
is ’’substantive law’’,.that part which aids or protects
11
them is 'adjective law' or procedure.”
The difficulty begins when 'procedural law1 becomes as
substantive as substantive law itself. Salmond gives numer-
12
ous examples of this which are not necessary to cite. In 
an interesting
10. Stone, Julius: Legal System And Lawyer's Reasonings
1964, p 24-9.
11. Taylor, H. z The Science of Jurisprudence, 1908, p 523*
12. Salmond, op. cit., Supra, pp 461-62.
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13
article, W.W. Cook pondered the distinction between 
"substance” and "procedure” and searched for it in the law 
in general and in the conflict of laws in particular. Accor­
ding to him, in distinguishing "substantive law” from 
"procedural Law" "some imaginary line has -arbitrarily been 
taken as a boundary." His own view is that the two can be 
demarcated by a line only on the basis of the purpose of 
the law in question. He goes on to say, " If once we 
recognize that the line can be drawn only in the light of 
the purpose in view it cannot be assumed without discussion
that as our purposes change the line can be drawn at precisely
14
the same point." According to him, the demarcating line
goes on moving as the purposes of the law go on changing and
for some purposes the distinction may disappear completely.
He further observes that "for some purposes the basis for
any such classification disappears entirely and all can be
15
treated or regarded as substantive."
1 U
Cook illustrates his argument by two examples .First
13. Cook, W.W., "Substance" and "Procedure", 1932, 42,
Yale, L.J., 333.
14. Ibid, 337.
15. Ibid, 336.
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taking up constitutional law, he quotes the principle that 
"constitutional prohibitions against retrospective laws are
generally held not to apply to acts which affect procedure
1 6 whether
only." now to determine/a retrospective law is merely
procedural or substantive as well ? The prohibition is
against substantive law only. Cook says that we must try
to discover the purpose of the law. It seems clear that the
underlying idea of the distinction is that it would not be
fair to individuals to alter their substantive rights by
subsequent legislative enactment but the machinery for the
enforcement of those rights may be altered. Therefore,"
S >
the precise meaning to be given to 'substance/, and to ' pro­
cedure ' ought to be determined in the light of this underlying
17
purpose to be fair to the individual concerned."
Cook takes the second instance from the conflict of laws, 
in which the 1 substantive law' of some country is applied 
to determine the rights of the parties but the procedure to 
enforce them is to be determined by the law of the forum.
He discovers in this instance that the purpose of the law 
is convenience to the court. To determine legal consequence, 
foreign substantive law is applied because of some factual
16. Ibid, 341
17. Ibid, 343
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connection of the situation but it would be quite inconvenient 
to the court, but not unfair to the litigants concerned, to 
make use of all themachinery of the foreign court for 
enforcing the rights involved.- In the light of this purpose 
of convenience, we can dr&w the distinction between the 
two laws. He observedr
"If we admit that the * substantive * shades off by
imperceptible degrees into the 'procedural-1 > and
-. >  ■
that the 'line1 between them does not 'exist', to 
be discovered merely by logic and analysis, but is 
rather to be drawn so as best to carry out our purpose, 
we see that our problem resolves itself substantially 
into this : How far can the Court of the forum go 
in applying the rules taken from the foreign system 
of law w^ghout unduly hindering or inconveniencing 
itself?"
Following the guiding lines given by Cook, let us 
enquire what the purpose of Art 368 is and, in the light 
of thafc purpose, whether it is a merely procedural or
/v*r’
substantive also. Obviously, the purpose of Art. 368 is to 
carry out amendments to the Constitution. The means adopted
18. Cook, W.W., op. cit., supra, pp 3^3-z^ »
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connection of the situation but it would be quite inanve
192
to carry out this purpose is the introduction of a Bill 
in either House of Parliament, to be passed in each House 
by a majority of the total membership of that House and 
by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members 
of that House present and voting and also to be assented to 
by the President. In respect of the articles mentioned in 
the Proviso to Article 368, further ratification by at least 
half of the state Legislatures is also required. This means 
that Art 368 can be reasonably said as laying down the 
procedure for amendment. Had the Article said nothing else, 
it bould be argued that it was merely procedural. .But Art. 
368 also contains the statment thatlfthe Constitution shall 
stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill*1*
This can only connote that the purpose of Art 368 is to 
permit the Constitution to be amended by adopting the 
above-mentioned means or procedure. There is another indi­
cation that these words contain the power to amend the
Constitution. If we refer to the defirition of 'power1
19 ,
given by Salmond. as ability conferredby law to alter 
legal relations1, it is quite clear that 'power would 
manifest in the form of change in legal relations only when
19• Salmond, op. cit, Supra, pp 229-30.
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it is exercised. In other words, two things are clear.
Eirst, power would manifest only when it is exercised. Second
of
its manifestation would be in the form/a change in legal
relations. The portion of Art 368 which we have emphasised,
namely, "the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance
with the terms of the Bill,'1 has both qualities i.e. the
manifestation of power as well as' the effect of a change
in legal relations. Therefore, the result achieved by these
words shows that they contain the power of amendments.
Wanchoo J who delivered the principal dissenting judgment
in the Golak Nath case, seems to have laid his hand on the
truth when he observed ”...... and we have no doubt that the
words 1 the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance
be
with the terms of the Bill1 to/found in Art 368 confer the
20
power of amendment.” It is significant to note that Art V 
of the Constitution of the United States does not have any 
words like ” Congress is empowered” or ”power to amend” and 
Art V has nevertheless been interpreted as conferring power 
to amend the Constitution.
The Constitution of Australia provides in Sec 128 the 
mode of altering the Constitution. The marginal note to 
Sec 128 is "mode of altering the Constitution,” , and the
20. Wanchoo J., Golak Nath, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. at 1676
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High Court of Australia never doubted that Sec 128 grants 
power to amend the Constitution..
It is reasonable to assume that, since the constitution 
framers provided a procedure to amend the Constitution in 
Art 368, they intended to vest the Parliament with the power 
to amend the Constitution, especially when they devoted one 
Part i.e. Part XX to the subject of amendment itself. The 
mere fact that the amending procedure is to be used by 
Parliament postulates that Parliament is clothed with that 
power. If Art 368 is only procedural, an enquiry:/ must 
be directed to the question of the source of the power to 
amend the Constitution. It is submitted that that power cannot 
lie elsewhere except in Art. 568. The majority in the Golak 
Nath case came to locate the pov/er to amend under Part XI 
in Art 245, 246 and 248 read with List I item 97 in the 
Seventh Schedule i.e. under the residuary power of legisla­
tion vested in Parliament. This location of the amending 
power, it is submitted, seems to disturb the whole scheme 
of the Constitution and leads to absurd results.
(A) Art. 245 provides in its opening words that all the 
legislative powers provided in the Union list and Art.. 248 
are to be exercised by Parliament subject to the provisions
of the Constitutions. In other words, the legislative powers
/
under Art 245, 248 read with List I in the Seventh Schedule
195
are to be exercised in such a way as not to override any of 
the provisions of the Constitution. If the amending power 
is traced to item 97 of List I, it would have to exercised 
in conformity with the provisions of ;^ the Constitution but 
this would never be possible because the amending power by 
its nature must contradict the letter of the Constitution. 
Chief Justice Subha Rao relied upon a very subtle and 
specious argument to show that there would be no inconsistency 
at all. He observed:
^Can it be said reasonably that a law amending an 
article is inconsistent with the article amended?
If an article of the Constitution expressly says 
that it cannot be amended., a law cannot be made 
amending it, as the power of Parliament to make law 
is subject to the said Article. It may well be that 
in a given case such a limitation may also necess­
arily be implied. The limitation in Art. 245 is in 
respect of the power to make a law and not of the
content of the law made within the scope of its 
21
power.”
It is submitted that inconsistency arises because words,
21. Golak Nath V State of Punjab A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1645 at 
1658.
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"subject to the provisions of this Constitution," control 
both the power to make a law and the content of the law •
For instance, when a statute is struck down under Art 15 
as being violative of fundamental right, it is the content 
of the law which is found defective and not the competence 
of the legislature to enact the law on the subject-matter^
On the other hand, a law may be perfectly valid under Art 15 
(2) but may be beyond the power of the legislature because 
of territorial restrictions or federal conflict or somethingy *
else. In both cases, the law is bad because of the words 
"subject to the provisions of the Constitution," in Art. 245.
The phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitu­
tion" itself clearly indicates that all powers in Art 245, 
and 248 read with List I item 97 should be of such a nature 
as to be exercised in conformity with the text of the ConstitU' 
tion. Alternatively those powers cannot include a power which 
is not in conformity with the text of the Constitution unless 
the text itself is altered. This point is conspicuously 
clear if we observe the exercise of all the powers enumerated 
in Part XI. Por instance, supposing Parliament makes a 
law on any of the matters in List I, List III or under Art.
248 in such a way as to be inconsistent with the text of the 
Constitution, such a law would be undoubtedly invalid under 
Art 245, because it failed to pass the test
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imposed by Art 245 i.e.. compliance with the provisions of the 
Constitution* (Then, will it not be unreasonable to place 
a power among the legislative powers which can never pass 
this test which all other legislative powers have to pass 
to attain validity? The barriers placed by Art. 245 upon 
the exercise of legislative powers admit of only those 
laws which can live without altering the terms of the Cons­
titution and, if they require alteration in the terms of 
the Constitution to fall in line with them, they may come 
by another way but certainly not through Art 245; otherwise, 
the restriction imposed by Art. 245 is rendered meaningless. 
According to Prof G.C. Venkata Subbarao^if constituent 
power is supposed to lie in the residuary power in item 
97 List I, the expression "subject to the provisions of 
this Constitution" is treated as a general prohibition 
as'well -as a proviso. Because in that case, it is a prohi­
bition proper in respect of all the legislative entries 
other than entry 97 List I so that no law can be made which 
is in any way at variance with the provisions of the Cons­
titution. But that part of entry 97 which takes in constitu­
ent power is. regarded as meaning " item 97- includes Power of 
Constitutional Amendment, subject to the provisions of the 
Constitution, i.e., except where there is a prohibition in
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22
the Constitution.*1 This also brings out clearly that 
constituent law by its very nature is different from ordinary 
law. Therefore, it is not correct to regard amendment as 
ordinary law having its root in legislative powers. As 
another writer has rightly observed, the residuary power can 
consist of legislative powers only and powers of a different
23
kind cannot be thrust into it. We are, therefore, not 
justified in depriving Art 368 of its potency by tracing the 
power to amend in the residuary power of legislation.
(B) If Art. 368 had been procedural only, logically
it should have found a place in an article after article 109 
which provides for legislative procedure. Its separate place 
and that too almost at the end of the Constitution shows 
unmistakably that it is neither mere procedure nor l e g i s ­
lative* in character.
(C) It is a historical fact that in the beginning the 
constitution framers intended to vest the residuary power 
of legislation in States but they finally vested it in the 
Union. If the original intention had been carried out, it 
could not possibly have been argued that Parliament had no
22. Snbbarao G.C.V. The nimansa Approach to the Indian 
Constitution, 1967* II S.C.J. at 85*
23- Vidwan&, M.D. A.I.R. 1968, Journal Section, p 65.
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role in the amending process particularly in view of the 
language in Art. 368. The mere fact that it came to be 
vested with the union should not mean that it includes 
constituent power.
(D) Since Lists I, II, and III were made sufficiently 
exhaustive, in case the framers intended to keep the cons­
tituent power in List I, there is no reason why they could 
not provide specifically for it when the subject of amendment 
was so clear to them that they allotted a part to it in the 
Constitution.
24
(E) Seervai has pointed out that if the amending 
provisions in Art 304 of the Draft Constitution were to be 
compared with Art. 368, it becomes clear that the power to 
amend cannot be in the residuary power. Art 304 of the 
Draft granted a limited power of amendment also to the State 
legislatures but, later on, the idea was dropped. Neverthe­
less it shows that the State legislatures having no resort 
to the residuary power, power to amend the Constitution for 
the States must be deemed to have been provided in Art 368.
In that case, one could never regard the residuary power as 
a source of amending power for the States.
24. Seervai, H.Ni., op. cit., Supra, p 1096.
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(P) It is of interest to note in this connection that 
the residuary power is exclusively of the Parliament whereas 
the amending process in Art 368 is not entirely exclusive 
to Parliament but is to be shared with at least half the 
State Legislatures in respect of the matters entrenched in 
the Proviso to Art. 368. Thus an exception would have to 
be read in Art. 248 that, in certain circumstances where 
the Constitution was to be amended, the residuary power 
is not exclusively with Parliament but is to be shared by 
Parliament and the State legislatures^
Moreover, if Art. 368 is merely procedural and the 
power of amendment lies in the residuary power of Parliament, 
the question arises r What is the State's source of the 
power to ratify an amendment? It is submitted that the 
only source of the power to ratify amendments is Art 368 
because there is no such power given in the legislative 
powers of the States. Therefore, it is anomalous and absurd 
to say that Art. 368 is only procedural so far as the 
Parliament is concerned but it is procedural as well as 
substantive so far as the states are concerned .
(G) If the only purpose of shifting the amending power 
from Art 368 to the residuary power is to limit the power 
to amend in relation to Part^ III, it rftns contrary to the 
intentions of the founding fathers who actually wanted to
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give ample power to amend the Constitution to Parliament.
The intention of the constitution makers regarding the 
power of amendment can be ascertained from the Constituent 
Assembly Debates. But the unfortunate thing is that the 
Supreme Court applies the rule of exclusion in regard to 
their admissibility in general and the speeches of the mem­
bers in particular, whereas the reasons for the rule of
25
exclusion had disappeared long ago- As Kilgour traces 
the history of the rule against the use of legislative 
history beginning from 1669 upto the present time, one is 
convinced that the circumstances in which the rule originated 
were quite different. In those days the Parliamentary debates 
were not freely and officially published and hence they 
were neither authentic nor reliable; but in modern times 
authentic official records of Parliamentary debates are 
available. Moreover the fifteenth century doctrine of ab­
solute literal, authority of statute has undergone a change 
in favour of admitting supplementary aids to interpretation. 
Kilgour has marshalled a catena of decisions to the affect 
that the rule had been a counsel of caution and never a 
cannon of construction. It seems that there is a strong 
case for admitting legislative history in appropriate cases
25. Kilgour, D.G., The Rule Against the use of Legislative 
History: ”Canon of Construction or Counsel of Caution?
30 can. Bar. Rev. p 769.
Merrillat: The Sound Proof Room: A matter of interprets-
tion, 9 JILI (. 1967 ), p 521.
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and for making discriminating use of it as one of the
26
supplementary aids in interpretation.
The speaches of the members of the Constituent Assembly 
bear clear testimony to the effect that they intended to
grant power to amend the Constitution to P 9rliament. While 
speaking about the amending procedure which was eventually 
incorporated in Art. 368, Dr Ambedkar, the Chairman of the 
Drafting Committee, went on record to say:
"The Draft Constitution has eliminated the elaborate 
and difficult procedures such as a decision by a 
convention or a referendum. The poorers of amendment 
are left with the Legislatures Central and Provin­
cial. It is only for amendments of specific matters—  
and they are only a few—  that the ratification of 
the state Legislature is required. All other articles 
of the Constitution are left to be amended by Parlia- 
ment. The only limitation is that it shall be done 
by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the 
members of each House present and voting and majority 
of the total membership of each House. It is
difficult to conceive a simpler method of amending
27
the Constitution."
26. Alexandrowicz, H.C.. op. cit., Supra, p 230.
27. Dr. Ambedkar, C A D  VII , p 4-3.
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As a matter of fact, the Constituent Assembly never 
doubted that it was granting power to amend under Art 368.
"In an important sense, their concern for the
procedure of participation by the federating units
in the federal complex of the provisions was also an
. expression of their preoccupation with the locus of
the amending power. The procedure for amendment
would represent allocations of decision- making power
with regard to constitutional changes between the
28
Union and federating units."
(H) One of the absurd and obnoxious results of looking 
for the amending power under the residuary power of the 
Union is that the ordinance-making power of the President 
under Art 123 is vastly extended. The extent of the ordinance- 
making power is co-extensive with the Legislative power of 
Parliament. An ordinance is an ordinary law and must conform 
with the provisions of the Constitution. Art 13(3) (a) 
defines "law" as used therein as including "ordinance" along 
with other subordinate legislation.. Therefore, an ordinance 
must not violate the Part III rights. The results of the 
holding in the Golak Nath case that the power to amend lies
28. Baxi, Upendra., "The little Done, the Vast. Undone."
9 J.I.L.I- 1967, 373- foot note.
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in item 97 tyist I is that the President comes to avail of 
that power while exercising his ordinance-making power. One 
writer has highlighted this drastic result :
“If this legislative power of Parliament includes the 
power of the constitutional amendment, then pro tanto, 
the Presidential ordinance making power is enlarged.. 
That means that making use of the ordinance-making 
power the President can ( when Parliament is not in 
session ) create a new Constitution without violating t) 
the present Constitution. The new constitution may be 
wholly unlike our present democratic constitution. It
29
may be purely of totalitarian character.11
This result alone is a sufficient corrective to the erro­
neous view that the residuary power takes in constituent power, 
In fact, the whole scheme of the Constitution would be totally 
disturbed if the amending power is misplaced under the 
residuary power. '"'Then the Constitution' Oan be amended by the 
President without resorting to the procedure provided in 
Art. 368 whereas the fact is that the President's legislative 
power is not an act of supreme legislation because it can be
i
replaced by Parliament and if it is to continue it requires
3°
ratification by Parliament. Then, is
29- Subbarao, G.C-V.: Mimansa Interpretation, 1967, II S.C.J. 
at p 99.
30. Misra, R.N., op. cit., Supra, p 103.
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it not illogical and unreasonable that the President's 
subordinate legislative power can do what the Parliament's 
supreme legislative power cannot achieve. Is it right to 
hold that amendment of the federal structure or entrenched 
clauses can be done by the President all alone whereas the 
Parliament cannot do it unless and until it seeks the coo­
peration of at least half the State Legislatures?
Is it not against the spirit and letter of the Constitu­
tion that it.jshould.be amended by the President in this 
fashion? The essence of a special majority and ratification 
in respect of the entrenched provisions provided in Art. 368 
becomesmeaningless. This again assures us that in the 
Constitution of India legislative and constituent powers 
have been separately vested in the Parliament. The 
ordinance-making power of the President is co-extensive only 
with the legislative power of the Parliament. The consti­
tuent power of the Parliament lies in Art. 368 and the 
President is not empowered to take it in his ordinance- 
making power under Art 123. This inevitably leads us to the 
conclusion that the right source of the power to amend the 
constitution is Art 368 itself and certainly not the residuary 
power in item 97 List I read with Art 248.
Are there express or implied limitations on the Amending
Power?.
After considering the locus of the amending power, it is
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necessary to study the limitations, if any, on that power. 
Limitations can be of two types, either express or by 
implication. It is proposed here to deal with express 
limitations first. To obtain a clear view of express 
limitations, it is essential to study them as they occur in 
the constitutions of other countries. Such a study would 
reveal their significance and utility as well as the complex 
and intractable problems which they give birth to in the 
growth of constitutional law. In this respect, we would 
consider the constitutions of the United States, Australia, 
and Canada in particular.
Express Limitations^- Constitution makers sometimes
feel it imperative to impose certain limitations on the power
them
to amend and, therefore, they expressly lay/down in the 
constitution. For instance, the makers of the United States 
Constitution provided in Art V that no amendment made prior 
to 1808 would affect the first and fourth clause in the 
ninth section of the first Article and that no State shall 
be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate without its 
consent. The former restrictions are now^unimportant, but 
the limitation regarding a permanent prohibition against 
any amendment whereby a state is deprived of its equal suffr­
age in the Senate without its consent is sbill existing. It 
is needless to add that this restriction is not absolute.
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If any amendment eliminating representation in the Senate 
were ratified by every State, it would be perfectly valid 
because the only requirement of a Statefs consent is satis­
fied in this way. Alternatively, this clause itself could 
be repealed by an amendment ratified by all the States. 
Therefore, in practice this clause turns out to be "a
31
restriction on the method rather than the scope of amendment."
But Cahrth,is‘ restriction be done away with in any
32
manner short of unanimity.? There is a view that the 
restriction can be removed in two stages: first repealing 
the proviso in Art V and, second, by the' amendment changing 
representation in the Senate. But this seems to be falla­
cious because the repeal of the proviso by the procedure 
in
given/Art V would be a violation of the terms of the proviso 
itself; the proviso requires unanimity of all the states. 
Rottschaeffer thought that had these limitations been 
permanent, they might have been ignored on the ground that
33
these make the constitution unworkable. It seems that, short
31. Orfield, L.B., op. cit., p 84.
32. Prof William Starr ilyers-cited by Edward Dumbauld in 
the Constitution of the United States, 1964, p 436.
33. Rottschaefer , A Handbook of American Constitutional Law 
1939, pp 9-10.
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of unanimity, there is no legal method, by which the restricti­
on could be romoved. The only method left in such a case is 
by way of revolution such as was adopted by the people in 
substituting the Articles of Confederation, which required
34
unanimous consent of the states for the purposes of amendment, 
by the present Constitution of 1787. In view of the fact that 
logic in such a case provides no-method other than revolution, 
logic itself should yield to convenience and the attempt 
to limit the power of amendment be held as an exercise in 
futility, though this view itself might be regarded as noth­
ing but revolutionary becau^g " an amendment, unless legal, 
is achieved by revolution." But one type of revolution can 
be chosen in preference to another. Prof. Rottschaefer 
observed on this point:
"there has been found no case in which the power to 
amend has been employed to directly or indirectly 
modify a constitutional provision expressly excepted 
from that power. The issues that such an attempt 
would raise could not be settled by any reasoning 
derived by logical processes from prevailing conceptions 
of sovereignty, and those based on considerations of 
convenience and expediency point to the solution 
that such attempts to limit the power of amendment 
should be held futile. The necessities of orderly 
government do not require that one generation should
34. Art XIII of the Articles of Confederation.
35* Hidayatullah J. in Golak Nath, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. at 1697*
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be permitted to permanently fetter all future
36
generations.!f
Be it as it may, this is a situation where the bounds 
of law end and those of extra-legal considerations begin. 
Within the boundary of law, the position is clear that an 
amendment to be valid must be achieved by observing the 
conditions laid down by the constitution itself.
Now let us study the express limitations on the amending 
power in Australia. Sec 128 of the Australian Constitution 
Act 1900 provides that no alteration diminishing the pro­
portionate representation of any state in either House of 
the Parliament, or the minimum number of representatives of 
a state in the House, or increasing, diminishing or otherwise 
altering the limits of the state, or in any manner affecting 
the provisions of the constitution in relation thereto, 
shall become law unless the majority of the electors voting 
in that state approve the proposed law. It is a matter of
controversy whether an amendment of Sec 128 itself omitting
37
this paragraph, would be valid. Dr. Jethrow Brown held
38
the view that such amendment was logically invalid. Mitchell 
joins with him on the ground that the amendment would be
36. Rottschaeferj E . , A Handbook of American Constitutional 
Law, 1939, pp 9-10.
37. Brown , J., Austinian Theory of Law, 1920, p 162.
38. Mitchell, E.F., What Every Australian Ought to know, p 79
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contrary to the !,political compact" • But Dr. Wynes holds 
that the amendment of this limitation in the manner provided
39
in Sec 128 itself is valid. His reasons for the view are:
First, the power of amendment extends to alteration of "this
constitution" which includes Sec 128 itself. Therefore,
there is nothing wrong with an amendment, if carried through
by the procedure of Sec 128, repealing the last limb of
Sec 128. There is considerable force in this argument.
Secondly, he points out that in the Constitution of the
in
United States which also has a similar limitation/Art V, the 
limitation begins with the words "provided", indicating 
an exception from the preVious grant of power whereas in the 
;Australian constitution there is no such qualification. The 
argument based upon the "political compact" was met by saying 
that the compact came into being after full discussion of 
Sec 128 itself. It is submitted that Dr. Wynes'sview seems 
to be correct because the limitation in the last para of 
Sec 128 is a limitation on the mode of amendment and not on 
the power of amendment . In other words, it is not an 
absolute limitation and what has been provided in the limi­
tation is itself subject to amendment upon the fulfilment 
of the condition specifically mentioned in the last para of
59. Dr. Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers 
in Australia, 1962, p 695#
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Sec 128. If Sec 128 itself had provided that the last
para would not be a subject-matter of amendment, then, of
course there was reason to hold a contrary view. As the
provision stands, a state is entitled to refuse to accept
a law changing the number of its representatives in the
House of Representatives or changing the limits of the state
unless and until the last para of Sec 128 is repealed. Once
the para is repealed, it would become a dead letter and
thereafter a law bringing the required changes can be passed.
It is of interest to note in this connection that on 27th May,
1967 the Australian government held a referendum on two
issues namely, to change the method provided in the constitu-
of
tion for determining the size of the House/Representatives 
i.e. Section 24 of the constitution, so that the number of 
the representatives be increased; and secondly, to change the 
constitution suitably to assist the aborigines , at the ins­
tance of the federal government. The Government argued for 
the first change on the ground that the work of the House 
was increasing day by day and the representatives were 
already over-worked. More members would release the pressure 
of the work. In spite of the fact that the government as 
well as the opposition party in the House were in favour 
of the change sought and only seven Senators voted against 
it in the Senate, the electors disapproved of the first
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proposal in five states, displaying their old prejudice
against the politicians. However, they saidfyes' to the
40
aborigines proposal*
The Canadian constitution furnishes a rare example of 
express limitations. The B.N.-A. Act 1867 had no provision 
for its amendment save to the limited extent provided xn Sec 
92(1) in which Provincial Legislatures were empowered to 
alter the constitution of the Province except the office 
of Lt- Governor. It was only in 1949 that the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom gave certain limited authority to 
amend the constitution excepting the distribution of 
legislative power and many other matters mentioned in Sec 91
(1) . Sec 91(1) provides express limitation on the amending 
power to be exercised by the Parliament. Theoretically, it 
is the Imperial Parliament which has the power to amend the
B.N.A* Act but in practice that Parliament never exercised 
the power of amendment suo moto but only on the suggestion 
of the Dominion Parliament of Canada. The real controversy 
regarding the amending procedure is whether the Dominion 
Parliament is bound to obtain unanimous consent of the
provinces before requesting the Parliament of the United
)
Kingdom to effect a particular amendment to the B.N.A Act*
40. Miller, J.D.B.:"The 1967 Australian Referendum," 
The Parliamentarian , 1968, IL No 2, p 59*
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Of the amendments so fscr effected important amendments, in
regard to the distribution of power were achieved by
unanimous consent of the Provinces e.g. Section 94-A. -But
there are other amedments to the Act in which provinces were
not consulted at all, not to speak of securing their unani- 
4-1
mous consent. The Canadians have been making serious
efforts to evolve a domestic amending procedure since 1927
and these efforts resulted in a formula known as the Fulton-
4-2
Favreau formula which was approved by all the provinces 
except Quebec and hence failed to be ripe for the approval 
of the British Parliament. The formula is discussed else­
where in this work. It is submitted here that, so far as 
express limitations on the amending power are concerned, the
4-3
formula does not improve the existing position. Bora Laskin
made a "brutal11 but "true" appraisal of it that "the agree-
4-4-
ment was reached on the basis that no one need agree."
Some of the modern constitutions also provide for express 
limitation. To name a few, the Constitution of the Fifth
4-1. The list of such amendments are given by Laskin. B. in 
Canadian Constitutional Law, pp 33-34-•
4-2. The Draft Statute given in Appendix 2, ibid.
4-3. Alexander: A Constitutional Strait Jacket for Canada, 196 
4-3, Can. Bar. R e v , p;, 262.
4-4-. Laskin, Borcc, Canadian Constitutional Law, 1966, p 37*
v 
n
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French Republic, 1958 provides in Art 89 that the republican 
form of government is not subject to revision and also that 
the amending procedure may not be initiated or pursued when
45
the integrity of the territory is under attack* Almost
similar provisions occur in the constitution of Dahomey 
46 47
Jan, 1964, in the Constitution of Gabon Feb, 1961 , in the
48
constitution of the Republic of Guinea, 1958 , in the
49
constitution of the Ivory Coast, 1960-63 , the constitution
50
of logo, May 5, 1963 * and the constitution of Upper Volta,
51
Nov. 1960 . The constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 1949 provides that an amendment affecting the 
division of the Federation into Laender, the participation in
45. Art. 79*
46. Art 99.
47. Art 69«
48. -^ rt 50.
49. Art 73.
50. Art 85.
51. Art 73.
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principle of the Laender in Legislation, or the basic 
principles laid down in Art 1 and 20 is j.nadmissible.
From the study of express limitations, two things are 
outstandingly clear. First, that express limitations can be
of two kinds , either absolute or qualified- Secondly,
absolute limitations pose more formidable difficulties in the
exercise of the amending power than qualified ones. Logically.
there is no other way than revolution to do away with the
absolute limitations. However, to avoid revolution, the
judiciary may disregard them by holding them as making the
52
constitution unworkable. Theoretically, an attack’- on their 
basic assumption can be launched. Obviously, absolute limi­
tations stem from the belief of constitution makers in the 
superiority of their wisdom as compared with that of the 
coming generations. This assumption is vulnerable in that 
a generation has no right or duty to bind the succeeding 
generations because the earth belongs in usufruct to all 
the living , and the dead have neither powers nor rights 
over it.
As regards qualified limitations, amending power must 
invariably be exercised while observing the conditions. To
52. Rottschaefer:: op. cit. supra, pp 9-10.
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exercise legislative or constituent power validly, the
conditions for the exercise of such powers must be satisfied,
otherwise the measure fails to attain the required validity
or the force of law, The American Jurisprudence states :TI An
attempt by the majority to change the fundamental law in
violation of self-igi^osed restrictions is unconstitutional
and revolutionary.11 There is a number of cases decided on
54
this point. In Bribery Commr. V Ranasinghe a legislative 
measure was passed by the Ceylon Parliament without observing 
the conditions required to be observed in passing the Act 
and the Privy Council rightly declared the Act to be invalid. 
Lord Pearce observed:
“....a legislature has no power to ignore the conditions 
of law-making that are imposed by the instrument which
55
itself regulates its power to make law."
. 5 6
Trethowan's case is another authority for this view.
In 1929, the New South Wales Legislature consisting of a
53. V. II Sec 25, pp 629-30.
54. 1965, A.C. 172.
55. 1965, A.C. 172( 197).
56. A. G. for New South Walefer V Trethowan, 1932, A.C. 526.
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legislative assembly and a legislative council passed a 
law to the effect that the Upper House of New South Wales 
might not be abolished except by a Bill which required 
approval of the electors at a referendum before being 
presented to the governor for assent. The Parliament had 
power to pass such a law under the N.S.W. Constitution Act 
1902 and also was assisted by Sec 5 of the Colonial Laws
Validity Act 1865* In 1930 a new Labour Government came into
power and it intended to repeal by ordinary procedure i.e. 
without holding a referendum, the law passed by the previous 
government, incorporated in the constitution as Sec 7? and al­
so to abolish the legislative council. Trethowan and some 
members of the legislative council sought a declaration 
from the Supreme Court of New South Wales to the effect
V
that the proposed action was illegal, which was granted. The
High Court confirmed the decision by a majority of four
against two and the Privy Council confirmed the majority.
Trethowan is an authoritative decision establishing 
the view that the conditions of law-making must be observed 
to breathe validity into the law and even the concept of 
sovereignty of Parliament i* not of any avail to avoid 
such conditions. Sir Owen Dixon, who was one of the judges
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of the Australian High Court in the Trethowan case, observed 
later as follows:
"The law existing for the time being is supreme 
when it prescribes the conditions which must be 
fulfilled to make a law. But on the question what 
may be done by a law so made, Parliament is supreme
57
over the law."
Another case which provoked much controversy and was
58
directly on the point was Harris Vs Minister of the Interior 
The case was decided by the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of the Union of South Africa invalidating an Act 
passed by the Parliament called the Separate Representation 
of Voters Act, 1951 which provides separate representation 
of "non-European” voters in the Province of the Cape of 
Good Hope. This Act was passed by a majority of that House 
and not by a specific majority required by Sec 55 and Sec 152
of the South Africa Act 1909 the constitution of the union
of South Africa. The arguments from the government proceeded 
on three main points:
57* Sir, Dixon, 0., The Law and The Constitution, 1935* 
L.Q.R., p 590(603)*
58. 1952. T.X.R. 124-5= 1952 2 S.A.LR. 4-28.
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Firstly, that the Statute of Westminister 1931 by Sec 
2(2) has given wider power to the Parliament and impliedly 
amended the South Africa Act 1909, so much so that Sec 35 
and Sec 152 pro tanto stand amended. The argument was 
rejected on the ground that Sec 2(2) of the Statute of 
Westminister 1931 does not amount to repealing Sec 35 or 
Sec 152 of the Constitution Act 1909; the Statute of 
Westminister immunizes the Parliament from the effects of 
Isws passed by the Mother Parliament but it leaves Sec 35 
and Sec 152 unchanged. Secondly, the government relied 
on the^Status of the Union Act, 1934- which declares the 
Parliament to be the sovereign legislative power in and over 
the union. The Court refused to accept the point that the 
legislative powers of the union were not limited. Thirdly,
59
the Supreme Court refused to follow an earlier case decided 
by it, in which an Act was declared valid by the Supreme Court 
but the judges expressed their opinion in a wider language 
than warranted by the facts of the case on the legal points 
involved in it. The powers of Parliament in that case were 
describe^ as "limitless11 and "sovereign".
The Union Parliament, to overcome the result produced
59* N Dlwana V Hofmeyr , 1937, A.D. 229
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by the judgment, enacted a law constituting a High Court
of the Parliament whose purpose was to review the judgment
of the Supreme Court invaliding any Parliament A ct, at the
instance of a Minister of State, by lodging an application
to that effect, The members of the High Court of Parliament
were all the senators and members of the House of Assembly.
60
In Harris Vs Minister of Interior-(II) this Act was also
held untra-vires by the Supreme Court.
Position In India::
In answer to the question whether there are any express 
limitations on the amending power under Art. 368, it is 
submitted thet the terms of that Article clearly show that 
there are none except that the prescribed procedure must be 
followed.. To pass an amendment to the Constitution validly, 
the Parliament must observe the majority rule required by 
Art. 368 and, in case of entrenched articles, the ratifica­
tion of at least half the State legislatures must be obtained. 
Thereafter Presidential assent must be given.
It is"df interest to note that the Draft Constitution 
had Art 305 which actually would have laid an express limi­
tation to the amendatory power in Art 368. Art 305 of the
1952(4) S.A. 769
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Draft Constitution ran as followsr
"Notwithstanding any thing contained in article 304 
(now Art 368) of this constitution, the provisions 
of this constitution relating to the reservation 
of seats for the Muslims, the Scheduled Castes, the 
Scheduled Tribes or the Indian Christians either in 
Parliament or in the Legislature of any state for 
the time specified in Part I of the First Schedule 
shall not be amended during a period of ten years 
from the commencement of this constitution and 
shall cease to have effect on the expiration of 
that period unless continued in operation by an 
amendment of the constitution."
This draft article was dropped, but it indicates un- 
mitakably that the constitution framers were well aware that 
the amendatory power could limited by providing an express 
provision to that effect* Since they thought it better to 
drop Art. 305 of the Draft Constitution, Art 368 became free 
from any express limitations or exceptions. As the article 
stands, it requires the observance of the procedure and there 
exists no other limitation on the exercise of the amendatory 
power.
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Are there any implied limitations to the amendatory 
Power?
Implied,‘.-.limitations arise because of some provisions 
of the Constitution which call for such limitations; they 
are the products of a dialectical approach and arise through 
the mode of interpretation. Sometimes, a particular provi­
sion of the constitution is pointed out as imposing a limi­
tation to the amending power, by implication or by pushing 
logical conclusions to the extreme to show that the conse­
quences justify the construction in favour of imposing a
61
limitation. For instance, in the National Prohibition cases, 
implied limitations were sought to be imposed on the power 
of amendment in Art V of the Constitution of the United 
States. It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that the 
amending power is only a precautionary safeguard to correct 
minor errors. On the other hand, if ample power is construed 
in Art V, it would bring aoout a constitutional revolution, 
converting the sovereignty of the people into a sovereignty 
of officials. An ingenious argument was made on the basis 
of "This Constitution,” occuring in Art V, that this 
phrase shews that the constitution , as it is, permits of 
minor amendments. The court however said :
"This constitution" is not a code of transient laws
61. 255 V S r. 350
but a frame work of government and an embodiment
of fundamental principles. By an amendment, the
identity or purpose of the instrument is not to
be changed; its defects may be cured, but 'this
62
constitution1 must remain."
Pointing out the consequences of an unlimited poxver of amend­
ment, it was urged that the limited government would have
63
the power to do away with its own limitations. But the 
Supreme Court rejected all these arguments.
Similarly, constitutional lawyers in Australia contend
64
that the covering sections of the Constitution Act 1900 
are outside the ambit of Sec 128 because they are not a 
part of the constitution and Sec 128 relates to "this 
constitution". Proceeding further, it is urged, any amend­
ment inconsistent with the preamble of the Act, referring 
to the sections which refer to "indisolluble" or "Federal" 
character, would be invalid. It is argued that the covering 
clauses can be amended only by the Imperial Parliament
65
which enacted the Statute.
62. ibid, pp 355-357.
63* ibid, 357*
64. The Pre^Jple and the first nine sections of the Consti­
tution/regarded as the covering sections.
65* Wynes. W.A., op. cit., Supra, 696.
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It is submitted here that the preamble is only a recital 
of the intention which the Act seeks to effect. If the 
effective part is^subject to amendment under Sec 128, it is
r.
illogical to hold that the recital part i.e. the preamble 
is beyond the reach of the power to amend. As compared 
with the effective part of the constitution, the preamble 
is definitely less important. In statutory interpretation, 
the preamble is generally excluded from consideration. It 
is not reasonable to limit the power of amendment by relying 
on the preamble to the Constitution.
In the Australian Constitution Act 1900, Sec 105A was 
added by amending the Act.. This Section says that a finan­
cial agreement made by the Commonwealth with the States would 
be binding, "notwithstanding anything contained in this 
constitution or the constitutions of the several States or 
in any law of the parliament of the commonwealth or of any
state.1 Since this section uses the words "notwithstanding
66
anything contained in this section," it is argued that this 
section is not amendable under Section 128 and any amend­
ment which is itself, or which authorizes any legislation 
which is, inconsistent with any such agreement is impossible 
unless all the parties to any such agreement have given
66. Mitchell, E . , op. cit., Supra
their consent. Dr. Wynes opines that Sec 105A is amendable 
and his view seems to be correct. Apart from the fact that 
when Sec 105A was put to pupular vote, attention was not 
directed to its fifth clause to the effect that it was to
67
be exempted from alteration under Sec 128 or to the fact 
that Sec 128 occurs later in sequence than Sec 105A and a 
later provision overrides an earlier one, it is illogical 
that Sec 105A,which was brought into being by virtue of
6 8
Sec 128, should restrict S e c '128 and control the instrument.
The financial agreement the subject matter of Sec 105A---
should not impose restrictions unpon the duly constituted 
means of amending the constitution. It is true that any 
amendment of the constitution which has the effect of 
destroying the bases of financial agreements might bring 
those agreements to an end, " but it seems an inversion of 
reason to suppose that the nature, or extent, or mutability 
of the constitutional source of legislative power should be 
in any way be controlled by some action taken pursuant to
69
that power." On the other hand, if the amending power in
67- Canaway, A.P., Sec 105A of the Commonwealth Constitution, 
12, A.L.J. 525, (1939).
68. H.G.M. 5 A.L.J. ( 1931-52), pp 357-58.
69. Ibid, p 358. \
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Sec 128 was intended to be curtailed, it was necessary that 
Sec 128 itself should have been altered when Sec 10JA was 
inserted in the constitution. Since Sec 128 was not touched 
at all, it is unreasonable to suppose that Sec 105A by 
implication has reduced the power of amendment provided in 
Sec 128.
Alleged Implied Limitation to the Amendatory Power In 
The Constitution Of India.
Though the Indian Supreme Court has not yet decided the
are
question whether there/any implied limitations on the Consti­
tutional amending power, several judges have indicated
sympathy with this argument. For instance, Subba Rao C.J.,
70
delivering the main majority judgment in the Golak Nath case 
characterised the argument that Parliament, while exercising 
the power of amendment, cannot destroy the structure of the 
Constitution but it can only modify the provisions, as 
having "considerable force". As the question was not nece­
ssary for the decision of the case, he left it open and 
suggested that "the question may arise for consideration only 
if Parliament seeks to destroy the structure of the Consti-
71
tution."
70. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643 at 1664
71. Ibid, 1664.
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Similarly Hidayatullah J, observed as:
"It is the duty of this Court to find the limits which
the Constitution has set on the amendatory power and
to enforce those limits. This is what I have
72attempted to do in this judgment.’'
Let us examine the arguments and reasons advanced for 
justifying implied limitations to Art 368.
I Meaning of Amendment: One of the easiest ways to
raise implied exceptions to the amendatory power is to narrow 
down the meaning of "amendment” . It is said that the consti­
tuent power and the amending power are of the same character 
but the latter is derivative and limited. Mortati held this 
view:
"It follows that while constituent power is exhausted 
in the very act of creating the constitution, the 
power to amend the constitution develops at inter­
mittent periods as gradually the need for adaptation
73manifests itself."
7g
Similar is the dictum in Livermore v. E.G. Y/aite,
72. Ibid. 1718.
73. Mortati Concetto Limiti, Procediment della Pevisione 
Constituzionale, Studi di Dritto Constituzional, 1952, p 379-
7k- 102 Cal 113 : 25 L R A 312.
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”0n the other hand, the significance of the terra 
1 amendment1 implies such an addition or change within 
the lines of the original instrument as will effect an 
improvement or better carry out the purpose for which 
it v/as framed.”
The corollary to this proposition is that amendment is 
to be done for modification, for improvement, and for minor 
changes here and there. Alternatively, the basic structure
(whatever that may mean) is not amenable to amendment. But
75this narrow approach was rejected in the United States.
76In Golak Nath, the main majority judgment, left it open but
77Hidayatullah rejected it. Wanchoo J rightly pointed out
the danger inherent in such an approach:
”To say that amendment in law means a change which results
in improvement would make amendments impossible, for what
is improvement of an existing law is a matter of opinion
and what, for example, the Legislature may consider an
7 8improvement may not be so considered by others."
75. National Prohibition Cases (1919) 253 Us 350.
76. Per Subba Rao C.J. A.l.R. 1967 S.C. at 1664.
77. Ibid, at 1696.
78. Ibid at 1680.
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If amendment is taken to mean as capable of introducing 
slight changes only, and not changing the so-called basic 
features,
MThe result would be that every amendment made in the
constitution would provide a harvest of legal wrangles
so much so that parliament may never know what provisions
79can be amended and what cannot.”
Moreover, Art 368 happens to include the word ’’change” indicating 
thereby that ’’amendment” and ’’change” were intended to be 
synonymous.
Apart from the difficulties in characterising a provision 
as ’’basic” , it is not easy to distinguish a minor change from 
a major one. This point can be illustrated from the consti­
tutional lav/ of Switzerland v/hich makes a distinction between 
total revision and partial revision. The distinction is not 
scientific and precise. Generally, a total revision is under­
stood as overhauling the whole constitution v/hereas a partial 
revision is limited to certain articles specified therein.
But at what point does a revision cease to be partial and amount 
to total? A deputy of the council of states rightly pointed out:
’’Suppose that it was proposed to suppress the council 
of states, or to vest executive power in the hands
79. Ibid. at 1681.
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of a President elected for life, no one would call 
this a partial revision, but an important fundamental 
change, although only one or two articles would be 
affected by it. It is therefore impossible to 
give an exact definition of a partial revision, or
to draw any precise distinction between a total and
.... . . ..80 a partial revision.11
Similarly, Borgeaud held that the said distinction is
not a distinction of lav; but of fact and an amendment of
one article may amount to a total revision.
’’This or that modification of a single fundamental
article may be more important than an entire series
of minor changes, covering a great number of articles,
and which might for this reason be qualified as a
Bl
total revision.”
It is submitted that neither the dictionary meaning 
of ’’amendment” nor its general acceptance admits of a narrow 
connotation. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word
80. Session of the Council of States, 17th December 1891;
Quoted by Deploig, S. The Referendum in Switzerland, 1898, 
pp 126-127.
81. Borgeaud, C. Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions in 
Eurone and America, 1893, at p 321.
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tfamendM as ”to make professed improvements (in a measure 
before parliament); formerly to alter in detail, though it 
may be to alter its principle so as to thwart it.” It is 
obvious that the word takes in even a contrary purpose as well.
”The term ’amendment’ connotes a definite and formal
82process of constitutional change.” The proponents of
07
implied limitations in the Golak Nath case invited the 
attention of the court to the fact that the word ’’amend” is 
followed by the words ”by way of addition, variance or repeal” 
in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution and they argued that, 
since these words have been omitted in Art 368, therefore, 
’’amendment” should be understood to serve only a narrow purpose 
of making minor changes.
It is clear that the founding fathers had before them 
the main written constitutions of the world viz, the constitutions 
of the United States, Australia, Canada, Ireland, South Africa, 
Germany and, especially in regard to the amendment of the cons­
titution, their attention was definitely fixed on them.^ It
can, therefore, be safely assumed that they used the word 
’’amendment” in the same sense as it had been used in those cons­
titutions. Since none of them gave a narrow meaning to
82. Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences vol.II, Macmillan, 1963,
P 21.
83. AIR 1967 S.C. at 1680.
8*f. Rau, B.N. Table of Amending Process (Constitutional Precedents 
1st Series).
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’’amendment” , we are not justified in attributing a narrow 
purpose to ’’amendment” as used in Art 368.
Sathe thinks that in the Constitution of India the power 
of amendment should be limited by the enduring values such as 
liberty, justice and equality enshrined in the constitution
but he admits that such a limitation is only a rule of political
85morality. ^ In other words it is not a legal argument to put
limitation on the amendatory power.
Another way to curtail the meaning of the term ’’amendment”
is found under the pretext of ’’intentions” . It is said that
anything which destroys the intention expressed in the consti-
86tution cannot be a valid amendment. It is submitted that
an amendment to a constitution may be necessary even to change 
the original intentions of the constitution makers, which may not 
suit a generation which is to work with the constitution. There­
fore, to hold that an amendment not falling in line with the 
original intentions of the founding fathers is not valid, does 
not seem to be a sound view.
In addition, to raise implied limitations to the amending 
power certainly creates rigidity in the document which, if it 
crosses a desirable point, blocks the growth of the constitution
85- Sathe, S.P. Fundamental Rights and Amendment of the 
Constitution, 1968, p 51-
86. Subramania, C.S. Express or Implied Limitation on the Amending 
Power under Art 368, S.C.J. vol.XVIII, 1955, P 101.
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and of the people working under it and is, therefore, not 
desirable. Orfield rightly observed:
!!Yet it would seem extremely unfortunate to impose any 
limitations on content, both because any one generation 
cannot foresee the needs of another and because such 
restrictions make a revolution necessary to accomplish
Or p
the change which is forbidden.”
(2) ”This Constitution”
The argument based upon ”this Constitution” is a double-
edged weapon and can be used in favour of both flexibility as
well as rigidity. It is interesting to note how it was used
to gain flexibility in the constitution of Portugal, 1822. In
1826 Dorn Pedro reproduced almost word for word the provisions
of the Constitution of 1822. The amending process in the 1822
constitution was very cumbersome and one of the devices to over
come it was to define the "constitution” in this way:
”1^4. Those only are constitutional acts which determine
either the respective limits and attributes of the
political authorities or the political or individual
rights of the citizens. Every act, not constitutional
may be altered by ordinary legislatures, without the
88above-mentioned formalities.”
87. Orfield, op.cit. supra, 1939, P 203.
88. Quoted by Borgeaud, op.cit. supra, p 93.
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It is needless to add that this definition made many articles 
amenable to amendment by ordinary legislation and saved them 
from the rigours of the amending process. Thus a fair amount 
of flexibility was gained.
An ingenious argument is often advanced to show that
89Art 368 itself admits of exceptions to it. In Sajjan Singh
Hidayatullah J. observed that ”this constitution” occurring in
Art 368 does not mean each individual article wherever found
and whatever its language and spirit. The main support for
this argument is found in the fact that the constitution itself
90provides in various articles that certain changes can be 
effected by following ordinary law-making procedure i.e. by 
simple majority, and these articles also specifically provide 
that their amendment in this way is not an amendment for the 
purpose of Art 368.
If sufficient attention is paid to the phraseology of 
such articles, it is evident that these articles themselves 
are not alterable by a simple majority ■ V/hat of them is alterable 
by a simple majority is their content and not the power they 
confer on the parliament to amend the content by a bare majority. 
There is a distinction between power to make a law and the content
89. Sa.i.jan Singh (1963) S.C.J. 393 : AIR 1965 S.C. 843&t862.
90. Art /f, 169, Sch.V para.7 and Sch.VI para.21.
These Articles have been discussed in Chapter V, supra p 152.
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of law. The point can be further explained by pointing out 
that each of these articles provides for certain matters, its 
subject matter, and can be termed as its contents. For instance 
Art k provides for a lav/ altering the subject matter of Art 2 
and Art 3 i.e. admission or establishment of new states and 
formation of new states, alteration of areas, boundaries or 
names of existing states. The Parliament is empowered to make 
an amendment to these matters by a bare majority but if the 
parliament intends to alter Art 2 or 3 or even Art k 9 it is not
a bare majority which is sufficient but a majority of the entire
membership of each House and a two-thirds majority of each House
present and voting as required by the main limb of Art 368.
Similarly, Art 169 empowers Parliament by a bare majority, 
to abolish the legislative council of a State or to create such 
a council in a State not having one. An amendment Bill abolishing 
a council of state would amend Art 168 (1) (a) to the limited 
extent permissible under Art 169 (2) i.e. inserting or omitting 
the name of a state. In other words, such an amending Bill 
cannot amend clauses (1), (1) (b), and (2) of Art 168 and if 
Parliament wants to amend the aforesaid provisions, it will have 
to proceed under Art 368.
Moreover, each of the aforesaid provisions has a sub-clause 
which provides that the law so made "shall not be deemed to be 
an amendment of this constitution for the purposes of Art 368."
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As Seervai has pointed out, the word "deemed" does not mean 
that though the Constitution has been amended in fact, it is 
to be considered not to have been amended. Its only import 
is to exclude the special machinery provided for the amendment 
in Art.368, as is clear from the words "for the purposes of Art 
368.1,91
The basic idea underlying these provisions seems to be 
that the Constitution should be saved from being amended time 
and again in the manner laid down in Art 368 in respect of the 
minor matters. But does this mean that these articles are to 
be regarded as exceptions to Art 368? The answer is certainly 
in the negative. If Parliament ever intends to repeal any of 
the above said provisions or amend them in regard to the power 
they confer, Art 368 would have to be complied with. Therefore, 
the inescapable conclusion is that far from being exceptions to 
Art 368, all these articles are subject to Art 368, though 
Parliament is competent to amend the matters referred to under 
them by ordinary procedure of law-making. Therefore, the argu­
ment that the words "this Constitution" in Art 368 do not mean 
each and every article of the Constitution, is without any substance.
Justice Hidayatullah observed that Art 35 which begins with 
a non-obstante clause: "Notwithstanding anything in this
91. Seervai, op.cit. supra p 1092.
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constitution, (a) Parliament shall have, and the legislature
of a state shall not have, power to make lav/s...." excluded
Art 368.^ He compared Art 35 with S.105A of the Australian
Constitution and, since in the New South Wales v. The Commonwealth 
93case^ the Australian High Court viewed S.105A as an exception to
5.128, so he considered that Art 35 excluded Art 368. There is 
a sharp division of opinion among the Australian constitution 
lawyers on the question of the amehdability of S.105A under
_ QL
5.128. As a matter of fact, there is nothing comparable in
Art 35 o f  the Indian Constitution to S.105A of the Australian
Constitution except the non-obstantc- clause. Unless one is
95inclined "to play a grammarian's role" to reach the result by
96a mechanical jurisprudence, no analogy can be drawn between 
these two constitutional provisions. The main reason for re­
garding S.105A of the Australian Constitution as being outside 
the scope of S.128 is the binding nature of the financial 
agreement made under S.103A.
"The imperious character of the language employed in this
92. AIR 1967 S.C. 16^ -3 at 1718.
93* New South Wales v. The Commonwealth ^6 C.L.R. 155-
9 k * Canaway, A.P. op.cit. p 326.
Wynes, W.A. op.cit. p 698.
95. AIR 1967 S.C. 16A3 at 1693-
96. Ibid.
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sub-section of the constitution, in my opinion, renders
certain the paramount force of any Financial Agreement to
97which the subsection applies.*1 
The Learned Judge further observed:
"Section 103A (5) is not a dead letter: it pulsates with 
the vitality of the constitution and imbues with the 
force of a fundamental law any agreement to which it 
applies .*'98
The non-obstante clause in Art 33 was introduced in order 
to give the power of legislation in , ... respect of the matters 
mentioned therein to the Union Parliament exclusively, so as to 
maintain uniformity in the laws restricting the fundamental 
rights. But for the non-obstante clause, Parliament would have 
had no power to legislate with respect to the police force because 
such legislation falls under Entry 2 of List II in the Seventh 
Schedule. The subject-matter of Art 33 itself makes it clear 
that the non-obstante clause was not intended to safeguard the 
article from being amended. On the other hand, when Art 33 
empowers Parliament to make law to give effect to the fundamental 
rights, how can this conferment of the power to make law be 
understood as delimiting the power of amendment in Art 368?
Far from putting any restraint on the Parliament, from which 
alone any implied limitation could be derived by any process of
97. McTiernan, J. in New South Wales v. The Commonwealth
C.L.R. 155 at 228.
98. Ibid. at 228-229.
239
reasoning, Art 35 strengthens the hands of the Parliament in 
making the fundamental rights effective.
(3) Obligation to uphold the Constitution
An implied limitation to the amending power in Art 368
is conceived on the basis of the provision requiring every
member of Parliament to take an oath or make an affirmation to
the effect that he will bear true faith and allegiance to the 
99Constitution. In other words, the duty of allegiance to
the Constitution seems to clash with the power to make an amend­
ment to it."*"^ Here a relevant question to ask is whether the 
duty of allegiance is to a static or a dynamic constitution.
If the duty is to a constitution which is static, one can make 
out a case for an implied limitation against amending it. But 
in reality, no constitution can be static; it is always changing, 
though the changes may be invisible and imperceptible. Customs, 
usages and judicial interpretation go on effecting changes in a 
constitution."*"^ Though changes brought out by these agencies 
are informal, nevertheless these changes are like amendments to 
the constitution.
Therefore, an allegiance to the constitution can only be to
99. Third Schedule Form B.
100. Mudholkar J. in Sa.j.jan Singh AIR 1965 S.C. 8^5 at 864*
101. Wheare, K.C. op.cit. supra Chapter VIII.
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a constitution which is being changed by customs, usages, 
political conditions and judicial interpretation. Formal amend­
ments also change a constitution. If an allegiance to the 
constitution is not affected in any way when the constitution 
is being amended by informal amendments, it is difficult to 
understand how that allegiance is affected when the constitution 
is amended formally. Moreover, if the nation overgrows its 
constitution, and the constitution is not amended suitably from 
time to time, it may lose its own value. In such cases, to 
effect a desirable amendment to the constitution is to fulfil 
one's allegiance to the constitution; otherwise, what is the 
value of an allegiance which itself makes the constitution un­
wieldy and unworkable? Therefore, allegiance to the constitution 
seems to mean the constitution as amended from time to time 
informally as well as formally. In the Indian constitution, it 
is all the more evident that the "constitution" means the consti­
tution as amended from time to time. The wording "the constitution 
shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill" in 
Art 368 shows that after the constitution has been amended, it is 
not the less "the constitution"; it is still "the constitution" 
after it has been amended. Hence, the provision relating to an 
oath of allegiance cannot stand in the way of amendment.
Let us examine the argument that the provisions relating to 
taking of oath in Art 8k and 173 read with the Third Schedule of 
the constitution, "impliedly import an entrenched clause into the
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102constitution on the amendment process itself." The Sixteenth
Amendment Act, 1963, amended, inter alia, the forms of oath in 
the Third Schedule meant for every candidate for membership of 
Parliament or State legislature, Union and State Ministers,
Members of Parliament and State legislatures, judges of the 
Supreme Court and High Courts and the Comptroller and Auditor- 
General of India, to the effect that they should utter the 
additional words "to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India." 
The argument proceeds that the oath to uphold the sovereignty and 
integrity of India runs contrary to the purpose of an amending 
Bill seeking to cede any part of the territory of India to a 
foreign country. In other words, the oath acts like a limitation 
on the amending power in that amendments providing for session of 
territory would be in conflict with the oath to uphold the sove­
reignty and integrity of India. The argument is based upon a
misconception. "Sovereignty" and "integrity" are highly indeter-
103minate concepts. "Sovereignty" has evoked a spate of writings,
and thinkers differ on the meaning of the term. The word "integrity"
has not been judicially interpreted in India so far, and it appears
that it has not been judicially defined in common law countries
either because none of the main legal dictionaries gives its 
104meaning. ^ Unless "integrity" is held as connoting the
102. Rao, K.N. Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Bill 1963 - 
Anti-Secession Measure 1963, 5 JILI p 153 (157-158).
103. Cohen, H.E. Theories of Sovereignty 1937
104. Burrows, R. Words and Phrases 1944 V VIII and Stroud's Judicial 
Dictionary 1952 V 2.
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preservation of the territorial limits of India,which is 
highly improbable in the circumstances in which the Sixteenth 
Amendment Act 1963 was passed, cession of territory to a foreign 
country cannot be considered as against the integrity of the 
country. The Sixteenth Amendment Act 1963, was passed on the 
report of the Committee on National Integration and Regionalism 
appointed by the National Integration Council. The main theme 
and purpose of the Report was to achieve national integrity of 
the people of India. Moreover, it is a matter of opinion 
whether national integrity is preserved or destroyed in ceding 
some territory to a foreign country in exchange for some other 
territory in order to resolve an international dispute.
Nationalism may yield one answer and internationalism another in 
such a situation. In addition, when an amending Bill ceding 
some territory to a foreign country is voted by a two-thirds 
majority of the members of each House of Parliament present and 
voting and also by an absolute majority, there is no escape from 
the conclusion that an overwhelming number of the representatives 
of the people considers the amendment in the interest of the 
country, and if this is so, how can it be regarded as against the 
integrity of the country? Without commenting on the desirability 
of cession of territory to a foreign country even under an agree­
ment or arbitration and limiting our thinking to purely legal and 
constitutional problems in this regard, it is submitted that
Parliament can remove the legal obstacle by repealing the 
changes brought about by the Sixteenth Amendment Act in the 
forms of oath in the Third Schedule. Thus, considered from 
various angles, it is quite clear that the provisions regarding 
the oath of upholding the sovereignty and integrity of India, 
cannot be regarded in any event as an implied limitation to the 
amending power in Art 368.
(4) Distinction between "State" and "Government"
Hidayatullah J. suggested another avenue for bringing in
implied limitations by making a distinction between "Government"
and "State". According to him, "State" is a superior entity to
105"Government" which is an agency of the "State". ^ In his own 
words:
"The State is no doubt legally supreme but in the supremacy 
of its powers it may create impediments on its own 
sovereignty. Government is always bound by the restric­
tions created in favour of fundamental rights but the state 
may or may not be. Amendment may be open to the state 
according to the procedure laid down by the constitution. 
There is nothing, however, to prevent the state from 
placing certain matters outside the amending procedure....
103. AIR 1967 S.C. 1643 at 1698.
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Amendment can then be by a fresh constituent body. To
106attempt to do this otherwise is to attempt a revolution.”
To summarise Hidayatullah J fs view, Parliament being an agency of 
the State cannot take away or abridge any of the fundamental 
rights since the State itself cannot do so because of the self- 
imposed restriction in Art 13 (2). The State can remove this 
restriction but Parliament cannot do so.
With due respect to the learned judge, his argument proceeds 
on the fallacious premise that "State” means the same thing in 
both political and legal senses. The distinction drawn by the 
learned judge between "State” and "Government” may have signifi­
cance in the political sense but is irrelevant for legal purposes 
because the expression "State” is defined in Art 12 of the consti­
tution as, inter alia, including "the Government and Parliament 
of India” . It is, therefore, submitted that it is not permissible 
to make any distinction between "State” and "Government” for the 
purposes of the amending power with respect to Part III of the 
cons titution.
As a matter of fact, the whole confusion arises because the 
word "State” has been used in a very comprehensive sense. A 
member in the Constituent Assembly rightly pointed out that
10 AIR 1967 S.C. 1696-97-
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"the word 'state has been grossly misused. 'State' 
means no less than several different kinds of insti­
tutions in the Constitution, and a reader will have to 
take careful note of the special definitions of the word
'state' in each Part in order to know what is really
107meant and even then he cannot be sure."
(5) Preamble
Can the Preamble be construed as an implied limitation to 
the power to amend the Constitution in Art 368? j. la the 
Sajjan Singh case, Justice Mudholkar expressed doubt whether 
the basic features of the Constitution can be amended as long 
as the Preamble stands unamended. He observed as follows:
"To illustrate my point, as long as the words 'sovereign 
democratic republic' are there, could the Constitution 
be amended so as to depart from the democratic form of 
government or its republic character? If that cannot 
be done, then, as long as the words 'justice, social, 
economic, and political, etc.' are there could any of 
the rights enumerated in Articles 14 to 19, 21, 23, 31 and 
32 be taken away? If they cannot, it will be for consi-
1 r\Q
deration whether they can be modified."
107. C.A.D. vol.XI p 632.
108. Saj.jan Singh v. State of Raj os than AIR 1963 S.C. 845 at 865.
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This brings us to the place and significance of the Preamble 
in the interpretation of the Constitution. The Supreme Court 
has had occasion to consider the role of the Preamble to the
109Indian Constitution. In re Beruban And Exchange of Enclaves '
the Court observed that the Preamble is not a part of the
Constitution but is,
"in the words of Story, ’a key to open the mind of the
makers’ which may show the general purposes for which
they made the several provisions in the Constitution....”
In State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar^ ^  the Court held
that the Preamble can be referred to, in cases of doubt, to
ascertain the extent and purpose of an Act. But where the
operative parts of the Act are clear and there is no ambiguity,
the Preamble cannot be allowed to control the express provisions.
Seervai has rightly, it is submitted, averred that the view taken
by the Supreme Court that the Preamble is not a part of the
Constitution is not correct as it is not in accord with modern
authorities. Moreover, when the Preamble was adopted, the
President of the Constituent Assembly put it to vote in these
112words: "That the Preamble stand part of the Constitution."
109. (I960) 3§>CR 250 at 281-82.
110. AIR 1952 S.C.79.
111. Seervai, H.M. op.cit. supra p 75.
112. C.A.D. vol.X p Jf56.
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Justice Mudholkar sought to have the Preamble regarded as
a part of the Constitution on the ground that it is an epitome
of the broad features of the Constitution and on the ground of
its own special quality. In his own words:
MIt has been said, no doubt, that the Preamble is not a
part of our Constitution. But, I think if upon a
comparison of the Preamble with the broad features it
would appear that the Preamble is an epitome of those
features or to put it differently, if these features are
an amplification or concretisation of the concepts set
out in the Preamble it may have to be considered whether
the Preamble is not a part of the Constitution. While
considering this question it would be of relevance to bear
in mind that the Preamble is not of the common run such
as is to be found in an Act of a Legislation. It has
the stamp of deep deliberation and is marked by precision.
Would this not suggest that the framers of the Constitution
113attached special significance to it?”
Conceding that the Preamble is a part of the Constitution, 
and accepting the fact that it bears ”the stamp of deep deliber­
ation” and the fact that the founding fathers did attach special
113. AIR 1963 S.C. 843 at 863.
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significance to it, should it automatically follow that the 
Preamble be regarded as delimiting the power of amending the 
Constitution in Art 368? It is submitted that even if the 
Preamble be considered as a significant part of the Consti­
tution, it does not necessarily imply that the Preamble or the 
broad features it epitomizes are saved from being amended under 
Art.368. First, when Article 368 empowers the Parliament to 
amend the tTepitomized features11 of the Constitution, how can 
the ’’epitome11 itself act as a limitation to the power of amend­
ment, especially when the rules of statutory interpretation
forbid the importation of any limitation from a Preamble to
114the powers granted by the Constitution? Secondly, the
Preamble uses words which are highly indeterminate, ever-changing 
and having a vast coverage of various conflicting ideologies.
115’’The concepts of liberty and equality are changing and dynamic...”
Regarding social justice, Bhagwati J observed: ’’Social justice
116is a very vague and indeterminate expression.” Allen lists
a large variety of the shades of meaning being attributed to
117’’social justice” in these days. The word ’’democratic” is
114. AIR (I960) S.C. 845.
115. Ramaswami J. in Golak Nath Case (1967) AIR S.C. at 1735*
116. Muir Mills Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor (1955) I S.C.R. 991.
117. Allen, C.K. Aspects of Justice, 1958, p 31.
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an adjective from "democracy11 which is again, "one of the most 
comprehensive terms used in political science. It may mean a
11 Q
political, social, as well as an economic condition."
119The word "Republic" is also used in various senses. The
highly elastic words used in the Preamble indicate that even if 
the so-called basic features of the Constitution are amended 
drastically it is most unlikely that there would be a conflict 
between the "epitome" and the "epitomized features" for the 
purposes of the interpretation of the Constitution and if there 
exists no conflict between the two, no case for holding the 
Preamble as an implied limitation to the amending power can be 
made out because the justification for such a limitation is 
based only on the existence of a conflict. For the sake of 
argument, supposing some conflict is shown to exist betv/een the 
Preamble and the provisions of the Constitution in case a 
particular amendment is effected to the Constitution, it is 
still very difficult to call in aid the Preamble in order to 
restrain the meaning of the provisions of the Constitution, 
unless some compelling reason is advanced. Viscount Simonds 
restated the rule of interpretation in regard to a Preamble as:
118. Basu, D.D. Commentary 5th Edn. 1955 V.I. p 69*
119. Ibid. p 70.
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"I would suggest that it is better stated by saying
that the content of the Preamble is not to influence
the meaning otherwise ascribable to the enacting part
120unless there is a compelling reason for it."
The effect of the Preamble is diluted if its own meaning
is ambiguous. "Still less can the Preamble affect the meaning
121of the enacting words when its own meaning is in doubt."
On the other hand, a contrary conclusion is all the more rein­
forced by the language of the Preamble, that the founding 
fathers intended to use flexible expressions, so that, as far 
as possible, all sorts of unforeseen changes may be accommodated 
in the Constitution from time to time by effecting as little 
amendment as possible to the Constitution.
(6) Scheme
Does the scheme of the Constitution suggest a limited 
amending power in Art 568? There is a view that the first
122four Parts of the Constitution are sufficiently self-regulative 
and hence admit of no amendment under Art 368. It is said that 
Part I dealing with the Territories of the Union provides in 
Art 3 that it is by a special law of Parliament that new states
120. A.G.V. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover (1957) A.C. 436 
at 463.
121. Ibid. at p 463.
122. Munikanniah, D. Amendments to Constitution, 1964, P 128.
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can be formed, and the areas, boundaries and names of the
existing states can be altered. Art 4 (2) permits changes to
be made to Part I without calling in aid Art 368. In Part II,
Art 11 empowers the Parliament to make any provision with respect
to the acquisition and termination of citizenship and all other
matters relating to citizenship. Therefore, there is a specific
saving for Parliament for making further provision connected with
citizenship. Regarding Part III, Justice Hidayatullah opined
that Part III itself is self-regulative. He observed:
uNo doubt Article 19 by clauses numbered 2 to 6 allows a
curtailment of rights in the public interest. This
shows that Part III is not static. It visualises change
and progress but at the same time it preserves the indi-
123vidual rights.”
124Blackshield also holds this view. Since Part IV contains
constant principles to instruct and inform legislative measures, 
there would be hardly any need to amend it. By this fairly 
flexible scheme it is sought to be established that the amending 
power in Art 368 is not intended to be made applicable in regard 
to the first four Parts of the Constitution. In this way, by
123. Sajjan Singh v. State of Ra.jasthan AIR 1965 S.C. 845 at 862.
124. Blackshield, A.R. Fundamental Rights 1966, 8 JILI, p 139*
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advancing this view of the scheme of the Constitution, Art 368 
is regarded as limited in its operation.
It is submitted that this is a misconceived view of the 
scheme of the first four Parts of the Constitution. It is true 
that the First, Second, and Third Parts are designed to be fairly 
flexible within their frame-work, but it is sheer exaggeration to 
say that these are too flexible to admit of any amendment under 
Art 368. The falsity of this argument of keeping Parts I, II, 
and III beyond amendment is exposed when the purpose and function 
of the provisions on which the claim is made to rest, are fully 
assessed. Starting with Part I, Art 4 (2) serves a limited 
purpose of changing the boundaries, areas, and names of the 
existing states; it is not sufficient to effect an amendment 
to the matters enumerated in Art 2 or 3. Neither is it true to 
say that the language of these articles need no amendment at all. 
Therefore, it is Art 368 and that Article alone which must be 
resorted to for amending any of the Articles in Part I.
No doubt parliament has been empowered to make any law 
relating to citizenship under Art 11, but laws cannot be made 
under Art 11 to contradict the provisions of Part II. In case 
Parliament wants to make lav/s in connection with citizenship and 
in contradiction to the provisions of Part II, it is essential 
that the conflicting provisions would have to be amended to 
make them fall in line with the laws and it is under Art 368 
alone under which the Parliament must move an amending Bill.
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Hence Art 368 cannot be dispensed with under the pretext that 
Art 11 contains sufficient law-making power.
The argument that Part III is self-regulative fails 
totally when it is seen that Part III failed to be self- 
regulative in regard to the Zamindari Abolition Acts. The 
self-regulative aspect of Part III is a technical device to 
preserve the viability of Part III but it certainly cannot meet 
the demands of an amendment. To think that the inbuilt flexi­
bility of Part III brooks no amendment to that Part is to 
magnify the flexibility to an extreme not permissible by Part III.
It is quite reasonable to assume from the nature of Part IV 
that Part IV would not need as frequent amendment as Parts I, II, 
and III. But this does not suggest that Part IV is exempted 
from the scope of Art 368. The inherent flexibility of Parts 
I, II, and III and the less need of amendment to Part IV cannot 
be exaggerated to the point of saving them from the operation of 
Art 368.
(7) The Argument of Fear
An implied limitation is conceived by invoking fear of the 
abuse of the amending power in Art 368. It is said that if the 
all-comprehensive power of amendment in Art 368 is not construed 
as limited, frightful consequences will follow. Being clothed 
with so vast a power, Parliament may scrap Part III, abolish 
elected legislatures, change the present form of government and
23*f
125may change the federal structure into unitary. It is
submitted that this is no reason to put a limit on the amending
power. It v/as rightly pointed out in reply to this argument
by Wanchoo J., that "possibility of abuse of any power granted
to any authority is always there; and if possibility of abuse
is a reason for withholding the power, no power whatever can
126ever be conferred on any authority."
In fact, the argument of fear is based upon an assumption 
that unlimited power of amendment in Art 368 will make the
127Parliament sovereign, meaning by sovereign a legal sovereign.
For our purpose it is not necessary to go into the basis of
128 12c
sovereignty, which is, indeed, a "dusty desert of abstractions". "
But it is necessary to consider whether the doctrine of parlia­
mentary sovereignty would hold good in respect of the Indian 
Parliament, if ample power to amend the Constitution is vested 
in it.
125. Golak Nath AIR (1967) S.C. at 1688.
126. Ibid. p 1688.
127. James Bryce analyses sovereignty as of two types, legal
(de jure) and practical (de facto). Studies in History and
Jurisprudence vol.II, pp 31-73. Other authors criticise 
this division on the ground that, "Sovereignty is authority, 
not might. The sovereign power is the highest legal autho­
rity qua legal not qua actual..." Mcllwain, C.H. Constitu­
tionalism and the Changing World, 1939, P 30.
128. Wade, H.W.R. thinks that sovereinty is a political fact for
which no legal authority can be constituted... The Basis of
Legal Sovereignty, Camb. L.J., 1933, P 196.
129. Bryce, J. op.cit. p 30.
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The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in the United
Kingdom has been established by a series of obiter dicta and no
decided case can be cited to the effect that Parliament is a
130sovereign body or that none of its acts can be challenged,
yet it is defined as "the legally unlimited capacity to create
131jural relations". Dicey would further add to it that no
person or body has any right to override or set aside the
legislation of P a r l i a m e n t i n c l u d i n g  the courts of law.^^
It is submitted that even if unlimited power of amendment
is granted in Art 368, the Indian Parliament does not become a
sovereign body. It is true that there is no rule of law which
it cannot amend. But the point to be considered is whether he
"who has the power to alter the Constitution is master of the 
134state". In our view the Indian Parliament is not such a
master. The reason is that there are two ways to prevent 
abuse of power; one is to withhold power completely, the other
130. Henston, E.F.V. in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence by 
Guest, A.G.
131. Wright, Quincy. Mandates under the League of Nations
1930, p 281.
132. Dicey, A.V. The Law of the Constitution 9th Edn. pp 40-41.
133. Jennings, Sir I. The Law and the Constitution 3rd Edn. 
pp 139-140.
134. Finer, H. op.cit. supra p 204.
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is to restrict its use. To use Andrew1s words, either "power
135is proscribed," or power is granted, but "procedure is 
prescribed"
Prior to the Golak Nath decision, the Indian Parliament
was regarded as being vested with unlimited power to amend the
Constitution subject to observing the prescribed procedure in
Art 368. V/here the compliance of procedure prescribed is very
essential, such rules of procedure are logically superior to 
137the sovereign. Perhaps, the position was accurately des­
cribed by Sir Owen Dixon in these words:
"The law existing for the time being is supreme when it 
prescribes the conditions which must be fulfilled to make 
a law. But on the question what may be done by a law so
-| '7Q
made, parliament is supreme over the law."
There is a view that the "manner or form" in which sovereign
power is to be exercised is in no way incompatible with the
139doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. It is submitted that
135. Andrew, W.G. Constitutions and Constitutionalism, 1968, p 13.
136. Ibid.
137- Wade's Introduction to Dicey!s Law of the Constitution p 38.
138. Dix©n, Sir Owen. The Law and the Constitution, 1935, 51 L.Q.R. 
596.
g
139-Cdwen, D.V.' - Parliamentary Soverejnty and the Entrenched 
Sections of the South Africa Act, 1951, PP 8-9*
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much depends on the nature of "manner or form" and sometimes
it may amount to denial of power. Friedmann commenting on the
140Trethowans case gave an example that if the Commonwealth
Parliament passes an Act- that no change in the existing powers
and structures of the upper House shall be made unless eighty
per cent of all voters agree in a referendum to such an alteration,
it would make any constitutional amendment of the functions of
the upper House virtually impossible, though it may look like
141a provision relating to "manner or form".
In the Indian Constitution as long as the procedure laid
down in Art 368 is there, it is not correct to say that the
Parliament is sovereign. The procedure itself imposes a restric­
tion on Parliament in regard to the use of the power to amend the
Constitution. It is the right rather the duty of the Supreme
Court to see that the procedure is fully complied with when 
Parliament acts under Art 368. Courts cannot inquire into
142
proceedings of the legislatures in regard to their irregularity
but they have full jurisdiction to see that the constitutional
143provisions are complied with. Any irregularity in regard
140. 1932 A.C.526.
141. Friedmann. Trethowan's case, Parliamentary Sovereignty, 
and the Limits of Legal Change 24 A.L.J. (1950) p 105.
142. Art 212.
143. Vinod Kumar v. State of H.p. AIR (1939) S.C.223.
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to the procedure prescribed in Art 368 is not only an irregu­
larity of proceedings but a non-compliance with the provisions 
of the Constitution and must be regarded as fatal to the exer­
cise of the amending power. Therefore, besides the political 
check on * the use of the amending paver, there is sufficient 
institutional check in the procedure of amendment. It is 
wrongly assumed that it is not difficult to gain a two-thirds 
majority of members present and voting and an absolute majority 
of the total membership of each House of Parliament. In fact 
it was because of the monolithic position of the ruling party - 
the Congress - at the centre as well as in the State legis­
latures that we have as many as twenty-one amendments in the first 
seventeen years of the Constitution. Had there been a strong 
opposition in the Parliament, the number of amendments would have 
been much less. With the growth of a multi-party system in the 
country, it would be not only difficult but almost impossible 
for Parliament to obtain the special and absolute majorities 
required by Art 368 to pass an amendment Bill.
There is a further argument against parliamentary sovereignty. 
Theoretically, we may hold that Art 368 vests Parliament v/ith the 
power provided for therein. But in view of the fact that that 
power remains unused in regard to the entrenched provisions until 
and unless at least half the State legislatures co-operate with 
the Parliament, there is no escape from the conclusion that 
Parliament cannot be said to be sovereign.
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After considering the alleged implied limitations,it is 
submitted that it is useless for the judiciary to impose any 
implied limitations on the power of amendment because all 
judicially implied limitations are removable by using the 
amendatory power. Of course, the amendatory power must be 
exercised in the manner laid down in the Constitution. It 
may happen that the process of amendment may be very rigid and 
may thus make changes almost impossible. But it is clear 
that implied limitations cannot stand in the way of the exer­
cise of the amending power. Unless a Constitution specifies 
some absolute limitations on the power of amendment, each and 
every article of the Constitution is amenable to amendment and 
no matter provided in the Constitution is exempted from its 
own amendment. To think otherwise is to get one's vision
beclouded regarding the nature of amendment. "For to amend is
144to deconstitute and reconstitute."
144. Finer, H. op.cit. supra p 193.
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CHAPTER VII
AMENDMENTS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Part III of the Constitution of India guarantees 
Fundamental Rights which may be classified as: (i) right to
equality; (ii) right to freedom; (iii) right against exploita­
tion; (iv) right to freedom of religion; (v) cultural and 
educational rights; (vi) right to property; and (vii) right 
to constitutional remedies. These rights are not absolute but 
limited by "reasonable" restrictions in the public interest.
The question whether Parliament can amend these rights so 
as to take away or abridge them, has become a knotty constitu­
tional problem in India. It is of interest to note that 
neither Part III of the Constitution nor Art 368 provides speci­
fically whether the rights enshrined in Part III are amendable or 
not. In the absence of any specific provision on the point, 
the answer to the question whether the Fundamental Rights are 
amendable by Parliament depends on the construction and inter­
pretation of certain Articles of the Constitution. One writer 
has described the problem of interpretation in this regard as 
"a fascinating intellectual puzzle"'*' and another feels that it
1. Blackshield, A.R. Fundamental Rights and the Institutional 
Viability Indian Supreme Court, 1966, 8 JILI p 139 at 140.
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requires one "to cut the Gordian knot".
The controversy arises mainly because of Art 13 (2) which 
reads as follows:
"The State shall n.ot make any law which takes away or 
abridges the rights conferred by this part and any law 
made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent 
of the contravention, be void.”
The question is how wide is the expression "law" in Art 
13 (2)? Does it include a constitutional amendment? If it 
does, the amendability of Fundamental Rights in such a way as 
to eliminate or reduce them' is denied to Parliament. Because 
even if Parliament amends Art 13(2) or Art 368 in order to arm 
itself v/ith the power to amend Part III in any way it likes, 
that amendment itself is liable to be struck down by the Supreme 
Court on the ground that the amendment is "law" within the 
meaning of Art 13 (2) and therefore ultra vires of Parliament.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Parliament amended the Constitution in 1951 by enacting 
the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. The Act, among 
others, amended Art 15 by adding a new clause (/+) to it. It 
substituted new clauses instead of clauses (2) and (6) of Art 19,
2. Chaudhari, P.S. Golak Nath Case - A Critical Appraisal 
AIR (1968) Journal Section p 90 at Xf.7 •
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Art 31A and 31B were inserted after Art 31.
3
In Sankari Prasad v. Union of India, the Constitution 
(First Amendment) Act, 1951 was challenged on a number of grounds, 
one of them being that "law" in Art 13 (2) includes "constituent 
law" and since the amendment in question abridged the fundamental 
right under Art 31, it was unconstitutional and void. The Court 
described the argument as "attractive" but held unanimously that 
"law" in Art 13 (2) did not take in an amendment; it was only a 
restriction on the legislature in regard to ordinary lav/s and not 
in respect of constituent lav/s, there being a well-recognized 
distinction between ordinary law and constituent law. The Court 
observed as follows:
"Although lav; must ordinarily include constitutional law, 
there is a clear demarcation between ordinary law, which 
is made in exercise of legislative power, and constitu­
tional law, which is made in exercise of constituent
Ll
power."
It is clear from the above observation that the word "law" 
as such does not prohibit the inclusion of constituent law, 
though there is a clear distinction between ordinary law and 
constitutional law. In fact, it was due to "other important
3. 1952 S.C.R. 89 (j ' 
k . AIP 1951 S.C. 463.
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considerations" that the Supreme Court ruled that "law" in 
13 (2) does not include constituent law. The Court said:
"We are inclined to think that they (Constitution framers) 
must have had in mind what is of more frequent occurrence, 
that is, invasion of the rights of the subjects by the 
legislative and the executive organs of the state by 
means of laws and rules made in exercise of their legis­
lative power and not the abridgement or nullification of 
such rights by alteration of the Constitution itself in
5
exercise of constituent power."
Moreover, the Court observed that the terms of Art 368 are 
perfectly general and empower Parliament to amend the Constitution, 
without any exception whatever. If the Constitution makers 
intended to save the fundamental rights from the operation of
i
Art 368, it would have been perfectly simple to make that inten­
tion clear by adding a proviso to that effect to Art 368. In 
any event, where two Articles (Art 368 and Art 13 (2)) are 
widely phrased but conflict v/ith each other "harmonious construc­
tion" requires that one should be read as controlled and qualified 
by the other.
3. AIR 1931 S.C. Zf63.
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The Court held that the constitutional prohibition in 
Art 13 (2) against the state making any law which abridges or 
takes away the fundamental rights, applies to rules or regu­
lations made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not 
to constitutional amendments made in exercise of constituent 
power. Besides this, it was also held that Parliament had 
power to amend every provision of the Constitution including 
the provisions of Part III and that such power was derived from 
Art 368 itself.
The decision in Sankari Prasad was assumed to be correct
c
by the Supreme Court in S. Krishnan v. State of Madras, State of
7
West Bengal v. Anwar Ali, and Basheshar Nath v. C o m ,  of I.T.
8 9Delhi and Pa.jasthan. In Saj.jan Singh v. State of Rajasthan,
the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, was sought to
be held invalid. The petitioners were affected by one or the
other Act added to the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act. Their main contention was that
the amendment being constitutionally invalid, the validity of
the Acts by v/hich they were affected could not be saved. It
was argued that since the amendment affected the jurisdiction of
6. AIP 1931 S.C. 301 at 312.
7. AIP 1932 S.C. 73 at 104.
8. AIR 1939 S.C. 149 at 162.
9. AIR 1963 S.C. 843.
the High Courts under Art 226, it needed to be ratified by 
half the state legislatures as required by Art 368 and since 
this ratification had not been obtained, the Amendment Act 
was invalid.
The Court rejected the argument on the ground that the 
Amendment Act did not make any alteration in Art 226 and any 
incidental effect on that Article was irrelevant.
During the course of oral arguments, counsel for the 
petitioners urged the Court to reconsider the correctness of 
the Sankari Prasad decision in so far as it held that Parliament 
had the power to amend Part III of the Constitution. The Court 
declined to do so but thought fit to comment on that decision.
As regards Art 13(2) three of the five judges, including the 
learned Chief Justice, observed:
MIt is true that Article 13 (2) refers to any law in 
general and literally construed, the word ’law’ may take 
in a law made in exercise of the constituent power con­
ferred on Parliament; but having regard to the fact that 
a specific, unqualified and unambiguous power to amend 
the Constitution is conferred on Parliament, it would be 
unreasonable to hold that the word 'law1 in Art 13 (2) 
takes in Constitution Amendment Acts passed under Art 368.
10. AIR 1963 S.C. 8^3 at 837.
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The majority also expressed the view that it would have 
been better if Part III had been included in the Proviso to 
Art 368 so that Parliament would not have had unchecked power 
to amend the fundamental rights. It is submitted that this 
view misses the point of the Proviso which is to enable the 
states to participate in the process of amending the federal 
provisions of the Constitution.
Hidayatullah and Mudholkar, JJ, delivered separate judge­
ments expressing their doubts on the merits of the reasons given 
by the majority judges. Justice Mudholkar took the view that
the amending process in Art 368 is itself a legislative one, and
if it is so,. Mlaw,f in Art 13 (2) would embrace even a constituent 
law. He observed:
"The language of Art 368 is plain enough to show that the 
action of Parliament in amending the Constitution is a 
legislative act like one in exercise of its normal
legislative power. The only difference in respect of
an amendment of the Constitution is that the Bill amending 
the Constitution has to be passed by a special majority 
(here I have in mind only those amendments which do not 
attract the Proviso to Art 368). The result of a legis­
lative action of a legislature cannot be other than flawf, 
and therefore, it seems to me that the fact that the 
legislation deals with the amendment of a provision of
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of the Constitution would not make the result any
the less a ’law*.”^
The matter stood in this state till 27th February 1967, when
12the Supreme Court rendered a decision which apart from its 
political, economic and constitutional consequences, has histo­
rical significance also. The Court gave two reasons for 
reopening the question of Parliament’s power to amend Part III 
of the Constitution, namely, !lthe conflict between the majority
and the minority in Sa.j.jan Singh’s case” and the ’’great impor-
13tance of the question raised” .
The wisdom of reopening this question at the present stage
of the country’s development has been questioned. Writing
before the Golak Nath decision, Blackshield observed:
” .... even if a day may come when the Court should ’enshrine*
Part III, it would be better to postpone the day until
constructive judicial ’social engineering’, and social
and even legislative appreciation of this, have become
deeply rooted Indian traditions. On this basis, the
wisest course for the time being would be to allow the
whole issue to remain in the unresolved openness in which
the Sajjan Singh case has left it, intellectually unsatis-
14fying though this might be.”
11. Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1965 S.C. 845 at 863.
12. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab AIR 1967 S.C. 1643
13. Ibid.1655.
14. Blackshield, A.R. Fundamental Rights, 1966, 8 JILI, 139 at 172.
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In the Golak Nath case, petitioners challenged the Punjab 
Security of Land Tenure Act, 1953, on the ground that the said 
Act infringed the petitioners1 rights under clauses (f) and (g) 
of Art 19 and Art 14 of the Constitution and therefore should 
be declared unconstitutional. Since the Act was included in 
the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution by the Seventeenth 
Amendment Act, the Amendment Act itself was challenged as ultra 
vires of Parliament. These petitioners were joined by peti­
tioners from Mysore who attacked the Mysore Land Reforms Act 
(No. 10 of 1962) on similar grounds. The petitioners sought
to challenge the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964,
and the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 
along with the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955/ because
the validity of these amendments could not be sustained if the
Seventeenth Amendment Act, 1964, was declared unconstitutional.
The Court, comprising all eleven judges of the Supreme
Court, v/as sharply divided on the interpretation of Art 13 (2)
and Art 368. The majority of six judges overruled the decision
in the Sankari Prasad and held that "law” in Art 13 (2) includes
a constitutional amendment because ’’amendment cannot be made
15otherwise than by following the legislative process” .
In order to understand the differing viewpoints expressed 
by the various judges it will be useful to summarise their main 
conclusions.
15. AIR 1967 S.C. 1643 at 1659-
The main conclusions reached by the majority are as
follows:
(Chief Justice Subba Rao, Shah, Shalet and Vaidialingam, JJ)
(1) The power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution is 
derived from Arts 245, 246, and 248, and not from Art 368 
which only deals with procedure.
(2) Amendment is "law” within the meaning of Art 13 of the 
Constitution, and therefore, if it takes away or abridges 
the rights conferred by Part III thereof, it is void.
(3) The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, the Constitution 
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, and the Constitution (Seventeenth 
Amendment) Act, 1964, abridge the scope of the fundamental 
rights. But, on the basis of earlier decisions of the 
Supreme Court they were valid.
(4) By applying the doctrine of "prospective overruling” , the 
decision will have only prospective operation and therefore 
the said amendments will continue to be valid.
(5) The Parliament will have no power from the date of the 
decision to amend any of the provision of Part III of the 
Constitution so as to take away or abridge the fundamental 
rights enshrined therein.
(6) As the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act is held 
valid, the validity of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures
Act X of 1962, as amended by Act XIV of 1965, cannot 
be questioned on the ground that they offend Arts 13,
14, or 31 of the Constitution.
Justice Hidayatullah1s conclusions were as follows:
(i) The Fundamental Rights are outside the amendatory process
if the amendment seeks to abridge or take away any of the
rights;
(ii) Sankari Prasad's case, 1952, S.C.R.89, and Sajjan Singh’s
case, 1965, I.S.C.R.933, concluded the power of amendment
over Part III of the Constitution on an erroneous view of 
Art 13 (2) and 368;
(iii) The First, Fourth and Seventeenth Amendments being part 
of the Constitution by acquiescence for a long time, 
cannot now be challenged and they contain authority for 
the Seventeenth Amendment;
(iv) Fundamental Rights cannot be abridged or taken away by
the exercise of amendatory process in Art 368, any further
inroad into these rights from the date of the decision will 
be illegal and unconstitutional unless it complies with 
Part III in general and Art 13 (2) in particular;
(v) For abridging or taking away Fundamental Rights, a consti­
tuent body will have to be convoked; and
(vi) The two impugned Acts are valid under the Constitution not
because they are included in Sch.9 of the Constitution but
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because they are protected by Art 31A and the 
President's assent. The petitions were dismissed 
but without cost.
(Per Wanchoo, Bhargava and Mitter, JJ)
The power to amend the Constitution is to be found in 
Art 368 and the power to amend the Constitution can 
never reside in Art 2/f5 and Article 2^8 read with Item 
97 of List I.
The power conferred under Art 368 is constituent power 
to change the fundamental law, i.e. the Constitution, 
and is distinct and different from the ordinary legis­
lative power.
When Art 13 (2) prohibits the state from making any law 
which takes away or abridges rights conferred by Part III, 
it is only referring to ordinary legislative power con­
ferred on Parliament and Legislatures of States and 
cannot have any reference to the constituent power for 
amendment of the Constitution contained in Art 368.
There being no implied limitations on the power to amend 
under Art 368, it is open to Parliament to amend any part 
of the Constitution, including Part III.
Sankari Prasad's case was correctly decided and the 
majority in Sajjan Singh's case was correct in following 
it.
The argument that the Seventeenth Amendment affects the
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powers of the High Court contained in Art 226 and 
therefore should have been ratified by half the state 
legislatures under the Proviso to Art 368, was rejected 
on the ground that the Amendment has brought no actual 
change in the terms of Art 226*
Ramaswami and Bachawat, JJ, delivered separate judge­
ments agreeing with the conclusions reached by the main minority 
led by Justice Wanchoo.
It may be pointed out that the majority was considerably
16influenced by an article written by A.R. Blackshield just
after the Sajjan Singh case, in which the writer suggested how
the main obstacle in accepting the view that Art 13 (2) takes in
amendment could be removed by applying the doctrine of "prospec-
tive overruling” in respect of the Constitution Amendment Acts
which affected Part III rights adversely, and, thus save them
from becoming void. Though the learned author cleared the way
for the majority in Golak Nath's case, he himself came to realise
the inherent dangers and difficulties with which the whole approach
and its end bristled. Therefore he took abundant care to express
17a large number of caveats.
16. Blackshield, A.R. Fundamental Rights and Institutional
Viability of the Indian Supreme Court, 1966, 8 JILI p 139*
17. Ibid. pp 169-190.
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As a result of the Golak Nath decision, Art 13 (2) has 
become an impervious rock of prohibition against the State and 
any amendment of the fundamental rights so as to take away or 
abridge them has become a legal impossibility.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF LAW IN ART 13 (2)?
It is submitted that the key to the question whether 
Parliament can amend Part III so as to take away or abridge 
the rights enshrined therein lies in the determination of the 
scope and nature of "law" in Art 13 (2). Therefore, the scope 
and nature of "law” in Art 13 (2) is studied under the following 
heads:
(A) Distinction between "ordinary law” and "constituent law”
(B) Contextual arguments
(C) Intentions of the founding fathers, and
1 o
(D) Consideration of issues raised by Golak Nath.
(A) Distinction between "ordinary law” and "constituent law”
In the Golak Nath case, the majority held that since amend­
ment is done by legislative process, with ordinary majority or 
with special majority, therefore, there remains no distinction
between ordinary law and the law made in the exercise of
19constituent power.
18. AIR 1967 S.C. 1643 ' : I . .
19. AIR 1967 S.C. 1643 at 1660 Per Subba Rao, C.J. at 1695 per 
Hidayatullah J.
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It is submitted here that the essence of the distinction 
between ordinary lav/ and constituent law is entirely lost, if 
the only criterion to distinguish them is the difference of 
procedure to be followed in each case and perhaps all the con­
troversy would have been resolved if sufficient attention would 
have been paid to the criteria to judge ordinary lav; and con­
stituent law.
It is of interest to note that Justice Hidayatullah tried
20hard to apply a few tests to distinguish between ordinary law 
and constituent law e.g. written constitution, different kinds 
of procedure for amendment, preference for constitution, cons­
titutions having form and power of government and not rules of 
private law which are found in ordinary law, and temporariness 
of ordinary law and permanence of constitutional law.
According to him, under the scheme of the Indian constitu-
21tion, there exists no distinction between the two. At the
end of this discussion he asks, "But if the legislative and 
constituent processes can become one, is there any reason why 
the result should be regarded as law in the one case and not in 
the other?"
20. AIR 1967 S.C. 1643 at 1695-96.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.p 1696.
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Here again, though the points of difference between 
the two types of laws were marked, but the main criterion 
was presumed to be the procedure and if the procedure 
followed in both the laws is one and the same, there 
exists no difference. It may be safely submitted that 
generally, there is some difference of procedure in both 
the cases, but the distinction does not depend at all 
on the procedure. Even if the constituent law and 
ordinary law are made by following one and the same pro­
cedure, there still exists a distinction between the 
two. If the procedures were the only criterion, there 
would have been no such thing as constitutional law of 
England and other than constitutional laws, e.g. civil 
or criminal laws in England, because the Parliament of 
England follows one and the same procedure in both the 
cases. Yet, there is a distinction between the two.
Then the question arises what is the real test to tell 
the one from the other.
Search for test of "Constituent Law"
In this section an attempt will be made to search 
for the test of constituent law. It is submitted that,
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though the distinction between ordinary and constituent 
laws suggests that "law" in Art 13 (2) should not contain 
constituent law, that itself is not the sole criterion to 
hold that "law" does not include constituent law. To 
say that there is a distinction between constituent law 
and ordinary law is one thing and to say that "lav/" in 
Art 13 (2) means only ordinary law is quite a different 
thing. However, if the character and nature of con­
stituent law is closely examined in contradistinction to 
ordinary law, that examination itself is fruitful and 
helpful to the extent it sheds light on our problem and 
that is why we need to go deep in search for the main 
test.
There is a large number of authorities who affirm 
that there is a distinction between constitutional law 
and ordinary law.^
23. Dicey, A.V. Law of the Constitution 10th edn. p 110.
Jennings, W.I. Law and the Constitution (1933) P 51.
American Jurisprudence 2nd edn. Vol.16, p 181.
Salmond. op.cit. supra, pp 83-8^.
Hamilton, A. & Madison, J. The Federalist (1961)
33rd letter, p 67.
Willis, H.E. Constitutional Law of the United States p 875•
Cooley, T.H. Constitutional Limitations (1903) Vol.I. p 4.
Orfield. op.cit. supra, p 1^6.
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It is not necessary to quote all these authorities 
because besides the affirmation of the existence of the 
distinction, no criterion to distinguish is expressly 
laid down. But we can deduce the criterion by pondering 
over what these authorities said. Sir W. Ivor Jennings 
says:
l!A written constitution is thus the fundamental 
law of a country, the express embodiment of the 
doctrine of the reign of law. All public 
authorities ... legislative, administrative 
and judicial ... take their powers directly 
or indirectly from it. Whatever the nature 
of the written constitution it is clear that 
there is a fundamental distinction between 
constitutional law and the rest of the law ... 
there is a clear separation, therefore, 
between the constitutional law and the rest of 
the law.»22f
Jennings: op.cit.supra, p 51*
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What we get from this is that the distinction between 
constitutional law and other laws does not depend 
upon the nature of the written constitution, that is 
to say, the constitution may be unitary or federal, 
rigid or flexible, the distinction is there, and also 
that the constitution stands on a higher pedestal 
because all other authorities and ordinary laws derive 
their power and validity from it.
In America, the distinction between constitutional 
law and other laws is well established. In The Federalist 
has been summarised the American position that the 
constitutional law is fundamental and other laws are 
non-fundamental:
MThe important distinction so well understood 
in America, between a Constitution established 
by the people and unalterable by the government, 
and a lav; established by the government, seems 
to have been little understood and
279
25less observed in any other country.”
It was further pointed out by the editor of The Federalist
that:
”This distinction was not new in 1787, nor is it
entirely an American creation, but it is true that
America had carried to an extent not elsewhere accepted 
certain tendencies of the middle ages and of early 
modern times.
In America, theoretically sovereignty is taken to be residing
in the people and since the Constitution derives its authority
from the people, it comes to assume higher authority.
Lawrence Lovell proceeded logically to carry this theory to an
extreme . He argued that:
"If all laws received their sanction from a direct
popular vote, this distinction would disappear. There
would cease to be any reason for considering one law
more sacred than another, and hence our courts would
soon lose their power to pass on the constitutionality
of statutes. The courts have in general no such power
in Switzerland, where indeed the distinction between
constitutional law and other lav/s is not so clearly
27marked as in America."
25. Hamilton, A., Madison, J. op.cit. supra, p 67.
26. Ibid. p 67.
27. Lawrence Lovell, A. The Referendum and Initiative (1895) 
Int. J. of Ethics. Vol.VI. p 59-
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Salmond expresses the view that incorporating fundamental 
law in a special document called the Constitution is nothing 
but maintaining the distinction between the constitutional law 
and an ordinary law, the Constitution not being alterable by 
ordinary legislative procedure.
MIn some states, though not in England, the distinction 
between constitutional lav; and the remaining portions of 
the legal system is accentuated and made definite by the 
embodiment of the former in a special and distinct en­
actment, the terms of which cannot be altered by the
28ordinary forms of legislature.”
The author elaborates the point that what is considered
to be fundamental and what is not fundamental is a mere matter
of practical convenience rather than of obedience to logical 
29requirement. People differ on the point as to what is more
important and primary and should be written in the constitution."^ 
In Marbury v. Madison, C h i e f  Justice Marshall expressed 
his reasoned view on this point in these words:
’’The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law,
28. Salmond. op.cit. supra, pp 83-84.
29. Ibid. p 83.
30. Wheare, K.C. op.cit. supra., 1931 edn. p 46.
31. 1803 (I cranch 137); 2 L Ed. 60 (1803).
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with 
ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts is alter­
able when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true then a 
legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law; 
if the latter part be true then written constitutions 
are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit 
a power in its own nature illimitable.”
This brings out an essential point; a written constitution 
must impose limitations on the powers of the institutions it 
seeks to create, otherwise it establishes its own futility. In 
other words, superiority of the constitution is based upon the 
existence of limitations on various functionaries created under 
and by the constitution. K.C. Wheare interprets the arguments 
as follows:
”0n this argument, if a constitution claims, by its terms, 
to limit the powers of the institutions it creates, in­
cluding the legislature, its provisions must surely be 
regarded as of superior force to any rules or actions 
issuing from those institutions. To think otherwise
reduces a constitution and the business of constitution-
32making to nonsense.”
32. Wheare, K.C. op.cit. supra. 1931 ed. p 82; 1966 ed. p 37*
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Jameson attempted to mark off the points of difference 
between a constitutional lav/ and an ordinary law very clearly 
and succinctly. First, ordinary lav/s are tentatory occasional, 
whereas fundamental laws are primary. Secondly, fundamental 
lav/s precede ordinary lav/s in point of time. He illustrated 
the distinction by considering the case of a ship to be dis­
patched by its ov/ner upon a distant voyage in which the owner, 
of the ship would prescribe the termini, object of the voyage 
and general duties of the officers on board the ship, leaving 
everything else relating to the voyage to the discretion of the 
master of the ship. According to Jameson, fundamental laws 
are just like the owner’s main instructions and ordinary laws 
are like the matters left for the master's discretion.
From these authorities, the following points are observable:
(1) The legal system of a country can be divided, according to 
practical convenience, into two categories, the primary and the 
secondary. The primary is called fundamental and the secondary 
as ordinary.
(2) Written constitutions preserve this distinction by incorpor­
ating more important matters in the document called the constitution.
(3) The constitution precedes ordinary laws in point of time.
33. Jameson, John A. A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions 
(1887) pp 84-83.
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(4) All functionaries, including the legislature created by 
the constitution derive their power from the constitution.
(5) Generally, written constitutions are not alterable by 
ordinary legislative procedures.
(6) A written constitution having limitations on the powers of 
the institutions created by it turns out to be superior by 
virtue of the limitations that it imposes.
(7) In America, the constitution is taken to be established by 
the people in whom the sovereignty is supposed to reside, so 
the constitution is treated as higher law because it derives 
power from the people.
These points of difference undoubtedly establish the dis­
tinction between the two types of laws but do not give us a 
test to apply in a particular case to know v/hether it is a 
constitutional lav; or an ordinary law.
Before we evolve a test, it is necessary to note the views 
of those who want to obliterate the distinction between the two.
W.W. Willoughby thinks that the constitution is subordinate 
to the state because a constitutional lav/ is the creation of the 
state for its purpose; the constitution ordinarily limits the
government and not the state; however, there is nothing to prevent
34the state from limiting itself. Sovereignty is traced to
34. Willoughby, W.W. The Fundamental Concept of Public Law 
(1924) P 84.
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reside in the state and in this way, a heirarchy of powers is 
created. The state occupying the apex position in the heirarchy 
of powers, the constitution comes next followed by the government 
under the constitution. This theory is meant to see the consti­
tution as a law rather than a higher law because there is still 
a higher authority than the constitution and that is the State
which is sovereign in its ov/n nature and can enact any law.
In this way assimilating the ordinary lav/ and constitutional 
law to the same status, he argues that when the courts declare 
a law as not valid the courts are not declaring a conflict 
between the ordinary law and the constitutional law.
MThat v/hich they do is simply to say that the statutes in
question, though enacted in the usual form, are not laws
at all, and never were laws, because their subject-matter
did not lie within the legal competence of the Legislature
enacting them. As Cooley says in his Principles of
Constitutional Lav/,'such enactment is in strictness no
law, because it established no rule; it is merely a futile
attempt to establish a law'. Strictly speaking, then,
the term 'unconstitutional law’ is a contradictio in
objecto: if it is unconstitutional it is not law; if it
35is law, it is not unconstitutional."
35. Willoughby, W.W. op.cit. p 86.
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It is submitted that the theory of state sovereignty as 
opposed to popular sovereignty does not, in fact, obliterate 
the distinction between the constitution and the ordinary laws. 
One may place sovereignty wherever one likes, either in the 
people or in the state, but the constitution, if it imposes 
limitations on its functionaries, would turn out to be a superior 
law in its working in regard to those functionaries and their 
acts. Therefore, the moment a constitution serves as a guide 
in determining whether a statute is valid or not, whether the
Legislature has exceeded the limits set upon it by the consti­
tution itself, the constitution becomes a higher law vis-a-vis 
the statute in question.
Similarly, Professor Labland attributes sovereignty to 
the state and assimilates the constitution to the ordinary lav; 
because both are an act of the will of the state. He goes to 
the extent of saying that the constitution may be amended in­
directly by enacting special laws without modifying the text of 
the constitution.
’’The doctrine that individual laws ought always to be in 
harmony with the constitution, and that they must not be 
incompatible with it, is simply a postulate of legislative
practice. It is not a legal axiom.”
36. Prof. Labland quoted by Borgeaud, C. in Adoption and Amendment 
of Constitution in America and Europe, 1895, P 69-
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It is submitted that if the terms of the constitution 
require that the lav/s passed under the constitution must con­
form to the constitution, it would be difficult to accept that 
laws not conforming to the constitution could be passed without 
altering the constitution, because it would lead to contra­
dictions and irregularities.
H. Bishop, another critic of the distinction between con­
stitutional lav/ and ordinary laws, based his argument on the 
monarchical principle. He considered that the principle that 
the constitutional law is higher than ordinary law is illogical 
because it is contrary to the monarchical principle, the reason 
being that it is the monarch which breathes life into both the 
lav/s. He holds that such a difference is maintainable if the 
two types of laws proceed from two different authorities and he 
refuses to accept the view that the constitution emanates solely 
from the sovereign people by branding it as an odious product of 
the revolution. Robert Von Mohl thrashes out the fallacy in 
H. Bishop’s argument by pointing out that monarchy is not nece­
ssarily identical with absolute government. Monarchy, if not 
absolute, is not necessarily incompatible with the principle of 
the constitution being a higher law. In his view constitutions 
are higher not because they emanate from popular sovereignty but 
because of the competent authority producing them. It is not 
out of place here to quote him.
”Now it is notoriously false that constitutions are regarded 
and treated as laws of a superior order because men see in 
them the emanation of popular sovereignty. They are 
recognised as such because competent legislative authority 
has clothed them with this attribute. The question is 
not what this authority is, but simply, had it the right 
to make this declaration? A royal charter is considered 
the supreme, unquestioned law of the country if the monarch, 
at the moment of its presentation, was indisputably the 
absolute master of Legislation. On the other hand, it 
is difficult to see how the authority of a prince is in­
compatible with the existence of positive rule whose modi­
fication is rendered difficult and which cannot be over­
turned by ordinary legislation. Only when one identifies 
monarchy with absolute government, with exemption from 
loyalty to promises, and with the denial of any rights
37to the citizens, can one advocate theories like these.”
In other words, Robert Von Mohl’s argument is that the distinction 
between constitutional law and ordinary law can exist even in a 
monarchical system provided the constitution puts limits on the 
powers of the monarch or lays down conditions precedent to the 
exercise of those powers. Monarchists might advance an argument
37. Robert Von Mohl quoted by Borgeaud, op.cit. p 67.
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that sovereignty itself is illimitable and cannot be determined
even by the monarch himself. This argument provoked a great
controversy in the past and now it seems that the matter has
been settled that the sovereign is capable of delimiting his
power and once limitations are put, these must be observed and
fulfilled. This, undoubtedly militates against the principle
that the present generation has no right to bind the succeeding
~z q
ones, but this is the current jurisprudential view. Theories
of sovereignty bring complications into the matter and we have
39dealt v/ith them briefly in their relevant place." For our 
purpose here, it is sufficient to say that if the constitution 
prescribes conditions for the exercise of the powers of the so- 
called sovereign and the authority of the constitution maker is 
valid, the limitations are perfectly valid and those conditions 
must be satisfied for a valid exercise of those powers.
If the present position that a sovereign authority can 
validly lay down restrictions on its power or the manner or form 
in which it is to be exercised is accepted, it removes a lot 
of confusion regarding the distinction between constitutional 
law and ordinary law. For instance, it is said that only the 
authority which frames a constitution is competent to alter it
38. Stone, J. Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasonings, 1964, p 110.
39. See ’’The Argument of Fear” in Chapter VI supra.
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even though that authority itself might have vested the power to
amend the constitution in the legislature - a body created by and
under the constitution.
Before we proceed further it should be noted that the power
to amend a constitution is the same as to constitute or 
L.0
’’deconstitute” ‘ and quite aptly it is termed as ’’constituent 
power” .
The emphasis on the competence of a constitutional con­
vention or constituent assembly alone to alter the constitution 
even when the constitution gives ample power to the legislature 
to amend the constitution resulted in a misunderstanding that 
if the power to amend the constitution lies in an authority which 
makes ordinary lav/s, the distinction between the two is com­
pletely obliterated. For instance, in Europe it was the 
constitution of Prussia, 1850, which for the first time provided 
for its amendment by ordinary legislative enactment. Its Art 107 
provided:
’’The constitution may be altered by ordinary legislative 
enactment. For such alterations a majority vote of each 
house, expressed in two successive ballots, separated by 
an interval of twenty-one days, shall suffice.” '^1"
40. Finer, H. op.cit. supra, p 193.
41. Cited in Borgeaud, op.cit. supra, p 62.
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Borgeaud observed that, !,Unfortunately this was accom­
plished at the expense of the distinction between constitution
42lav/ and ordinary law.” There can be tv/o assumptions for
this view. First, that the distinction between ordinary lav/ 
and constituent law exists only when the constitution is 
amended by another body than the legislature. Secondly, the 
manner of constitutional amendment should be different from 
the manner in which an ordinary lav/ is made and if it is one 
and the same, the difference between the constituent law and 
ordinary law is effaced thereby.
The first assumption does not hold good at the present 
time, though it v/as considered to be so in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. In many of the constitutions of the 
States in America and in the constitutions of many other countries 
also, constitution makers expressly provided for the amendment 
of the constitutions by the legislature, though approval by the 
people in a referendum is also required in some cases. Probably, 
practical convenience or expediency dictated the shift in the 
amending power from the constitutional convention to the legis­
lature. Be that as it may, constitutional amendments are also 
done by the legislature and this fact alone is incapable of 
blotting the distinction.
42. Ibid.
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The second assumption that, if the legislature is em­
powered to amend the constitution by following its ordinary 
procedure of legislation with or v/ithout special majority, 
the distinction betv/een the constituent law and other laws no 
longer remains, has provoked a sharp division of opinion among 
jurists. The question came up for decision in the United 
States on the point whether the Congress does a legislative act 
while following the procedure of amendment of the Constitution 
under Art 5 of the Constitution.
The difficulty in this matter is that the similarity of 
procedures in legislative acts and constituent acts to be 
followed by the same body gives one the impression that there 
should be no difference or distinction between the two. Even 
in cases where a special majority, as opposed to a simple 
majority which is generally required for ordinary laws, is 
insisted upon in regard to constituent laws the whole process 
is regarded as legislative merely because the ordinary procedure 
of law-making is still being followed and special majorities 
are considered as a minor or more aptly negligible departure from 
the usual procedure. Obviously, it is an important question to 
enquire into, namely, whether the similarity of procedure in 
constituent acts and legislative acts goes to identify them with 
each other or does there still remain any distinction betv/een 
the tv/o? Such an enquiry is necessary because there has not
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been evolved so far any test to distinguish a constituent lav/ 
from an ordinary one though there is a large number of points 
of difference which have been mentioned above.
In such cases, the manner of doing a thing has been 
stressed unduly so much so that the manner itself has been 
regarded as a determinant factor in characterizing the nature 
itself. It is submitted that the similarity of procedure does 
not affect the nature of the constituent law and constituent law 
still remains entirely different from ordinary law, though it 
has been achieved by following an ordinary legislative pro­
cedure. To distinguish the two, we should look at the quality 
and nature of the final product and not the manner followed in 
obtaining it. Posing the question v/hether there is any test 
for distinguishing constituent law from an ordinary one, one 
writer says,
"Surely the answer to such question should depend not so 
much on how a thing is done as on what is done; i.e. on 
the nature and quality of what is done. So that it is 
possible that under one constitution Bills passed by the 
country’s legislature by a simple majority under certain 
circumstances are characterised as constituent; while in 
particular circumstances measures passed by a three- 
fourths majority and ratified by the people at a referen­
dum under another constitution are not. The important
293
point is whether the end-product of such deliberations
43is such that it can be characterised as special."
If the final product itself is examined, it is quite obvious 
that the amendment of the constitution is different from the 
legislative act. In fact the two powers are so different that 
these can never be mixed together, and hence they produce quite 
different things.
"Legislative power, as the term itself indicates is the 
power to enact laws, rules and regulations governing in 
the main relations between individuals or corporate 
bodies not partaking of the character of an organ of 
the state. The term 'constituent power1 connotes the 
pov/er to formulate laws and principles regarding the 
organisation of the state, the functioning of its autho­
rities and the reciprocal relations between the state and 
its citizens. The difference between the two powers is, 
therefore, ratione materiae; the subject matters of the 
exercise of the two powers belong to tv/o different cate­
gories. There is a further point of difference. Legis­
lative power accrues from a constitutional grant and is, 
therefore, subject to such limitations and conditions as 
may be prescribed by the constitution. Constituent
43. Jagat Narain. Constitutional Changes in India - An Inquiry 
into the Workings of the Constitution, 1968, 17.I.Com.L.Q. 
Vol.XVII p 878 at 893.
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power, on the other hand, is, as Virga points out,
inherent in the juridical order. More appropriately
it may be described as an essential element of the
judicial sovereignty of a state, whether such sovereignty
appertains to a single individual or a group of
44individuals or the entire body of the people."
It is quite clear that an amendment of the constitution 
brings a change in the constitution itself and the change is 
formal in the sense that it alters the letter of the constitution 
by way of addition or deletion. The important point here is 
that the amendment achieves a formal change in the test of the 
constitution. It is to be noted that the constitution may be 
modified in reality without altering the letter of the consti­
tution by the judiciary or by constitutional conventions or 
usages. If the change is effected by any other means without 
altering the text of the constitution it is not regarded as an 
amendment of the constitution. If this were not so, the consti­
tution could be said to be amended by every decision of the 
highest judicial authority which interprets the provisions of the 
constitution. But changes effected in actuality by judicial 
interpretations are never labelled as "amendments". The question
44. Sen, D.K.S. op.cit. supra, p 288.
295
arises, why not? The answer is clear that amendment signi­
fies only a formal change in the actual text of the constitution;
whereas interpretation does not bring about a formal change; of
order otherwise. Judicial changes are rightly called as informal and
course, it does effect changes of a high/amendatory changes as
formal. One writer has observed:
"The formal procedure of amendment is of greater importance 
than the informal processes, because it constitutes a 
higher authority to v/hich appeal lies on any question 
that may arise. While changing conventions, new legis­
lative acts, and new interpretations may effect serious 
changes in the constitutional structure, the formal
amendment is superior to them all; it may override any
i± 5
of the others and none of the others may override it."
46K.u. Wheare describes an amendatory change as formal.
"It is well to ask first just what is meant by saying that 
judicial interpretation and decision can change a consti­
tution. Courts, it must be emphasized, cannot amend a
L 7
constitution. They cannot change the words."
The essence of an amendment of the constitution lies in the 
fact that it alters the text of the constitution. The formal 
aspect of amendments is rightly emphasised in some of the newly
45- Livingston: op.cit. supra, pp 13-14.
46. Wheare, K.C. op.cit. supra.p 121.
47. Ibid. p 153.
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enforced constitutions. To name a few, the Burmese consti­
tution, 1961, provides specifically that the proposal for an 
amendment shall be in the form of a Bill and shall be expressed 
as a Bill to amend the constitution.^ Art 20 (2) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, I960, provides that 
an Act to amend the Constitution must state that it amends the 
Constitution and goes a step further to lay down that the Act
must contain no provisions other than those which repeal or 
U°alter. Similarly the Constitution of Federal Republic of
Germany 19A9, known as Basic Law, provided in Art 79 that the 
Basic Law can be amended only by a law which expressly amends 
or supplements the text thereof. Similarly, the constitution 
of Malawi, 1966, provides in Art 97 that an amending Bill shall 
not be passed unless the Bill is in its title expressed to be 
an Act to amend the constitution.
If we study the nature of constituent law and ordinary 
law, one thing is significant, namely, that a constituent lav/ 
changes the text of the constitutions by way of deletion, 
alteration, or addition; whereas an ordinary law does not 
affect the letter of the constitution. If this distinction is
if 8. S.210 of the Constitution of Burma, 1961.
if9. Art 20 (2), Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, July 1st, 
I960.
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borne in mind, the tv;o laws cannot be mixed together even 
though they are made by following the same procedure. The 
similarity of procedure cannot fog our vision regarding their 
nature. A stricter procedure is generally adopted in regard 
to amendment of a con titution because, obviously, that there 
should be a larger concurrence of opinion to amend the consti­
tution. In parliamentary government, the party in power must 
seek the co-operation of opponent parties to secure a larger 
majority which is generally required to amend the constitution.
In some constitutions a particular period is set for considering 
the proposal to amend the constitution. This is provided so
that those who are responsible for making the change must think 
f*or
it over/sometime. The provisions for a special majority or 
special period of time do attach importance to a constituent 
law as compared to an ordinary law and especially in case of a 
written constitution, such provision is essential to maintain 
the importance of the constitution. It is to be noted that 
even in countries where the constitution is alterable by an 
ordinary procedure of law-making, the distinction still exists.
For instance the British Constitution, though not ’written1 in 
the sense of being in one whole document, can be altered by the 
Parliament by following its ordinary procedure. But does it 
obliterate the distinction between constitutional law and 
ordinary law? In fact, it does not. The constitutional law 
in Britain consists of a few Acts, e.g. The Act of Settlement, 1701, 
The Act of Union with Scotland, 1707,
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the Act of Union with Ireland, 1800, the Parliament Act, 1911,
the Representation of the People Acts, 1832, 1867, 188^, 1918,
1928 and 19^ -8, the Ballot Act, 1872, the Judicature Acts, 1873,
1:73 and 1923, the Incitement to Disaffection Act, 193^, His
Majesty’s Declaration of Abdication Act, 1936, the Regency Act,
301937, and the various Acts to set up different ministries.'' 
Therefore, every Act passed by the Parliament is not placed on 
the same footing as the constitutional laws. The inevitable 
conclusion is that the similarity of procedure does not affect 
the nature of the constituent law. We may add here that, 
though the Constitution of Britain is highly flexible in the 
sense that the Parliament is sovereign but the practice had 
been established that before significant changes can be brought, 
public opinion is taken into account. Considerable discussion, 
debates and publicity in the papers precede the passing of the 
Bill.51
Friedrich writes that the two-party system in England is
sufficient restraint upon the amending process. In important
matters the government feels obliged to appeal to the electorate
52on any major issue. In other countries the same purpose is
50. Wheare, K.C. The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status 
U-th edn. p 8.
31. Livingston, op.cit. supra, p 271
32. Friedrich, C.J. op.cit. supra, p 138.
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achieved by providing for constitutional amendment by a 
special majority. In either case the purpose is to provide 
for detailed discussion of the proposed measure and securing 
larger concurrence for it.
In some constitutions, ordinary laws are passed subject 
to the provisions of the constitution and, therefore, if a law 
is contradictory to the provisions of the constitution, it is 
declared to be void. Such a provision gives added importance 
to the constitution and to the judiciary also and brings out
the distinction between the two kinds of laws to the fore.
But it is not a fundamental or a decisive criterion to distinguish 
the one from the other. It is submitted that the test to dis­
tinguish an ordinary lav/ from a constituent law should be based 
on the fact that amendment brings a formal change in the text 
of the constitution, and not on the difference in procedure or 
the body who brings the change, i.e. constituent assembly or 
legislature. Thinking on similar lines, one writer attempted 
to formulate the test in these words:
"The real test, it is submitted, should be whether the
amendment brings about a change in the basic lav/. If
it does it must be regarded as 'constitutional law’, if
53it does not, it is 'ordinary law'."
93. Chaudhari, P.S. The Golak Nath Case - A Critical Arpraisal 
AIR ^1968) Journal 90 at 9A.
The present writer would like to explain that the test 
as formulated may be susceptible of misinterpretation in that 
it may be interpreted as a change in the meaning of words used 
in the constitution and not a formal change in the text, and in 
this way the essence of the test may be lost. What is being 
stressed here is that the amendment must change the text of the 
constitution; if the words of the constitution are not changed, 
it is not an amendment and hence not constituent law. So, it 
seems that for the sake of clarity it is better to state the 
test as follows: whether the lav; brings about a change in the
text of the constitution or not. If it does, it is "consti­
tuent law", if it does not, it is ordinary law. The word 
"change" here includes all shades of the meaning of amendment, 
i.e. alteration, modification, deletion, addition. It is also 
necessary to state that the formal aspect should not be mis­
construed as allowing only minor changes and not drastic changes 
changes may be minor or drastic. The essence of our test is 
that it must change the letter of the constitution. If the 
distinction given above is kept in mind or the simple test is 
applied in cases of doubt, an amendment of the constitution 
can never be an ordinary law or vice versa.
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Application of the Test
It is necessary here to examine the two cases on which
Chief Justice Subba Rao relied heavily for the proposition
that "an amendment of the constitution can be nothing but law,”
meaning, it is submitted, by "law11, ordinary law in the context.
55First he considers the case of MeCawley v. The King. In this 
case a statute passed by the Legislature of Queensland v/as 
sought to be invalidated on the ground that the provisions of 
the statute were inconsistent with the Constitution Act 1867 
and the main argument was that the legislature could not dis­
regard the constitution, though it could alter it. It is to 
be noted that the Legislature of Queensland was empowered to 
alter the Constitution Act, 1867, in an ordinary manner except 
the provisions regarding the constitution of the legislative 
council in which case a two-thirds majority of the legislative 
council and the legislative assembly was required. The Privy 
Council upheld the impugned statute on the ground that the 
Legislature v/as fully empowered to pass the impugned Act, and 
therefore it was valid. The learned Chief Justice Subba Rao 
viewed the decision as an authority for the proposition that an 
amendment is "law11 in the sense of ordinary law. It is humbly
54. Golak Nath AIR, 1967, S.C. at 1660. 
55- (1920) A.C. 691-
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submitted that the decision does not support the proposition 
at all, the reason being that the statute in question did not 
amend the Constitution. The amendment of the constitution is 
invariably a formal alteration of the constitution, as opposed 
to informal or judicial alteration. Actually it was an ordinary 
law and it was not intended to alter the Conetitution Act, 1867, 
though impliedly its effect was to render a provision of the 
constitution nugatory. If we apply the test, whether the Act 
in question brings about a change in the text of the Constitution 
Act, 1867, or not, the answer is undoubtedly in the negative.
Regarding the plea that the impugned Act was in conflict 
with the Constitution, the Privy Council concluded that the 
Legislature was fully empowered to pass the Act, that the 
Constitution Act itself did not restrict the power of the 
Legislature in regard to the passing of the impugned Act. It 
is submitted that the Act was valid but suffered from an irregu­
larity in so far as its provisions were in conflict with the 
Constitution Act, 1867* In this case, the Legislature should 
have altered the provision of the Constitution to bring it in 
accord with the statute. The decision of the Privy Council 
proceeded on the argument that the Legislature of Queensland 
was fully competent to pass the Act in question, and also to 
alter the provisions of the Constitution said to be in conflict 
with each other in the same ordinary manner of law-making as 
the Act itself was passed.
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The fact that the Legislature had general pov/er to 
legislate except on one subject v/hich was not in question, 
led the Privy Council to hold the Act to be valid, treating 
it as pro tanto alteration of the constitution. In fact this 
decision rendered the provisions of the Constitution Act as 
nugatory as opposed to repealed or modified. In this way an 
irregularity had been perpetuated, which could have been cured 
by the legislature by amending the Constitution Act suitably.
It is pointed out here that the Act in question cannot be 
regarded as an amendment of the constitution in the right sense 
of the word. Had it been an amending Act, it v/ould have not 
left the letter of the constitution untouched and the question 
of conflict between the two Acts v/ould have not arisen at all.
The second case cited by Chief Justice Subba Rao was
56Bribery Comm v. Rana Singhe.^  In this case the Bribery Amend­
ment Act, 1958, passed by the Ceylon Legislature was challenged 
on the ground that S.41 of the said Act was in conflict v/ith 
S. 55 of the Constitution which vests pov/er to appoint judicial 
officers in the Judicial Service Commission. S.29 (4) of the 
Constitution says that no Bill for the amendment or repeal of 
any of the provisions of the Constitution may be presented for
56. (1965) A .C. 172.
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the Royal Assent unless it has endorsed on it a certificate 
under the hands of the Speaker that the number of votes cast in 
favour thereof in the House of Representatives amounted to not 
less than two-thirds of the whole number of members of the 
House. Therefore once it is shown that an act amends the 
Constitution the certificate of the Speaker under the proviso 
to Section 29 (4) of the Constitution is essential. The Act in 
question did not have any certificate to this effect. The 
Privy Council held the Act as ultra vires and void on the 
ground that a Legislature has no pov/er to ignore the conditions 
of law-making that are imposed by the instrument which itself 
regulates its power to make law. The main argument of the 
Appellant was that the Legislature of Ceylon being sovereign, 
therefore, possessed inherent power to pass any law. The 
Privy Council rejected this argument.
"But the proposition which is not acceptable is that a 
Legislature, once established, has some inherent power 
derived from the mere fact of its establishment to make 
a valid law by the resolution of a bare majority which 
its own constituent instrument has said shall not be 
valid law unless made by a different legislative process. 
And this is the proposition which is in reality involved 
in the argument."
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Chief Justice Subba Rao holds the Act as an amendment 
of the constitution and therefore, an authority for the 
proposition that a constituent law is law* meaning thereby, 
it is submitted, ordinary law. It is submitted here with
all due regard to the learned Chief Justice that it is not
correct to regard the Act in question as an amendment. In 
fact, it was an ordinary Act which by implication, if held 
valid, rendered S.29 (4) as meaningless. The subject matter 
of the Act required a special majority for passing the Act but 
this condition was not observed in passing it and hence it was 
held invalid even though it had received Royal Assent.
P.J. Fitserald viewed the Act to be an ordinary law in these 
words:
"In the Bribery Commissioner v. Rana Singhe the Privy
Council held invalid an Act of the Ceylon Parliament
which had received the Royal Assent. Here, however,
there was a conflict between a fundamental rule of the
constitution and an alleged Act of Parliament, and the
57constitution took precedence over the statute."
It is submitted that the Act was rightly held as invalid 
because the conditions to pass the law validly were not observed. 
But to hold the Act as a constituent law is to stretch the 
meaning of "amendment" beyond its limits and purpose.
57. Fitzerald, P.J. (editor): Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th edn.
p 121. ".....
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We have already made clear that the process itself is 
no criterion to judge v/hether it is a constituent law or any 
other law; the right criterion is to judge its nature and 
quality and the test in such cases is to see v/hether the 
Act changed the text of the constitution or not. Applying 
this very test, we find that the Act in question did not change 
the letter of the constitution.
In reality, in a legislative body having absolute pov/er 
to make or unmake any constituent law as v/ell as ordinary law 
in one and the same manner, the legislative and the constituent 
powers seem to be so indistinguishably mixed that both of them 
seem to be one and the same thing, and one is most likely to 
be misled and call the whole activity as legislative merely 
because that b dy itself is called a legislative body and/or the 
bulk of its v/ork is legislative and so the small quantity of 
constituent lav/ is made to lose sight of its own existence and 
character just as a deep colour in a picture seems to absorb 
completely a light but little colour along with it, if seen by 
a cursory or distant glance. But if v/e do not go by the manner 
a law is passed but by the nature and quality it possesses, 
the ordinary law and the constituent lav/ stand clearly dis­
tinguishable from each other.
We may state here that what is done under Art 368 in 
the constitution of India is nothing but a constituent law and
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never an ordinary lav/. The essence of our test has been so 
v/isely expressed in the Article itself that one is filled 
with a sense of admiration for the drafters. Particularly, 
the phrase, "The constitution shall stand amended in accordance 
with the terms of the Bill," fulfils the very purpose of an 
amendment, i.e. a change in the text and our test is carried 
to complete fruition. The Article leaves not a shadow of 
doubt that it produces constituent law and nothing but consti­
tuent law. The customary procedure of law-making has been 
employed to make constituent law and there is nothing bad in it. 
Constituent law can be perfectly made by following ordinary 
rocedure of law-making; mere procedure being no touch-stone 
to distinguish the ordinary law from the constituent law. It 
should be noted that, strictly speaking, it is not exactly the 
similar "legislative" procedure v/hich is followed in Art 368.
The procedure of carrying out amendment to the Federal 
constitution has been provided in Art 112 of the constitution 
of Switzerland, 1848, as follows: "Amendment is secured through
the forms required for passing Federal laws." Borgeaud comments 
upon this in these v/ords:
"It (the Article) signifies that the customary rules of 
legislative procedure shall be adhered to in cases of 
constitutional revision. It would be impossible to
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argue from it that the Federal Constitution authorizes
an assimilation of the exercise of constituent functions
58with ordinary legislative acts."
In fact, Justice Hidayatullah seems to have realized that
the product of an amending process is nothing but constitution
itself, when he observed: "An amendment of the Constitution has
59been aptly called a constitution in little . .."
(B) Contextual Arguments
It is clear from what has been said above that there does 
exist a distinction between a constituent lav; and an ordinary 
law, especially in case of written constitutions. Now regarding 
the problem whether "law11 in Art 13 (2) includes constituent 
law or not, it is submitted that the question cannot be decided 
on the basis of the meaning of "law” itself. "Law” is a generic 
term and it is difficult to define it precisely. Y/riting on 
the definition of law, a great jurist of our time writes:
"In so far as definition imports specific differentiation 
within the genus, we have thought (and still think) that 
to offer a definition of lav; is to obscure and impoverish, 
rather than to clarify and enrich, the understanding of
38. Borgeaud, C. op.cit. supra, pp 293-29%
59. Golak Nath, AIR 1967, S.C. at 1697.
60. Stone, J. in Australian Studies in Legal Philosophy 
(ed. Tammelo), 1963, P 6.
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Again he v/rites: "In either case ’definition’ cannot
be more definite nor more definitive than the exposition which
61it calls to mind."J Lav;, as such, includes every type of law 
including constituent law. But the question before us is not 
whether "law" in its generic sense includes constituent law or 
not. The question is whether "lav;" as used in Art 13 (2) 
includes constituent lav; or not. The difficulty is that the 
meaning of "law" in Art 13 (2) has been derived in the Golak Nath 
case from the word "law" in its widest possible generic sense.
It is not denied that "law" in its generic sense does include 
constituent law, but the point to be considered is whether "lav/" 
in Art 13 (2) has been used in a generic sense or some limited 
sense. This enquiry into the meaning of "law" in Art 13 (2) 
should be based on the context in which the word "lav;" has been 
used in Art 13 (2) and not on the intrinsic meaning of law, 
otherwise it would be begging the question. Professor Subba Pao 
attempted to find the meaning of "law" from the word itself.
For instance, he argues that a law which can enlarge fundamental 
rights by adding to Part III can be only constituent lav/ and
6-hence "law" in Art 13 cannot exclude a constitutional amendment.''1
61. Stone: op.cit. p 31.
62. Professor Subba Pao, G.C.V. The Mimansa Approach to the 
Indian Constitution, 1967, Sup. Ct. Journal, p 9 %
It is submitted that the nature of a lav/ v/hich adds to Part III 
does not help us in determining the nature of a lav/ v/hich takes 
away or abridges the rights enshrined in Part III, simply 
because the word MlawM in Art 13 (2) is used in respect of a 
lav/ which takes away or abridges the rights existing in Part III 
and not in respect of a lav/ v/hich adds to them. Art 13 does 
contemplate a valid addition of rights but it cannot be 
reasonably said that such a "law" is covered under the term 
"law" in Art 13 (2). With due respect to the Supreme Court, 
it is submitted that the Golak Nath case attached a generic 
sense to the word ’’law” in Art 13 (2), without paying sufficient 
attention to the context in v/hich it has been used. The com­
prehensiveness attributed to the word "law" in Art 13 (2) stems 
from this fallacy and the total neglect of the context has 
resulted in lifting the term "law" higher than constituent lav/ 
because ’’law” in Art 13 (2) overrides, according to the Golak Nath 
judgement, even a constituent law if it takes away or abridges 
the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. 
The context in which a word is used cannot be ignored if its 
true meaning is to be discovered.
’’Once the relativity in the use of words and of the
concepts for v/hich the words stand is recognised, it is
seen that ’logic’ alone does not and cannot settle the 
63matter.” In this connection, quite pertinent and
63* W.W. Cook, Substance and Procedure Yale L.J. 1932-3, p 333 at 3k
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relevant is the observation of the Supreme Court of the
United States made in Lamar v . U.S.:
"The same words may have different meanings in different
parts of the same Act, and of course words may be used
in a statute in a different sense from that in v/hich
6 4they are used in the Constitution."
It is apt here to point our that the commerce clause in the
Australian Constitution Act, 1900, happens to be so v/idely
worded as "trade, commerce and intercourse among the states
shall be absolutely free," and yet the High Court of Australia
interpreted the v/ords "absolutely free" as meaning not abso- 
65lutely free. It is one of the outstanding examples to
bring our point home that v/ords used in the constitution are 
not necessarily to be understood in their generic sense as 
the word "law" in Art 13 (2) has been construed by the Golak Nath 
majority but must be interpreted taking into consideration not 
merely their text but context also, meaning by "context" not 
merely the total document or existing law to help interpret a 
particular prevision but also the larger social context in 
which the constitution is being worked. The significance of 
the context in the process of interpretation has been rightly
64. (1916) 2WJ.S. 60 at 65.
65. Duncan v. State of Queensland, 1916, C.L.R. 556 at 573 
Per Griffith C.J.
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stressed by Professors McDougal and Lasswell in these words: 
"From the standpoint of the task of interpretation,
the most sweeping point to be made is the contextuality
of any process of communication. Every feature may
gg
affect the outcome."
The contextual area v/ould be covered under the following 
rubrics:
(i) Significance of Fundamental Rights and their proper place 
in the Indian Constitution 
Our enquiry into the nature of the Fundamental Rights in 
the Indian Constitution is directed to a limited purpose, 
namely, their significance to the individual and v/hether they 
are, or were intended to be, permanent in the sense of not
being touchable by way of amendment under Art 368 when these
are taken away or abridged by such amendment. Therefore, it 
is neither necessary nor possible within the range of our 
enquiry to deal with all these rights in detail in their various 
aspects. Our sole endeavour is to find out whether these 
rights or their significance warrant any limitation on the power 
of amendment in Art 368.
66. McDougal and Lassell: Interpretation of Agreements and 
World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure 
1967, p 15.' ~
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The chapter on Fundamental Rights represents mainly
an ideology of individualism propounded by Bentham and
preached by J.S. Mill and a host of other philosophers.
The idea of individual liberty and freedom is significant
because it "permits the full development of the personality
6 7of every citizen in the best way he can achieve it . .."
Though individual liberty is precious, yet it is not so 
precious as to be unlimited; its proper sphere is to be de­
limited by other factors responsible for the needs of the community 
or the society. If individual liberty is not to be delimited
by social controls, its results are most undesirable,- as abso-
6 8lute freedom to contract results in a state of slavery,  ^ so 
is the case with liberty in general. K.M. Panikkar describes 
this result in these words:
"The laissez-faire tradition of liberalism on v/hich the 
doctrine of individual liberty is based and to which 
we hark back did not lead to an Arcadian system of 
happiness. It meant inevitably the right of the 
capitalist to exploit the worker, of the powerful to 
oppose the weak, of the rich to grow richer, and the 
poor to grow poorer, all in the sacred name of the
67. Gajendragadkar, P.B. Law, Liberty and Social Justice, 1965,
P 65*
68. "... To put no restrictions on the freedom to contract 
would logically lead to contracts of slavery."
Cohen: The Basis of Contract, 1933, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553-586.
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liberty of the individual. It was the doctrine of
the devil taking the hindmost. Life was conceived
as a race for success with the state heavily weighted
in favour of privilege, as the umpire. It is the
omnipotent state that has set right some of these
injustices of a competitive society by emphasising
the ideals of economic equality, social security,
nationalised health services, organisation of labour
to prevent exploitation, control of production and
distribution in order to secure for every one the minimum
69necessities of good living."
The constitution framers in India were well aware of the
importance of Fundamental Rights as well as the need of their
proper delimitation. They knew that "true individual freedom
cannot exist without economic security and independence.
70Necessitous men are not free men." A great philosopher of
India expressed the same idea on the day the constitution came 
into force, in these words:
"For the vast majority of human beings the main anxieties 
are economic rather than political. Political freedom 
is mainly a means to a better life. The right to work,
69. Panikkar, K.M. The State and the Citizen, 1956, p 5*
70. Shah, K.T. Prasad Papers File 4--c/47: quoted by Austin, G 
op.cit. supra, p 60.
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the right to a living wage, the right to care and
« i
maintenance in infancy, old age, and ill health, are
more important to the ordinary man than the right to
71vote or freedom of speech and assembly.”
The needs of India's millions far exceeded the resources of the 
Government and the constitution framers, being realistic, 
appreciated that positive rights could not be granted; what 
they could provide for were negative rights in Part III and 
non-justiciable state obligations in Part IV of the Constitution. 
The constituent assembly members realized that these negative 
rights, or in other v/ords, legal restraints on the legislatures 
and other functionaries subsumed compendiously as "the state", 
could not be absolute in their nature. The founding fathers 
v/ere on the horns of a dilemma when they had to face the 
problem of defining the rights precisely and spelling out the 
limitations to them.
Cn the one hand, they intended to grant individual freedom,
on the other hand they desired that the public weal should not
be overridden by private rights. Therefore, it was a difficult
task to set out limits to private rights so that the interest
of the public
71. S. Radhakrishnan: Economic Rights of Man; The Hindu, 
26th January 1950.
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would get priority over that of the individual. One of the
devices to limit the rights was by way of their suspension
in certain circumstances, and the founding fathers showed
their wisdom by adopting this device during an emergency in
respect of Art 19 and of other rights specifically mentioned
72in a Presidential order. Secondly, individual liberty was
circumscribed by allowing state intervention for certain social 
purposes. The right to equality was not to stand in the way 
of making special laws protecting women and children, and freedom 
of religion was not to prevent the state from passing social 
reform legislation. Similarly, the freedoms enshrined in 
Art 19 can be regulated to serve the interests of the general 
public mentioned in clauses (2) to (6) of Art 19.
Therefore, the scheme of the Fundamental Rights makes it 
clear that the sphere carved out for individual freedom is not 
fixed or permanent but flexible, increasing or diminishing in 
proportion to the pressure of the public interest. The one 
discernible thread running through Part III is that all the 
rights have been made subservient to the public interest. In 
this connection it is of interest to note that the riders to the 
rights are highly flexible and ever-changing in their nature.
For instance, concepts like "public interest" and "morality",
72. Art 358-359.
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"reasonable restrictions" which have been employed to regulate 
the scope of the Fundamental Rights are such as to defy all 
attempts to define them. In fact, these elastic expressions 
made the boundaries of the spheres of individual freedom and of 
the public weal to be fluid. Therefore, it is obvious that 
the rights as they have been written in Fart III have no sign 
of permanency in them. Art 13 does not give them any "inviola­
bility" or "transcendental" character. An ordinary law taking 
away or abridging any of these rights, if held justified under 
any of the limits imposed upon the rights, is still a valid law. 
It is only when such a lav/ fails to be "reasonable" that it is 
hit by Art 13 (2) and declared ultra vires.
Moreover, Parliament has been authorised to restrict the 
operation of these rights. Arts 33 and 3A empower Parliament 
to take away or modify the availability of Fundamental Rights 
to the Armed Forces. Finally, the Directive Principles 
incorporated in Part IV also suggest that Part III was not 
intended to be permanent in the sense of being unamendable.
(ii) Directive Principles
It is an historical fact that the Directive Principles and 
the Fundamental Rights were both regarded by the founding 
fathers as rights and their separation into two parts, so that 
Part III became justiciable and Part IV non-justiciable was an
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after-thought. Though one of the Constituent Assembly 
members described the Directives contemptuously as Ma veritable 
dustbin of sentiment ... sufficiently resilient as to permit
73any individual of this House to ride his hobby horse into it,"
the fact is that the Directives and the Fundamental Rights
74together are "the conscience of the Constitution." '
Dr. Ambedkar likened the Directive Principles to the instrument
of instructions issued to the Governor-General and to the
75Governors under the Government of India Act, 1935* He also
described them as nothing but "implied powers" given to the
nr
legislature to make laws on the matters mentioned therein.
K.M. Munshi justified them on the ground that they serve to
77provide some basis of protest against arbitrary legislation.
To him, "they are a body of doctrines to which public opinion can 
rally." Dr. Ambedkar also had a similar idea when he said:
"What great value these Directive Principles possess will be
realized better when the forces of right contrive to capture
7 P)
power." There is a view that there is no provision in the
73. Krishanamachari, T.T. C.A.D.VIII, p 383.
74. Austin Granville: op.cit. supra. Chapter 3 (Heading). 
73- C.A.D.VIII, p 41.
76. c.f. Markandan, K.C. Directive Principles in the Indian 
Constitution, 1966, p 83-
77. Austin: op.cit. p 78.
78. C.A.D.VII. pp 41-42.
7°constitution to prevent a misuse of the legislative power. ' 
Perhaps, the Directive Principles pose a great check on the 
misuse of legislative pov/er and it is the chapter on Directives 
v/hich v/ould be a corrective to the Legislature, when the people 
register their protest invoking any of the Directives against the 
Legislature which intends to misuse its legislative power.
The fact that the Directive Principles v/ere not made justiciable 
does not render them mere "pious wishes" or much window-dressing 
for the social revolution, as one of the Assembly members thought.
Professor Gledhill has rightly observed that the courts may 
determine the "public interest" in the light of the Directive
81
Principles, and thus, restrict some of the Fundamental Rights. 
Narkandan, in his studies on the Directive Principles in the 
Indian Constitution, says:
"The courts as a matter of fact took the help of the 
Directives in defining what was 'public purpose1 and 
weighed the reasonableness or otherwise of statutes on 
the basis of standards and norms set forth in the 
Directives.
79. Narayan, J. (1968) 17.I.C.L.Q. p 878.
80. Shah, K.T. Shah's minute: Prasad Papers File I-E/45, quoted 
by Austin, op.cit. p 79.
81. Professor Gledhill, A. The Republic of India, 1964, p 206.
82. Markandan, K.C. op.cit. supra, p 251.
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While interpreting the Constitution, courts must not 
ignore the Directives. It is relevant here to point out 
that when the Constituent Assembly substituted "enforceable" 
for "cognizable" in Art 37, they really meant to allow the 
courts to take into consideration the Directive Principles in
0  "Z
the interpretation of the constitution.
Blackshield prefers to describe the provisions of Parts 
III and IV as moral rights:
"To adopt Lon Fuller’s now well known distinction, 
the 'fundamental rights' are a 'strict morality of 
duty' v/hich India's constitution-makers set for them­
selves; the Directive Principles are merely a 'morality
of aspiration'. Nevertheless it is clear that the
84tv/o sets of articles have a great deal in common."'
He further observed:
"Above all, the distinction between Part III and Part IV 
is not that Part III, being justiciable, is the respon­
sibility of the courts (and not of the Parliament), 
whereas Part IV, not being justiciable, is the respon­
sibility of the Parliament (and not of the courts). All
the moral rights reflected in Part III and Part IV are
85the responsibility of the organs of government."
83. c.f. Ibid. p.154.
84. Blackshield, A.R. Fundamental Rights 10.J .I.L.I.(1968) p 44.
85. Ibid. p 45-
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If we take into consideration the fact that the 
Fundamental Rights are negative whereas the Directives are 
positive, though unenforcable, it seems that the Directive 
Principles, if given due effect, v/ould be more significant 
to the individual than the Fundamental Rights. The Directives
86have been described as more potent than the Fundamental Rights. 
Another author speaks in similar refrain:
’’Truly speaking, the Directive Principles are more 
fundamental than fundamental rights from the point of 
view of the constitution since the ideals enshrined in 
it, ’’Justice, social, economic and political,” are 
loftier in conception, and seek to secure to the individual 
tangible benefits of great significance than fundamental 
rights. It is for this reason that both in the objec­
tive Resolution and in the Preamble to the constitution 
the ideal of ’’Justice, social, economic and political” 
is mentioned first and prior to the securing of guarantees 
under fundamental rights. It is also for the same reason 
that when B.N. Rau prepared the draft outline of the 
constitution he included the provisions relating to 
Directive Principles in Part 'A' and those on Fundamental 
Rights in Part ’B ’
'or
Anderson, J.N.D. (ed.) Changing Law in Developing Countries 
(1963) p 89.
87. Markandan, K.C. op.cit. supra, p 1J-8.
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It was suggested by B.N. Rau, the Constitutional Advisor
to the Constituent Assembly, that in the case of conflict between
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles the former should be
made subservient to the latter; otherwise he believed, as he
was warned, that the framers might not be accused of Msucking
the Bill of Rights dry".uo
In the beginning the judicial attitude towards the
Directives was one of indifference. In the State of Madras v.
89Srimati Chamnakam Dorairajan it was observed:
MThe chapter of Fundamental Rights is sacrosanct and 
not liable to be abridged by any legislative or executive 
Act or order, except to the extent provided in the appro­
priate article in Part III. The Directive Principles of 
state policy have to conform to and run as subsidiary 
to the chapter of Fundamental Rights.11 
Later on, it was also accepted that in the interpretation of 
the Constitution, the Directive Principles should be given atten­
tion to and the courts should endeavour to give effect to them
90as far as possible. In re. Kerala Education Bill, the 
Supreme Court realized the importance of the Directives and
observed:
88. Rau, B.N. India's Constitution in the Making, p 333.
89. (1931) S.C.R. 323 at 331.
90. AIR 1938 S.C. 936.
"The Directive Principles have to conform to and 
run subsidiary to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. 
Nevertheless, in determining the scope and ambit of the 
Fundamental Rights relied on by or on behalf of any 
person or body the court may not entirely ignore these 
Directive Principles of state policy laid down in Part IV 
of the constitution but should adopt the principle of 
harmonious construction and should attempt to give effect 
to both as much as possible.”
It is submitted that in the interpretation of the
\
Constitution, the Fundamental Rights need not be over-emphasised 
otherwise the Constitution itself would be failing in its aims 
and objectives.
"The Fundamental Rights Chapter deals on_y with liberal 
rights of individuals and they seem to conform to the 
old school of thought which has outlived its utility, 
the school of utilitarians and liberals. As against 
this, the principles enunciated in Fart IV approach a 
socialistic pattern. The sincerity or the goodness of 
this government will be judged by how far they go to 
implement these Directive Principles. It is very easy 
to stick to Fundamental Rights and appear progressive 
while doing nothing to reduce class differences.
But really, liberty will have no meaning unless there is
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91economic equality.”
Mr. Nehru described the Fundamental Eights as representing 
something static, whereas the Directive Principles are 
’•dynamic” .
’’The Directive Principles of state policy represent
a dynamic move towards a certain objective. The
Fundamental Eights represent something static, to
preserve certain rights which exist. Both again are
right. But somehow and sometimes it must so happen
that that dynamic movement and that static standstill
92do not quite fit into each other.”'
He further observed that if Fundamental Eights are over­
emphasised as compared with the Directives, then,
’’the result would be that the whole purpose behind the 
Constitution, which was meant to be a dynamic constitution 
leading to a certain goal, step by step, is somewhat 
hampered and hindered by the static element being
93emphasized a little more than the dynamic element.”"'
The study of the Directive Principles makes two points 
clear: First, though the directi es are unenforceable, they
impose a solemn moral duty on the Legislatures to observe them
91. Parliamentary Debates (lok Sabha) Part II, 1953, Vol.II,
Col.2129.
92. Parliamentary Debates (of India) Part II, Vol.XII, Col.8822-8823.
93. Ibid.
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in enacting laws. That is why they have been described as 
,fnevertheless fundamental” in Art 37. Failure to observe 
them may earn disrepute for the legislatures and overall 
progress may be hindered. Secondly, the Directives affect 
indirectly the sphere of the individual liberty and freedom 
as do the limitations to the fundamental rights in Part III.
The judiciary as well as the legislature and the executive 
have to give effect to Directives as well as Fundamental Rights 
and though the conflict in some cases may be hard to resolve, 
the delicate task of accommodating and harmonising the two 
parts as far as possible is always there. The very existence 
of such a situation brings it in light, that it is neither 
possible nor desirable to attribute any permanency to Part III. 
Part III is ever to be in flux as regards its real sphere and 
scope; its real area or scope is left to be determined by 
the circumstances, economic and political, from time to time. 
Therefore, it is quite futile to assert that the Fundamental 
Rights are ’’inalienable” or ’’sacrosanct” , ’’permanent” or 
’’transcendental” . Moreover, it is meaningless to call them 
’’transcendental” without answering the question, ’’transcendental 
to what?”^
94. Annual Survey of Commonwealth Laws (1967) p . 41.
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In this connection, let us see whether the founding
fathers really intended to make Part III untouchable by way
of amendment under Art 368, so that the rights may not be
abridged or taken away. Of course, too ipuch reliance on
the intentions of the framers is neither necessary nor
desirable in the interpretation of the constitution because
a constitution is not a contract, in which the real intentions
of the parties count much; a constitution is intended to be
an instrument to last for ages to come and the intentions of
the framers may not suit the coming generations. That is
why some of the constitutionalists recommend a "progressive
95interpretation" of the constitution.
The intentions of the constitution makers, however, always 
have some relevance particularly when the constitution has 
been recently framed so that their intentions are more or less 
of a contemporaneous nature. Viewed in this light, the inten­
tions of the Indian founding fathers can be a useful guide to 
determining whether the fundamental rights should be treated as 
amendable or not
93* Basu, D.D. Commentary, 1963> Vol.I. p 36.
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C. Intentions of the Founding Fathers
Jawahar Lai Nehru, while presenting to the Constituent 
Assembly the Interim Report on Fundamental Rights, expressed 
his idea regarding the nature of the Fundamental Rights:
11A Fundamental Right should be looked upon, not from 
the point of view of any particular difficulty of the 
moment but as something that you want to make permanent 
in the Constitution 
The point to be considered is whether he meant by "permanent" 
unamendable in the legalistic sense, or something else. It 
seems that by "permanent" he never meant "unamendable" because 
he clarified his view later on in these words:
"... that while we want this constitution to be as solid 
and as permanent a structure as we can make it, never­
theless there is no permanence in constitutions. There 
should be a certain flexibility. If you make anything 
rigid and permanent, you stop a nation's growth, the 
growth of a living vital organic people. Therefore it 
has to be flexible. So also, when you pass this consti­
tution you will, and I think it is proposed, lay down a 
period of years - whatever that period may be - during 
which changes to that constitution can be easily made
96. CAD III, p k5k.
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97without any difficult process.11^ '
Pandit Nehru was all in favour of a flexible constitution
and the fundamental rights were no exception to it. Bather
he favoured the view that the constitution should be amendable
98by a simple majority. Moreover, if he intended to make the
rights unamendable in any way by Parliament, he would not have
moved that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1930, just
99after the Constitution came into force, y which abridged cer­
tain Fundamental Bights. After giving examples of the better 
framed and better phrased constitutions of the Weimar Bepublic 
of Germany and of the Bepublic of Spain, he expressed his views 
on the flexibility of constitutions:
"A constitution which is unchanging and static, it does 
not matter how good it is, how perfect it is, is a 
constitution that is past its use. It is in its old 
age already and gradually approaching its death, A 
constitution to be living must be growing, must be adap­
table, must be flexible, must be changeable. And if 
there is one thing which the history of political 
developments has pointed out, I say with great force,
97• CAD VII. pp 322-323.
98. Austin, G. op.cit. supra, p 239.
99- Parliamentary Debates (of India) May 16th, 1931» Vol.XII, 
Cols.88H-88l5.
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it is this that the great strength of the British 
nation and the British people has laid in their 
flexible constitution. They have known how to adapt 
themselves to changes, to the biggest changes, consti­
tutionally, Sometimes they went through the process 
of fire and revolution. Even so, they tried to adapt 
their constitution and went on with it.11^ ^
Therefore, it is clear from the record that he never intended 
to make the fundamental rights unamendable by Parliament, 
Speaking on Art 32 which guarantees the constitutional 
remedies for enforcing the Fundamental Rights, Dr. Ambedkar 
described Art 32 as, ,!the very soul of the constitution and 
the very heart of it,11^ ^* because that article alone makes the 
rights effective by their speedy enforcement. The uniqueness 
of Art 32 was pointed out by a learned author in these words: 
“There is no other country where citizens and others can 
in the first instance, go to the highest tribunal in
the land and obtain a final pronouncement regarding
102their fundamental rights.”
100. Parliamentary Debates (of India) May 16th, 1931> Vol.XII, 
Cols.9623-9626.
101. Dr. Ambedkar, CAD VII, p 953-
102. Triphati, P.K. Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar and Constitutional 
Interpretation (1966) 8 JILI p 479 (583).
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Dr, Ambedkar emphasised the point that without the constitutional
remedies, the rights would have been meaningless^^ but he did
not rule out their amendability.
"The constitution has invested the Supreme Court with
these writs and these writs could not be taken away until
and unless the constitution itself is amended by means
104left open to the Legislature.11
He considered that the constitutional remedies provided for in
Art 32 were "the greatest safeguards" and in this way the funda-
105mental rights were not "glittering generalities" ^ or pious 
declarations but made real by guaranteeing their enforceability 
by the Supreme Court under Article 32. It is obvious that if 
he regarded Art 32, which is the only provision making the 
Rights effective, as amendable by Parliament, it can be safely 
inferred that the other Rights cannot be considered as unamendable.
Speaking about the amending provision of the Draft Consti­
tution, Dr. Ambedkar said:
"The powers of amendment are left with the legislatures 
central and provincial. It is only for amendments of
103. Dr. Ambedkar: CAD VII, p 953*
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
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specific matters - and they are only few - that the
ratification of the state legislatures is required.
All other articles of the constitution are left to be
106amended by Parliament.11
This very view was reiterated by him when he replied to the
critics of the amending procedure:
"The Assembly has not only refrained from putting a seal
of finality and infallibility upon this constitution by
denying the people the right to amend the constitution,
as in Canada, or by making the amendment of the consti­
tution subject to fulfilments of extraordinary terms
and conditions, as in America or Australia, but has 
provided for a facile procedure for amending the consti­
tution ... those who are dissatisfied with the constitution 
have only to obtain a two-thirds majority, and if they 
cannot obtain a two-thirds majority in the parliament 
elected on adult franchise in their favour, their dis­
satisfaction with the constitution cannot be deemed to
107be shared by the general public.11
106. CAD VII, p if3.
107. CAD XI, p 976.
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There is one ambiguous statement of Dr. Ambedkar 
which throws some doubt regarding the amendability of the
Fundamental Rights, but does not make clear what he had in
i oP\
mind." Explaining the final form of the amending pro­
cedure under Art 30^ - of the Draft Constitution (Art 368 of 
the Constitution), he informed the Assembly that Art 368 
divides all the articles under three categories, namely, 
first, articles amendable by parliament by a simple majority, 
secondly, by a two-thirds majority and an absolute majority, 
and thirdly, those provisions which require ratification by 
the half the states.
He then went on to say:
"If the future parliament wishes to amend any parti­
cular article which is not mentioned in Part III or 
Article 30^, all that is necessary for them is to
109have a two-thirds majority. Then they can amend it."
Since Article 30^ + (368) is an entrenched article in the proviso
to that article, it is amendable by a two-thirds majority
and an absolute majority plus ratification as required by Art 368.
108. Subba Rao C.J. relied upon this paragraph in the Golak Nath 
case, op.cit.supra, p 1657.
109. CAD IX, p 1661.
333
Linking Part III with Art 304 may mean that he might he 
thinking that Part III is also entrenched which is not so or 
he might he intending that Part III is unamendable. In the 
latter case, there emerges a fourth category of articles (of 
Part III) which are not amendable at all. But according to 
him there are only three categories of articles for the pur­
pose of amendment. In any event, the statement is quite 
ambiguous and does not clearly affirm that Part III is not 
amendable. In the light of his earlier statements which 
are quite clear and emphatic, and the fact that he enlightened
the House on the justification of the Constitution (First
110Amendment) Act, 1931, as Law Minister, this statement seems
to be meaningless and takes us nowhere.
In the Golak Nath case, Justice Hidayatullah referred to
the historical efforts to have fundamental rights embodied in
111the Constitution and hence construed them to be permanent.
For instance, he quoted this statement from the Nehru Report:
MIt is obvious that our first care should be to have 
our fundamental rights guaranteed in a manner which 
will not permit their withdrawal under any circumstances.
110. Parliamentary Debates (of India), 1931, Vol.XII, Part II, 
Cols.9004-9031.
111. Golak Nath AIR, 1967, S.C. at 1694.
112. All Parties Conference. Report of a Committee to Determine 
Principles of the Constitution for India, 1928,
(Nehru Report) pp 89-90.
112
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It is relevant to point out that in spite of the fact 
that the Motilal Nehru Report (1928) laid emphasis on funda­
mental rights to make them permanent, the amending provision 
in Clause 87 of the Report empowered the Indian Parliament to
repeal or alter any of the provisions of the Constitution.
No doubt, the Nehru Report was a close precursor of the funda­
mental rights; ten of the nineteen sub-clauses re-appear
materially unchanged and three of the rights were shifted to
113the Directive Principles, but in regard to their amendment,
the Nehru Report and the Sapru Report (1944) were largely
114ignored by the Union Constitution Committee. Therefore,
it is not reasonable to attribute any permanency to fundamental 
rights on the basis of these Reports. It is said that the 
word "fundamental" as an adjective to the rights, and the 
11guarantees” in Art 32 are intended to bestow permanency upon 
the rights. It may be submitted that the epithet "fundamental11 
is not synonymous with permanent in the sense of being unchange­
able. "Fundamental” only means that the rights are essential 
but certainly not as "unamendable". Finer1s warning is most 
relevant in this respect:
113. Austin Granville: op.cit. p 35.
114. Ibid. p 237.
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"There are no fundamentals capable of standing proof 
against time, except entities so vague as to be meaning­
less. Stability and change, settlement and flux, must 
then be expected and men will constantly hover between 
the extremes and struggle for their fixture in consti­
tutions. And the lesson of it all is that there is 
nothing so fundamental that it may not change, and 
nothing so fundamental that it ought not change; nor
anything so fugitive that it may not be one day fixed
115and worshipped as an absolute dispensation."
In the Constituent Assembly, Mr. Deshmukh had moved an
amendment to the effect that the fundamental rights be not
116amended so as to restrict their scope. But later on he
117withdrew this amendment. It has been suggested that
Mr. Deshmukh withdrew his amendment because some members must
have drawn his attention to Art 13 (2), which already safe-
118guarded the fundamental rights. There is no record of such
a suggestion in the Constituent Assembly Debates and even 
assuming that such a suggestion was made, then, how is it 
that no member of the Constituent Assembly has described the
113* Finer, H. Theory and Practice of Modern Government. Vol.I, 
p 239*
116. Amendment No.212, CAD IX, p 16V*.
117. CAD IX, p 1665-
118. Dr. Minattur thinks so. See Fundamental Rights. 1968,
II M.L.J. (Journal Section) p 23.
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the Part III rights as unamendable by Parliament? It is
submitted that if the constitution framers had intended to
make the fundamental rights unamendable, they must have made a
clear provision to that effect in the Constitution. It seems
that the real reason why Hr. Deshmukh withdrew hie amendment
was that he failed to muster any support for it in the Consti-
119tuent Assembly.
Beginning from the Objectives Resolutions, 11 the foundation
120stone of the Constitution,*1 to the passing of Art 304 of the
Draft Constitution, at no time was the view ever expressed in
the Constituent Assembly, that any Part of the Constitution was
unamendable. On the contrary, several members expressed
apprehension whether the document they were forging would work
121properly or not. How could they put a seal of finality on
any part of the Constitution when they were in such a state of 
mind? Moreover, it was highly improbable for them to keep 
any part of the Constitution beyond amendment when they believed
in a Constitution capable of keeping pace with the changing
122situation.-
119. CAD IX, Pp 1644-1665.
120. Seth Govind Das, CAD XI, p 611.
121. See CAD IX, 1645; CAD XI, pp 625, 644 and 684.
122. Dicken Cherry, H. The Constitutional Philosophy of India. 
India Quarterly VIII, 401 at 416.
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How can the constitution framers be regarded as intending 
to keep Part III beyond amendment, when they did not even 
think fit to entrench them in the Proviso to Art 368. Austin 
describes the fact that the fundamental rights were not en­
trenched, as a "surprising aspect of constitution-making in 
123India." It is submitted that, in view of the fact that only
those provisions were intended to be entrenched which relate to
the Centre-State relationship, there is no reason to be sur-
the
prised that/fundamental rights were not entrenched.
There can be no more convincing proof of the intentions 
of the founding fathers than the fact that the Constitution 
(First Amendment) Bill, which drastically abridged certain 
fundamental rights, was passed by the same House (though under 
the designation of "Parliament") which enacted the constitution. 
During the passage of this Bill, no member raised any objection 
in regard to the competence of the House to amend Part III.
If their intentions are gathered from what they said in 
the Constituent Assembly and their overt act in passing the 
Constitution (First Amendment) Bill, there is overwhelming 
evidence that they never intended to make Part III permanent in 
the sense of its being unamendable by Parliament in any way.
123* Austin, G. op.cit. p 262, foot-note.
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If the founding fathers ever happen to know of the Golak Nath 
decision they would realise how true Bishop Hoadly was when he 
uttered: "Whoever hath absolute authority to interpret any
written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the law-giver to 
all intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote 
or spoke them."^**’
D. Consideration of Issues Raised by Golak Nath Decision 
Besides the textual meaning and the intentions of the 
framers of the Indian Constitution, there is a large number of 
other considerations which also reinforce the conclusion that 
the decision in the Golak Nath case was reached on miscon­
ceptions. The Golak Nath judgment raises more issues than it 
solves. A brief discussion of these issues will prove the 
correctness of our view.
(I) A strange construction of Article 13 (2)
If Art 13 (2) was a prohibition against amendment of the 
fundamental rights, how is it that constitutional lawyers and 
text-book writers failed to appreciate its potency? D.D. Basu, 
a great commentator on the Constitution of India, took the view 
that the entire chapter on fundamental rights can be amended by
12*f. Bishop Hoadly, quoted by Gray: Nature and Sources of the Law 
2nd Edn, 1921, P 102.
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125the majority in Parliament, Professor Gledhill did not
hold that the fundamental rights were unamendable by Parliament
126though he appealed for their security and permanency,
1?7 1Pft
Professor K.C* Wheare f and Sir Ivor Jennings, who con­
sidered the provisions relating to the amending process, did
not point out that Art 13 (2) prohibits the amendment of the
129fundamental rights. The Indian text-book writers also 
never viewed the permanency of these rights in the way the 
Supreme Court did* Not only these jurists, but the Supreme 
Court itself in its earlier decisions in the Sankari Prasad 
and Sajjan Singh cases came to the view that Part III was 
amendable and the prohibition in Art 13 (2) was only against 
the legislative power of the Legislatures and other functionaries 
in the "state1*. The Golak Nath majority of one was also very 
slender. If the number of all the judges who considered the 
question be counted, twelve judges hold the contrary view as 
against seven judges. The soundness of the decision in 
Golak Nath must be judged against the fact that the Sankari Prasad
123. Basu, D.D. The Indian Constitution through American Eyes 
XII, FLJ, p 158*
126. Gledhill, A. India*s Fundamental Rights IYBIA, 1952, V*I.P*9*
127. Wheare, K.C* op*cit*supra; 1. ' , : r-,
128. Jennings, Sir Ivor: op.cit. supra*
129. Jain, M*P. The Indian Constitutional Law, 1962.
Seervai, H.M. The Constitutional Law of India* 1967*
Joshi, G*N* The Constitution of India* 1961.
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case was unanimously decided by five judges, Sajjan Singh by 
a majority of three to two, the minority view not being 
dissenting but expressing doubts only. The interpretation 
of Art 13 (2) in other cases also militates against the view 
of the majority in Golak Nath* For instance, in A.K. Gopalan v. 
State of M a d r a s Kania, C.J, said:
"... the inclusion of Art 13 (1) and 13 (2) in the 
constitution appears to be a matter of abundant caution. 
Even in their absence, if any of the fundamental rights 
was infringed by any legislative enactment, the court 
has always the power to declare the enactments to the 
extent it transgresses the limits invalid.1*
It stands to reason that if Art 13 (2) is a mere matter of 
abundant caution, and performs the same functions as Art 2^5 
does, namely to invalidate a law to the extent it violates 
fundamental rights, what is the justification of giving any 
dterminative effect to Art 13 (2) in respect of amendment 
under Art 368?
Considering the question whether a taxing law under Part 12 
of the constitution is hit by Art 13 (2), the Madras High Court 
held:
130. (1930) SCR.88.
Hidayatullah, J. referring to this observation, said that 
far from belittling the importance of fundamental rights 
it emphasised their commanding position - see Sajjan Singh v. 
State of Rajasthan (1963) ISCR. 933 at 961.
f,It (Art 13) does not enact that other portions of the
Constitution should be void as against the provisions
in Part III and it would be surprising if it did, seeing
that all of them are parts of one organic whole. Art 13,
therefore, cannot be read so as to render any portion of
the constitution invalid. This conclusion is also in
accordance with the principle adopted in interpretation
of Statutes that they should be so construed as to give
effect and operation to all portions thereof and that a
construction which renders any portion of them inoperative
should be avoided. For these reasons, I must hold that
operation of Part 12 is not cut down by Part III and
that the fundamental rights are within the powers of the
taxation by the state.
This interpretation of Art 13 was supported by the Supreme
132Court in M.S. Sharma v. Sri Krishana Sinha. On parity of
reasoning, it can be argued that Art 13 warrants an interpretation 
which gives effect to other Parts of the Constitution including 
Part XX (Amendment of the Constitution).
131. A. Krishnan v. State of Madras AIR (1932) Mad.395 at *f03.
132. AIR (1959) S.C. 397.
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(ii) Importing Rigidity
The Golak Nath holding does not prevent Parliament from
amending Part III; what it forbids is an amendment seeking to
take away or abridge the rights in Part III. That means that
Parliament can amend Part III so as to add to it any new rights
or enlarge the existing rights but not so as to detract from
or reduce them. Such a proposition is logically absurd because
it means that a body which can add to Part III cannot take
away the added part. When it has power to add to Part III,
there is no reason for denying it the power to take the
addition away. Faced with the question that the law can never
be static, but must change with social changes, Hidayatullah, J.
suggested that only a Constituent Assembly, and not a constituted
body, i.e. Parliament, can amend Part III if any of the rights
133therein is intended to be taken away or abridged. The
numerous insurmountable difficulties involved in calling a 
Constituent Assembly will be considered later and it will be 
shown that it is not legally possible to call any Constituent 
Assembly. It was rightly pointed out by one of the minority 
judges^**" that if the Constitution provides its own method of
133. Hidayatullah, J. suggested that a distinction be made
between possession of a right and its exercise. The first 
is fixed and the latter controlled by justice and necessity.
1967 AIR SC 1704
Blackshield viewed that alteration for
just adaptation be allowed. (1968) 8 JILI.p 166. 
!34. Ramaswami J. AIR (1967) S.C. at 1737.
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amendment, any other method of amendment would be unconsti­
tutional and void. Secondly, when Parliament has no power 
to amend Part III according to the Golak Nath decision, how 
can it delegate such a power to any other body created by it? 
Moreover, according to the prevailing constitutional doctrine
of the Supreme Court, Parliament cannot delegate essential
135legislative functions. ^  It is n©edless to say that consti­
tutional amendment is a very essential law-making function and 
the Golak Nath decision holds amendment as an ordinary legis­
lative act. Parliament is empowered to delegate its amending 
power to any other body, the doctrine regarding non-delegation 
of essential legislative functions is also overruled thereby. 
Thirdly, supposing a constituent body is called and proposes 
an amendment to Part III to take away any of the rights, would 
that amendment not qualify to be a fllawft within the prohibition 
of Art 13 (2)? To suggest a Constituent Assembly for amending 
Part III is to set up an almost impassable and insuperable 
barrier against amendment, which is not there even against the 
States, since federal clauses can be amended without any 
Constituent Assembly. The founding fathers were proud of the 
fact that they gave the nation an easily amendable constitution
135* la re Deehi Laws Act (1951) II.SCR.7V7
136by avoiding the rigour of rigidity in the amending process ^ 
but the conclusion reached In Golak Nath has reversed this 
position by importing rigidity into the Constitution.
(iii) Does the Golak Nath decision safeguard fundamental rights?
This question cam be considered from two points of view. 
First, the legalistic view; second, the sociological view.
(a) Legalistic view: The only consideration on which the
majority based its decision is that the fundamental rights must 
be safeguarded and protected from being eroded away. But the 
point to be considered is whether the decision achieves the end 
it purports to achieve. It is submitted that without deciding 
the fate of Art 31A, Art 31B and the Ninth Schedule, funda­
mental rights can still be made ineffective by Parliament.
137This Is so because Art 31B is susceptible of two views.
First, the narrow view that Art 31B was meant for a definite 
and determinate restriction on the fundamental rights in regard 
to the first thirteen specific statutes. Secondly, the broad 
view, according to which Art 31B imposes an indefinite and in­
determinate restriction on Part III. The latter view seems to 
be more authentic since Art 31B was used for adding more statutes
136. CAD VII, pp 35-36.
137* Blackshield, A.P. Fundamental Fights, 1968, 10.JILI, p 1 at 101.
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to the Ninth Schedule in the Fourth and Seventeenth Amendment 
Acts. This means that Parliament, if it wants to save any 
statute in respect of at least the property rights, needs only 
to amend the Ninth Schedule so as to include it in the list of 
already existing sixty-four statutes. Since Art 31A and Art 
31B and the Ninth Schedule shall remain protected after the
170
Golak Nath decision also, J the amendment is perfectly valid.
This demonstrates the utter failure of the holding in Golak Nath
in regard to the purpose it claims to achieve.
Secondly, granting that Parliament is deprived of the
right to amend Part III, then also the rights are not protected
139at all. Ex-Chief Justice Subba Pao himself  ^admitted that
along with the Executive and the Legislature, the Supreme Court
also curtailed the freedoms guaranteed in Part III. He rightly
based his conclusion on the judicial Interpretation in the cases
140of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras. State Trading Corporation
141 142v. Commercial Tax Officer, Ujjambai v. State of Uttar Pradesh.
143 144Daryao Singh v. State of P.P., ^  and Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha. w
138. Golak Nath AIR, 1967, S.C. and Subba Rao: Frequent Amendments 
to Constitutions: Hindu Weekly Review, 3th February 1968, p 7,
139- Subba Rao: Freedoms in India, 1968, AIR, Journal Section, p 22.
140. AIR 1950 S.C.27.
141. AIR 1963 S.C.1811.
142. AIR 1962 S.C.1621.
143. AIR 1961 S.C.1457.
144. AIR 1959 S.C.395.
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Therefore, the Golak Nath decision is a shield against the 
Executive and Legislature but not against the Supreme Court 
itself. The Supreme Court, by employing the judicial technique 
may reduce the contents of the fundamental rights or widen their 
scope. It is a strange irony that the learned Chief Justice, 
being well aware of the fact that the Supreme Court itself may 
reduce our liberties by interpretation, bases his own decision 
in the Golak Nath case on the vulnerable presumption that the 
Supreme Court never abridges or takes away the rights but 
always safeguards them.
(b) Sociological view: There is a view that fundamental rights
are better safeguarded if kept out of the Cohstitution than by
145incorporating them in it. ^ It is said that what makes them 
effective is not their being written in a document but the 
public opinion behind them. Be that as it may, it is a fact 
that all other freedoms become meaningful only when a required 
economic standard is achieved.
"The greatest of all the freedoms is 'freedom from want' - 
while it is true that man does not live on bread alone 
but it is equally true that we cannot preach freedom 
or high values on an empty stomach ... All the freedoms
145* De Smith, S.A. Fundamental Rights in the New Commonwealth iq ki 
10.I.C.L.R. p 83-
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in a way depend upon this freedom* If this freedom 
is not achieved by the people, the frustration created 
among them will become a fertile field for totalitarianism 
and despotism, which in its turn destroys all the other 
freedoms.1*^1^
This is a very significant point to be considered in the Indian 
context. The Part III rights are meaningful only to those who 
have adequate material conditions of life. But the rights 
should also become meaningful to those who lack such means.
Therefore if economic conditions are not improved, Part III rights
ii
remain entirely useless to the masses. Blackshield rightly 
thinks:
f,But for millions of India*s hundreds of millions, the
material conditions of life were not adequate, nor likely
to become so. Given the facts of mass starvation of these 
millions of human beings and the real possibility that an 
entire nation may eventually fall into hopeless famine, 
political and spiritual ideals have a certain air of 
unreality .**^^
148It is true that ftexistence is prior to essence1*. ^ This
146. Subba Rao, K. Freedoms in India, 1968, AIR journal section, p 22
147. Blackshield, A.R. Fundamental Rights. 1968, 10.JILI, p 1 at 27.
148. Blackshield: 1968, 10.JILI at p 27.
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is not to suggest that fundamental rights may he sacrificed at 
the altar of economic improvement; the point is that economic 
development is an essential and prerequisite element to enable 
the Part III rights to play their role of civilizing and 
spiritualizing the masses. If fundamental rights are over­
emphasised to the point that economic development is hampered 
and hindered, this sort of over-emphasis itself would precipi­
tate their erosion. Considered against this background, the 
Golak Nath decision, under the pretext of false protection of 
fundamental rights, may stand as a formidable obstacle in the 
way of economic development. Baxi comments upon this aspect 
as follows:
”In 60 exceptional a situation as Golak Nath, obviously
much more is at stake than self-luminous Judicial policy.
What is at stake can, perhaps over-simply (but not
erroneously), be stated in one phrase: the economic
12,0
development of India.” 7 
It is another fact that the Constitution, First, Fourth and
Seventeenth Amendment Acts were validated by ’’prospective over-
150 151ruling” ^ and ’’acquiescence” x but the reasoning in Golak Nath
149* Gpendra Baxi: The Little Done; The Vast Undone. 1967* 
JILI p 323 (383).
150. Per Subba Rao, C.J. and four other judges: Golak Nath.
151. Per Hidayatullah, J: Golak Nath.
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first holds them invalid and void. No doubt these amendments 
abridged some of the rights but at the same time these amend­
ments were responsible for improving the economic conditions of 
millions of people in India and thereby enabled them to avail 
of these rights. If the Golak Nath view had been taken in 
the Sankari Prasad case so as to make the Land Abolition Acts 
a nullity, the wrong in the decision would have been well demon­
strated, constitutionally and politically. Enough time has 
not elapsed after Golak Nath to present practical difficulties 
before the legislatures. However, Mr. Gae, Law Secretary to 
the Government of India, was able to point out just eight months 
after the Golak Nath decision that the Land Acquisition (Amend­
ment and Validation) Act, 1967> is liable to be invalidated by
152the Supreme Court. ^
In addition to this, India being a welfare state, economic
measures to ameliorate the conditions of the masses are a "must”.
It is experienced by all the: states claiming to be service
states, that individual rights cannot be saved from being
153affected by social legislation ^ and the problem of striking a
152. Gae, R.S. Amendment of Fundamental Rights. 1967* 9*JILI, 
475 at 517.
153* Friedmann, W. Law in a Changing Society. 1959> P 485*
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just balance between the individual freedoms and social 
justice remains ever-perplexing* This was expressed as far 
back as 1950 by Justice Fazl Ali:
f,I am aware that both in England and in America and 
also in many other countries there has been a re­
orientation of the old notions of individual freedom 
which is gradually yielding to social control in many 
matters."^ **'
In the Indian context, it is not fair to put unneccessary 
restrictions on the state in its welfare activities and parti­
cularly when 11 an Average individuals pursuit of well-being in
India depends less on his freedom to exercise fundamental rights
155and more on the States freedom from r e s t r i c t i o n s ^
In view of these circumstances, it has been justly sltid
that the Golak Nath decision is "productive of the greatest
156public mischief" ^ and is a disservice to both 11 fundamental
157rights" and "democracy",
15k* A.K, Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950, SCR 88 at 188*
155* Baxi, U, op.eit.supra. p *fll.
156. Seervai, H.M. op.cit.supra. p 1117.
157. Baxi, U. op.cit.supra, p 382.
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(iv) Adjustment of fundamental rights inter se made difficult
When considered at an institutional level, the Golak Nath 
case opens a Pandora’s box* How the institutions of "Parlia­
ment" and 11 judiciary11 may be affected will be considered under 
the heading of "Balance of Power". Here we will consider how 
the mutual adjustment of fundamental rights among themselves is 
likely to be endangered. For instance, Art 17 abolishing un- 
touchability comes in conflict with Art 25 and 26 conferring 
freedom of religion* The state can ban the practice of un- 
touchability from non-religious places. But can it ban untouch- 
ability from religious places? "Can it throw open the religious
institutions ... to persons to whom these institutions are closed
158according to the tenets of their religion?" Supposing,
Parliament in future wants to ban untouchability from religious 
places also, it would be giving effect to Art 17 but the scope 
of Art 25 and 26 would be definitely affected. The conflict 
between them can be removed in such a situation by amending these 
articles suitably but the Golak Nath decision is likely to pose 
a difficulty because the amendment would abridge the freedom 
of religion.
Similarly, the freedom of religion as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court is said to have impinged upon the liberty of the
158. Luthera, V.P. The concept of the Secular State in India. 
196if, pp 106-107.
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people. Reviewing the case law on Art 25 and Art 26 up to
19659 a learned author has concluded that the Supreme Court has
been establishing ”autonomous and inviolable government of the
Mahants and the Dais even at the expense of the liberty of the
159men and women belonging to the respective denominations.”
Criticising the view of the Supreme Court that the essential 
part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference 
to the doctrines of that religion, Dr. L.M. Singhvi described 
the doctrine of ”auto-interpretion” and ”autogenesis” as dangerous. 
He argued that, if the scope of a religion is to be determined 
by the religion itself, perhaps, a case could be made in favour 
of "sati".160
For our purpose, it is clear that the Supreme Court may by 
interpretation expand the sphere of the freedom of religion. 
Supposing it did and Parliament intending to set the Supreme 
Court right, brings an amendment to Art 25 or 26 or to any other 
Article would the Golak Nath decision allow this?
Theoretically it is possible or perhaps the future may 
render it desirable that the scale of values embodied in Part III 
be changed; one right may be more emphasised than the other.
159* Tripathi, P.K. Secularism: Constitutional Provision and 
Judicial Review and its Implications for Law and Life in 
India, ed. Sharma, G.S., 1965, P 193-
160. Ibid. p 243.
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Blackshield suggests that "personal" rights he preferred to
"property" rights on the pattern of the "double standard"
170applied in America. Justice Hidayatullah holds that it
171was an error to place the right to property in Part III.*
Mr. Hath Pai, a Member of Parliament, moved a bill to the effect
that the property right should be taken out of Part III and
172provided for in a separate statute. Without commenting
upon the wisdom or otherwise of such a measure, it is pointed
out that the Golak Nath decision denies validity to such an
amendment. In America, the Bill of Rights is considered as
imposing no limitation on the amending process in this respect.
"Even these constitutional limitations, however, do not
deny the group’s right to revise the scale of values
handed down to it from the past; they merely restrict
173the legal methods of their revision."
(v) Balance of power between Judiciary and Legislature disturbed 
It is unfortunate that the relations between the judiciary 
and legislature in India have not been as cordial and co-operative 
as these ought to have been. The causes of this lack of co-opera­
tion between the two wings of the government have been discussed
170. Blackshield: Fundamental Rights. 1968, 10.JILI I at 86.
171. Hidayatullah J. Golak Nath, AIR, 1967, S.C.1710.
172. The Statesman, lifth December 1968. (The Statesman Weekly)
173. Rottschaefer: Legal Theory and the Practice of Law (1926) 
10.MINN.L.R.382.
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174by a number of authors. ' The whole blame cannot be laid 
only at one of them. What is required to be emphasised is 
that Parliament as well as the judiciary,*need to walk hand in 
hand and neither of them should impinge upon the sphere of the 
other if the Constitution is to be worked properly. It is not 
by show of power that good relations can be built up, but by 
realizing each other's difficulties and trying to see each 
other's points of view. While the judiciary enjoys the maxi­
mum independence and full powers to interpret the Constitution 
and other laws, it should avoid a show of superior authority 
and overtones which serve no purpose except embittering its 
relations with the legislature. In any event, the judiciary 
is not justified in provoking Parliament unnecessarily. The 
unduly harsh criticism made by the Golak Nath majority on the
use of the amending power by Parliament was uncalled for. To
175think of Parliament as a mere party before the court is to 
underestimate the powers of Parliament. To expect of Parlia­
ment complete obedience to judicial decisions is to attempt to
176impose the judicial will on Parliament.
174. Irani, P.K. The Courts and the Legislatures in India,
1965, 14.I.C.L.Q. p 850 at 859-862.
Tripathi, P.K.in. Secularism: its implications (ed. Sharme, G.S.)
- ; 1965, P 193.
175. Subba Rao, K. Freedoms in India, AIR, 1968, Journal, p 22.
176. Ibid.
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The history of the judiciary in other countries bears
testimony to the fact that if the judiciary fails to avoid
conflicts with the legislature, it threatens its own existence
though the constitution might have given the judiciary unlimited
powers. The Supreme Court of the United States got involved in
such a conflict with President Roosevelt on the validity of the
New Deal Legislation in the 1930s. Later events showed that
the Supreme Court had to give way to the will of the Congress
and if it had not done so the President’s plan to pack the
Court would not have been defeated in the Congress. Not long
ago, the Supreme Court of South Africa, though quite justified
in its interpretation of the constitutional provisions, had to
177yield to the will of Parliament. It seems that in a power
struggle between the Supreme Court and Parliament, the former 
is always bound to lose. Perhaps this observation about the 
Supreme Court of the United States is equally true of the Indian 
Supreme Court:
ftThe judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the 
three^departments of power... (It) has no influence 
over either the sword or the purse; no direction of
177* Harris v. Minister of Interior. 1952, 2.S.A. *f28.
Minister v. Harris. 1952, A-.S.A. 769, culminating in the 
Senate Act Case. 1957, (1)S.A.552.A.D.
For a detailed discussion of the cases, see Marshal, G. 
Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Courts, pp 170-2&0.
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the strength or of the wealth of the society; and 
can take no active resolution whatever. It can truly 
be said to have neither force nor will, but merely 
judgment.
This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court should not 
invalidate a law which is inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Constitution under the fear of the political power enjoyed 
by Parliament. It is just to stress the point that the Supreme 
Court should refrain from a power struggle. Particularly, 
the sensitive areas of possible conflict should be dealt with 
delicacy and a sense of humility. For instance, in matters 
of social legislation, the Supreme Court should try to uphold 
it as far as possible in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. Cases falling in the border area of the juris­
diction of the Supreme Court and the powers of Parliament 
need to be handled with the greatest possible care and awareness.
The American Supreme Court has evolved the doctrine of "political 
179question11  ^ to meet such cases. It is not suggested that that 
doctrine should be imported into India; it is only to point out 
that various judicial techniques can be evolved in such eventu­
alities. Probably the Indian Supreme Court would do better
178. The Federalist No.78.
179- Luther v. Borden. l8*+9, 7 Howe (ifg.U.S.) I.
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to follow this observation of the U.S. Supreme Court: "The
most fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication is
not to face constitutional questions but to avoid them, if at
all possible."180
Judged against this background, the Golak Nath decision
worsens the already uncordial relations between the judiciary
and the Parliament. Mr. Nath Pai's recent Bill to arm
181Parliament with full power of amendment is a reaction to 
the Golak Nath decision. Replying to the criticism that the 
decision has introduced a conflict between the judiciary and 
the Parliament, ex*Chief Justice Subba Rao observed that there
1 Qp
cannot be a dispute between a court and the parties before it.
It is submitted that Parliament is not a mere party before the 
court but a co-ordinate department of the government. In fact, 
in the guise of interpretation of the law, the Supreme Court 
is claiming an excessive jurisdiction over the Parliament by 
denying it the power of amendment in regard to Part III of the 
Constitution. Because if Part III is made untouchable by 
Parliament by way of amendment, the Supreme Court comes to have 
an area in which it becomes the monarch of all, there being no
180. United States v. Lovett. 328 U.S. 303 at 320.
181. The Statesman Weekly. 14th December 1968.
182. Subba Rao, K. Freedoms in India, 1968, AIR Journal, p 22.
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check or balance on it. Thus the way is clear for the 
supremacy of the Supreme Court and there would be no surprise 
if gradually and imperceptibly, the government of the people 
is replaced by a "government of judges". If the Golak Nath 
path is constantly trod, the two wings of Government are set 
on a collision course and a clash would inevitably occur. 
Visualising such a situation, there seems to be no exaggeration 
in saying that, "it would be a strange irony if judgements which 
seek to preserve cherished human rights not only fail to do so,
T Q-z
but lead to the destruction of a cherished judicial system."
(vi) Search for a proper check on amending power
Since the Constitution was amended seventeen times in the
first fifteen years, the Golak Nath decision is designed to put
a restraint on the frequent use of the amending power under Art
368. It is submitted that the number of amendments need not
give us a cause for concern or worry. Some of the amendments
were necessitated by decisions of the Supreme Court. Some of
184them were mere verbal changes, and some were expected even
by the founding fathers for adapting the constitution in the
185lights of the defects brought out in its working.
183. Seervai, H.M. op.cit.supra, at 1119.
184. For instance, the Sixteenth Amendment.
185. CAD. Vol.XI, pp 717, 719.
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The proper check to the amending power is to be found in
the opposition parties* The main reason for having such a
large number of amendments is that the ruling Congress party
had been having a steam rolling majority in the centre as well
186as in most of the states. It is submitted that with the
waning influence of the Congress party and the growth of other
parties, the amending power will not be so easily used. If the
present trend of the development of a multi-party system is any
indication, the special majority required for amending most of
the articles of the Constitution would be hard to gain so much
so that the Constitution, which is felt to be very flexible
at the moment may prove to be almost as rigid as the Australian
Constitution. Therefore, the check on the power of amendment
lies in healthy political growth rather than the doubtful legal
restraint imposed by the Golak Wath decision.
The fact that the fundamental rights were amended three
times in the first thirteen years, does make one feel that they
187
bear "an unfortunate air of impermanence.” It is obvfcious
186. In 1952 it secured 364 out of the 489 seats in the Lok 
Sabha; in 1957, 371 out of the 494 seats; and in 1962, 
356 out of the 489 seats.
187. Gledhill, A. India's Fundamental Rights, I.Y.B.I.A.,1952, 
VI, p 9.
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that Part III is of the utmost value for living an honourable 
and dignified life as a free citizen of India* It is also 
equally important for non-citizens. It is also significant 
that Part III safeguards the rights of the minorities, e.g. 
freedom of religion, educational and cultural rights. There­
fore, if Part III is not sufficiently secured, communal harmony 
is difficult to attain and the minorities are not adequately 
assured of their rights. Generally, the number of amendments 
suggests that the rights are mere ,fplaythings” of a special 
majority in Parliament. But if considered rationally, is 
the special majority of two-thirds in each House easy to obtain? 
If it is, should the special majority be further increased to 
three-quarters, or an additional requirement of ratification 
by the states be required? It is submitted that the scheme of 
the Constitution is well planned to last for a long time and 
the instrument need not be made unamendable under any supposed
fear that 11 a time might come when we would gradually and
188imperceptibly pass under a totalitarian rule.” The Consti­
tution has provided an adequate balancing wheel and a sufficient 
check to the amending power in the two-thirds majority. It is 
submitted that it is the complexion of the political parties 
which makes easy or difficult the attainment of this special
188- Subba Rao C.J. in Golak Nath, AIR* 196^J S.C. at p 1666.
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majority and the future trend is likely to make it almost 
unattainable.
It is to be noticed that in requiring Part III to be 
made more difficult of amendment than what it is today, 
Parliament is being distrusted. As a matter of fact, 
Parliament is as much a guardian of the fundamental rights as 
the Supreme Court and it does not seem to be fair to think
189that Parliament is all out to empty Part III of its meaning.
The amendments so far made indicate unmistakably that it is for 
unavoidable and well justified reasons that Part III had to 
be amended.
It is argued that if Part III is made amendable, a party 
having a two-thirds majority, may scrap Part III and bring in 
a dictatorial regime. Normally this would not happen. 
Supposing for the sake of argument, any dictatorial party
189* Sathe, S.P. Amendment of Fundamental Rights, 1969,
S.C. Journal, vol.XL, No.3, P 33*
The writer argues that the constitutional history of 
India furnishes instances where parliamentary processes 
have thwarted all attempts to impose unnecessary and 
unjustifiable curbs on fundamental rights. For instance, 
in 196k, the Constitution was sought to be amended to 
immunize the state and its officials for acts done in 
violation of the fundamental rights during the period 
of emergency but the Government withdrew the proposed 
amendment (Eighteenth Amendment) Act when it was severely 
opposed in Parliament and vehemently criticized in the 
press.
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comes into power and does what is now feared, would the
Golak Nath decision deter it from doing what it wants to do?
If the Supreme Court adheres to its view in the Golak Nath case,
can the party enjoying the special majority not undermine the
judicial system and undercut the powers of the Supreme Court
indirectly by appointing judges of its own choice to the
Supreme Court? Is the threat ot warning given by Pt. Jawahar 
190Lai Nehru less potent and less effective in that situation? 
Would it not be undemocratic that the will of at least 66% 
of the representatives of the people is thwarted by the judges 
of the Supreme Court who sire not elected by the people? Given 
the facts of such a situation, can the Supreme Court dare to go 
against a party having such an overwhelming majority? In that 
situation, the Golak Nath decision is a mere scare-crow. The 
fear underlying the majority decision of the Supreme Court is 
entirely baseless, and in any event, the remedy is not effective 
in allaying that fear.
190. MNo supreme court and no judiciary can stand in judgment
over the sovereign will of parliament representing the will 
of the entire community. If we go wrong here and there, 
it can point it out, but in the ultimate analysis, where the 
future of the country is concerned no judiciary can come in 
the way ... otherwise, you will have strange procedures 
adopted. Of course, one is the method of changing the 
constitution. The other is that which we have seen in 
great countries across the sea that the executive, which is 
the appointing authority of the judiciary, begins to appoint 
judges of its own liking for getting decisions in its own 
favour but that is not a very good method.11 
CAD.Vol.IX, pp 1195-1196.
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To a ruling party having a vast majority in the 
Parliament, the Golak Nath decision is no hindrance and a 
party which fails to muster a two-thirds majority does not 
need the restriction imposed by Golak Nath because its own 
weak position would not allow it to act under Art 368 save 
for an exceptional situation when opposite parties may be 
willing to support it on the amendment. On the authority of 
Golak Nath, the Supreme Court can, however, weaken an already 
weak ruling party by frustrating all its efforts of passing 
social legislation, if they, in the opinion of the Supreme 
Court, abridge or take away the^fundamental rights.
Thus, the decision, far from helping the enhancement of 
fundamental rights, is going to harm the harmonious working 
of the Constitution.
One must appreciate the intentions of the Supreme Court 
to safeguard the fundamental rights as jealously as it can, 
especially when it has been entrusted with the task of acting 
as a guardian of the constitution in general, and in regard 
to fundamental rights in particular. One is, indeed, over­
whelmed with a sense of respect and regard for the Supreme Court, 
when one realises the depth of sincerity and loyalty of the 
Supreme Court judges in discharging their duty, undaunted by 
any subsequent consequences. The court*s purpose to preserve 
the rights is laudable but the means adopted to do so are such
36k
as to tilt the scale for the worse rather than for the better.
To have a situation in which the fundamental rights may be
taken away at any time by a special majority is bad but to
have an unamendable Part III is worse still. Here the choice
is not between good and bad; it is between bad and worse.
The present writer would have gone all the way in sympathy 
with the Supreme Court but for the dangerous results likely 
to flow from the judgment, which convince beyond any shadow 
of doubt that the position gained for Part III by the Golak 
Nath decision is worse than it was before; it practically 
jeopardises the fundamental rights, the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court, the judicial system, the hopes and aspirations 
of the constitution framers and even the economic development 
of India - the dire need of the hour.
Convening a Constituent Assembly
It is proposed here to study the institution of a con­
stituent assembly for the purpose of amending the consitution.
A suggestion was made by the Supreme Court that if Part III is
required to be amended to overcome the prohibition in Art 13 (2)
191a constituent assembly is needed to effect such an amendment. ^
191. Golak Nath. AIR, 1967, S.C. at 16^6. Per Hidayatullah J.
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It is necessary to enquire whether the constitution requires, 
in respect of amendment of any of its provisions, the convening 
of such an assembly to effect the amendment* Even if the 
constitution does not require this, the question remains whether 
it is desirable to put the suggestion into practice.
It is submitted that the suggestion may sound novel and
192democratic but bristles with legal problems.  ^ Is it legally 
possible within the frame-work of the constitution? Supposing 
it is possible who should call the assembly and by what authority? 
How should it be elected? Who should elect it? - the parlia­
ment or state legislatures, or both, or the people? What 
qualifications should be laid down for the assembly? What 
procedure should govern its proceedings? Supposing the 
assembly exceeds its powers, who should be the final judge in 
the matter? What place should be fixed for its deliberations? 
Should the members of the assembly draw a salary? If yes, 
who should pay for it? What time limit should be laid down 
within which the constituent assembly must accomplish its 
task? If the assembly arrives at no decision regarding the 
proposed amendment, what should be done? What value should 
be attached to a proposal for amendment made by the assembly?
192. Kagzi, M.C.J. The Constitution of India. 1967, p 385-
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Should the parliament be bound by it or not? If not, what 
alternative course is open to it? To answer these and other 
questions in regard to the position and status of a constituent 
assembly, it is essential to study the institution in its 
various legal aspects.
The Institution of Constituent Assembly
A body which frames a constitution of a state may be called 
a constituent assembly or a constitutional convention. In 
America such a body is popularly called convention. The consti­
tutional convention is a by-product of revolutions in the
193
American States; ^  it is an off-shoot of the theory of the 
sovereignty of the people. Since sovereignty is supposed to 
be residing in the people, they have the right to elect the 
members of the constitutional convention whose task it is to 
frame a workable constitution for the State. Some of the state 
constitutions framed in the revolutionary period provided 
that these could be altered by conventions, e.g. the consti­
tutions of Pennsylvania, Vermont, Georgia, Massachusetts and
New Hampshire; some of the revolutionary constitutions contained
194no provision for alteration in any manner^ presumably the
193* Dodd, W.F. The Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions 
1910, p 191.
194. Ibid.
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framers visualized no necessity of amendment or believed
that these instruments were too perfect to require alteration.
But there were some revolutionary constitutions which provided
for their alteration by legislative action, for instance, the
constitutions of Maryland, Delaware and South Carolina (1778).
It is of interest to note that none of the earlier constitutions
in the states provided for more than one method of amendment,
i.e. the conventional as well as legislative. Experience
revealed that the conventional method was very cumbersome and
inexpedient for effecting minor changes, and therefore, during
the nineteenth century the advantages of the legislative method
for partial revision and that of the convention for a general
195revision of the constitution were realised. ^  But, "the two
modes of amending Constitutions are of about equal antiquity
196and of about equal authority.M y
"The amendment of constitutions by conventions really 
antedated the general use of the method of partial 
amendment through legislative action, although the two 
methods were introduced at the same time - the convention 
was more extensively used at first, but its cumbersomeness
195* Jameson, J.A. A Treatise on Constitutional Convention. 1887, 
P 550.
196. Ibid. p 551.
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for small changes soon caused the states which employed
it to adopt in addition or as a substitute the method of
197initiating proposed amendments in the legislature.11 71
Judge Jameson held the view that from the point of view of
expediency, conventions are better than legislative bodies for
198a general revision of constitutions. 7 Legislatures being 
usually preoccupied with other matters of law-making, are unable 
to devote sufficient attention to the subject. As compared 
with it, the attention of a convention will be confined to, and 
concentrated on, the one task of framing a constitution. Since 
it had been a practice to obtain for membership in conventions 
a higher grade of men than in the ordinary legislative bodies, 
the result had been invariably far better in quality. Legislatures 
consisting of political parties are not free from party disci­
pline and political partiality; conventions perform their duty 
without any political bias. It was on the basis of this im­
partiality that Dr. Ambedkar justified the right of the consti­
tuent assembly of adopting the constitution by a bare majority 
but denying the same right to a future Parliament hy providing 
for a special majority for amendment of the constitution. He said:
197. Dodd, W.F. op.cit.supra, p 120.
198. Jameson: op.cit.supra, p 562.
199. Bryce, J. American Commonwealth. 1928, pp 667-670. 
Jameson: op.cit.supra, p 561.
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»The constituent assembly in making a constitution has 
no partisan motive. Beyond securing a good and 
workable constitution it has no axe to grind...
Parliament will have an axe to grind while the consti­
tuent assembly has none. That is the difference 
between the constituent assembly and the future 
parliament,
For effecting trivial changes in the constitution the 
legislative mode is generally considered as more expedient 
and useful.
Legal Position of a Constitutional Convention
About the legal position of a convention, there is a 
sharp division of opinion among jurists. One school of thought 
holds that conventions are sovereign. Sovereignty is attri­
buted to them on the ground that they have been elected by the 
people in whom the ultimate sovereignty resides. Once a con­
vention comes into being, it is bound by no authority and can 
lay down in the constitution whatever it desires. Whatever 
measures it adopts are perfectly valid even if they fly in the 
face of the existing constitutional provisions. nTheir validity 
rests not upon constitutional provisions, nor upon legislative
acts, but upon the fundamental sovereignty of the people them- 
201selves.” The sovereign status based upon the sovereignty
200. Dr. Ambedkar: CAD.VII, pp k3-kk*
201. Hoar, R.S. Constitutional Conventions. Their Nature, Powers 
and Limitations, 1917, P 32.
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of the people Is further substantiated by reasons of expediency,
A body chosen by the people to revise the organic law of the 
state should be as free from interference from the several 
departments of government as these departments are from inter­
ference from each other; otherwise the will of the people 
might easily be nullified by the existing judiciary or legis­
lature.
Diametrically opposed to this view is the thesis of Judge 
Jameson who argues for almost a complete subordination of a 
convention to the existing government. The justification £i>r 
legislative restrictions on the convention is sought on the 
basis that the legislators are representatives of the people 
and, therefore, the restrictions sought to be placed upon the 
convention by the legislature become restrictions imposed by 
the people. But this would be true only when the convention 
is not directly elected by the people i.e. when the convention 
is called without consulting the people. It would be diffi­
cult to sustain the theory if the people have voted for delegates
202to a convention and also voted for their complete independence. 
However, Borgeaud denies sovereignty to an American convention 
because such a convention has to submit its plans to the people. 
This requirement makes it lose its sovereignty and its position 
is reduced to a mere committee on the constitution.
202. Dodd, W.F. op.cit.supra, p 75.
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MFrom the necessity in which the American Constitutional 
Convention is placed, of submitting its plans to the 
people, results the important characteristic which 
distinguishes it from most European Assemblies with 
which one might be attempted to compare it, viz. it is 
not sovereign. It is merely a committee on the consti­
tution charged with the preparation of an instrument to 
which the approval of the people can alone give the 
force of supreme law.”^ ^
But Jameson thought that a convention might disregard the re­
quirement of submitting its work to the people and he also thought 
that the legislative restrictions upon it must be ”in harmony 
with the principles of the convention system, or rather, not
inconsistent with the exercise by the convention, to some extent,
204of its essential and characteristic function.” As has been
205pointed out by Dodd, ^ this disproves his own thesis that a
206convention is absolutely subordinate to the legislature.
Dodd treads a middle path between the two extremes. According
to him the convention is neither sovereign nor subordinate to
207the legislature, but independent within its proper sphere.
203* Borgeaud, C. op.cit.supra, p 183.
204. Jameson: op.cit.supra, p 364.
205. Dodd: op.cit.supra, p 73.
206* Jameson: op.cit. supra, pp 362-365, 494-493.
207. Dodd: op.cit.supra, p 80.
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In any event, the problem still remains unsolved as to 
what is the 11 proper sphere" according to Dodd, or what is 
"essential and characteristic function" of a convention in 
Jameson*s view. It is a question of some difficulty on which 
the precedents and authorities might throw light. Summarising 
the history of various conventions in the American states up to 
1897, Jameson concluded:
"Among all the wild assertions of power in the people 
ever made, it has never been contended that they can 
enact an ordinary statute at all, and it has never but 
once been contended that they can enact a constitution 
without the previous recommendation of the legislature 
acting under the express authorization of the existing 
constitution. The exception was in the case of the 
attempted revolution of the Dorr Party in Rhode Island 
in 18%1."208
It is relevant here to state that in Rhode Island, the 
Dorr party intending to revise the constitution, called a 
people*s convention which framed a constitution and was approved 
of by the people by majority. After this was done, the Dorr 
Party established its own de jure government against the already
208. Jameson: op.cit.supra, p 581.
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established state government. The question arose whether the 
new constitution was valid or not. The Supreme Court of the 
United States declined to assume jurisdiction in the case,^^ 
leaving the matter to the final authority of the state judiciary, 
Jameson stated the reasons for and against the validity of the 
new constitution. In his view the new constitution was not 
valid because the sovereignty of the people must have been ex­
pressed only through an organised body acting by its recognised
organs. In the absence of these requirements, the entire popu-
210lation of a state could not constitutionally pass a law.
Can a Convention pass an ordinary law?
As a rule, a convention is not supposed to assume legis­
lative functions; its sole duty is to forge a constitution.
But there Is no escape from the conclusion that it can if it 
so wishes, pass an ordinary law under the cloak of the consti­
tution.
f,A constitutional convention may not properly enact a law 
or ordinance abolishing the fellpw-servant rule, but it 
may insert into the constitution a provision accomplishing 
the same purpose. By the insertion into new consitdtions 
of matters really not fundamental in character
209* Luther v. Borden. 7 How (U.S.) R.Vf.
210. Jameson; op.cit.supra, p 233.
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constitutional conventions have come to exercise
211great powers of legislation.”
Procedure of a Convention
How the procedure of a constitutional convention becomes
material and a matter of great controversy can be seen from
the conflicting views on Art 3 of the Constitution of the
United States. Art 3 provides for two alternative ways of
amending the Constitution. Amendments may be proposed by
212a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress or, by a con­
vention called on the application of the legislatures of two- 
thirds of the states. Amendments proposed in either of the 
two ways have to be ratified either by the Legislatures of 
three-quarters of the states or by conventions in three-quarters
of the states. It is the Congress which has to propose one or
213the other method of ratification. Up to 1968, there have
been twenty-five formal constitutional amendments pursuant to
Art 3 but the conventional device for initiating the procedure
214of Art 5 has never been used and it has been called a tfdead 
letter11 or only a “protest clause” for venting popular protest
211. Dodd: op.cit.supra, p 116.
Dealey, J.Q. Our State Constitutions, 1907, P 9-
212. Two-thirds majority of the members present and voting 
assuming the presence of a quorum. 33•U.S.350.
213. U.S.v. Prague. 1931, 282.U.S.176.
214. Dixon, Robert G. Article 3: The camatose article of our 
living constitution? 1968. 66 Mich.L.Rev, p 931 at 944.
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against the Congress refusing to initiate a given amendment*
Senator Ervin has proposed a bill so that the conventional method
215of amending the consitution be implemented* ^ The occasion for
the proposed bill arose because of the Supreme Court decisions
216
in the reapportionment cases in which it was held that the
state legislatures should be apportioned on the basis of ,1one man -
one vote11. To get around the Supreme Court decision, 32 state
legislatures (34 states make two-thirds of the total number of
states)petitioned to Congress to call a convention to propose
a constitutional amendment. Apart from the legal difficulties
involved in calling such a convention, it is feared that the
convention would act as a sovereign body and hence would have
217no limit to its powers. No less is the fear that the pro­
cedure of the convention may frustrate all efforts at reaching
p] o
democratic decisions.
With this background, let us see whether the Constitution 
of India provides for a consitutional convention for amending 
any part of it. It is submitted that the founding fathers were 
well aware of the difficulties in the way of calling a consti­
tuent assembly and hence they specifically dispensed with it.
215* Proposed bill is given in Ervin’s article, proposed legis­
lation to implement the convention Method of Amending the 
constitution, 1968, 66 Mich.L.Rev. 875 at 896.
216. Colorado case 377 U.S.713, 1964, Roman v. Sincock. 377 U.S. 
695, 1964.
217. Carson, Ralph M. Disadvantages of a Federal Constitutional 
Convention. 1968, 66 Mich.L.Rev. 921.
218. Ibid. p 927.
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Dr. Ambedkar made it clear when he said: f,The Draft Constitution
has eliminated the elaborate and difficult procedures such as a
219decision by a convention or a referendum.”
As a rule of constitutional interpretation, if the consti­
tution provides its own mode of amendment, any other method of
amendment would be void and unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
220of the U.S.A. held in George S. Hawke v. Harvey C. Smith. that 
Art 5 of the Constitution of the United States provides for rati­
fication by the state legislatures or by state conventions, 
therefore, a referendum for ratifying an amendment to the federal 
constitution was void. When Art 368 of the Indian constitution 
provides the mode of amendment, any other mode - a convention 
or referendum, would be void.
Assuming that Parliament is competent to convene a consti­
tuent assembly, a law is required for providing for the composition 
and duration, qualifications and disqualifications for membership 
of the constituent assembly. Its election, powers, privileges, 
salaries and allowances of members need to be specified and 
defined accurately. Its powers require to be duly specified 
and its procedure elaborately prescribed.
219* Dr. Ambedkar: CAD.Vol.VII, pp 43-Mf. 
220. (1919) 64 Law Ed. 8?1.
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Supposing all this is done, the following possibilities 
cannot be ruled out:
(a) The constituent assembly may override the restrictions 
imposed by parliament on it. It may declare that it is a 
sovereign body and may by-pass the will of parliament.
(b) It may not reach any decision in regard to the proposed 
amendment or it may reject the proposal outright.
(c) Instead of confining itself to the proposed amendment, it 
may assume the responsibility of overhauling the whole consti­
tution or alternatively think it proper to do so in order to 
effect the proposed amendment.
(d> It may start enacting ordinary laws if not directly,
221indirectly as pointed out by Dodd. Thus it may function as
222a parallel legislature to parliament. Since it was held in
the Golak Nath case that a constitutional amendment is law, it 
is difficult to prevent it from enacting ordinary laws.
(e) It is possible that the deliberations of a constituent 
assembly may take unduly long time. Thus the required amendment 
may not be effected in time.
(f) The expenditure on the assembly may be a heavy burden on 
the exchequer.
221. Dodd: op.cit.supra. p 116.
222. Prof. Subba Rao, G.C.V. The Mimansa interpretation Approach 
to the Indian Constitution. 1967, 11 S.C.J. 83.
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(g) The validity of the amendment proposed by a constituent 
assembly may be challenged in a court of law. The assembly 
would be an authority within the definition of ”authority” under 
Article 12. In case the amendment takes away or abridges the 
rights enshrined in Part III, it may be caught within the mis­
chief of Art 13 (2), amendment being ”law” to be hit by Art
22313 (2)4 Supposing the amendment is declared void by the
Supreme Court, would not all the efforts of the assembly be 
put to nought?
(h) The amendment as suggested by the assembly may be unsuitable 
to parliament. In such a case what would be the fate of the 
proposal? Would the parliament be bound by it?
Assuming it is thought fit to convene a constituent
assembly in spite of all these difficulties, would the result
be better? Can a constituent assembly be based on a wider
franchise than the parliament? If not, what, after all, is
the special gain achieved by such an assembly? Will an assembly
have a higher grade of persons to hammer out the proposed
amendment? It is not to be ignored that in America, conventions
have been successful only because of the fact that abler and
224wiser men are available for their membership. There is no
223. AIR 1967, S.C.1643.
224. Bryce; American Commonwealth. 1928, pp 667-670. 
Jameson: op.cit.supra* p 361.
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reason to expect that such a thing would happen in India.
It is submitted that it is not correct to assume that 
each and every thing, if done with the participation of the 
people, or democratically, is always better done. Democracy 
is not a panacea for every disease. Constitution-making or 
amendment of a constitution is a highly complicated task; it 
requires expertise rather than laymen for its better accom­
plishment.
In view of these factors, it i6 suggested that it would be 
a great error if a constituent assembly is convened to effect 
amendment of any part of the Indian Constitution. Short of a 
complete revision, Parliament is a competent and fit body to 
effect amendments to the Constitution. Incase Parliament needs 
to revise the Constitution in toto, there is no constitutional 
bar against it. Art 368 arms it with all the necessary powers. 
But in view of the fact that Parliament has to be busy with its 
normal function of law-making, it would be a heavy task to take 
up constitution-making in addition to law-making. Therefore, 
it is suggested that Parliament would do better if it takes the 
help of a commission.
In the American states, it had been the practice to appoint 
o/ommissions to submit a report on a required amendment. The 
commission could not do anything directly to affect the consti­
tution; its work was subject to review and amendment by the
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225legislature. ^ It is to be noted that the legislature
is not bound by the report of the commission but the legislature 
must make a serious endeavour to give effect to the report
as far as possible; otherwise the benefit of the supposed
superior wisdom and ability of the commission is lost.
In the Indian circumstances, a commission comprising men 
of high calibre and integrity and possessing sufficient know­
ledge of constitutional law would be a far better agency for 
the task of the revision of the constitution, than a consti­
tuent assembly elected on adult franchise. Such a commission 
might be called periodically for reviewing the working of the 
constitution and for suggesting suitable amendment or other 
measures to work the constitution satisfactorily. In addition 
to its main function of reviewing the working of the consti­
tution, it might be entrusted with the responsibility of looking 
into extra-legal factors such as political conditions, freedom- 
effects on the people etc. It might advise the government 
as to whether an emergency be continued or lifted; whether 
Presidential rule be prolonged or removed in a particular 
situation; whether provisions regarding preventive detention 
are being used unnecessarily; whether centre-state relations 
are being strained and whether the executive and the administra­
tors are complying with the spirit of the constitution.
225. c.f. Dodd: op.cit.supra, p 26*f.
226. Jameson, J.A. op.cit.supra, p 57b*
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The Reaction of Parliament to Golak Nath v. State of Punjab
227
Since in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab f the Supreme 
Court has ruled that Parliament is not competent to amend 
Part III of the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the 
rights, Mr, Nath Pai, the Socialist Party Leader, introduced 
a Bill in the Lok Sabha in order to restore the power of amend­
ment to Parliament, In the statement of objects and reasons 
he characterised the issues raised in the decision as of 
"cardinal importance to the supremacy of Parliament,"
The Bill has been debated for a considerable time and has 
provoked acute controversy. Though it was introduced as a
ppA
private member*s bill, it found support from the ruling party 
and the Bill was referred to a joint committee which suggested 
drastic amendments to the Bill.
Originally, the Bill purported to assert the right of the 
Parliament to amend every provision of the constitution, including 
Part III. Therefore, Art 368 was sought to be amended with an 
additional clause in the beginning: wti) Any provision of this
227. AIR 1967, S.C.1643.
228. It is speculated that the Government is contemplating some 
radical economic reforms to check the growing concentration 
of wealth and means of production. It is expected that any 
constitutional hurdle to such measures would be overcome 
with the passage of the Bill.
See: Nafer: Fundamental Rights and Parliament, The Pioneer, 
2nd December 1968.
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constitution may be amended in accordance with the procedure
229hereafter provided in this article." * The present provision
in Art 368 was intended to be Clause 2 with the substitution of 
"An amendment of this constitution" by the words "Any amendment 
of any such provision.
The Bill as reported by the Joint Committee seeks to effect 
changes not contemplated by the original Bill. For instance, 
the marginal note "procedure to amend the constitution" is 
sought to be replaced by the words: "Power to amend the consti­
tution" ; the first clause of Article 368 is to read as 
"(i) Parliament may by law amend any provision of this consti­
tution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article"; 
the proviso to Art 368 is to include "Part III" just before 
"Chapter IV of Part V" and the last clause of the Article is to
run as: "Nothing contained in Article 13 shall apply to any law
230made in pursuance of this Article". ^
Taking into consideration the political stand taken by 
the various parties it is thought that the Bill will not get 
through.
It is submitted that the Bill as reported by the joint 
Committee is not only ineffective in attaining its objective 
but also undesirable. In any event, it fails to reach the 
heart of the matter. If it becomes law, it will not only
229. Section 2 of Bill No.10 of 1967.
230. Bill No.lOB of 1967.
231. Sathe, Amendability of Fundamental Rights: Golak Nath
and the Proposed Amendments, 1969, SCJ Vol.I p 34 (38 & 39)
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make the constitution more rigid but also make the situation 
worse than it is at present. Much of the criticism levelled 
against the Bill is without any substance. For instance, it 
is said that if the Bill is put on the statute book, it would 
enable a party in power having totalitarian leanings to subvert 
the constitution by abridging or taking away the fundamental 
rights, thus jeopardising democracy. It is totally forgotten 
that it is not a mere majority that can make amendment to 
Part III but an absolute majority of the total membership of 
each House of Parliament and also a two-thirds majority Of the 
members present and voting. Any effort to prevent the special 
majority from making a law under a real or unreal fear that it 
may bring in a totalitarian regime, can be safely characterized 
as "undemocratic". If democracy means rule by majority, how 
can a measure taken by the special majority under Article 368,
In accordance with the procedure laid down therein, be dubbed 
as "undemocratic"?
For the sake of argument, even if the special majority f*e- 
quired to effect amendment to Part III becomes totalitarian in 
its outlook, can the denial oF power to amend Part III prevent 
it from pursuing its policies? The answer is certainly In the 
negative. Therefore, the fear is entirely misconceived. It 
is submitted that the special majority required to amend Part III 
is not easy to attain. It has been easy in the past because of
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the monolithic position of the Congress Party but in the future
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to secure it. Hence,
the proper check against the misuse of the power of amendment
lies in the requirement of the special majority itself.
Neither the charge that Mr, Nath Pai's Bill seeks to
232"abridge or abrogate the authority of the Supreme Court" nor
233the criticism that the Bill is a "threat" to minorities ^  is
true. It seems to be a specious and spurious argument that
the Supreme Court judgment in Golak Nath has commended itself
to a body of opinion and is appropriate in the socio-economic
234conditions existing in India.
Yet the Bill, in our view, is neither efficacious nor 
desirable. It is not efficacious because even if it is passed 
and the constitution is amended accordingly, it may not save an 
amendment to Part III from being struck down on the ground that 
it takes away or abridges the fundamental rights. If the 
process of reasoning adopted in the Golak Nath case is applied 
to such an amendment, it would be "law" and hence hit by Art 13 (2).
232. The Mail (Madras) 11th December 1968.
233. Bid to amend Art 368, The Pioneer, 11th December 1968.
234. Srivastava, B.P. Fundamental Rights and their Amendability 
The Pioneer, 24th November 1968.
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Therefore, if Golak Nath is strictly followed by the Supreme 
Court, the amendment fails to achieve the desired goal. If, 
however, the Supreme Court adopts a co-operative attitude it may 
hold the amendment valid. Our submission is that the Bill as 
such does not overcome the reasoning in Golak Nath.
The Bill is not desirable because it seeks to entrench 
Part III in the Proviso to Art 368. If Part III is entrenched, 
it would become unnecessarily so rigid as to be almost immutable 
and eternal. It is to be noticed that the provisions entrenched 
in the proviso are those which are pivotal in the centre-state 
relationship. Besides this, the important thing to be observed 
in the entrenchment is that flexibility has not been sacrificed 
at all. We have shown in our chapter on nAmendment of Federal 
Clauses*1 that the entrenchment does not foreclose the possibilities 
of moulding the entrenched provisions as and when required by the 
Parliament, without having resort to the process of amendment 
under Article 368.
Even after Golak Nath, an amendment to Part III which does 
not take away or abridge the rights but adds to them is feasible, 
if carried out by the special majority required by Art 368; no 
ratification is necessary! But after Part III Is entrenched, 
an amendment to Part III even when it adds to it, would require 
ratification by at least half the state legislatures. Since
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various political parties are emerging in power in the States, 
ratification is likely to become a great hurdle in the future. 
Therefore, the Bill makes the present position worse.
In our view, Parliament has two alternatives open to it.
First it can pass Mr. Nath Pai's Bill in its original form.
Of course, verbal changes can be added such as altering the 
marginal heading to **power to amend the constitution*1. In 
other words, the suggestion of entrenching Part III seems to 
be unnecessary and tends to do more harm than good. Though 
such a Bill should be passed after a good deal of discussion, 
it should not be prolonged in its passage. The way the present 
Bill is being considered Is detrimental and injurious to the 
prestige of the Supreme Court. The Bill was introduced fin 
9th March 1967 and is still pending in the Lok Sabha. Since 
it is a private member*s Bill, it is taken up for consideration on 
alternate Fridays for about two hours. In this way, the 
position of the Supreme Court is lowered and regard for the law 
is also being lowered. The Government, when It has patronized 
the Bill, should not have hesitated in introducing a Bill de 
novo to the same effect and passed it sooner, though after 
discussing it thoroughly.
Secondly, Parliament can wait and see what practical and 
insurmountable difficulties come in its way of enacting social 
legislation. In the first instance, every genuine endeavour
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should be made to draft the law feared to be struck down eo as 
not to affect Part III adversely. In case the law is very 
essential and the Golak Nath decision proves an impassable 
barrier, let the law be challenged in the Supreme Court and 
the Supreme Court should be persuaded to review its decision.
Let us hope that the judges of the Supreme Court would rise to 
the occasion and act in the best3interests of the country.
The fundamental rights are important but more important than 
these is the fact that the progress of the country should not be
held up. If the country*s progress is checked by attaching
^oo much importance to Part III, the fundamental rights would 
be robbed of their efficacy and role in the process of uplifting 
the masses of India. In any event,
nThe Court must not depart so far and so palpably from 
the text of the Constitution and from the accepted values 
and the acknowledged creed of the community that the 
government of the people begins to be replaced by the
government of the judiciary and the finality of the legal
decision-making begins to be misunderstood as the acknow­
ledgment of ultimate political and social wisdom in the
235judicial wing of the government.” ^
235* Tripathi, P.K. Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar and Constitutional 
Interpretation (1966) 8.JILI. p 480.
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE AMENDING PROCESS IN ACTION
After explaining theoretically the amending process in 
the Constitution of India, it is interesting and instructive 
to examine how the process has been worked and used. In 
this Chapter, an endeavour will be made to sketch broadly the 
factors which were responsible for the twenty-one amendments 
made to the Constitution up-to-date. The main purpose is 
to show the practical aspect of the amending machinery - how 
it is activised and used, so that the whole amending apparatus 
might be observed as it has been in action from time to time.
The practical working of the amending machinery might suggest 
some improvement and supplement, if not supplant, its theory.
The First Amendment
The Constitution (First Amendment) Bill was introduced by 
the Prime Minister, Mr. Jawahar Lai Nehru, on 12th May 1931> 
and was referred to a select Committee consisting of twenty 
Members of Parliament on 16th May 1951* The opposition parties 
were fairly represented on the Select Committee. The Bill was 
discussed in the Lok Sabha for three days before the Select 
Committee started its deliberations which lasted for six days. 
The Select Committee submitted its Report on 25th May 1951 >
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which was taken up for consideration on 29th May, Amendments
were proposed to circulate the Bill for the purpose of eliciting
public opinion but these amendments were negatived.^
When reference of the Bill to a select committee was
being considered, one Member rose to a point of order that
Art 368 presupposes the existence of both Houses of Parliament
and since at that time there was only one House i.e. the
2
Provisional Parliament, the Bill was not in order. Another
member, however, pointed out that Art 379 cures this defect
and the Chairman of the House further added that Art 368 had
been adapted by the President long before and the adapted article
allowed the Bill in question to be introduced and passed by
3
the single House.
The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 $ was passed 
on 18th June 1951. It amended the following provisions of 
the Constitution.
Art 15: A new clause (k) was added to Art 13. Its necessity
was said to have arisen on account of the judgments of the
Supreme Court in two cases, namely, State of Madras v. Smt.
k 5Champakam Devairajan and Venkataram v. State of Madras.
1. Pari. Debates (1951) Vol.XII, May 16th Col.8856.
2. Mr. Babu Ramnaran Singh (Bihar) Pari Debates (1951) Vol.XII, 
Cols. 8882-8883.
3. Ibid. Col.8883.
*f. AIR 1951 S.C.116.
5. AIR 1951 S.C.229.
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In the first case, the communal G.O. of the Madras Government, 
fixing the proportion of students of each community to he 
admitted into the stateeeducational institutions was held as 
ultra vires of Art 29 (2); in the second case, it was held 
that the Madras communal G.O.. reserving posts in the state 
services for different communities according to their race, 
caste, and religion, contravened Art 16 and was, accordingly, 
void. These two cases were viewed by the Government of India 
as impeding the educational advancement of the backward classes 
contemplated by Art 46 of the Constitution. Since every Hindu 
has a caste, it is impossible to make a reservation in favour 
of the backward classes without excluding some people who have 
got a caste.^
Art 19 (2): Clauses (2) and (6) of Art 19 were substituted by
new clauses. In Clause (2) three new heads: (i) Relations
with foreign states, (ii) public order, and (iii) incitement
to offence were added. These additions were necessitated by
two judgments of the Supreme Court in Romesh Thapar*s casef and
o
Brij Bushan^ case.
6. Pari. Debates (of India) 1951, Vol.XII, C0I.9OO7.
7. AIR 1950 S.C.124.
8. AIR 1950 S.C.129.
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The head "public order" was added in order to arm the
Legislature with authority to restrict utterances which provoke
public disorders. Such authority was not felt to be lacking
a
until the decision in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras,
In this case, Section 9 (1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of 
Public Order Act 1949 which gave authority to the Provincial 
Government "for the purpose of securing the public safety ot 
the maintenance of public order, to prohibit or regulate the 
entry into or the circulation, sale in ♦ was challenged.
The Madras Government acting under this section, had banned the 
entry into Madras of the Bombay weekly journal, Cross-Roads.
The action of the Madras Government and section 9(1-A) of the 
Act were sought to be declared unconstitutional, being in 
contravention of Art 19 (l)(a), which provided for the funda­
mental right of free speech. The Supreme Court held that the 
right of free speech necessarily included freedom of circulation. 
The right to freedom of speech, as it stood in the Constitution 
of 1930, could be controlled by various factors specifically 
provided for under Art 19 (2); one of them was "the security 
of the state, or tends to overthrow the state". The question 
to be considered was whether the impugned Act could be vali­
dated under the head "security of the state". The Supreme
9. AIR 1930 S.C.124.
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Court held that the Constitution drew a distinction between 
serious and aggravated forms of public disorder which are 
calculated to endanger the security of the state and those 
relatively minor breaches of the peace of purely local sig­
nificance. "Unless a law restricting freedom of speech and 
expression is directed solely against the uhdermining of the 
security of the state or the overthrow of it", such law could
not come within the protection of Art 19 (2). The inclusion 
Order"
of "Public/ in Clause 2 would enable the legislatures to
enact laws to restrict freedom of speech for the preservation
of the public order.
The insertion of the expression "incitement to offence"
was justified on the ground that the decisions of the High
Courts created a situation in which it was open to anybody to
incited, encourage, tend to incite or encourage the commission
of the offence of murder or any cognisable offence involving 
10violence. The Government intended to check this situation 
by legislation and the protective provision in the Constitution 
was necessary.
The expression "relations with foreign states" was added 
under the fear that the existing law dealing with friendly 
relations with foreign states might be declared ultra vires.^
10. Dr. Ambedkar: Pari* Debates (of India) 1931» Vol.XII, Col.9008.
11. Ibid. Col.9015.
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Most of the opposition members were apprehensive that under
this category, they were going to be prevented from criticising
the foreign policy of the Government, Dr. Ambedkar allayed
this fear by making it clear that this was l!a complete mis-
12understanding and misconception.'1
Art 19 (6); This clause was amended in the light of the
Allahabad High Court decision in the case of Motilal v. State
13of Uttar Pradesh. In this case, a transport monopoly in 
favour of the state-operated bus service was struck down as 
unconstitutional because it deprived the citizen of his 
fundamental rights to carry on business under Article 19 (l)(g). 
It was realized by the Government that if Art 19 (l)(g) was not 
amended to counter this decision, nationalisation would not be 
possible.
It is to be noted that the wording of Art 19 (2) was 
improved by bringing in the expression "reasonable restrictions" 
into it. In fact, Clause (2) was brought into line with 
Clauses (3) to (6) which had already provided "reasonableness" 
as the touchstone of constitutional validity of the restrictions 
Imposed under them. The change also enabled citizens to
12. Dr. Ambedkar: Pari. Debates (of India) 1931» Vol.XII, 
Col.9016.
13. AIR 1931 All.237.
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challenge any restriction imposed by law on their freedom
of speech and expression as being “unreasonable”•
Insertion of Art 31A; The purpose of inserting Art 31A was
to save the various Zamindari Abolition Acts passed by the
State Legislatures from being declared ultra vires. The High
Court of Patna had held the Bihar legislation for abolition of
14Zamindari unconstitutional. With a view to put an end to 
litigation, the Union Government amended Art 31 so that the 
Zamindari Abolition Acts were declared valid. A general 
provision in the form of Art 31A was inserted providing that 
no law affecting the rights of any proprietor or intermediate 
holder in any estate shall be deemed to be void on the ground 
that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges the 
rights enshrined in Art 14, 19 and 31. Art 31A was made 
retrospective by using the words “deemed always to have been 
inserted”,
Art 31B: Art 31B was added to save the laws passed by various
state legislatures by listing them in the new Ninth Schedule.
The members criticised this procedure as “very unusual”. Since 
these laws were not scrutinised by the Parliament, the members 
wanted to know what these Acts were. Dr. Ambedkar informed the 
House that all these laws were laws which fell under Art 31A.
14. Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1951 Patna, 91.
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Since the principle of Art 31A is that whenever a law is made 
for the acquisition of an estate, neither the principle of 
compensation nor the principle of discrimination shall stand 
in the way of its validity, the insertion of Art 31B could not 
be a matter of objection.
The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, made minor 
amendments to Art 85, 87, 17^, 176, 372, and 376 of the Consti­
tution. During the consideration of the Bill, the Speaker 
informed the House that, according to the requirements of 
Art 368, it was necessary to have voting by the division of the 
House. Mr. Hanumanthaiya felt that the word "passed11 in Art
368 need not be construed as referring to every stage of the Bill.
15According to him, it referred to the final passing of the Bill. ^ 
If the word "passed11 in Art 368 is construed as referring to 
every stage of the Bill, that is to say, the first reading, the 
second reading, and the third reading, then the special majority 
would be required at every stage. The Speaker replied that he 
had already consulted the Attorney-General on that point and he 
would not run the risk of leaving the whole legislation open to 
challenge in the courts. Therefore, he preferred to err on the 
safer side in having the division and the voting record on each 
stage of the Bill.16
15. Pari. Debates (of India) 1951, Vol.XII, Col.9747.
16. Ibid. Col.9748.
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The motion for taking the 5111 into consideration was
carried fcy a vote of 2M> to Ik on 31st May 1951 after the
motion had been discussed for three days* The Speaker felt
that every proposed amendment to the clauses of the Bill should
be put to vote by division of the House* But this would have
taken a lot of time* The Home Minister thought that the
voting on amendments to the clauses should be by voice only
because the net result of an amendment in a particular clause
would depend very much on the form which the clause ultimately
took. On the other hand, if the amendments to a clause were
voted by division, they might contradict one another because
each amendment has its individual value but the totality of the
clause would have to be voted upon in the form which it took
17after all the amendments were passed*
Ultimately the Speaker ruled that the amendments proposed 
to the clauses of the Bill would be decided by voice* The 
members, while voting by voice, need not rise in their seats 
to mark their numbers. If someone chooses to challenge the 
decision of the Chair on some amendment, then it would be worth 
considering whether a division should or should not be granted. 
Ultimately any amendment that was accepted would again be voted 
on by the special majority of the House, when the clause as 
amended, was going to be put to the House.
17♦ Pari* Debates (of India) 1951, Vol.XII, Col*979*f.
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The question whether all the clauses should be put 
together for voting by division was a bit controversial.
The Speaker wanted to save time in the mechanical act of 
recording divisions, and therefore, he favoured the idea that 
all the clauses might be put to vote in one instalment. But 
the members were not agreeable to this proposition. Then the 
Speaker suggested that the important clauses might be voted on 
separately whereas non-controversial and formal clauses might 
be put together for the purpose of voting. He also referred 
to the practice of the House that in the case of clauses on 
which there is not much controversy or amendment, all the 
clauses are put together.
After the amendments to the clauses had been voted by 
voice, the Speaker put Clause 2 to vote and it was carried by
T O
ZWb Ayes to 5 Noes. Then clause 3 of the Bill (i.e. the
amendment of Art 19) was taken up. The proposed amendments
to clause 3 were put to vote by voice and then the clause wap
19carried by 228 Ayes to 19 Noes. 7
After this, clauses k> 3 and Ik were taken up for discussion. 
The proposed amendments to these clauses, as usual, were decided 
by the voice vote. For the purpose of special majority, first,
18. Pari. Debates (of India) 1951, Vol.XII, Col.9833.
19. Ibid. Col.9885.
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Clause 4 as amended, was voted and carried by 239 Ayes to 
6 Noes* Then Clause 5 was voted and carried by the special 
majority. Similarly Clause 14 was put to vote separately 
and carried by 233 Ayes to 7 Noes. Clauses 6 to 13 were
taken up for discussion and were voted separately ahd carried
20by the special majority. In the end, ClauseI, the Title 
and the enacting formula were put to vote and carried by 234 
Ayes to 12 Noes. At the third stage, the whole Bill as 
amended, was put to vote and passed by 228 Ayes to 20 Noes.
The Constitution (Second Amendment) Act. 1952 
Objects and Reasons: The original article 81 (1) (a) provided
for an absolute limit of 300 elected members in the House of 
the People. Art 81 (l)(b) provided that the States should be 
divided into territorial constituencies to be represented by 
members in such a way that there would be not less than 
730,000 (7*3 lakhs) of the population and not more than one 
member for every 300,000 (3 lakhs ) of the population. At 
first, seats were allotted in the House of the People to Part A 
and Part B states on the basis of one member for every 7*2 lakhs 
of the estimated population giving a total of 470 members to 
these states. To this effect, the President made an order 
under Art 387 which was to lapse on 23th January 1933* In the
20. Pari. Debates (of India) 1931, Vol.XII, Col.10106
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1931 census, the population had increased by 13%* Since 
the overall limit of 300 members prescribed in Art 81 (l)(a) 
was not sought to be disturbed, it was thought fit to reduce 
the representation from one member for ever 5 lakhs to one 
member for every 7*5 lakhs of population. This figure of 
7*3«lakhs was the maximum permissible under Art 81(1)(b) as 
it stood; but even so if the average population of a parlia­
mentary Constituency in any state was to be 730,000 it was 
obvious that the population of some constituencies would 
exceed that figure. It was, therefore, deemed necessary that 
Art 81(1)(b) should be amended relaxing the limits prescribed 
therein so as to avoid a constitutional irregularity in delimiting 
the constituencies for the purpose of readjustment of represen­
tation in the House of the People as required under Art 81(3) 
of the Constitution.
The Constitution (Second Amendment) Bill, 1952, was 
Introduced on 18th June 1952 in the Lok Sabha (House of the 
People) by the then Law Minister, Mr. Biswas. He expained 
that the result of the proposed amendment would be that the 
number of representatives in nine states would remain unaltered, 
Bombay would have three more representatives and Madras and 
Mysore one more each. Uttar Pradesh would have two less members 
and Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and West Bengal one less each.
At that time, there were special provisions for Part C states.
#00
The members criticised the measure as smacking of
«bureaucratic rehash11 and as treating the Constitution in a
cavalier fashion. The opposition members questioned the
sanctity of the number of 500, pointing out that the members
of the House of Representatives in the United States increased
from 65 to #35, that the number of the members in the House of
Commons in the U.K. was 6#0 and in the House of Lords 7#6. It
was argued that the peoplefs right to representation had been
21curtailed by the enlargement of constituencies. If the
number of representatives was not increased with the increase in
population, 11 the Parliament will become one of the most unrepre-
22sentative of representative institutions in the world.11 In
the Rajya Sabha also, examples of France and USSR were given,
23where the representatives were 627 and 682 respectively.
It is to be noted that the original Bill sought to increase 
the upper limit to 850,000 and the lower limit to 650,000. In 
that case, there would have been a necessity of amending the 
Constitution after each census. The Select Committee reported 
that to avoid this inconvenience, the upper limit be removed and 
the lower limit be maintained as it was, on the pattern of Art 170.
21. Pari. Debates, 1952, Vol.VI, Col.1951.
22. Pari. Debates, 1952, Vol.V, Col.3##.
R S
23.’Debates, 1952, Vol.II, Col.2509.
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The opposition members demanded that the Bill be circu­
lated for the purpose of eliciting public opinion to which 
the government agreed and the period for this purpose was 
fixed up to 15th October 1952, i.e. over three months.
Public opinion was, however, sought on the question whether 
the lower limit should be raised from 500,000 to 650,000 and 
the upper limit from 750,000 to 850,000 and not on the question 
whether the upper limit should be removed which was what was 
ultimately done. The public opinion was divided and was 
naturally of little use in determining the popular support for 
the amendment in question.
On 11th November 1952 the Bill was referred to a Select 
Committee consisting of 37 members of the Lok Sabha only.
No member from the Rajya Sabha was included in the Select Com­
mittee and the members of the Rajya Sabha complained of this 
failing. We will see that in the succeeding Consitution Amend­
ment Bills, the members of the Rajya Sabha were represented on 
the Select Committee.
It is of interest to note that when reference of the Bill 
to the Select Committee was being considered, some members 
wanted to widen the scope of the Bill to include Art 8l(l)(a) 
along with Art 8l(l)(b). The government, however, insisted 
that Art 81(1)(a) was not to be amended and, therefore, Art 81(1)(b) 
alone was considered by the Select Committee.
2f02
As a matter of fact, the whole problem related to the 
delimitation of constituencies and a Bill was introduced to 
th^t effect Just after the introduction of the Constitution 
(Second Amendment) Bill.2** The same select committee con­
sidered the Constitution (Second Amendment) Bill and also the 
Delimitation of Constituencies Bill* Objection was raised in
the House that the one and same committee should not consider 
the 
both/Bills.
It seems that the increase in population did not call for 
a change in the constitutional provisions in Art 81. The in­
creased population could be well covered within the prescribed 
limits. The sponsor of the Bill, Mr. Biswas, admitted in both 
the Houses that there was no difficulty and it was possible to
keep within the existing limits but the administrative units
25would have to be disturbed. The difficulty could have been 
easily got over by changing the limits of the constituencies.
It is strange that when the members wanted to know which con­
stituencies would have to be changed in the changed circumstances, 
the Law Minister had no statistics and he replied that the 
Delimitation of Constituencies Commission would go into the
2*f. The Delimitation of Constituencies Bill was introduced in
the Lok Sabha on 18th June 1952. L.S. Debates 1952 Part II, 
Vol.II, Col.2013.
23. L.S. Debates 1952, Vol.VI, Col.1939.
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matter in detail. In the circumstances, the opposition
members rightly criticised the government for amending the
26Constitution without thinking. Some members even demanded 
that the first thing to be done in the matter was to have a 
report of the Commission and then, if it was necessary, the 
amendment Bill should be considered. As a matter of fact, 
to remove the upper limit was to give a free scope to the De­
limitation Commission to delimit the constituencies with a 
certain amount of injustice because constituencies could be 
carved out in such a way that one constituency might have one 
representative for 5 lakhs and another for 7i lakhs or even 
more. Thus, the Government could gerrymander constituencies 
to a great extent. The measure aroused fears in the minds of 
the members representing minorities because the amendment could 
be abused for suppressing political minorities, particularly in
areas where minor language groups could be tagged on to dominating
27language groups•
Moreover, the next census was to take place in 1961 and the 
second Lok Sabha elections were to take place in 1957, which 
could be held in accordance with the provisions of Art 81.
Then what was the justification for amending the Constitution?
26. R.S. Debates, 1952, Vol.II, Col.2462.
Parliament Debates, 1952, Col.369*
27. Example of Traneore Cochin was given by Mr, Abdul Kazak-Rajya 
Sabha Debates 1952, Vol.II, Col.2495.
¥>k
The only justification advanced by the Law Minister was that
the Presidential order under Art 387 was only for three years;
it was to expire on 23th January 1953* If some eventuality
were to occur after that date requiring the holding of elections
for any state legislature, there was no law. This difficulty
could be easily met, as was pointed wut by a learned member of
28the Rajya Sabha, by asking the President to pass an ordinance.
The futility of the amendment was established in 1936 when/
the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act was passed, which 
amended the amended Art 8l(l)(b) by substituting the principle 
of uniformity of representation among the States inter se as 
also among the territorial constituencies of the same state for 
the numerical minimum prescribed by the earlier clause (b) of 
Art 81.
The sponsor of the Bill piloted the Bill in both the Houses. 
The Bill was put to vote to fulfil the requirement of a special 
majority at the first reading stage, at the second reading and 
the third reading of the Bill. The proposed amendments to the 
Clauses of the Bill were voted by voice-vote and a division was 
called for Clause 2, and Clause 1, the Title and the enacting 
formula separately and these clauses were carried by the required 
majority under Art 368.
R S .
28. Kunzru, H.N./Debates, 1952, Vol.II, Col.2^ 75.
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The Constitution (Third Amendment) Act, 1954.
Objects and Reasons: Art 369 empowered Parliament to legislate
in respect of certain specified essential commodities, for a 
period of five years after which the whole Part XXI containing 
Art 369 was to lapse. The Government considered it advisable 
to have this power continued even after the expiry of this 
period. Therefore it decided to amend Entry 33 of the Concurrent 
List to amplify it so that it might include the powers provided 
in Art 369 and also a few other items. The amended entry 33 of 
the Concurrent List reads as follows:
"Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and 
distribution of: (a) the products of any industry where 
the control of such industry by the union is declared 
by parliament by law to be expedient in the public 
interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such 
products; (b) food stuffs including edible oil seeds 
and oils; (c) cattle fodder, including oil cakes and 
other concentrates; (d) raw cotton, whether ginned or 
ungrined, and cotton seeds; and (e) raw jute.11 
Importance of the Change: It is necessary to explain the sig­
nificance of the change brought about by the substitution of 
this new entry 33 in List III. Under the original entry 33 the 
only matter specified was "trade and commerce, and the production, 
supply and distribution of the products of any industry where
406
the control of such industry by the Union is declared by 
Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest".
Entry 52 of List I empowers Parliament to bring under Its 
control such industries, the control of which by the Union 
is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public 
interest. Therefore, Entty 52 of List I and the original 
Entry 33 of List III yield the result that only products of 
those controlled industries which are enumerated in Acts of 
Parliament passed under Entry 52 of List I, are brought into 
the concurrent sphere. In other words, inter-state trade and 
commerce, except in relation to the products of controlled in­
dustries, would be within the exclusive competence of the State 
Legislatures. Art 369 conferred powers on the Parliament to 
pass laws for a period of five years from the commencement of 
the Constitution, in relation to certain matters as if they were 
included in the concurrent list. The government sought the ad­
vice of an expert committee as to whether the continuance of 
controls in future was desirable. The committee strongly re­
commended that central regulation of the commodities specified 
in Art 369 was essential for an indefinite period not only in 
the interests of the proper distribution and supply of these com­
modities but also in the interest of the maintenance of these 
industries. The amendment vests the control of the controlled 
industries in the hands of the Union for ever, if it ever wishes
407
to exercise its concurrent power under Entry 33. Not only 
that, new matters such as imported goods similar in nature to 
the products specified, food stuffs, cattle fodder, raw cotton 
and raw jute, were also brought in.
Introduction of the Bills The Constitution (Third Amendment)
Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 6th September 1954,
by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Shri T.T. Krishanamachar.
On 10th September, he tabled the motion that the Bill be referred
to a joint committee consisting of 36 members, 24 from the Lok
29Sabha and 12 from the Rajya Sabha.  ^ The names of the members
from the Lok Sabha were mentioned but those from the Rajya Sabha
were to be included by that House. The quorum of the Joint
Committee was fixed as one-third of the total number of members
30and the Committee was to report by 17th September.
An objection was raised that since the Bill included
"foodstuff and cattle fodder" the Food Minister should be present
in the House but the sponsor replied that it was not necessary
31because the Cabinet has a collective responsiblity. Mr. Moore 
suggested that Parliament should develop a convention that all 
amendments of the Constitution should be piloted by the Minister
29. Later on one Member withdrew his name - Pari. Debates, 1954, 
Vol.VII, Col.1661.
30. L. S. Debates Part II, 1954, Vol.VI, Col.1353.
31. Pari. Debates, 1954, Vol.VI, Col.1388.
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in charge of the Law Ministry. In other countries, the
constitutional amendments are sponsored by the Minister in
32charge of the Legal Portfolio.
The opposition members proposed that the Bill be circu­
lated for the purpose of eliciting public opinion but the
33proposal was rejected.
The report of the Joint Committee was presented on the
table of the House by the Prime Minister on 20th September 1954*
The Joint Committee included members from opposition
parties and these members expressed their dissent in the report.
Some members of the Joint Committee were ag&inst the amendment.
But they were told that they could not oppose the amendment at
that stage because by accepting to serve on the committee, they
3hhad accepted the principle of the Bill. However they ex­
pressed their view that the doctrine of "occupied field" intro­
duced by the amendment would "progressively pulverise" State 
autonomy. They also suggested that if it was found necessary, 
the transitional period provided in Art 369 might be increased 
to ten years. A member fairly summarised the position when he
»aid that all the arguments of the opposition centred around
35two points, namely, autonomy of states and democracy.
32. Pari. Debates, 1954, Vol.VI, Col.1400.
33. Ibid. Col.1662.
34. R.S. Debates, 1934, Vol.VII, Col.3565.
35. Shah, C.C. Pari. Debates, Vol.VII, 1954, Col.2847.
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It is of interest to note that the members in both the
Houses asked the Government whether the State legislatures
had been consulted on the measure. As a matter of fact, all
the States had not sent their replies to the Union. In the
Rajya Sabha, Dr. Ambedkar reminded the Government that prior
consultation was very necessary in the matter because ratification
by the States was required to make the amendment effective.^ 
the
Was/Amendment Necessary? It seems that the amendment was not
necessary at all. All that the government intended to achieve
by the amendment could be easily done under the provisions of
the Constitution. First, Art 249 could be used for transferring
any matter lying in the state list into that of the centre list,
though the power under Art 249 requires the periodical approval
of the Rajya Sabha. Secondly, the sponsor of the Bill rightly
pointed out that the amendment was not being introduced for a
lack of power. He further added that Art 302 gives power to
the Union Government to impose restrictions on the freedom of
trade, commerce or intercourse between one state and another,
37in the public interest. Again Entry 52 of List I also gives 
ample power to the Union and when the tea and coffee industries
36. R.S. Debates, 1954, Vol.VII, Col.2298.
37. Pari. Debates Part II, 1954, Vol.VI, Col.1515.
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were ‘being regulated under that entry there was no reason why
other industries could not be taken under it. The taxing
38powers of the Union could also he employed to regulate the
products of industries. In fact, the real reason for bringing
forward the amending Bill was revealed by the sponsor of the
Bill himself. In his view, the procedure in Art 249 was
39^cumbersome and unsatisfactory11 and acting under other pro-
40visions would entail tta certain amount of uncertainty11.
Therefore, he wished that the area of doubt should be resolved.
But was this alone a sufficient reason to amend the Constitution?
No wonder, the Government was accused of having a "low regard
41for the Constitution"•
As usual, the Bill was put to vote by division of the House 
on the consideration stage, second reading and the third reading. 
But it is to be noted that Clauses 1 and 2, the enacting formula 
and the Title were put to vote together. The Speaker thought 
that, though there was more than one clause, the substance was 
one. Here was a departure from the past practice.
33. Part XII of the Constitution.
39. Pari. Debates Part II, Vol.VI, Col.1515•
40. Ibid. Col.1313.
41* Dr. Ambedkar: P.S. Debates 1954, Col.2302.
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The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act 1955*
Objects and Reasons; The Supreme Court held in the cases of
LP
State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal. Dwarkadas Shrinivas v.
43Sholapur Spinning Co. and Saghir Ahmed v. State of Uttar
Xiii
Pradesh that the expressions 11 taken possession of 11 and 
"acquisition” occurring in Art 31 (2) conveyed the same meaning 
as the expression ‘’deprivation*1 in Art 31 (1) and, therefore, 
both Clauses (1) and (2) of Art 31 dealt with one and the same 
subject matter. Even if the title to property is not vested 
in the State, it would require the payment of compensation.
The net result of these decisions was to require compensation 
even in cases where property rights were affected by purely regu­
lating laws or what is termed as the exercise of '‘police powers” 
by the state in America. The Government intended to pay com­
pensation only in the cases of ”acquisition or taking possession 
of the property” directly by the state - cases covered by 
"eminent domain” in America.
In order to get over this situation, Clause (2) was reworded 
taking in the words "compulsorily acquired or requisitioned”.
42. AIR 1954 S.C.92.
43. AIR 1954 S.C.119.
44. AIR 1954 S.C.728.
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A new explanatory clause (2A) was added, making it clear that 
flwhere a law does not provide for the transfer of the 
ownership or right to possession of any property to 
the state or to a corporation owned or control^ by 
the state, it shall not be deemed to provide for the 
compulsory acquisition or requisitioning notwithstanding 
that it deprives any person of his property."
A very important change was brought about by the Fourth 
Amendment by making the adequacy of compensation a non- 
justiciable issue. This amendment was made to circumvent the
decision given by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v.
45Mrs. Bella Banerjee ^ where Chief Justice Patanjali Shastri 
observed:
"While it is true that the legislature is given the 
discretionary power of laying down the principles which 
should govern the determination of the amount to be 
given to the owner for the property appropriated, such 
principles should ensure that what is determined as 
payable must be compensation, that is, a just equivalent 
of what the owner has been deprived of.11 
Since it was held in the Bella Banerjee case that in all cases 
of compulsory acquisition of land and property, the government 
must pay full and fair compensation, it became necessary for
45. AIR 1954 S.C. 170 at 1?2
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the government to amend Art 31 (2), otherwise its social
46and economic programmes could be held up.
Saving of Laws: Art 31A was amended providing therein four
new categories of legislation to be saved from challenge on 
the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or 
abridge any of the rights conferred by Art 14, 19 or 31.
These categories ares
(a) the taking over of the management of any property by the 
state for a limited period either in the public interest or in 
order to secure its proper management;
46. It is of interest to note that although it was specifically 
provided in Art 31 (2) that a law providing for compensation 
under Art 31 (2) shall not be called in question in any 
court on the ground that the compensation provided by it 
is not adequate, the Supreme Court ruled in Va.jravelu 
Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector (AIR 1965 S.C.1017) 
that the Fourth Amendment did not affect the Bella Banerjee 
decision and that "compensation11 must not be illusory.
In the Metal Corporation (1967) I.S.C.R^the Court held that 
a provision for compensation must provide for a "just equi­
valent" compensation. But the Metal Corporation case has 
been overruled by its ruling in State of Gujarat v.
Shantical Mangaldas on January 13th, 1969, wherein it has 
been held that the adequacy of compensation (apart from 
compensation which is illusory or proceeds upon principles 
irrelevant to its determination) cannot be questioned in 
any court.
25* The Journal of Parliamentary Information (1969) Vol.XV, No.l. 
Short notes p 47.
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(b) the amalgamation of two or more corporations either 
in the public interest or in order to secure the proper 
management of any of the corporations;
(c) the extinguishment or modification of any rights of 
managing agents, secretaries and treasurers, managing directors, 
directors or managers of corporations, or of any voting rights 
of shareholders thereof;
(d) extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing
by virtue of any agreement, lease or licence for the purpose 
of searching for, or winning, any mineral or mineral oil, or 
the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement, 
lease or licence.
The purpose of providing for these categories of laws is 
to enable the State to enact social welfare legislation and to 
save those laws from being attacked on the ground that they 
infringe the fundamental rights enshrined in Art 14, 19 or 31.
Section 4 of the Amendment Act amended Art 305 so that the 
laws passed by the state legislatures and Parliament to create 
state monopolies might be saved from being challenged either 
under Art 19 or Art 301 and 303.
The Fourth Amendment Bill was introduced by the Prime 
Minister, Mr. Jawahar Lai Nehru, in the Lok Sabha on 20th December 
1954. On 14th March 1955 he moved that the Bill be referred 
to a Joint Committee of 45 members, 30 from the Lok Sabha and
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15 from the Rajya Sabha. The Speaker requested the members
to relax the convention of the House that the members of a
joint select committee should not try to catch the eye of the
Speaker. In regard to this particular amendment, the members
47of the joint select committee were also allowed to speak.
The Bill was put to vote at the three stages, in accordance 
with the practice of the House. There was a difficulty in 
regard to the amendments to the clauses. The number of amend­
ments was extremely large, as many as 120. The Speaker suggested 
that each clause might be taken up for discussion and all the 
amendments to it might be decided by voice. In this way, at 
the end, all the clauses might be put to vote together.
Mr. Thakur Das Bhargava observed that putting all the clauses
together would be tantamount to passing the motion at one 
48stroke. Ultimately, each clause was put to vote by division 
of the House and the amendments to the clauses were decided 
by the vote of voice, that is to say, the old practice was 
adhered to. It is to be noted that in the Rajya Sabha, the
49Bill was sponsored by Mr. Govind Vallabh Pant, the Home Minister.
47. L.S. Debates Part II, 1955, Vol.II, Col.1958.
*-*S-
48. ^Debates Part II, 1955, Vol.II, Col.4965.
49. R.S. Debates, 1955, 17th March 1955, Col.2226.
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The Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1955»
The Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act had a checquered 
history in getting through the process under Art 368. The 
sum and substance of the Bill was first introduced in the Lok
50Sabha in a Bill called the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Bill, 
which contained provisions regarding other matters also. But 
the government wanted that the matters covered by clauses 10 
and 11 of that Bill be passed urgently and that the other pro­
visions of the Bill might be passed afterwards. Therefore,
Clauses 10 and 11 were incorporated in a separate Bill which
'‘51was introduced as "The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Bill
on 28th November 1955 in the Lok Sabha. The Bill related to
the amendment of one^Article, i.e. Art 3 of the Constitution.
It is interesting to note that the two Constitutional Amendment
Bills, namely the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Bill and the
CSixth Amendment) Bill were still pending for consideration in
the Lok Sabha when the (Seventh Amendment) Bill was taken up for
consideration and passed. Only four hours were allotted for
52all the stages of this one-clause Bill. The Government
was in such a hurry to rush through the measure that even the
50. Clauses 10 and 11 of the Bill were introduced on 20th November 
1955 in the Lok Sabha.
51. L.S. Debate Part II, Vol.IX, Col.659*
32. Ibid. Col.661.
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reference to a select or joint committee was sought to be dis­
pensed with; such a reference had been regularly made in respect 
of the Constitution Amendment Bills previously passed. But 
the Business Advisory Committee of the Lok Sabha thought it 
necessary to follow the old practice of having a reference to 
a select committee in case of a Constitution Amendment Bill. 
Accordingly, a motion was tabled on 1st December 1955, for the 
Bill to be referred to a select committee consisting of 21 
members from the Lok Sabha only.
When this motion was put to vote, as usual, the bell was 
rung for two minutes after which the doors of the House were 
closed and the tellers started counting by heads. While the 
counting was going on, suspicion arose that the Government was 
lacking the special majority. Many points of order were raised 
as to the desirability of the practice of closing the doors of 
the House in case of a division, and as to the necessity of having
a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting even in
53adopting a Bill - that is at that stage. The result of the
voting was declared as Ayes 246 and Noes 2. The total membership
54of the Lok Sabha at that time was 499* However, certain seats
53* L.S. Debates Part II (1955) Vol.IX, Col.883.
An Honourable Member thought that a bare majority was 
sufficient for all the intermediate stages of the Bill and 
special majority was required at the last stage only.
Ibid. Col.889.
54. L.S. Debates Part II (1955) Col.887.
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were vacant so that the sitting members were less than 491.
The Speaker informed the House that he was not clear as to what
he should declare in regard to the passing of the Bill. The
point to be considered was whether "absolute majority of the
House" in Art 368 means the strength of the House for the time
being or the total strength of the House as it should be. In
this particular case, Rule 169 of the Rules of Procedure of the
House was referred to, which provided that an Amendment Bill,
at the stage of being referred to a select committee, requires
an absolute majority of the total membership of the House and
a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. An
objection was raised as to whether a rule can supersede, or add
55to the words of, the Constitution. Ultimately, the Speaker 
declared that the motion was not carried in accordance with 
Rule 169 of the Rules of Procedure.^ He also ruled that the 
doors of the House are closed only by convention and the word 
"present" in Art 368 means those present two minutes after the 
bells are rung and the doors are closed.
After the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Bill was mis­
carried, the Government embodied practically the same matter in 
another bill introduced as the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) 
Bill on 8th December 1955 ia the Lok Sabha by the Home Minister,
55- L.S. Debates Part II (1955) Vol.IX, Col.890. 
56. Ibid. Col.890.
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Mr. G.B. Pant. This Bill was taken up for consideration
on 12th December. This time the practice of referring the
Bill to a select committee was intentionally dispensed with by
ordering the suspension of a rule In this regard. When the
Members insisted on having a select committee, it was agreed
by the Government that the members could meet the Law Minister
and the Home Minister after the consideration stage of the Bill
and could ha-ve informal discussions but this would not be treated
57as a precedent in future. Next day the Bill was passed by 
377 Ayes and no Noes i.e. unanimously. It is to be noted that 
the Government had proposed an amendment to Clause 1 of the Bill 
to the effect that "Fifth" be substituted for "Eighth" and the 
Speaker ruled that the change sought was merely formal and he 
would do it himself in his discretionary power and, therefore, 
the amendment to Clause 1 was not moved at all. Clauses 1 and 
2 were put to vote together.
Change brought about by the Amendment
The Fifth Amendment amended the proviso to Art 3 to the 
effect that the President would be able to prescribe a period 
within which the state had to express its views on the Bill.
The whole purpose and object was that it would not be possible 
for any state to take up a non-co-operative attitude and thereby
57. L.S. Debates Part II S(l955) Vol.X, Col.2465
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impede implementation of the Bill for the formation of new 
states or for alteration of boundaries. The States Reorgani­
sation Commission Report was sought to be implemented by the 
Government as expeditiously as possible and by the amendment 
states were prevented from adopting delaying tactics. After 
the prescribed period was over, the Parliament could take up 
a bill for consideration and pass it, notwithstanding the fact 
that some of the states were not able to express their views on 
the bill within the prescribed period. If the states feel that 
the period is short or inadequate, they can prevail upon the 
President to extend the period and if they succeed, they can 
have a longer period than what is prescribed.
The Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1955*
Objects and Reasons: The amendment was brought to remove the
confusion regarding the scope and effect of the Explanation in
Clauses 1 and 2 of Art 286. The Supreme Court expressed the
58view in State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd. that the 
Explanation in Clause 1 of Art 286 prohibited the taxation of a 
sale involving inter-state elements by all states except the 
state in which the goods were delivered for the purpose of 
consumption therein. It was further held that Clause 2 did not
58. AIR 1953 S.C.252
421
affect the power of that state to tax the inter-state sale
even though Parliament had not made a law removing the ban
imposed by the clause. The result of this decision was that
dealers resident in one state were subjected to the sales tax
jurisdiction and procedure of several other states with which
they had dealings. After some time, the Supreme Court held
that no state can impose or otherwise cause the imposition of
any tax on sales or purchases of goods when such sales or
purchases take place in the course of inter-state trade or 
59commerce.
Moreover, in pursuance of Clause 3 of Art 286, Parliament 
passed an Act in 1952 declaring a number of goods to be essen­
tial to the life of the community. Since this Act could not 
affect pre-existing state laws imposing sales tax on these 
goods, the result was a wide disparity from state to state in 
sales tax. The Taxation Enquiry Commission recommended that 
Art 286 (3) of the Constitution be amended to remove the 
existing exemption of articles essential to the life of the 
community from the scope of state sales taxes and that sales 
tax must essentially continue to be a state tax as a source of 
revenue and must continue to be levied and administered by state 
governments.
59. Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar : AIR 1963 S.C.661.
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Changes made by the Amendment
The Explanation in Clause 1 of Art 286 was omitted. For
new clauses
Clauses 2 and 3 of Art 286/were substituted enabling Parliament 
to formulate by law principles for determining when a sale or 
purchase of goods takes place in any of the ways mentioned in 
Clause 1. It was also provided that any state law providing 
for taxes on sales or purchases of goods declared by Parlieament 
by law to be of special importance in inter-state trade or 
commerce shall be subject to restrictions imposed by Parliament 
by law, A new Entry 92A in the Union List was added to give 
power to impose tax on sales or purchases of goods in inter­
state trade or commerce. Entry 32 of List II was consequently 
amended. To the same effect, Art 269 was also amended. 
Procedure in Enacting the Amendment
The Bill was introduced on 3rd May 1956 by the Minister of 
Revenue and Civil Expenditure. The Bill was referred to a 
joint committee consisting of 45 Members, 30 from the Lok Sabha 
and 13 from the Rajya S a b h a . T h e  Report of the Committee 
was presented on 23rd May and taken up for consideration on
29th May. At this stage it was the Minister of Finance who
61piloted the Bill. At the consideration stage, Clauses 2, 3, 
and 4 were put to vote together. The Constitution (Seventh 
Amendment) Bill was introduced as the “Tenth11 Amendment Bill 
and the “Tenth” was substituted by “Seventh” by an amendment to
60. L.S. Debates Part II (1936) Vol.IV, Col.7089.
61. L.S. Debates (1956) vol.V, Col.9875.
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62Clause 1 by the Government. Clause 1 as amended, the 
Enacting Formula and the Title were added to the Bill and 
were not voted by division but by a bare majority. It is 
to be noted that in the Rajya Sabha, for the purposes of voting, 
Clauses 2, 3» and k were clubbed together and Clause 1, the 
Title and Enacting Formula were voted together.^
It is obvious that the Bill needed ratification by at 
least half the State Legislatures, as required by Art 368.
The lists in the Seventh Schedule being entrenched in Art 368, 
and the Amendment seeking to amend the Union and State Lists, 
ratification was necessary.
The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956.
Objects and Reasons: When the Constitution was framed, the
states were not organised on any rational basis except, of course, 
on the basis of administrative convenience. The states were 
not placed on an equal basis but were divided into Part A, B, 
and C states. Soon thereafter, pressures began to build up 
for a reconstruction of the states and for the elimination ofr 
the disparity between the different classes of states. The 
government appointed a Commission known as the State Reorganisation
62. L.S. Debates (1956) Vol.V, Col.9972.
63. R.S. Debates (1956) Vol.XIII, Col.^190.
Commission which submitted a report in 1956. The Commission 
recommended a reconstitution of the states on linguistic, 
geographical and ethnic basis. To implement these recommendations 
the Constitution required to be amended and this was done by the 
Seventh Amendment Act.
By this Amendment Part B and Part C states were abolished 
and gill the units of the Union were given the same status and 
character. The alteration in union Territories changed rep­
resentation for states in Parliament, It provided that one 
and the same person can be appointed as the Governor of two or 
more states. Art 170 providing for the composition of Legis­
lative Assemblies, was altered. It extended the jurisdiction 
of High Courts to Union territories and the establishment of a 
common High Court for two or more states was made possible.
The duration of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly was 
extended by Section Zk of the Act. An important change was 
brought about by substituting Art 298 by a new Article which 
provided that the power of the Union and the State shall extend 
to carrying on trade or business and to the acquisition, holding 
and disposing of property and the making of contracts for any 
purpose. Entry 33 of List I and Entry 36 of List II and Entry 
kZ of List III of Schedule VII, were recast to make them comprise 
the seemingly simple formula for 11 acquisition and requisition of 
property".
Procedure under Art 368: The Seventh Amendment Bill was first
introduced as the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Bill but it
was withdrawn on 18th April 1956 to embody many new provisions 
6kin it. On the same day it was again introduced as the
Constitution (Ninth Amendment) Bill by the Home Minister. The
Bill was referred to a Joint Committee comprising 3k members
from the Lok Sabha and 17 from the Rajya Sabha, making a total 
6
of 51 - the largest number till then taken for Committees on
Constitutional Amendment Bills. The Report of the Committee
was taken up for consideration on kth September 1956. As usual
the Bill was voted by division at the time it was referred to a
Joint Committee, at the consideration stage and at the final
stage. But it is to be noted that at the consideration stage,
clauses were grouped for the purpose of voting, according to
the subject-matter they contained. Clauses 2, 3 and k formed
one group; Clauses 5, 6 and 7 another group. Clause 8 was voted
separately whereas Clauses 9, 11, 12 and 13, 16 and 25 as amended
66were clubbed together and voted. Clause 10 was put to vote 
separately. A larger group was made of Clauses 17 to 20,
Clauses 18 to 23, Clauses 26 to 29 and the Schedule. Clause 2k 
was voted separately.
6k- L.S. Debates Part II (1956) Vol.IV.
65. L.S. Debates Part II (1956) Vol.IV, Col.6472.
66. L.S. Debates Part II. Vol.VIII, Col.5802 to 6063.
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In the Pajya Sabha, the clauses were grouped differently. 
There were five divisions. Clauses 6, 18, 24 and Clause 1, 
the Title and the Enacting Formula were each voted separately. 
Clauses 2 to 3, 7 to 17, 19 to 23, 23 to 29 and the Schedule 
were put to vote together. This was the first time that so 
many clauses were clubbed together for the purpose of voting 
and the practice of having votes by division on each clause 
was deviated from.
The Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, I960.
Objects and Reasons: This Amendment altered Art 334 so as to
extend the operation of the said Article from ten to twenty years 
from the commencement of the Constitution. Art 334 provides 
for: (a) the reservation of seats for the Scheduled castes and
the Scheduled Tribes in the House of the People and in the 
Legislative Assemblies of the States; and (b) the representation 
of the Anglo-Indian community in the House of the People and in 
the Legislative Assemblies of the States by nomination.
It is interesting to note that the Bill was objected to
67by a Member on the ground that It was ultra vires of Art 17.
His argument was that Art 17 forbids the practice of untoucha- 
bility in any form. It specifically provides that the enforce­
ment of any disability arising out of "untouchability" shall be
67. L.S. Debates Second Series (1939) Vol.36, Col.2449-
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an offence punishable in accordance with law. He further 
stated that the Government had prescribed an official criterion 
for designating persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, viz. 
that they must, in addition to being backward, suffer from the 
tangible disability of untouchability. His point was that if
the test for future election to the reserved seats was to be the
tangible disability of untouchability, the Bill would become 
ultra vires of Art 17. When he was reminded that when Art 17 
was framed, Art 333 and 334 were also framed, he pointed out 
that the Constituent Assembly had adopted a different criterion 
for determining the Scheduled Castes, viz. standard of education 
and certain social disabilities and not untouchability.^
There seemed to be force in his argument but the objection was 
not accepted and the House proceeded with the Bill.
Action under Art 368: The Bill was sponsored by the Home
Minister and it was considered on 30th November 1959 by the 
69Lok Sabha. It was not referred to a select or a joint com­
mittee. Some members proposed to get the Bill circulated
for the purpose of eliciting public opinion but the proposal was
70not accepted by the Government.
68. L.S. Debates 2nd Series (1959) Vol.36, Col.2449.
69. L.S. Debates 2nd Series (1959) Vol.35, Col.2443*
70. Ibid, Col.2552.
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The Government wanted to pass the Bill on the same day it
was taken up for consideration. The time of voting was fixed
as 5 o’clock in the evening. Actually, the voting started at
5.20 p.m. This time the House was fitted with electric apparatus
for automatic recording of votes. The Members were requested to
rise in their seats and press 11'Ayes11 or "Noes” buttons as the case
may be and record their votes accordingly. The members pressed
their respective buttons and the indicator showed the result but
some members complained that their machines did not work properly.
The Speaker then asked the members to go into their respective
lobbies and record their votes. But in the lobbies, there were no
clerks and, therefore, there was a bit of confusion. The Speaker
was requested to postpone the voting and he did so. The next day,
many members raised points of order and asked why the motion was
71postponed when it was lost the day before.
The irregularity in procedure was sought to be remedied by
having a de novo consideration of the Bill. But the Speaker ruled 
that there was nothing wrong in having voting the next day. Then 
voting started and each clause was voted separately by division and
the Bill was passed. The Rajya Sabha passed it on 7th December 1959*
71* L.S. Debates 2nd Series (1959) Vol.36, Col.2700.
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The Constitution (Ninth Amendment) Act, I960.
Objects and Reasons; India and Pakistan entered into agreements
dated 10th September 1958, 23rd October 1959 and 11th January I960,
collectively known as the Nehru-Noon Agreements) which settled
certain boundary disputes relating to the borders of the States
of Assam, Punjab and Benagal (West) and the Union Territory of
Tripura* The agreements involved, among other matters, the cession
of one half of the Berubari Union No.12 which was Indian territory
to Pakistan and the exchange of old Cooch-Behar Enclaves in Pakistan
and Pakistan Enslaves in India. The Constitution (Ninth Amendment)
Act, I960, amended the Constitution to give effect to the transfer
of these territories.
Advisory Opinion of the Supreme Court
The Government was doubtful whether the agreements were purely
relating to boundary disputes or cession of territory and as to
how the agreements could be implemented because the constitutional
provisions relating to the matter were not clear. Therefore,
the Supreme Court was asked by the President under Art 143 of the
Constitution to express its opinion on the matter. The Court
72gave its opinion on the Reference after hearing all the necessary 
parties. It held that Art 3 (c) of the Constitution does not
72. In re Berubari (I960) 3 SCR 250 : AIR I960 SC 845.
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include the case of cession of national territory in favour of a 
foreign state as the diminution of the area of a State contemplated 
by Art 3 (c) is diminution following its addition to another State 
as a matter of internal adjustment of territories within the Indian 
Union, Therefore it was not competent to Parliament to implement 
the Agreement by making an ordinary law under Art 3 (c). Three 
possible ways of implementing the Agreements were suggested by the 
Court,
First, by amending Art 1 and consequentially the First Schedule, 
The Court observed:
nWe have already held that the Agreement amounts to a cession 
of a part of the territory of India in favour of Pakistan; 
and so its implementation would naturally involve the alter­
ation of the content of and the consequent amendment of 
Art 1 and of the relevant part of the First Schedule to the 
constitution, because such implementation would necessarily
lead to the diminution of the territory of the Union of India,
73Such an amendment can be made under Art 368,H 
The second method was to amend Art 3 suitably so as to include 
cases of cession of territory and then implement the Agreement 
by an ordinary law since Art 2, 3 and 4 read together provide for
73. (I960) 3 SCR at p 249.
« 1
such a legislation being enacted by an ordinary law. The 
Court said:
"Parliament may, however, if it so chooses, pass a law 
amending Art 3 of the Constitution so as to cover cases 
of cession of the territory of India in favour of a 
foreign state. If such a law is passed then Parliament 
may be competent to make a law under the amended Art 3 
to implement the Agreement in question. On the other 
hand, if the necessary, law is passed under Art 368 itself 
that alone would be sufficient toi.implement the agreement."
It is to be noted that the third method suggested is in 
the last line of the paragraph just quoted, namely, "if the 
necessary law is passed under Art 368 itself that alone would 
be sufficient to implement the agreement." It is not clear 
what the court means by "necessary" law under Art 368. It 
is of interest to note that the Government did not act according 
to the first and second suggestions but in accordance with the 
third suggestion.
The first suggestion was not followed in enacting the 
Ninth Amendment Act because the Act amended only the First 
Schedule and did not amend Art 1.
The second suggestion was not thought fit to be followed 
and rightly so on two grounds. First, on the ground of 
principle, cession of national territory should not be provided
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for in the Constitution because no Constitution in the world
74makes a provision for cession of national territory.
Secondly, it would have made it easier in future to transfer 
territory in favour of a foreign state because Art 3 requires 
a simple majority to pass a law under it and not a special 
majority as is required by Art 368.
Now the question to be considered is whether the Ninth 
Amendment Act is Necessary” law under Art 368 to give imple­
mentation to the agreement in question? The Supreme Court had 
held that, though the right to cede territory is an attribute 
of sovereignty, there being no provision in the Constitution
empowering Parliament to cede national territory, Parliament
75was incompetent to do so. ^ The questioh arises, since such a 
power was not introduced in the Constitution and does not exist 
even today, from where did Parliament derive the power to 
amend the First Schedule so as to provide for the territories 
ceded or acquired in the Agreement? It is submitted that 
Art 368 does not bestow any inherent power upon Parliament; 
the power in Art 368 can be used by Parliament only by following 
the procedure prescribed in the Article itself. As the power
74. Dr. Krishnaswami: L.S. Debates 2nd Series (I960) Vol.49, 
Col.6503.
75. Seervai takes the view that this power is to be found in 
Art 3 or the residuary power of the Union under Art 248 
read with List 1, Item 97. Seervai: Constitutional Law of 
India. 1967, P 121.
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to cede national territory was not there in the Constitution, 
Parliament should have acted first under Art 368 and amended 
the Constitution suitably to provide the required power and 
then passed the necessary law to give implementation to the 
Agreement.
Procedure under Art 368: The Bill was introduced by the Prime
Minister, Mr. Jawahar Lai Nehru. At the introduction stage
an objection was raised that the Nehru-Noon Agreement was not
discussed in Parliament before ratification and, therefore, an
76amendment to give effect to the Agreement was improper but
the objection was ruled out. At the consideration stage the
two Bills, namely, the Acquired Territories (Merger) Bill and
the Constitution (Ninth Amendment) Bill were taken up for dis-
77cussion simultaneously. It is to be noted that the acquired
territories were provided in the Acquired Territories (Merger) 
Bill and it was treated as an ordinary law, and therefore, was 
passed by an ordinary majority. This measure was criticised 
because the views of the West Bengal Legislature under Art 3 
were not ascertained properly. The sponsor explained that the 
Presidential order prescribed one month as the period within 
which the State legislatures concerned were to express their
76. L.S. Debates (I960) 2nd Series, Vol.49, Col.6012.
77. Ibid. Col.5982.
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views. The papers were sent to them on 23rd September I960.
The West Bengal legislature demanded more time and so the
period was extended up to 15th December. But the legislature
did not send its views by that date. Parliament could not be
expected to wait indefinitely and hence there was no substance
in the argument. The Bill was considered on 16th December I960.
The exact changes in the territories ceded or acquired were not
indicated in the two Bills. This lacuna was explained as
owing to the fact that the Government had no legal authority
to go into the disputed territories and demarcate them. After
the Government had been clothed with necessary legal authority,
it was possible to give the exact area of the territory ceded 
78or acquired. The proposal for circulating the Bill for the
79purpose of eliciting public opinion thereon was negatived. '
It is to be noted that the Bill was not referred to a select or 
joint committee. But each clause was voted severally for the
purpose of having special majority under Art 368. Even the
oq
schedules in the Bill were voted separately in both the 
Houses. Since voting was by the automatic machines in the 
Lok Sabha many members complained that their machines did not 
work properly.
78. L.S. Debates, 2nd Series, I960, Vol.49, Col.6258.
79. Ibid. Col.6567.
80. L.S. Debates 2nd series, I960, Vol.59, Col.6574 and 6610; 
Rajya Sabha Debates (I960) Vol.31, Col.3286.
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The Constitution (Tenth Amendment) Act, 1961.
Objects and Reasons: In response to the request of the
people of Free Dadra and Nagar Haveli, expressed through 
a Resolution adopted by their Varishta Panchayat on 12th June 
1961, for integration of their territories with the Union of 
India, the Government of India decided that these territories 
should form part of India as a specific Union territory with 
effect from 11th August 1961. The Act makes amendments to 
the Constitution in order to absorb the territories into the 
Union of India.
Changes made: The First Schedule was amended so as to include
an entry flDadra and Nagar Haveli11 under the heading HThe Union 
Territories11. Art 240 was amended so as to include an 
additional Clause (c) .
Was the amendment under Art 368 necessary?
8lIt is to be noted that it was held in Re Berubari that
is necessary
no amendment of the Constitution under Art 368/in regard to 
acquisition of territories. But for cession of national 
territory in favour of a foreign state, legislation under 
Art 368 is necessary. So far as acquisition of territory is 
concerned, Art 4 (2) is quite clear; it can be done by an
81. (1960) 3 SCR 250 : (I960) AIR S.C.845.
ordinary law. No doubt it is an amendment of the Constitution
since the First Schedule has to be necessarily altered but
Art if (2) says that such a law is not to be deemed to be an
amendment of the Constitution for the purposes of Art 368.
Therefore, in the case of acquisition of the territories of
Dadra and Nagar Haveli it was not necessary at all to have
acted under Art 368 as the Parliament did. It seems that
Parliament acted as a matter of caution in this regard. Some
members of the Lok Sabha also took the view that the procedure
82under Art 368 was not necessary. The Law Minister explained 
that in the Berubari Reference the Supreme Court held that if 
acquisition is sought to be given effect to by alteration of 
the First Schedule, then a constitutional amendment was necessary. 
It is submitted that this is a misinterpretation of the judgment. 
Moreover, it is to be noticed that in the Ninth Amendment Act, 
acquisition of territories was effected by an ordinary law, 
namely, the Acquisition of Territories (Merger) Act, I960.
The real reason to act under Art 368 seems to be the amend­
ment to Art 2^0, which the Government intended to effect by the 
same Bill. Since that amendment could not be covered by Art if, 
action under Art 368 was essential. The Government should have
82. L.S. Debates, 2nd Series (1961) Vol.36, Col.2092.
83. Ibid. Col.21if9.
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acted under Art 368 to amend Art 240 but not to amend the 
First Schedule.
Procedure under Art 368; The Bill was introduced by Shrimati
Lakshmi Menon, the Deputy Minister for External Affairs,
84on 11th August 1961. It was moved for being taken into
consideration on 14th August 1961. No reference to a select
committee or a joint committee was made. Clauses 2 and 3 were
put to vote together. Clause 1, the Enacting Formula and the
85Title were voted together.
The Constitution (Eleventh Amendment) Act, 1961.
Objects and Reasons: It was considered that the requirement of
Art 66 (1) that members of the two Houses of Parliament should 
assemble at a joint sitting for the election of the Vice-President 
was totally unnecessary. Art 71 was sought to be amended 
because it was possible that the elections to the legislatures 
might not always be completed before the election of the 
President or Vice-President. The two proposals were given effect 
to by the Act.
Changes made: In Art 66 (1) the words flmembers of both Houses
of Parliament assembled at a joint meeting” were substituted by 
the words ffmembers of an electoral college consisting of 
members of both Houses of Parliament”. In Art 71 & new Clause (4)
84. L.S. Debates, 2nd Series (1961) Vol.56, Col.1658.
85. L.S. Debates, 2nd Series (1961) Vol.56, Col.2151.
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was inserted to provide that f,the election of a person as
President or Vice-President shall not be called in question
on the ground of the existence of any vacancy for whatever reason
among the members of the electoral college electing him.11
Was the amendment necessary? To justify the first proposal,
the sponsor mentioned a few difficulties such as the fact that
under Art 324 the Chief Election Commissioner has to conduct
all elections. If the Speaker or the Chairman of the Pajya
Sabha is to conduct the proceedings of the joint committee,
how can the Chief Election Commissioner conduct the election?
Since the number of the members is large, filing of nomination,
thereof
the scrutiny and withdrawal/and various other matters would
86have to be done outside the House.
It is submitted that the words in Art 66 were Mjoint
meeting*1 and not **joint sitting*1. Since it was not a sitting
of Parliament, it was not necessary for the Speaker or the
Chairman to preside and the Chief Election Commissioner could
have conducted the meeting. The difficulties adumbrated were
misconceived and without any substance. The second proposal
was made to plug a lacuna brought out by the decision in
87Khare v. Election Commissioner. In this case a point was made
86. L.S. Debates, 2nd Series (1961) V0I6O, Col.3267.
87. 1959 SCR 1081.
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that for a valid election of the President all elections to 
the two Houses of Parliament should be completed before the 
date of the Presidential election. Though the Supreme Court 
did not express its opinion on the point, the Government 
thought it fit to take out the ground of challenge. But 
the amendment goes further than this. The sponsor of the 
Bill explained that elections in the hilly areas such as 
Himachal Pradesh cannot be held at the same time as in the 
plains as these areas are snow-bound at that time. Therefore, 
the amendment was brought. The amendment seems to be very 
simple but it has far-reaching consequences. First, though
the prospective members from such areas are competent to contest
88the election for President, they have been denied the right 
to vote in such an election. It was not proper to deprive them 
of this right. Secondly, Art 71 (1) provides that all doubts 
and disputes arising out of or in connection with the election 
of a President or Vice-President shall be enquired into and 
decided by the Supreme Court whose decision shall be final.
The amendment to Art 71 restricts the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court in that it removes one ground of challenge, 
namely the existence of any vacancy for whatever reason among 
the members of the electoral college. Thirdly, it was pointed
88. Art 59 provides that the President shall not be a member of 
either House of Parliament.
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out by a member of the Rajya Sabha that the amendment had made
it very easy for the Government at the centre to advise the
President to dissolve three, four or five legislative
assemblies and get the Presidents election done when there
89was no member in these states, y The Law Minister who piloted
the Bill admitted that the Bill was capable of allowing the
elections of the President and Vice-President while the majority
90of the electoral college was vacant. It was proper that 
instead of "whatever reason" specific reasons should have been 
mentioned.
The difficulty could be solved by holding the election in
Himachal Pradesh three or four months ahead so that members from
this area could avail of their rights. That much change could
be effected in the Representation of the People Act. It seems
that there was no need for this amendment of the Constitution.
Procedure: The Bill was introduced by the Law Minister,
Mr. A.K. Sen. There was no reference to a select committee or
a joint committee. Nor was the Bill circulated for eliciting
public opinion. As usual, the special majority required by
Art 368 was obtained at all three stages of the Bill. At the
91consideration stage, each clause was voted separately. In
89. R.S. Debates (1961) Vol.36, Col.2003.
90. L.S. Debates, 2nd Series, (1961) Vol.61, Col.3328.
91. L.S. Debates, 2nd Series 1961, Vol.61, Col.3338. 
R.S. Debates (1961) Vol.36, Col.2033.
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the Lok Sabha, voting was done with the help of automatic
machines and many members complained that their machines did
not work properly. The Speaker corrected the mistakes in
voting but ruled that in future it would be a convention that
92
members must suffer for their mistakes.
The Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1962.
Objects and Reasons: It was thought fit by the Government to
include the former Portugues territories of Goa, Daman and Diu 
in the First Schedule to the Constitution under the heading 
"The Union Territories'1 after Entry 7. It was also considered 
that Clause (1) of Art 2^0 should be suitably amended to confer 
power on the President to make regulations for the peace, 
progress and good government of Goa, Daman and Diu. Therefore, 
the Act makes appropriate amendments to the Constitution.
Was the amendment necessary under Art 368? Whatever has been 
said about the Tenth Amendment in regard to its necessity or 
otherwise applies to this amendment also. For amending the 
First Schedule of the Constitution in order to include the 
territories of Goa, Daman and Diu, Parliament could safely act 
under Art 4 (2) and effect the required amendment by an 
ordinary law. But it seems that it was in order to amend 
Art 21+0 rather than to amend the First Schedule that Parliament
92. L.S. Debates, 2nd Series (1961) Vol.61, Col3338. 
R.S. Debates (1961) Vol.36, Col.2033.
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proceeded under Art 368 so that the amendment of Art 240 
might be saved from harsher criticism. As a matter of fact, 
if Parliament had amended the First Schedule by an ordinary 
law which was the right course according to the consitutional 
provisions, then the amendment of Art 240 under Art 368 would 
have drawn the attention of the critics of the Government.
It is submitted that if the Government could adopt any other 
way of administering these territories than by the President 
under Art 240, a constitutional amendment under Art 368 was 
not necessary at all.
Procedure under Art 368: The Bill was introduced by the Prime
ax
Minister, Mr. Jawahar Lai Nehru, on March 12th, 1962. It
was taken up for consideration on 14th March and passed unani- 
94mously, by a large number of members present and voting. The 
requirement of a special majority was fulfilled at each stage 
of the Bill. For the purpose of voting, Clauses 2 and 3 were 
put to vote together and Clause 1, the Enacting Formula and the 
Title were put as one clause. The Bill was presented to the 
Rajya Sabha on 15th March and it was passed by that House on 
20th March.
93. L.S. Debates 2nd Series (1962) Vol.61, Col.37.
94. L.S. Debates 2nd Series (1962) Vol.61, Col.312. 
R.S. Debates, Vol.37, Col.801 (1962)
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The Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1962,
Objects and Reasons; As a result of an agreement between the 
Government of India and the leaders of the Naga Peoples con­
vention a separate state of Nagaland was sought to be created.
To give effect to the agreement, the Constitution was amended 
suitably.
Changes Made: The title of Part XXI of the Constitution was
changed from "Temporary and Transitional Provisions11 to 
"Temporary, Transitional and Spedial Provisions". A new 
article, namely Art 371A was inserted containing special pro­
visions with respect to the State of Nagaland. It is to be 
noted that Clauses k and 3 of the State of Nagaland Act 1962 
respectively amended the First and Sixth Schedules of the Consti­
tution. The State of Nagaland has been treated on a special 
footing. For instance, it has been provided that, notwithstanding 
anything in the Constitution, no Act of Parliament in respect 
of the specified matters shall apply to the State of Nagaland 
unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so 
decides. It was further provided that the Tuensang district 
shall be administered by the Governor who has been clothed with 
powers by which he may repeal or amend with retrospective effect,
if necessary, any Act of Parliament or any other law which is for
95the time being applicable to that district.
95- Art 371A (d).
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Procedure under Art 368: The Bill was introduced by the
Prime Minister, Mr. Jawahar Lai Nehru, on 21st August 1962.
An objection was raised by an honourable member on the intro­
duction of the Bill. He cited Rule 66 of the procedure of 
the House which says that a Bill which is dependent wholly or 
partly upon another Bill pending before the House, may be 
introduced in the House in anticipation of the passing of the 
Bill on which it is dependent. In his view, the Bill in 
question was dependent upon the State of Nagaland Bill and 
since the latter had not been introduced by that time and,
therefore, was not pending before the House, the former could
96not be introduced. In this connection, reference was made 
to the Seventh Amendment Act in which case the States Reorgani­
sation Bill was passed first and then the Constitution was 
amended. The honourable Member thought that the Constitution 
could not be amended unless the State of Nagaland was consti­
tuted. But the Speaker observed that Nagaland could not be 
constituted unless the Constitution was first amended. He 
ruled that Rule 66 did not apply as the two Bills were inter­
dependent and not dependent one on the other and hence the intro­
duction of the Bill was in order. It is to be noted that the
96. L.S. Debates 3rd Series (1962) Vol.7, Col.3179-
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State of Nagaland Bill was also introduced on the same day.
Both the Bills were moved together for being considered simul-
07
taneously. In both Houses, the two Bills were discussed 
together. For the purpose of voting, the State of Nagaland 
Bill was passed by simple majority, it being an ordinary law where­
as the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Bill was passed under 
Art 368. As noted above, the State of Nagaland Bill amended 
the First and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution. An honourable 
member of the Rajya Sabha criticised the device of effecting 
constitutional amendments by an ordinary law. When the consti­
tutional amendment Bill was also on the anvil, why were all the
provisions relating to amendment of the Constitution not embodied
98in one and the same Bill and other provisions in the other Bill?
The sponsor of the Bill replied that Art 2, 3, and 4 of the 
Constitution allow this being done by an ordinary law and, there­
fore, it was not necessary that Clauses 4 and 3 of the State of 
Nagaland Bill should have found a place in the Constitution
QQ
(Thirteenth Amendment) Bill.
It is significant to note that a demand was made in the 
House that in accordance with Art 3, the views of the State of
97. R.S. Debates (1962) Vol.40, Col.4686.
98. L.S. Debates 3rd Series (1962) Vol.?, Col.4498.
99. Ibid. Col.4714.
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Assam should have been ascertained by the President and the
same should have been made available to the members. The
Speaker informed the House that the Assam legislature had
already considered the matter and the proceedings of that
House were available at the counter. About 18 members in the
Legislative Assembly of Assam took part in the debate and as
many as 16 opposed the bifurcation of the State.
It is further to be observed that no reference to a select
or joint committee was made. Nor was the Bill circulated for
the purpose of eliciting public opinion on it. The special
majority required by Art 368 was observed at the three stages
of the Bill. Each clause of the Bill was voted separately
in both the H o u s e s . A s  usual, amendments to clauses were
decided by voice vote. In regard to two such amendments, the
ruling of the Speaker was questioned and, therefore, a division
102was ordered in each case.
The Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act, 1962.
Objects and Reasons; As a result of the Indo-French Treaty of 
16th August 1962, the French establishments of Pondicherry, 
Karikal, Mahe and Yanam became territories of the Indian Union.
100. L.S. Debates 3rd Series (1962) Vol.7, Col.4538.
101. Ibid, Col4638; R.S. Debates (1962) Vol.40, Col.4718.
102. L.S. Debates 3rd series (1962) Vol.7, Cols.4.627-4635*
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The amendment provided for these territories being specified 
in the Constitution as a Union Territory called "Pondicherry".
It was thought necessary to give representation to Pondicherry 
in both Houses of Parliament. Therefore, Art 81 was suitably 
amended. By inserting a new Art 239A, Parliament has been 
given necessary legislative power to enact lav/s for creating 
legislatures and councils of ministers in certain Union 
Territories.
Changes Made: In Art 81 (b)(1) the words "twenty members" were
substituted by "twenty-five members" so that "Pondicherry" might 
have five representatives in the House of the People (Lok Sabha).
The First Schedule to the Constitution was amended to 
include the ninth entry under the heading the Union Territories. 
The most significant change brought about by the amendment is 
the insertion of a new Art 239A. It is to be noted that the 
provisions of Art 239A are applicable to the Union Territories 
of Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura, Goa, Daman and Diu and 
Pondicherry. Therefore, it was not an amendment purely relating 
to Pondicherry; it is in fact a constitution of the Union 
Territories. The Parliament was empowered to create by law
(a) a body whether elected or partly nominated and partly 
elected, to function as a Legislature for a Union territory, or
(b) a council of ministers, or both, with such constitution,
^ 8
powers, and functions, in each case, as may be specified in 
105the law. Art 239A (2) provides that any such law is is
referred to in Clause 1 ©hall hot be deemed to be an amendment 
of the Constitution for the purpose of Art 368 notwithstanding 
that it contains any provision which amends or has the effect 
of amending the Constitution. This means that Parliament was 
given power to amend the provisions relating to the legislature 
or council of ministers for a Union Territory by ordinary law 
even when such amendment amends or has the effect of amending 
the Constitution. In reality, this provision robs Art 368 of 
its potency in relation to those provisions of the Constitution 
which happen to be affected by a law under Art 239A. In other 
words, Parliament has been relieved of the necessity of observing 
the special majority required by Art 368 at least in respect of 
one matter, viz. a law relating to the Constitution of the 
legislature or council of ministers or both for a Union Territory, 
though it may affect such provisions of the Constitution as are 
amendable by a special majority under Art 368. It is to be 
noted that though only one matter-seems to have been saved from 
the operation of Art 368, in actuality other provisions of the 
Constitution may be affected e.g. the mode of election and 
nomination of a legislature under Art 239A (l)(a) might be
103. Art 239A (l)(a) & (b).
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different from what is prescribed for the state legislatures.
The powers and functions of a legislature or council of ministers 
or both might not be at one with the corresponding provisions 
for the state legislatures. The wording of Art 239A has been 
so widely phrased that a different constitution for the Union 
Territories can be framed by Parliament by ordinary law containing 
provisions contrary to the Constitution of India.
When the Members criticised the Government on the insertion 
of Art 239A,^^ the sponsor explained that Art 239A (2) was 
bodily taken from Part VIII of the Constitution which had been 
repealed by the Seventh Amendment Act. The intendment of the 
Government was that the legislatures of the Union Territories 
should be empowered to legislate in regard to matters enumerated 
in the state and concurrent lists subject to the overriding 
legislative authority of Parliament. This would in effect 
entail an amendment of Art . Moreover, it was also inten­
ded that there might be a separate consolidated Fund for each 
Union Territory which might have a legislature and the revenues 
relatable to matters in the state and concurrent lists might 
be directly credited to the Consolidated Fund of India. For 
this, Article 266 would also have required amendment. There­
fore an all-covering provision was made in Art 239A.
10^. L.S. Debates 3rd series (1962) Vol.8, Col.3940.
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Art 2.1+0 (1) was amended to include "Pondicherry” with 
a proviso that when any body is created under Art 239A to 
function as the legislature for Goa, Daman and Diu or Pondicherry, 
the President shall not act under Art 2k0. The Fourth Schedule 
was amended to give one seat to Pondicherry in the Council of 
States. Section 7 of the Amendment Act provides that the 
amendment of the First Schedule (Section 3 of the Amending Act) 
and the amendment of Art 2k0 (l)(a) (Section 3 (a) of the Act) 
shall be deemed to have come into force on 16th.August 1962 
i.e. with retrospective effect.
Modus operandi under Art 368: The Bill was introduced by the
Home Minister Mr. Lai Bahadur Shastri in the Lok Sabha on
30th August 1962. It was taken up for consideration on
kth September 1962. The special majority was observed at the
three stages of the Bill. Each clause except Clause 1 was
105voted separately. ^ The Bill as passed by the Lok was sent
to the Rajya Sabha on 5th September 1962. It was taken up for
consideration on 7th September 1962. Many members complained
that there was insufficient time to consider so many bills at the
fag end of the session. The sponsor of the Bill himself admitted
that the Bill did not come up in the Upper House in accordance
107with the rules of the House. Each clause was voted separately
105. L.S. Debates 3rd Series (1962) Vol.8, Col.5971.
106. R.S. Debates (1962) Vol./fO, Col.5325.
107. R.S. Debates (1962) Vol.JfO, Col.5373-
451
for the purposes of Art 368 and a special majority was 
observed. It is submitted that S.3 and 6 of the Amendment 
Act could have been passed by ordinary majority under Art 2 and 
3 because they amended the First Schedule and the Fourth Schedule 
respectively. By virtue of Art 4 (2) the amendment should not 
have gone through the procedure of Art 368. Of course, other 
sections of the Bill required the operation of Art 368. It 
was not because of mere constitutional recognition of Pondicherry 
that the Constitution was amended since that did not require any 
amendment of the Constitution under Art 368. In fact, it was 
for creating a special administrative machinery for the Union 
Territories that the Constitution was amended.
The Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963.
Objects and Reasons: It was proposed to raise the age of
retirement of High Court judges from sixty to sixty-two years. 
Therefore, Art 217 was amended. A further amendment to Art 217 
and a consequential amendment to Art 124 were necessitated by 
the Case of Mitter J. of the Calcutta High Court, who contended 
that, contrary to the view of the Union Home Ministry, he was 
under sixty years of age and hence not due for retirement.
Since the Chief Justice refused to allocate work to him,
Mitter J. filed a petition in the Calcutta High Court seeking
I a O
a writ of mandamus against the Chief Justice.
The Amendment Act also inserted a new clause (2) in 
Art 222 to provide for compensatory allowances to judges 
transferred from one High Court to another under Art 222 (1). 
Under Article^ as it stood originally, a petitioner inten­
ding to proceed against the Union Government could do so only 
in the Punjab High Court because the seat of the Union
Government - Delhi - was within the jurisdiction of the Punjab 
109High Court. J This caused inconvenience to residents living 
in distant parts of India. Therefore Art 226 was amended to 
make it possible to proceed against any Government or authority 
in the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action 
arises, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or 
authority or the residence of such person is not within the 
territory of the High Court. Articles 311, 297, 316 and Entry 
78 of List I were also amended.
108. Jyeti Prakash v. H.K. Bose C.J. AIR 1963 Col.483.
On a preliminary objection, the High Court held that it 
was competent to issue a writ against the Chief Justice. 
The latterfs appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed. 
For a criticism of this provision, see Seervai: op.cit. 
supra, pp 1011-12.
109.Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao AIR 1933 
S.C.210.
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Changes Made: The Amendment Act made very significant changes
in regard to the tenure and other matters relating to High 
Court and Supreme Court judges. The provision regarding the 
determination of age of a High Court judge is capable of being 
abused and, therefore, affect the independence of the judiciary 
in India. The Amendment of Art 226 was desirable and non- 
controversial. As a matter of fact, the Amendment Act con­
tained many matters and touched important provisions of the 
Constitution. It was rightly characterised as a ’’legal and 
constitutional jumble sale,”^ ^  jumbling up all sorts of 
amendments of the Constitution. In the Rajya Sabha it was 
contended by a member that separate Bills should have been 
brought to amend the Constitution so that sufficient attention 
could be devoted to each matter sought to be provided for. But 
the Law Minister, who was piloting the Bill, replied that there 
was nothing in the Art 368 that requires that each separate 
provision should form the subject matter of a separate Bill and 
that, on the contrary, the Government had been telling both the 
Houses that the necessary constitutional amendments would be 
collected together to be incorporated in one consolidated Bill.^^
110. L.S. Debates 3rd series (1962) Vol.2, Col.5023 (8th December).
111. R.S. Debates (1963) Vol.43, Cols. 2587-88.
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Modus operand! under Art 368: The Bill was introduced in the
Lok Sabha on 8th December 1962 by the then Law Minister,
Mr. A.K. Sen. On 11th December 1962, a motion was made to
refer the Bill to a Joint Committee consisting of 45 members,
30 from the Lok Sabha and 15 from the Rajya Sabha. The Report
of the Committee was to be submitted by the last day of the
first week of the next session. However, the time for the
presentation of the Report was extended. It is to be noted
that the time fixed for the discussion on the reference motion
in the Rajya Sabha was only half an^hour and many members rightly
felt that more time should have been given for the motion so
that the Members of the Select Committee could know the criticisms
112and suggestions made by the other Members of the House.
Ultimately the Report was considered on 29th April 1963. The 
special majority was observed for the reference motion, the con­
sideration and the third reading of the Bill. Each Clause was
113put to vote separately. In the Rajya Sabha, the Chairman
proposed putting clauses 7 to 9 together. An honourable Member 
objected to this being done. He observed that taking the 
clauses together for voting did not meet the requirements of 
the Constitution. Because it might be conceivable that a
112. R.S. Debates (1962) Vol.41, Col.4009.
113. L.S. Debates 3rd series (1963) Vol.18, Col.13156.
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member may not like to v;ote against a particular clause but
would like to reverse his stand in regard to another clause.
If all the clauses are lumped together and one vote is taken,
114he is denied the chance of making his choice. ^ The Chairman, 
therefore, put Clauses 7 to 9 also separately to vote. Since 
some of the provisions of the Amendment Act related to the 
entrenched provisions under Art 368 the Bill had to be ratified 
by at least half the State Legislatures before receiving the 
assent of the President on 3th October 1963*
The Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 1963*
Objects and Reasons; The Committee on National Integration and 
Regionalism appointed by the National Integration Council recom­
mended that Art 19 of the Constitution be so amended that 
adequate powers become available for the preservation and 
maintenance of the integrity and sovereignty of the Union. It 
was further proposed by the Committee that every candidate for 
membership of a State legislature or Parliament and every aspirant 
to and incumbent of public office should pledge himself to uphold 
the Constitution and to preserve the integrity and sovereignty 
of the Union.
114* R.S. Debates (1963) Vol.43, Col.2736.
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Changes Made: Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of Art 19 were amended to
enable the State to make any law imposing reasonable restrictions 
on the exercise of the rights conferred by sub-clauses (a), (b) 
and (c) of Art 19 (1) iu the interest of "the sovereignty and 
integrity" of India. Art 84 and 173 and the Third Schedule to 
the Constitution was amended so as to provide that every candi­
date for membership of Parliament and a State Legislature,
Union and State Ministers, Members of Parliament and State 
Legislatures, Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts 
and the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India should take an 
oath to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India. The 
object of the amendment is so laudable that no-one can quarrel 
with it but this object could have been attained by other means 
than by amending the Constitution. So far as the forms of oath 
for candidates to the legislatures are concerned these could 
have been easily provided in the Representation of the People 
Act. It is to be noted that the President and the civil servants 
have been exempted from taking any such oath. As regards the 
President, the Law Minister was of the view that it was not 
necessary to include the President specifically because he is
the protector of the Constitution, and therefore, he automatically 
115comes in. The measure was rightly criticised for placing
113. L.S. Debates 3rd Series (1963) Vol.12, Col.3815-
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restriction on the exercise of the Fundamental Right in Art 19
by employing expressions like "sovereignty and integrity which
have not been tested anywhere in the context of curtailing the
116liberties of the people." These expressions are, indeed,
elusive and indefinite and carry with them, at the same time, 
a wide and varying coverage. These are capable of being abused 
and of inviting a host of legal wrangles. It remains unexplored 
whether the preservation of sovereignty and integrity of India 
cannot be achieved by enacting laws in the interest of the 
T*security of the state" and "public purpose" under Art 19.
Modus operand! under Art 368: The Bill was introduced by the
Law Minister on 21st January 1963. At the first reading stage, 
a motion was made for the Bill to be referred to the same Joint 
Committee to which the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Bill 
had been referred. The Law Minister explained that the purpose 
of bringing together these two Amending Bills was that they might 
be considered by the House at the same time and voting be done 
on the same occasion instead of having to go through the
117procedure for constitutional amendment on two occasions.
The Joint Committee was already dealing with the Fifteenth 
Amendment Bill, examining witnesses and studying memoranda sent 
by various associations. When the Committee was so overworked,
116. Mr. Narayan Rao, Research Officer Indian Law Institute, 
quoted in L.S. Debates (1963) Vol.l8, Col.13^12.
117. L.S. Debates 3rd Series (1963) Vol.12, Col.5769*
it was neither proper nor advisable to refer the two Bills
to one and the same Committee, especially when the Fifteenth
Amendment Bill was a comprehensive one. It is for the first
time that two Constitution Amendment Bills were referred to
the same Committee. This was a very bad precedent and ought
not to be followed in future. However, the consideration of
the two Bills was not taken up simultaneously as was intended
by the sponsor of the Bills. The Bill was voted clause by
clause for the purpose of a special majority under Art 368 in
llRboth the Houses of Parliament.
The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 1964 
Objects and Reasons: The main object of the amendment was to
amend Art 31A, particularly in regard to the definition of "estate". 
The expression ^estate", as it stood before, was defined 
differently in different states and in different parts of the 
same state. Several state Acts relating to land reform 
were struck down on the ground that the provisions of those 
Acts were violative of Art 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution and 
Art 31A could not protect them. Therefore, the definition of 
"estate" in Art 31A was amended so as to include lands held 
under ryotwari settlement and also other lands in respect of 
which provisions are normally made in land reform enactments.
118. L.S. Debates 3rd Series (1963) Vol.18, Col.13476.
R.S. Debates (1963) Vol.43, Col.2892.
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Certain State laws relating to land reform were sought to be 
protected by putting them in the Ninth Schedule.
Changes Made; In Art 31A a new proviso was added after the 
existing proviso:
"Provided further that where any law makes any provision 
for the acquisition by the state of any estate and 
where any land comprised therein is held by a person 
under his personal cultivation, it shll not be lawful 
for the state to acquire any portion of such land as is 
within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any 
law for the time being in force or any building struc­
ture standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless 
the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building 
or structure, provides for compensation at a rate which 
shall not be less than the market value thereof."
In Clause 2 (a) of Art 31 the expression "estate" was given an 
inclusive definition. The Ninth Schedule to the Constitution 
was amended to include 124 State laws so as to protect them from 
the challenge of the fundamental rights in Part III. Commenting 
upon the Ninth Schedule device, it was pointed out by an 
eminent lawyer, that if there is inherent lack of legislative 
competence, no amount of incorporation in a Schedule to the 
Constitution will validate an enactment which is void.
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Incorporation of any Act in the Ninth Schedule means that a
challenge for invalidity on the ground of its being repugnant
to the fundamental rights is no longer open, but that cannot
119validate a void law. It cannot cure the initial defect.
The amendment was a very contentious and controversial measure. 
It was argued that it would expropriate the holdings of poor 
peasantry. But it seems that the measure, in fact, did not 
deserve the harsh treatment meted out to it by its opponents. 
Since the amendment touched property rights, it provoked nation­
wide controversy, which was reflected in the Lok Sabha.
Modus operandi under Art 368: The measure had a checquered
history in Parliament; it had to undergo many ups and downs 
before being enacted. The Bill was moved by the Law Minister, 
Mr. A.K. Sen, on 18th September 1963 to be referred to a Joint 
Committee consisting of 45 members of whom 30 were to be taken
from the Lok Sabha and 13 from the Rajya Sabha. The proposal
for circulating the Bill to elicit public opinion was negatived.
It is to be noted that the reference motiLon was adopted by a
simple majority i.e. no division was taken. When a member
argued that voting should be by division, the Speaker ruled that
121it was not an amendment as yet. The Committee presented its
119. L.S. Debates 3rd Series (1964) Vol.32, Col.378.
120. L.S. Debates 3rd Series (1963) Vol.21, Col.7136.
121. Ibid. Col.7137.
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Report on 23th March 1964 and the Lok Sabha took it into con­
sideration on 31st March 1964. On 17th May 1964 the Bill 
was put to vote for taking into consideration. At the time 
the Bill was put to vote, many members of the ruling party 
were outside the House for the purpose of voting for various 
committees. The division bell was rung for two minutes and 
afterwards the doors of the House were closed. The voting was 
done by the automatic machine and the result was declared as 
206 Ayes and 19 Noes. Many members of the majority party
contended that the mechanical device failed to function and,
122therefore, there should be proper voting once again. The
Law Minister suggested that the Speaker should invoke his
residuary power to allow proper voting. But the Speaker
did not accede to his suggestion and he said, "Whatever has
happened may be very unfortunate, but the facts are to be
accepted, whatever the consequences. I am not prepared to
123sacrifice the traditions of Parliament." There was then,
no alternative for the Government except to introduce the Bill 
onee again. The same Bill was introduced as the Constitution
122. L.S. Debates 3rd Series, 1964, Vol.30, Col.13223.
123. Ibid. Col.13223.
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(Nineteenth Amendment) in a special session of the
Parliament on 27th May 1964 - a fateful day on which death laid
its icy hands on the beloved Prime Minister Mr. Jawahar Lai Nehru.
The Bill was pressed for consideration on 1st June 1964 by the
care-taker Government headed by Mr. G.L. Nanda. This time also
the motion for circulating the Bill for public opinion was nega- 
125tived. For the purpose of special majority all the clauses
were voted separately but Clause 1 (short title) was adopted
by ordinary majority. In this clause the word T,NineteenthM
was substituted by "Seventeenth" on the motion of the sponsor.
An honourable member rose on a point of order that there was no
division on Clause 1 under Pule 155 but he was informed that
Clause 1 was only a short title and could be adopted by a simple 
126majority. Another member asked the Speaker the time when
124. It was numbered as Nineteenth11 because the Constitution 
(Eighteenth) Bill was pending in the Lok Sabha at that 
time. The object of that Bill was to amend the Consti­
tution in such a way as to immunize the executive violations 
of the fundamental rights committed during the period of emer­
gency. The Bill was vehemently criticised and opposed at 
the introduction stage. Ultimately the Government thought
it better to withdraw the Bill and so the House was informed 
by-the sponsor that the Government did not want to proceed 
with the Bill. It is to be noted that no leave to with­
draw was requested and an honourable Member observed that 
the Minister should ask for leave to withdraw the Bill.
The Speaker ruled that the Minister was not withdrawing 
the Bill; he was just not proceeding with the Bill. In 
fact, the result was the same; it was withdrawal.
L.S. Debates 3rd Series, Vol.30, Col.12225.
125. L.S. Debates 3rd Series (1964) Vol.32, Col.kk5.
126. Ibid. Col.681.
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voting would take place at the end of the third stage of the
Bill. At this, another member rightly pointed out that it is
not a very sound practice that members should come and vote
127
without taking any interest in the discussion. The Bill was 
passed in the Lok Sabha on 2nd June 1964. It was considered
-| pO
by the Rajya Sabha on 4th June 1964. All clauses including
129Clause 1 (short title) were voted separately, 7 and the Bill 
was passed on 5th June 1964.
The Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 1966.
Objects and Reasons: The Government acceded to the demand for
forming a new state out of the Punjab state on the basis of 
language and, therefore, the old Punjab state was bifurcated 
into two states called Punjab and Haryana. It was intended to 
include some areas of Himachal Pradesh - a Union Territory, in 
the new Punjab state. There seemed to be a constitutional 
difficulty because Art 3 under which Parliament has power 
inter alia to unite two or more states, speaks of "states" and 
not "Union Territories". Before the Constitution (Seventh 
Amendment) Act, 1956. was enacted, the expression "states" 
occurring in Art 3 meant Part A, Part B and Part C states.
127. L.S. Debates 3rd Series (1964) Vol.32, Col.685.
128. R.S. Debates (1964) Vol.48, Col.789.
129. Ibid, Col.1030-1047.
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By the Seventh Amendment, the concept of*Union Territories" 
was introduced in the Constitution hut Art 3 was not amended 
to include "Union Territories". Therefore, there was a doubt 
that if Art 3 was not amended so as to include "Union Territories" 
the merger of some Union Territory with the Punjab state would 
be unconstitutional.^^ The Eighteenth Amendment defines the 
word "state" as including "Union Territory" for the purposes 
of Clauses (a) to (e) of Art 3 but not including "Union 
Territory" for the purpose of the proviso to Art 3. It was 
also considered proper to make it clear that the power under 
Art 3 (a) includes power to form a new state or union territory 
by uniting a part of a state or union territory to another 
state or union territory.
Changes Made: Art 3 came to have an explanation to the effect
that the word "state" includes "Union Territory" for the purposes 
of Clauses (a) to (e) of Art 3 but not for the purpose of the 
proviso to Art 3 which provides that a Bill under Art 3 can be 
introduced only after the President has referred the Bill to 
the States concerned for expressing their views on the Bill and 
the period prescribed by the President for expressing such views 
has expired. Since all the Union Territories do not have a
130. L.S. Debates 3rd Series (1966) Vol.56, Col.17118.
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legislature, such a procedure, even if Parliament was so 
minded, would not have been practicable for Union Territories.
Of course, the formality is not of much importance because the 
Union Government is not bound by the views of the State 
Legislatures concerned. It has ignored such views in the 
past.1^1 But it contains a good principle of consulting the 
will of the people in such matters.
It is to be noted that this Amendment would have been 
avoided if sufficient attention had been paid by the draftsmen 
of the Seventh Amendment Act by which Clauses 2 and 3 of Art 1 
were amended so as to abolish the three categories of states and 
to convert the erstwhile Part C States into Union Territories.
Had Art 3 been futher modified so that the word "state" might 
include "Union Territory", the Eighteenth Amendment would have 
been entirely unnecessary. The second Explanation added by 
the Amendment to Art 3 reads as follows:
"The power conferred on Parliament by Clause (a) includes 
the power to form a new State or Union Territory by 
uniting a part of any State or Union Territory to any 
other State or Union Territory."
Modus operandi under Art 368: This Bill also had to undergo
the vicissitude of the special majority required by Art 368.
131. For example, in the case of Ninth Amendment, views of the
West Bengal Assembly were not taken into account. Similarly 
in the state of Nagaland Bill 1962 (Act 27 of 1962) the views 
of the Assam Legislative Assembly were almost ignored.
if66
It was introduced by the Minister of State on behalf of the
Home Minister in the Lok Sabha on 9th May 1966 as the Constitution
132(Nineteenth Amendment) Bill. When the Bill was moved for
being taken into consideration, the requisite majority of the
133members was not there and consequently the Bill was not carried.
It was r^htroduced as the Constitution (Twentieth Amendment)
Bill in the Lok Sabha by Mr. C.R. Pattabhi Raman, the Minister
of State in the Ministry of Lav/, on 25th July 1966. It was
taken up for consideration on 10th August 1966. The Law Minister,
Mr. G.S. Pathak, piloted the Bill. An honourable member asked
the Speaker to tell the time for voting so that Members might
be informed to be present in the House at that time.^^ Though
the practice was criticised as "wrong11, the approximate time for
bfoting was fixed. For the purposes of voting under Art 368
Clause 2 of the Bill was voted by division but Clause 1 (short 
was voted by simple majority. In Clause 1, the word "Twentieth"
title)/was substituted by the word "Eighteenth" by moving an 
amendment by the Law Minister. The Bill was passed by the 
Lok Sabha on 10th August 1966.^^
132. L.S. Debates 3rd Series 1966 vol.53 Col.l53^f3*
133. L.S. Debates 3rd Series 1966 Vol.56 Col.17121.
13*f. L.S. Debates 3rd Series 1966 Vol.58 Col.3936.
133. Ibid. Col.3998.
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The Constitution (Nineteenth Amendment) Act, 1966.
Objects and Reasons: Under Art 324 of the Consitution,
there was provision for the appointment of election tribunals 
by the Election Commission to decide disputes arising out of 
elections to Parliament or to state legislatures.
The Government proposed that, instead of election tribunals 
High Courts be empowered to decide such disputes so that there 
might be expedition in the resolution of election disputes. 
Changes Made: In Art 324 of the Constitution the words
"including the appointment of election tribunal for the decision 
of doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with 
elections to Parliament and to the Legislatures of States*? 
were omitted.
Modus operandi under Art 368: The Nineteenth Amendment Bill was
introduced by the Law Minister, Mr. G.S. Pathak, on 29th August 
1966 in the Lok Sabha. In fact it was introduced as the 
Constitution (Twenty-First Amendment) Bill and it was renumbered 
as "Nineteenth" at the stage of clause by clause consideration 
by moving an amendment to Clause 1.
The jurisdiction to try election disputes was conferred on 
the High Courts by an amendment of the Representation of the 
People Act 1951* This amendment and that of the Constitution 
were taken up for discussion together. An objection was taken
136to these two Bills being discussed simultaneously. It
was argued that the Constitution should be amended first and 
then the Representation of People Act be amended because the 
latter Bill depended on the former Bill. An honourable 
Member observed that Art 32-k was mandatory and, therefore, the 
constitutional amendment must be effected first. The Law 
Minister took the view that both the Bills were interdependent 
and that, in any case, mere voting cannot make a Bill an Act. 
Until and unless the President gives his assent a Bill does not 
become an Act. Ultimately the Speaker ruled that the two Bills 
should be discussed together but for the purposes of voting, 
the Constitution Amendment Bill would be passed first. The 
Bill was thoroughly discussed and was ready to be vo ted on but 
the requisite majority of the members was lacking. On 5th Nov­
ember 1966 the Government moved a motion to adjourn the debate 
because many Members had gone on Diwali Holidays to their 
constituencies. The opposition Members vehemently criticised
the government for its ineptitude in organising the business of 
137the House. They argued that there should not be an
adjournment merely for the sake of taking votes. The motion
170
for adjournment was put to vote and was carried. The Bill
136. L.S. Debates 3rd Series (1966) Vol.60, Col.2169.
137. Ibid, Col.3026.
138. Ibid, Col.3037.
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was passed in the next sitting. For the purposes of Art 368, 
a special majority was observed at the three effective stages 
of the Bill. It was signed by the President on 11th December 1966.
The Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act. 1966.
Objects and Reasons: The appointments of district judges in
Uttar Pradesh and a few other States were rendered invalid
139and illegal by a judgment of the Supreme Court on the ground 
that such appointments were not made in accordance with the 
provisions of Art 233* In another judgment the Supreme Court 
held that the power of posting a district judge under Art 233 
does not include the power of transfer of such judges fronj one 
station to another; the power of transfer was covered under 
the word Control1' in Art 235 and was, therefore, to be exer­
cised by the High Court. In order to validate the judgements, 
decrees, orders and sentences passed or made by all such district 
judges in those States and also to validate the appointment, 
posting, promotion and transfer of such district judges barring 
those few who were not eligible for appointment under Art 233, 
the amendment was brought.
139- Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 S.C.1987.
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Changes brought about by the Amendment; After Art 233 another 
article 233A was inserted which reads as follows:
n233A notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of 
any court ....
(a) (i) No appointment of any person already in the
judicial service of a state or of any person who 
has been for not less than seven years an advo­
cate or pleader, to be a district judge in that 
state, and
(ii) No posting, promotion or transfer of any such 
.person as a district judge made at any time 
before the commencement of the Constitution 
(Twentieth Amendment) 1966 otherwise than in 
accordance with the provisions of article 233 or 
Art 235 shall be deemed to be illegal or void or 
ever to have become illegal or void by reason 
only of the fact that such appointment, posting, 
promotion or transfer was not made in accordance 
with the said provisions;
(b) No jurisdiction exercised no judgment, decree, sentence 
or order passed or made and no other act or proceeding 
done or taken, before the commencement of the 
Constitution (Twentieth) Act, 1966, by or before any 
person appointed, posted, promoted or transferred as
a district judge in any state otherwise than in
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accordance with the provisions of Art 233 or Art
235 shall be deemed to be illegal or invalid or
ever to have become illegal or invalid by reason
only of the fact that such appointment, posting,
promotion or transfer was not made in accordance with
the said provisions
It is to be noted that the judgment of the Supreme Court
was delivered on 8th June 1966 but the judges affected were not
stopped from carrying on their duties. If the Government had
determined not to amend the Constitution, only eleven judges
140would have been affected. It is questionable whether it
was proper for the government to have regularised and legalised 
the irregularities and illegalities committed by the executive, 
by amending the Constitution.
Modus operandi under Art 368: The Bill was introduced by the
Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Y.B. Chavan in the Lok Sabha, on 
25th November 1966 under the title the Constitution (Twenty-Third; 
Amendment) Bill. It was taken up for consideration on 
3rd December 1966. The Bill came up for discussion at the fag 
end of the extended session. When an honourable Member asked 
the Speaker to fix the approximate time for voting, the Speaker
140. L.S. Debates 3rd Series (1966) Vol*62, Col.7250.
fixed the t i m e I n  observing the special majority under
Art 368, the Bill was voted at the three stages, namely,
adoption of the Bill, consideration, third reading; each clause
was voted separately and in clause 2 the words "Twenty-third11
1U2.were substituted by "Twentieth".
The Constitution (Twenty-first Amendment) Act. 1967.
Objects and Reasons: About a million Sindhi people, who are
residents of India, speak the Sindhi language. This language 
is well-developed and rich in cultural heritage. There is no 
specific area in which this language is spoken, because before 
partition Sindhis used to live in Sindh which is now within 
the territory of Pakistan. The Sindhi people sacrificed their 
identity for the sake of the freedom of India. Because of 
their patriotic contribution and the cultural heritage of the 
Sindhi language, Sindhi was included in the list of languages 
in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution.
Changes brought about by the Amendment: In the Eighth Schedule
Entries 12 to l^ t were renumbered as entries 13 to 13 respectively, 
and Entry 12 now mentioned Sindhi.
141. L.S. Debates 3rd Series Vol.62, Col.7233. 
li+2. Ibid. Col.7333.
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Modus operandi under Art 368: The Bill was first introduced in
the Rajya Sabha in the month of November 1966. It was con­
sidered and passed by the House on 9th December. The Bill 
remained pending in the Lok Sabha, but it lapsed because of 
the dissolution of the Lok Sabha on 3rd March 1967. The Bill
was again introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 20th March 1967
143by the Home Minister, Mr. Y.B. Chavan. It was taken up
for consideration on 4th April 1967 by the Rajya Sabha. It
was a non-controversial measure and was passed unanimously
144by the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha. The Lok Sabha passed 
it on 7th April 1967 and it was signed by the President on 
10th April 1967.
It is of interest to note that this is the first amendment 
which originated in the Rajya Sabha.
A Review of the Amending Process at Work
The practical working of the procedure prescribed in 
Art 368 has presented a few difficulties which require consider­
ation. It is proposed to state them and suggest how they can 
be removed.
143. R.S. Debates (1967) Vol.39, Col.177.
144. Ibid, Col.2121; L.S. Debates 4th Series (1967) Vol.2, 
Col.3608.
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1. Who should introduce and pilot the Bill?
According to Art 368 every member of the Lok Sabha or 
Rajya Sabha is competent to introduce a Bill seeking to amend 
the Constitution of India! But it is very rare for such a 
Private Member's Bill to be passed because it is impossible 
to gain the special majority required by Art 368 without the 
co-operation of the Government. When the Government intends 
to amend the Constitution, who should introduce and pilot the 
Bill? The practice so far established in this regard suggests 
that there is no particular consideration; some Bills have 
been moved by the Prime Minister, some by the Minister of 
Home Affairs and others by the Law Minister. The Third 
Amendment was piloted by the Minister of Trade and Commerce 
and the Sixth Amendment by the Minister of Finance. It is 
submitted that so far as the introduction of the Bill is con­
cerned, it may be done by any Minister, but for the further 
stages of the Bill, it is the Law Minister who should pilot 
the Bill. Though there is no constitutional requirement that 
a particular Minister should discharge this duty, in view of 
the fact that the Constitution is an organic law and its 
amendment is a serious matter, the Law Minister is supposed to 
be the proper person to hammer out an amendment in a better 
way by reason of his vast knowledge of constitutional law.
In America, Australia and Canada and in most of the countries
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which have written constitutions it is the Minister in charge 
of the legal portfolio who pilots the Bill seeking to amend 
the Constitution. Therefore, it is better if in India a 
convention is established to the effect that constitutional 
amendment Bills are piloted by the Law Minister, except in 
very exceptional circumstances.
Appropriate time for introduction of Bill
It is submitted that a Constitution amending Bill may be 
introduced and considered at any time except at the fag end of 
the session. In India a few amending Bills have been intro­
duced, considered and passed at the end of the session. The 
Members, being tired of debating, are not in a position to give 
as much consideration to the Bill as the constitutional amendment 
requires and deserves. It so happened in the case of the 
Twentieth Amendment that the Members of the Rajya Sabha were to 
consider five or six Bills in the same week along with the 
Amendment Bill and they rightly criticised the Government for 
hustling through a constitutional amendment.
Time allotted for the Bill
Since a constitutional amendment is a very important matter, 
the Business Advisory Committee of the Lok Sabha is supposed 
to allot adequate time to it and no amendment should be effected^ 
without giving sufficient opportunity to the Members for expressing 
their views on it. It would be better if sufficient time is
k76
allowed to pass between the introduction and the consideration 
of the Bill so that the Bill might be discussed in the press 
and the members might have assessed the public opinion on it 
and formed their own opinion after taking into consideration 
all the pros and cons of the measure.
Consideration of Amendment
For the consideration stage, it is suggested that, in 
case the constitutional amendment and the passing of or amendment 
of an ordinary law are related, it is better that the consti­
tutional amendment is considered separately from the ordinary 
law. For instance the Nineteenth Amendment, and the amendment 
to the Representation of People Act, which were related, were 
moved and considered together. Though the matter was undoubtedly 
the same, constitutional propriety requires that the constitutional 
amendment should be considered separately and the constitutional 
change sought to be brought about should be discussed and con­
sidered in reference to its overall effect on the Constitution.
It is important to examine how the amendment is going to affect 
other parts or provisions of the Constitution. It is submitted 
that when an ordinary law and the related constitutional amend­
ment are considered together, the Constitution is relegated to 
the background and it fails to receive adequate attention from 
the Members.
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Joint or Select Committee Stage
It is better to have a joint committee of both Houses to 
report on the amending Bill rather than a select committee of 
either or both Houses. The Second Amendment Bill was referred 
to a Select Committee of the Lok Sabha and when the Bill as 
reported by the Select Committee and passed by the Lok Sabha, 
went to the Rajya Sabha some members legitimately criticised the 
Government for not taking members on the Committee from that 
House. Since then, a Joint Committee has been constituted in 
most of the amendments and it is in the fitness of things that 
this practice be follwed.
The Joint Committee may consider the amending Bill and re­
lated ordinary law together but it is most inconvenient and 
inexpedient to refer two constitutional amending Bills to one 
Joint Committee. The Fifteenth and Sixteenth Amendment Bills 
were referred to one and the same Joint Committee and it was 
found that it was really jumbling too $any matters together.
In spite of the fact that extension of time was given to the 
Joint Committee, its Members felt that the task was too heavy. 
Therefore, in future the Government would do better if only ohe 
constitutional amending Bill is referred to a Joint Committee at 
a time. It is also necessary for good consideration that a 
constitutional amending Bill should not contain many matters.
As far as possible, a separate Bill for each matter should be 
introduced.
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Dependence of Bills
Rule 66 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business 
of the Lok Sabha, 1957, has caused a difficulty in regard to 
the Ninth and Twentieth Amendment Bills. Rule 66 provides 
that when a Bill dep ends upon another Bill, the dependent Bill 
may be introduced in anticipation of the passing of the Bill on 
which it depends but the dependent Bill shall be taken up for 
consideration and passing in the House only after the first Bill 
has been passed by both Houses and assented to by the President. 
When a Constitution amendment Bill and a related ordinary Bill 
are sought to be considered one after another, Rule 66 poses a 
difficulty. In the Ninth Amendment Bill, the Speaker ruled that 
the Bills were not such that one could be said to depend upon 
the other; they depended on each other and, hence, they were 
interdependent. Therefore, Rule 66 was not applicable to them.
In the case of the Nineteenth Amendment Bill, it was contended 
that first the Constitution should be amended and then only the 
other Bill, namely, The Representation of People (Amendment)
Bill 1967 should be passed. The Speaker ruled that the two Bills 
might be taken into consideration together and at the time of 
voting, the Constitution amendment Bill should be voted first.
This difficulty can be got over in either of twovays: first,
Rule 66 may be suspended under Rule 388 of the R.P.C.B. of the 
Lok Sabha; second, Rule 66 itself might be modified to the
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effect that it shall not be applicable to Bills seeking to 
amend the Constitution; otherwise, a strict observance of Rule 
66 might cause delay or even considerable difficulty in regard 
to the validity of the ordinary Act. The point can be illus­
trated by taking the example of the Constitution Nineteenth 
Amending Bill. This Bill sought to amend Art 324 of the 
Constitution so as to take away the jurisdiction of election 
tribunals in cases of doubts or disputes arising out of or 
in connection with elections. The Bill was accompanied by 
another Bill seeking to amend the Representation of People 
Act 1951? which, inter alia, provided that the jurisdiction 
vested in election tribunals under Art 324 shall be vested 
in the High Courts. If the Constitution Amendment Bill was 
passed first and then the Representation of People ( Amend­
ment ) Bill was taken up for consideration in order to comply 
v/ith Rule 66, there is a conceivable difficulty that if 
perchance the latter Bill is not carried, the power in Art 
324 remains neither with the election tribunals nor with the 
election tribunals nor with the High Courts. In case the 
Representation of People Amendment Bill is passed, first 
its validity is questionable since it can be declared as 
unconstitutional because, at the time it is passed, it is 
in conflict with Art 324. It is submitted that the only 
way out of this dilemma is for the President to assent to 
both Bills simultaneously.
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Fixing time for voting
Since an amending Bill requires a special majority at all 
three stages of its passage, Members have to be present at 
the times of voting* In order to inform the members to be 
present at the time of voting, the approximate time for voting 
is usually fixed. The practice of fixing time for voting, 
though convenient to the members, is detrimental to the very 
essence of the debate because some members are enabled to 
r emain away from the House until the time for voting* Thus . 
it becomes possible that some members may come and vote without 
taking any interest in the discussion* It was rightly criti­
cised by an honourable member that the practice of fixing
145time for voting is "wrong11. Therefore, it is better if this
practice is dropped.
Voting clause by clause
Rule 155 of the R.P.C.B. in the Lok Sabha 1957 provides 
that for the purpose of the special majority required by Art 368 
each clause or schedule or clause or schedule as amended shall 
be put to the vote of the House separately. However, the 
Speaker may, with the concurrence of the House, put such clauses 
and / or schedules together to the vote of the House. If any
145. L.S. Debates 3rd series (1966) 10th August Col.3936.
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member requests that any clause or schedule be put to vote
separately, the Speaker shall be bound to put it to vote
separately. This rule has been observed in the Lok Sabha.
But in the Rajya Sabha it seems that there are no rules in this 
~Lh.firespect. While the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Bill
was being voted in the Rajya Sabha, the Chairman intended to 
lump clauses 7 to 9 together and put them to vote. This 
procedure was objected to by an honourable Member and then the 
Chairman put each clause separately. It is submitted that 
each clause should be voted on separately unless the House con­
curs and no Member objects to certain clauses being clubbed 
together for the purposes of voting under Art 368; otherwise 
members are deprived of the chance of distributing their votes 
according to their choice. Supposing, three clauses are put 
to vote together and a certain member intends to vote "yes" 
with regard to one of them and nno" with regard to the other 
two, he cannot apportion his vote in this order. He would 
either have to vote "yes11 or nnoM for all of them.
146. The Chairman observed in the Rajya Sabha that there are 
no rules of the House in regard to voting clause by 
clause.
R.S. Debates (1963) Vol.43, Col.2736.
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Amendments by ordinary majority
Certain changes in regard to scEse of the provisions of 
147the Constitution can be effected by observing an ordinary 
majority and not a special majority under Art 368. It is 
submitted that a Bill bringing about such changes is undoubtedly 
a Bill which amends the Constitution, though such amendments 
are outside the purview of Art 368. Therefore, it is desirable 
that such a Bill is called a Constitution Amendment Bill, even 
though it requires a simple majority to pass it. In respect 
of these Bills, the necessity of observing a special majority 
has been obviated but nevertheless these are constitutional 
amendments and should go by their real name and not under the 
cover of an ordinary Act.
The procedure prescribed in Art 368 has been strictly 
observed in enacting all the twenty-one amendments to the 
Constitution up to date. The above suggestions, if observed, 
might go a step further in improving the amending process.
147. Art 4, Art 169» Sch V, para 7, and Sch VI, para 21.
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS
It is clear from our study that there is a distinction 
between constituent law and ordinary law and the distinction 
is not based upon how each of them is enacted, though some 
difference of procedure is generally found, but it rests 
upon their respective nature. In case of written consti­
tutions the distinction between the two types of laws is crystal 
clear. To know whether a law is nordinary lav/11 or Constituent 
law” , one needs only to ascertain whether it is going to be a 
part of the constitution or not. If the answer is in the 
affirmative it is a "constituent law"; otherwise not. To 
make it clear, constituent law must emerge literally in the 
body of the written constitution. This is so because the de­
marcating line between the two is a mere matter of form.
Applying this test, we have concluded that whatever is enacted 
by Parliament acting under Art 368, is nothing but "constituent 
law". Besides this, law made by Parliament under Art 4 (2),
Art 169 > Sch.V para 7, and Schedule Vi para 21 are of the nature 
of "constituent law" and, hence, these should be called as such.
An attempt has been made to remove the confusion in the
minds ofnany authors and commentators on the Constitution of India,
148who regard a large number of articles of the Constitution as
148. In Chapter V these articles have been studied in the 
necessary details.
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alterable by Parliament by ordinary legislation whereas the 
fact is that none of them is amendable by ordinary legislation.
In other words, these articles are amendable only under Art 368 
with or without ratification, as the case may be. No doub.t 
certain changes can be effected in the operation of these pro­
visions by ordinary legislation but it is totally wrong to 
characterise the changes as amendments of the Constitution. In 
fact, the mechanism underlying these provisions is subtle and 
defies description though we have attempted a description.
The analysis of Art 368 has revealed many significant 
points. We have attempted to answer the question whether 
Ar 368 includes the power to amend or merely contains the pro­
cedure for amendment. As a result of our enquiry, we would 
venture to say that it contains both power as well as procedure 
for amendment. Not only that, the question has been considered 
and it has been submitted that there are no express or implied 
limitations to the power of amendment provided in Art 368. The 
only limitation, if it can be called as such, is that the pro­
cedure prescribed in Art 368 must be complied with.
The problems raised by the Golak Nath decision, namely, 
whether Parliament has or has not power to amend Part III of 
the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the rights 
enshrined therein has been examined in detail and we have reached
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the conclusion that each and every provision of the Constitution 
is amenable to amendment and there is no provision which can 
be said to be unamendable by Parliament acting under Art 368. 
Therefore, there is no need of calling a constituent assembly 
for Amending Part III even when the rights are abridged or 
taken away. Moreover the implications and risks of calling 
such an assembly prove and reinforce the view that the sugges­
tion is not so good as it appears to be.
A layman may dislike the idea that the fundamental rights 
can be taken away or abridged:.by Parliament and, therefore, 
would tend to support the Golak Nath decision whole-heartedly.
In our study, we have attempted to take into consideration a 
large number of arguments and counter-arguments and ultimately 
the propositions laid in Golak Nath turned out to be miscon­
ceived and hazardous. The view taken by the Supreme Court in 
the Sankari Prasad case in this regard is sound and must be 
reverted to in future. The efforts of the Parliament directed 
to circumvent the judicial pronouncement in Golak Nath by 
enacting Mr. Nath Pai!s Bill into law are not only misdirected 
and ineffective but also undesirable. In case, Mr. Nath Pai's 
Bill is passed, it is likely to make the situation worse than 
what it is at present.
The study of the entrenched provisions has revealed a 
number of loop-holes in the entrenchment and these may attract
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litigation in future. We have tried to offer suggestions 
to meet such an eventuality. Most probably, the Supreme 
Court will be called upon to play an effective role in moulding 
the operation of the proviso to Art 368 according to changing 
circumstances. The process of amendment is not easy and it 
will become all the more rigid when a large number of political 
parties assume power in the several states and the centre comes 
to have a coalition government or a government having just a 
bare majority. When the forces of regionalism and localism 
gain strength and the power tends to flow from the centre to 
the states, the Constitution will have to bear great stresses. 
Moreover, as the economic, political and social conditions 
undergo changes, the law in general and the Constitution in 
particular must bend and yield to the demands of the time. If 
the law or the Constitution fail to respond to the required 
changes they would gain nothing but disrespect and disregard. 
Therefore, it is but apt that the Supreme Court should come to 
the rescue of the Consitution and grant it a measure of flexi­
bility as and when required. It is up to the genius and 
sagacity of the Judges of the Supreme Court to rise to the 
occasion and establish the prestige and regard of the Court by 
interpreting the Constitution according to the circumstances and 
conditions so that the country may make progress by leaps and
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bounds in every sphere and be proud of its unity in 
diversity. If the futue can be prophesied at the moment, 
the Supreme Court will do well to remember Abraham Lincoln’s 
words:
"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to
the stormy present;.... As our case is new, so we
must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall 
149ourselves."
As our economic and political conditions indicate 
clearly that the future holds a lot of changes in store for the 
country, it does not require an astrologer to predict that the 
Constitution will be required to be amended time and again. 
Though the Constitution should command respect and regard from 
all, it should be amended if and when the nation needs to 
amend it. After all, the Constitution is not a rope to tie 
down the whole nation; it is a tie to keep the whole nation 
together while it is marching rapidly on the way to material 
progress, intellectual betterment and moral uplift. To 
worship the Constitution as an idol is to make it useless fbr 
the future generations. Amendment of the Constitution is
149* Abraham Lincoln: Message to Congress, 1st December 1862.
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necessary to keep it alive but, at the same time, there
should be amendment only when it is needed in the interest
of the whole country and, as far as possible, it should be
amended rarely. In other words, an amendment should not
be for the sake of amendment only. Samuel Johnson said:
,fSuch is the state of life that none are happy but
by the anticipation of change. The change itself
is nothing. When we have made it the next wish
150is to change again.tt
Therefore, such a wish should be avoided. Not only that, in
case a genuine amendment is required, it should be hammered
out after a good deal of thought and, in particular, its
effects on other parts of the Constitution should be studied
thoroughly. That is why we have reached the conclusion
that a constitutional commission be constituted periodically
and entrusted with the task of suggesting suitable amendments
to the Constitution from time to time and, as we have pointed
151out, it may be asked to discharge other duties also. x
The amending procedure as put in action in effecting 
the twenty-one amendments to the Constitution has been reviewed
150. Samuel Johnson: Rasselas, XLVII, 1759- 
151• See Chapter VII supra.
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and we have given a number of suggestions in regard to it.
In addition to these, we would stress that in ratification, a 
procedure of sending direct communication from the Central 
secretariat to the Secretariate of the legislatures of the 
States should be followed instead of the present procedure of 
transmitting the amendments for ratification through the 
Ministry of Law. When the amendment is ratified, it would 
be beneficial if the names of those States who ratified the 
amendment should be published in the Gazette of India, so 
that the States which favoured or rejected the amendment can 
be ascertained. Since it is not expected in the near future 
that one and the same party will be in power at the Centre as 
well as in most of the States, ratification would be a diffi­
cult matter. Therefore, if a State legislature refuses to 
ratify an amendment, while the bulk of its population favour it, 
the people must be informed of it so that they may think tv/ice 
before returning the party again in the next election.
At the end we would qu&te Walter Bagehot, who said: 
"Progress is only possible in those happy cases where the 
force of legality has gone far enough to bind the nation 
together but not far enough to kill out all varieties
15 p
and destroy nature*s perpetual tendency to change.’* '
152. Walter Bagehot: Physics and Politics.
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